THE MILL NEWS LETTER

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You will notice above that Michael Laine, of the Department of English, Victoria College, has joined John M. Robson in the strenuous pleasures of editing the Mill News Letter. For the present at least, there will be no special division of duties, so letters on any (appropriate) subject may be sent to either editor.

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In 1882, Alexander Bain closed his John Stuart Mill with the suggestion that Spring, 1973, the bicentenary of James Mill's birth, and the centenary of John Stuart Mill's death, would provide an appropriate occasion for "their conjoint influences" to be "finally summed up." The Editorial Committee for the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill has taken up the suggestion (though "finally" is too arrogant), and now announces a Centenary Conference on the two Mills in 1973. A committee is actively planning for the conference, the details of which will be given in subsequent numbers of this News Letter. The editors would welcome all early suggestions about the best form for the conference.

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We should like to include in each number a piece of Milliana, in the form of recorded talks with, views of, or records relating to JSM. Please send us your favourite snippets, entertaining or instructive. We begin the series with Thomas Hardy's recollection, in a letter to The Times in 1906, of having seen Mill during his first election campaign.:

"Sir,

This being the 100th anniversary of J. Stuart Mill's birth, and as writers like Carlyle, Leslie Stephen, and others have held that anything, however imperfect, which affords an idea of a human personage in his actual form and flesh, is of value in respect of him, the few following words on how one of the profoundest thinkers of the last century appeared forty years ago to the man in the street may be worth recording as a footnote to Mr. Morley's admirable estimate of Mill's life and philosophy in your impression of Friday.

It was a day in 1865, about three in the afternoon, during Mill's candidature for Westminster. The hustings had been erected in Covent Garden, near the front of St. Paul's Church; and when I--a young man living in London--drew near to the spot, Mill was speaking. The appearance of the author of the treatise _On Liberty_ (which we students of that date knew almost by heart) was so different from the look of persons who usually address crowds in the open air that it held the attention of people for whom such a gathering in itself had little interest. Yet it was, primarily, that of a man out of place. The religious sincerity of his speech was jarred on by his environment--a group on the hustings who, with few exceptions, did not care to understand him fully, and a crowd below who could not. He stood bareheaded, and his vast pale brow, so thin-skinned as to show the blue veins, sloped back like a stretching upland, and conveyed to the observer a curious sense of perilous exposure. The picture of him as personified earnestness surrounded for the most part by careless curiosity derived an added piquancy--if it can be called such--from the fact that the cameo clearness of his face chanced to be in relief against the blue shadow of a church which, on its transcendental side, his doctrines antagonized. But it would not be right to say that the throng was absolutely unimpressed by his words; it felt that they were weighty, though it did not quite know why.

Your obedient servant,

Thomas Hardy."

(Florence Emily Hardy, _Life of Thomas Hardy_ [London: Macmillan, 1933], II, 118-19.)

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After these notices, this number settles down with an article by James Steintrager on a very large topic, Bentham's religious views. (Professor Steintrager is editing four volumes of Bentham's writings on religion for the _Collected Works_, under the General Editorship of Professor J.H. Burns of University College, London.) Next comes a discussion by John M. Robson of a much smaller topic, the probable influence of Harriet Taylor on JSM's revisions for the 3rd ed. of his _Logic_; then comes an extended query by Harriet R. Holman on Mill and Poe. Two thesis abstracts, a note by D.A. Rohatyn concerning Walter Kaufmann's views on justice, information on recent publications, and a review conclude the number.

MORALITY AND BELIEF:
THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF BENTHAM'S WRITINGS ON RELIGION

James Steintrager

John Stuart Mill testified that the Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion, on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind "was one of the books which by the searching character of its analysis produced the greatest effect" on him.[1] The work, written by George Grote, based on Jeremy Bentham's manuscripts and published under the pseudonym of Philip Beauchamp in 1822, was placed in his hands while still in manuscript and he made a marginal analysis of it. The impact of the book on him was such that he rated its influence next to that of Bentham's Traités de Legislation, no mean praise since Mill claimed that upon reading the Traités he had "become a different being."[2] Although his general reaction to Benthamism affected his later evaluation of the Analysis, he still was able to write in 1854 that "on reading it lately after an interval of many years, I find it to have some of the defects as well as the merits of the Benthamic modes of thought, and to contain, as I now think, many weak arguments, but with a great overbalance of sound ones, and much good material for a more completely philosophic and conclusive treatment of the subject."[3]

Despite Mill's qualified but decided praise, little attention has been given to the Analysis, and even less to Bentham's other writings on religion, either as influences on Mill or on other nineteenth-century thinkers. This remains true although John Robson pointed out some time ago that "work needs to be done on the influence of Bentham's religious views on the two Mills."[4] The mere fact that Bentham's writings on religion are relatively inaccessible, especially since they were not included in John Bowring's edition of Bentham's works, scarcely begins to explain the neglect. Rather a misconception about the origin of his views on religion, and a consequent misconception about the place of those views within his utilitarian system seem the much more likely reasons. Unless these misconceptions are eliminated, it is unlikely that the planned publication of the writings on religion in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham will lead to a revival of interest in this aspect of Bentham's thought.[5]

The orthodox opinion is that Bentham's views on religion were an outgrowth of the battle over "schools for all." Until about 1812, Bentham gave little or no thought to the subject of religion. Then, already embittered by the Establishment's treatment of his Panopticon proposal, his rage was further kindled by what he thought was the Church of England's attempt to prevent the establishment of secular schools. In anger, he took up his pen to attack the Church and, given his characteristic lack of moderation, this attack spilled over into an attack on religion in general. Accordingly the writings on religion are the product of spleen rather than reasoned considerations intended to estimate religion fairly. As the mere polemics of a man crossed in political battle, the products of "a fierce and exceedingly shallow critic of organized religion,"[6] they may be and have been

dismissed out of hand. The origin of the writings, almost by itself, is seen as sufficient to call into question the substance. Even if this genetic interpretation were correct, however, one might have wondered (entirely aside from Mill's testimony) whether the influence of the writings might be considered apart from their substantive merit. Indeed, one might speculate that the very superficiality might have contributed to success in discrediting religion in the popular mind. Be that as it may, even those revisionists who have sought to re-establish the importance and relevance of Bentham's thought have been more than a little embarrassed by what they consider to be the inadequacies of his views on religion. The usually sympathetic Mary Mack, for example, has remarked that "there is probably less light and more heat in Bentham's religious writings than in any other area of his thought."[7] This uncomfortable fact led David Baumgardt to argue that "the extended anti-religious campaign in which Bentham indulged during his later life must count as one of the most short-sighted crusades of this type" and to insist that "Bentham's understanding of religion remains appallingly limited, his very approach to it awkward."[8] Apparently Baumgardt believes that Bentham's views on religion are but a late and thoughtless appendage to his philosophic system and his understanding of ethics. Thus they may be severed and cast aside without hesitation.

An escape from such misconceptions begins when one finds that Bentham's post-1812 polemics on religion were anticipated in writing long before the frustrations which he experienced over the Panopticon scheme, to say nothing of the subsequent struggle over schools for all. Bentham was raised in a gloomy, pessimistic version of the Church of England religion. A sensitive and highly impressionable child, he was terrified by the threat of eternal damnation that was pictured as the likely fate for the great majority of believers, himself included. He wondered whether, given such a painful prospect, it was worth being born. But, he claims, he vowed to make the best of a bad bargain and tried to adhere to the Church's dogma and to be faithful to her moral requirements. He soon discovered that his own efforts were not matched by the clergy, the official exemplars of morality and upholders of dogma. At Westminster School and Oxford University, he found that the clergy readily yielded to temptation, and that they accepted sinecures. The clergy was riddled with moral corruption and, not infrequently, marked by open atheism even in the highest ranks. While the Church Establishment insisted that students swear allegiance to the literal and grammatical sense of the Thirty-Nine Articles, many members of the hierarchy openly declared their own doubts or disbelief. Bentham himself could find no meaning or sense in some of the Articles, while others, particularly the First Article on the Trinity, struck him as contrary to all good sense. His attempt to have the Articles explained to him and his doubts allayed was met with the rebuff that it was not the business of the young to question the wisdom of tradition and the authority of superiors. So it was that in 1763, upon receiving his Bachelor's degree at the age of sixteen, Bentham was compelled to swear his belief in and adherence to the Articles although the oath violated his conscience.[9]

Perhaps overly scrupulous, he was not able to accept such duplicity with the same ease as William Paley, for example, who defended subscription as part of the articles of peace necessary to avoid civil disorder, and who argued that one could take the oath in good conscience even if one doubted or denied the truth of particular Articles.[10]

These early experiences, which unquestionably offended Bentham's strict and perhaps legalistic sense of morality, might never have led him actively to oppose the Church of England. They might well have resulted only in a gradual drift away from the Church. But a convergence of events, far too complicated to sort out in brief compass, led him to reflect more fully on matters of religion and turned him into an enemy of the Church while he was still in his twenties. In 1768 he discovered, probably in one of Priestley's writings, an explicit formulation of the greatest happiness principle, a principle toward which he had been groping and which, as Halévy has demonstrated, was very much in the air.[11] Immediately he set to work on the task which would occupy him for the rest of his life, the task of working out the meaning and consequences of the principle of utility in every corner of law and life. Sooner or later he would have to attend to the Established Church and its impact on law and morality. Baumgardt is wrong in asserting that it was Bentham who "hopelessly confused . . . religious teachings with . . . moral questions."[12] Nor was it Bentham who confounded religious questions with legal matters. The fact of the matter is that religion, morality, and the law were more or less one. They flowed from common sources and together they supported and were administered by one common Political and Religious Establishment.

The inevitable confrontation between Bentham's utilitarianism and the Church Establishment came when an extended controversy over oaths and subscription developed at Oxford and spread to the press and to the Houses of Parliament between 1768 and 1774. Difficult as it is to date with precision Bentham's early manuscripts, it is safe to say that well over a hundred pages belonging to the period of 1772-1774 (and shortly thereafter) examine the problem of oaths, subscription, the status and arguments for an Established Church, and the effect of these upon law and morality.[13] Unordered and fragmentary, these manuscripts anticipate most of the main points which Bentham was to make about the Church in his post-1812 polemics. In general his argument is that subscription is an act of enforced dishonesty which creates habits of servility, timidity, reserve, "an aversion to inquire, a prostration to Authority, and a jealousy of Reason and an indifference to Truth."[14] The Church uses this enforced dishonesty to corrupt the intellectual elite. By corrupting it controls the elite and through the elite it keeps in check the people. Thus the Church's dominance of education and of the substantial patronage of sinecures permits it to protect its position. By debasing the intellectuals, it makes intelligent criticism of the Establishment impossible and, thus, prevents any reforms which might otherwise be beneficial to the nation.[15] All of these themes were subsequently developed by Bentham at great length in the <u>Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism Examined</u>, which was not published until 1817-18. Other early manuscripts also anticipate the central thesis of <u>Not Paul, But Jesus</u>, published in 1823 under the

pseudonym of Gamaliel Smith. In several places Bentham criticizes the asceticism of Christianity, its condemnation or restriction of harmless sensual pleasures (and, in particular, sexual pleasures of all kinds). Asceticism makes Christianity the inevitable enemy of human happiness and, hence, of utilitarian morality.[16]

If Bentham had already set upon the themes that would be developed in his published writings on religion, he had also adopted the singularly irreverent tone which was later to outrage even rather unorthodox religionists.[17] This is particularly true of the one work on religion that he published early (in 1774), his lengthy Preface to his anonymous translation of Voltaire's Le Taureau Blanc. One can scarcely mistake the mocking levity toward Biblical exegesis for anything other than deep-seated scepticism toward the claims of historical Christianity.[18] This ribald blasphemy, read in the light of other evidence, suggests that Mary Mack, who almost alone has paid much attention to Bentham's early views on religion, is cautious in her assessment of his hopes to drive religionists "from their illegitimate invasions of politics and morals back to the more narrow boundaries of religion proper."[19]

Bentham does at times compromise his hostility toward religion by suggesting that a reconciliation between established religion and utilitarian morality is conceivable. This reconciliation would have to be entirely on utilitarian terms.[20] Moreover, despite his occasional ruminations on the potential utility of the religious sanction if freed from traditional religion, the main thrust of his writings is clearly to demonstrate the pernicious effects of religion whether established or not. He expressly argues that neither social order nor morality depends on such weak threads as the fears of punishment threatened by religionists; that increasingly public order is and ought to be supported by the growing public awareness of what constitutes the true interest of the public; that this popular sanction is an enormous improvement over the religious sanction and its pernicious scholastic subtleties. Religion contributes to disorder in society, not order. The characteristic fruits of religion, especially when established, are religious strife, civil wars, and anarchy. Even when religion is not established, it diminishes the greatest happiness since it invariably preaches a restrictive and ascetic morality.[21] All in all it is difficult to see what, if any, useful purpose religion might serve or what the proper boundaries of religion might be, given the arguments Bentham sets forth in these manuscripts. The overwhelming impression, then, which one gets from the manuscripts and from the "Preface" to The White Bull is one of hostility toward religion in any form because religion is an enemy, perhaps the enemy, of genuine morality.

The main force of Bentham's objections to religion are, then, moral ones. There are also arguments from what one might call an epistemological standpoint, although these are not very well developed. For example, Bentham insists on several occasions that religion is based on purported knowledge about the nature of the Diety, and that religious morality is based on a supposition that man can know the will of that Diety. As an empiricist, Bentham denies that such information is available to men, since it transcends human experience. On the other hand, he apparently leaves no room for revelation, and certainly

evaluates revelation by strict empiricist standards. "Religion or if the term pleases better Superstition," then, is based on spurious claims to knowledge and, accordingly, has ignorance as a necessary and central feature of its pretended science.[22]

Bentham opposed religion on moral and on philosophic grounds. He hoped that religion might be discredited in the not too distant future, and that it would disappear or be greatly weakened so as no longer to be a matter for serious consideration: "In an Academy for the Moral Science, Politics, Ethics, and if the time allowed of it, Religion: or rather for the present exclude Religion because not safe to meddle with it: and at length because there will be found to be nothing to meddle with."[23] This hope is also indicated by remarks in his early letters which suggest that he saw himself as part of a general, unstructured movement that included writers like Gibbon and Hume and that hoped to discredit and extirpate religion.[24] Elie Halévy correctly noted that Bentham had been "a free-thinker in the eighteenth century at Lord Lansdowne's, in a circle whose incredulity scandalised Priestley," and that he saw his work as irreligious as early as 1787.[25] In fact, Bentham's free-thinking and incredulity predate his first visit to Lord Lansdowne's Bowood estate by almost a decade, and his hostility toward religion surely went beyond the drawing-room variety that flourished there. A strong opposition to religion was built into the very fibre of his utilitarian system almost from the very beginning in 1768.

If it is true that anti-religious sentiments and atheism were an intricate part of Bentham's utilitarianism long before 1812, then it is more puzzling than ever that his writings prior to the schools-for-all controversy are singularly circumspect, although not altogether silent, on the subject of religion.[26] Certainly he was not merely a drawing-room atheist. Might it nevertheless have been the case that his early views on religion are not essential to his call for a reformed political and moral order? Is it not possible that they are akin to his much debated essays on democratic representation, written around 1790, which Halévy has described as a "logical exercise"?[27] Are they but hypothetical speculations, incidental to his system, ruminations on topics currently being discussed? On the contrary, the evidence suggests that Bentham's well-known habit of "always running from a good scheme to a better"[28] kept him from developing and publishing his views on religion at an earlier time. In addition, it is apparent that the young and middle-aged Bentham was a much more cautious man than the aging radical who ignored Sir Samuel Romilly's warning that the publication of Church-of-Englandism might land him in jail.[29] Halévy noted that in editing the Traités, Dumont modified "the irreligious passages" and "above all, he completely did away with Bentham's long and important reflection on délits religieux, the attack on what Bentham calls catholéisme, the plea for atheism,--reflections which foreshadow the future Analysis of Natural Religion."[30] But characteristically this remark is made in an Appendix and the text of M. Halévy's great work is flawed by several misleading statements that, given Halévy's general caution and reliability, have contributed considerably to the inaccurate assessment of Bentham's views on religion, and to the impression that the writings on religion were the result of the schools-for-all controversy. Halévy suggests that Bentham confused

anti-clericalism with democracy, when it is evident that Bentham was anti-clerical long before he was a democrat.[31] When Bentham finally came to publish his religious opinions he purposely mixed pro-democratic with anti-clerical arguments. The Church and Political Establishment mutually reinforced and supported one another, and neither was notorious for its democratic proclivities.

One must not be misled into supposing that Dumont's suppression of Bentham's irreligious writings was entirely his own doing. As has been suggested, Bentham's life was long marked by considerable caution about his heterodox views on religion and on sexual pleasures (which were related topics for him). He recognized that his opinions on these subjects might be quite offensive to and alienate the support of those who might otherwise be sympathetic to his proposals for secular reform. Indeed, his cautiousness went so far at times that his brother, Samuel, became thoroughly exasperated with his writing, literally between the lines of his letters, in "sympathetic ink" which could only be read by being held up to a candle.[32] Personal idiosyncrasy aside, this caution stemmed from an awareness that he could expect little or no support from the public in any battle against religion. The mass of uneducated men scarcely realized the paralyzing effect of religion on the educated elite, or the way in which religion prevented reforms that would be beneficial to the public. Nor was the educated elite itself sympathetic to reform. Either they had fallen under the sway of religion or, if personally irreligious, they saw the Establishment to which they belonged as a seamless garment which might be destroyed by an attack at any one place. Hence all attacks, all calls for reform must be opposed.[33]

As an old man Bentham claimed that he had been excessively naive as a young reformer. He had expected ready acceptance of the principle of utility and the reforms which flowed from it. "Instead of the universal sympathy, of which I had expected to see these graspings after improvement productive in those higher regions, universal antipathy--antipathy on the part of all parties--was the result: proofs of the fact came in upon me one after another; but sixty years had rolled over my head before I had attained to anything like a clear perception of the cause."[34] The early writings on religion as well as passages in his early letters make it difficult to accept Bentham's recollection. The cause of opposition to reform that he was later to term interest-begotten and office-begotten prejudice is clearly adumbrated at an early time. He was alert to the manner in which the Religious and Political Establishment profited from and was protected by such practices as subscription and the patronage of sinecures. He was aware that reasonable arguments, arguments from utility, would make little headway in overcoming the Establishment's hostility toward change. He knew that the Church leaders would oppose change in any area, however remote from their own particular concerns, because they knew that a change in one area would spawn an atmosphere in favour of change in general. Bentham was caught between thinking that no real reforms would be possible until at least the Established Church was discredited, and fearing that any attack on the Church of England would jeopardize his secular reforms. Surely this predicament was only deepened by the reaction to the French Revolution

which resulted in a much harsher and more repressive attitude toward religious heterodoxy in Great Britain.[35]

Bentham, given his habit of running from one good project to another, needed little cause to put off publishing his opinions on religion. In the years after the French Revolution, he turned to the safer subjects of economics and the Panopticon scheme for prison reform. However, in 1802, he became interested in the subject of evidence while working on suggested reforms for judicial procedure. The staggering masses of manuscript pages that he wrote on judicial procedure and evidence were, of course, edited by John Stuart Mill and published in 1827 as The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, a work that Halévy and Mack consider to be Bentham's most important, and of which John Henry Newman wrote, "Mr. Bentham made a treatise on judicial proofs a covert attack upon the miracles of revelation."[36] Newman's observation is singularly astute since it was in the course of writing on evidence in the decade between 1802-1812 that Bentham turned once more to the subject of religion. This time, however, his concern was epistemological and he examined the evidence for Christianity, the credibility of the Gospels, the evidence for miracles and for natural religion. Manuscripts from this period, supplemented by post-1812 writings, formed the basis for the Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion.[37] In short, in the years immediately preceding the schools-for-all controversy, Bentham began to work on a philosophical critique of the evidence for religion whether natural or revealed. Unquestionably his disappointment over the Panopticon scheme and his bitterness about the Church of England's opposition to schools for all galvanized his longstanding opposition to religion. But his views on religion were settled years before. They were not the mere product of bitterness. Nor was the decision to publish those views solely the product of bitterness and frustration. The publication of the attacks on religion in the years following 1817 corresponds with the decision to publish works such as a Plan of Parliamentary Reform, written in 1809, and to set before the public his reasons for democratic reforms. A confluence of forces seems to have motivated these decisions. Increased agitation for change convinced him that reform suggestions were now likely to receive a sympathetic hearing from the public. The Establishment, on the other hand, using the great bugaboo of Napoleon, was becoming increasingly repressive and intolerant. The activities of the public convinced him that radicalism was not dangerous, that the British common man would sensibly respond to change like his sober Anglo-American cousin and not like the impassioned and anarchic Frenchman. The activities of the Establishment convinced him that traditional British liberties and the happiness of the British people were gravely endangered by civil and religious authorities. His own personal frustration at the hands of the Establishment was certainly an element, but probably it did not rank with his awareness of his growing reputation and, hence, of his importance to any movement for reform. The cautious Bentham was replaced by a bold Bentham with his eyes firmly fixed on the possibility of shaping public opinion and the course of reform.[38]

This suggestion points to a difficulty about Bentham's writings

that needs to be worked out in a more satisfactory manner. What is the nature of Bentham's rhetorical strategy? Who was his audience? Why did he present his arguments in the way that he did? Perhaps the most common criticism of his books on religion is the levity and the extraordinary crudeness with which he sets forth his criticisms. Those who contend that the substantive character of much of what he wrote on religion is superficial, that his criticisms are often niggling and unfair, are surely not entirely wrong. Yet perhaps Bentham consciously planned his attack on religion in this way. Perhaps he was more aware of the tenor of his time than are critics of a more sophisticated era, an era which has become quite used to critiques of religion, indeed so used to them as to ignore them altogether. Perhaps Bentham, who translated a blasphemous and irreverent book by Voltaire when a young man and who added a more blasphemous and irreverent Preface, knew "how mockery came to play so great a role in critique of religion in the Age of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, as Lessing put it, had to laugh orthodoxy out of a position from which it could not be driven by any other means."[39] Ridicule and mockery might not be necessary or successful in convincing deep thinkers of the falsity or inutility of religion. But they might be very successful in discrediting religion in the minds of the general public. In this regard, it is well to keep in mind Coleridge's complaint that this was an age when "all men being supposed able to read, and all readers able to judge, the multitudinous Public, shaped into personal unity by the magic of abstraction, sits nominal despot on the throne of criticism."[40] Nor is it surprising to note that tactics condemned by Coleridge, such as those employed by "Bolingbroke [who] removed love, justice, and choice, from power and intelligence, and yet pretended to have left unimpaired the conviction of a Diety,"[41] are also tactics employed by Bentham.

The suggestion that Bentham employed clever rhetorical strategy in his attacks on religion runs into the following apparently insuperable objection: the style of such books as <u>Church-of-Englandism</u> is so unattractive as to make it unlikely that even a sympathetic reader would see it as very successful propaganda. Certainly the unsympathetic Quarterly Reviewer, while confirming the mocking tone of <u>Church-of-Englandism</u>, was able to dismiss its danger by commenting that "it is fortunate that this book (as we have said) is not at all attractive; it is too obscure to be generally understood, and too ridiculous to be admired; and however mischievous the intention, the tendency will be very innoxious. Of its worst part, the indecent levity with which all that is sacred is treated in it, we have not spoken. These offences must be answered for at a higher tribunal; but we would seriously recommend it to the author to consider, whether the decline of life cannot be better spent than in captiously cavilling at the doctrines of religion, and in profane ridicule of its most holy rites?"[42] The sympathetic Francis Place, editor of <u>Not Paul, But Jesus</u>, also noted regarding the <u>Church-of-Englandism</u> that "this book is calculated to do infinite injury to the Establishment,--it exposed the fraud of the National Society in a masterly manner. [B]ut the sire [i.e., author] and the stile will prevent it being read as much as it ought to be."[43]

However valid these comments may be, they fall short of the mark.

One must consider not only the direct but the indirect influence of Bentham's writings on religion. The Examiner, for example, quoted briefly from the Church-of-Englandism shortly after its appearance, and praised the passage as "one out of a great number of irresistible blows which the powerful mind of Mr. Bentham has struck at the very roots of bigotry and worldliness." It promised "to give extracts, from time to time, from the whole of this admirable work, which will form an era in the history of rational belief."[44] What then of other publications like the Black Dwarf and Morning Chronicle which were more or less under Bentham's influence? Certainly the cause of the book was advanced more by the popular press than by direct sales. This support may explain why Bentham chose to reprint brief sections of the otherwise unwieldy volume. Pamphlets containing the summary statement on the political and moral disorders caused by the Established Church and calling for reform appeared in 1823 and 1825 as Mother Church Relieved by Bleeding. Another edition, with additional material and a new Introduction purporting to be by a "disciple of Mr. Bentham" (although the extant manuscript is in Bentham's hand!), appeared in 1831 as the Book of Church Reform.[45] The section of the work entitled "The Church of England Catechism Examined" (which ran to only 86 pages) appeared separately in 1824 and, again, many years after Bentham's death, in 1868. In the light of these facts it is well to ponder Best's grudging admissions that "it was the force of public opinion that more than any thing else precipitated the crisis in church reform," and that even Conservatives who disliked the political claims made on behalf of public opinion nevertheless "could not help regarding it as in some ways a useful ally" when they tried to remedy the undeniable internal defects of the Church.[46]

The influence of Bentham's writings on religion ought not to be lightly dismissed merely because his views now prove superficial to sophisticated academic minds. Judging from the controversy which surrounded Not Paul, But Jesus, his contemporaries did not ignore the potential influence his work might have. At least four or five rebuttals appeared within the year after Not Paul was published.[47] Curiously enough the Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion, which deeply impressed Mill and which has received the most attention from later students of Bentham, attracted the least public notice at the time of its appearance. Perhaps this was because it was a more serious, less ribald work. Perhaps it was because it appeared only in a limited edition.[48] In any case, what does seem evident is that Bentham's writings on religion may have been more influential than has been recognized, and that they provide one of the turning points between the deistic challenges to religion that grew up during the Enlightenment and the less circumspect, more aggressive attacks on religion that culminated in the "Atheist Mission" in the years after 1840.[49]

Perhaps slightly less than one-half of what Bentham wrote on religion has never appeared in print. To cite but one example, the second and third parts of Not Paul were suppressed by Bowring despite Bentham's wish that they be published after his death.[50] Taken as a whole, the writings make it apparent that Bentham hoped for a future entirely free of religion and that his opposition to religion was

rooted in the inevitable collision between religion and utilitarian morality. Much work remains to be done, then, not only on the influence of Bentham's views on Mill and others but also on the place of his irreligious opinions within utilitarianism. One cannot accept Baumgardt's easy distinction between Bentham's consistent secular utilitarian ethic and his rejection of religion. Hostility toward religion seems to have been intrinsic to utilitarianism as Bentham understood it, and, as he wrote to George Grote, the subject of religion and its influence on human happiness was one of "matchless importance."[51] Bentham's treatment of the subject is of considerable importance itself since it reveals (along with other writings such as the Deontology which Bowring so badly edited) a great deal about Bentham's model for man, and about the tone and the texture of the society in which he thought the greatest happiness of the greatest number would flourish.

NOTES:

[1] Autobiography (N.Y.: Liberal Arts Press, 1957), 46. I should like to thank the Earhart Foundation, The Society for Religion in Higher Education, and the American Philosophical Society for grants which made possible research in Bentham manuscript collections.

[2] Ibid., 44.

[3] Ibid., 46. Mill's first draft is more emphatic in its praise: "It is now many years since I have read it, but it remains in my memory as a most searching & substantial piece of argument, far superior to any other discussion of the subject which I have seen, & abounding in incidental instruction on important collateral topics." The Early Draft of John Stuart Mill's Autobiography, ed. Jack Stillinger (Urbana, Ill., 1961), p. 78, n. 198. Given the dating of the Early Draft, it is apparent that Mill reread the Analysis while preparing the "Utility of Religion" in early 1854. Compare Stillinger's Introduction, pp. 5-11 with John Robson's Textual Introduction to Mill's Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, Collected Works, X (Toronto, 1969), cxxii-cxxix and Mill's comments in the "Utility of Religion," loc. cit., 406.

[4] "John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, with some Observations on James Mill," in Essays in English Literature from the Renaissance to the Victorian Age, ed. Millar MacLure and F.W. Watt (Toronto, 1964), 263.

[5] Bowring's edition of The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols. (Edinburgh, 1838-43) will be cited as Works. The present writer is preparing a four-volume edition of the writings on religion for The Collected Works. See my "Jeremy Bentham's Manuscripts and Writings on the Utility of Religion," American Philosophical Society Year Book 1969 (Philadelphia, 1970), 462-4. Bowring's reason for withholding Bentham's writings on religion is suggested by the following remark: "Many of his writings I have not deemed it safe to give to world, even after his death, so bold and adventurous were some of his speculations. . . ." Autobiographical Recollections, edited with a brief Memoir by Lewin B. Bowring (London, 1877), 339. It is also apparent that Bowring may have been influenced by his own pietistic beliefs. See his Matins and Vespers: with Hymns and Occasional Devotional Pieces

(London, 1823).

[6]G.F.A. Best, Temporal Pillars: Queen Anne's Bounty, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and the Church of England (Cambridge, 1964), 242. See also C.M. Atkinson, Jeremy Bentham: His Life and Work (London, 1905), 210; Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians, 3 vols. (London, 1900), I, 219, 315; and Henry James Burgess, Enterprise in Education (London, 1958), 17-19. It is worth noting that even the unsympathetic Best remarks that "it [is] difficult to take, without a pinch of salt, H.J. Burgess's insistence that the National Society did not originate as a counter-stroke" to the attempt to establish schools free from Church of England dominance (see p. 157, n. 3). Best quotes Robert Southey to the effect that the Bishop of London and the National Society "would cram the children with the Catechism and be very glad, if they could, to teach them nothing else" (see p. 158). Bentham's suspicions of and accusations against the Church in Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism Examined: Preceded by Strictures on the Exclusionary System, as Pursued in the National Society's Schools (London, 1817-18) were not entirely misplaced. See Best, 153-83 and S.C. Carpenter, Church and People: 1789-1889 (London, 1933), especially 55-6.

[7]Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideas, 1748-1792 (London, 1962), 299.

[8]Bentham and the Ethics of Today (N.Y., 1966), 482-3.

[9]Works, X, 10-14, 18-22, 26-45; Mack, 31-56; C.W. Everett, The Education of Jeremy Bentham (N.Y., 1931).

[10]Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy in The Complete Works of William Paley, 4 vols. (London, 1825), II, 134-5, 388-406. See Bentham's comments in the Library of University College (London) Manuscript Collection, Box 5 ff. 9, 17 and Box 96 ff. 269-70, 274, 306. Further references to this collection will be by Box and folio numbers.

[11]Box 14 ff. 360-3 and Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, trans. Mary Morris (Boston, Beacon Press ed., 1955). Also, Mack, 102-3.

[12]Baumgardt, 484, which must be contrasted with Best, 1-9 et passim.

[13]See Box 5 ff. 1-32; Box 73 ff. 90-100; Box 74 ff. 1-25; Box 96 ff. 263-341. References to newspaper stories help to date the manuscripts. See Box 96 ff. 272, 308, 333. W.R. Ward, Georgian Oxford: University Politics in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1958), 239-68 provides an account of the controversy.

[14]Box 96 f. 287. Also Box 96 ff. 269-70, 309; Box 5 ff. 2, 5-6, 11, 14, 18.

[15]Box 96 ff. 263, 316, 320; Box 5 ff. 10, 17, 24, 26.

[16]Box 73 ff. 90-100 and Box 74 ff. 1-25.

[17]See Ben David [pseudonym of John Jones], A Reply to Two Deistical Works entitled "The New Trial of the Witnesses, &c." and Gamaliel Smith's "Not Paul But Jesus" (London, 1824), 1-2.

[18]The White Bull, An Oriental History (London, 1774). See, also, the fragment "Castrations to Mr. B by the Daemon of Socrates," Box 74 ff. 15-17.

[19]Mack, 302 and 297-305 in general.

[20]Box 5 f. 18; Box 96 f. 288; Box 70 ff. 25-7.

[21]Box 5 ff. 18-22, 27; Box 96 ff. 274, 280, 282, 285-6, 291-2, 296-98, 314, 318; and the references in n. 17 *supra*.

[22]Box 71 ff. 40-1 and Box 69 f. 16. Also Box 70 ff. 3, 16, 25-8, 36; Box 96 ff. 111, 120-3, 275, 289; Box 98 ff. 53-6.

[23]Box 96 f. 342.

[24]See remarks in *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, 1752-1780*, ed. Timothy L.S. Sprigge, 2 vols. *The Collected Works* (London, 1968), I, 305; II, 7, 38, 47-8, 76. Further references will be to Sprigge.

[25]Halévy, 291 and 87.

[26]In the light of the argument made in this essay consider the passages in "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," *Works*, I, 14, 52, 56, 58, 63-4, 66.

[27]Halévy, 147-8. See Bentham's essays in Box 126 ff. 1-18; Box 127 ff. 1-19; Box 170 ff. 1-42. These are partly reproduced in Appendices D-G of Mack, 448-66. Compare her interpretation at pp. 416-42 with that of J.H. Burns, "Bentham and the French Revolution," *The Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, XVI (1966), 95-114.

[28]George Wilson's criticism in *Works*, X, 171. Also X, 194-5 for another of Wilson's criticisms of Bentham's failure to employ his talents properly.

[29]*Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly*, edited by his sons. 3 vols. (London, 1840), III, 336-7. Also the letters bound with Francis Place's copy of *Church-of-Englandism* in the British Museum.

[30]Halévy, 520.

[31]*Ibid.*, 294 and 285-96 in general. Halévy also misleads by asserting that in the *Analysis* Bentham "defines religion *a priori*, and looks for the necessary consequences of religion as so defined," p. 292. See Bentham's instructions to George Grote in the British Museum, Add. Mss. 29,806 ff. 1-2.

[32]See Sam's remarks quoted in Sprigge, II, 410, n. 22. Bentham's caution is indicated in Box 74 ff. 4, 21, 23-4; Box 96 f. 266; Sprigge, II, 117, 252, 386; Halévy, 76.

[33]On the masses see Box 96 ff. 263, 266, 297. On the elite see Box 96 ff. 286, 315, 318-9, 322. Bentham's awareness of interest and office-begotten prejudice is indicated in these latter references and in Sprigge, II, 105, 108-10.

[34]*Works*, X, 80.

[35]Carl B. Cone, *The English Jacobins* (N.Y., 1968), especially 96-224; Ursula Henriques, *Religious Toleration in England, 1787-1833* (London, 1961); and Norton Garfinkle, "Science and Religion in England, 1790-1800: The Critical Response to the Works of Erasmus Darwin," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XVI (June, 1955), 376-88.

[36]*On the Scope and Nature of University Education* (London: Everyman's Library, 1915), 77. See Halévy, 383, and Mack, 3 and 22 for their estimates of the *Rationale*. Also Bentham's account in Box 45 ff. 740-7.

[37]The manuscripts for the *Analysis* or rather for the longer work which Bentham intended to call *The Influence of Religion in the Present Life Examined* are in Add. Mss. 29,806-9.

[38]See *Works*, III, 435-622. Also E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (N.Y.: Vintage, 1966), and Joseph Hamburger,

James Mill and the Art of Revolution (New Haven, 1963).

[39]Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion (N.Y., 1965), 143.

[40]"Biographia Literaria," The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, edited by W.G.T. Shedd, 7 vols. (N.Y., 1853), III, 184.

[41]"The Friend," loc. cit., II, 52. The Analysis proceeds very much in the manner Coleridge condemned.

[42]The Quarterly Review, XXI (Jan., 1819), 166-77. The remark is on p. 177.

[43]Add. Mss. 36,623 f. 59.

[44]The Examiner, Sept. 13, 1818. Also Nov. 1, 1818.

[45]The autograph manuscript for the Introduction is in Add. Mss. 33, 551 ff. 307-8 and the reverse sides of ff. 231-8. That Church-of-Englandism was favourably noted in the Black Dwarf and the Morning Chronicle is suggested by Box 174 f. 60.

[46]Best, 240.

[47]See the work cited in n. 17 supra, and Edward W. Grinfield, The Doctrinal Harmony of the New Testament . . . to which is added A Letter to the Author of a Book Entitled 'Not Paul But Jesus' (London, 1824); Rev. T.S. Hughes, A Defense of the Apostle St. Paul against the Accusations of Gamaliel Smith &c. (Cambridge, 1823), and On the Miracles of St. Paul. Being Part II of A Defense &c. (Cambridge, 1824); and D.B. Wells, St. Paul Vindicated . . . A Reply to a Late Publication by Mr. Gamaliel Smith (Cambridge, 1824).

[48]This possibility is suggested in a letter from Harriet Grote to Helen Taylor, August 16, 1873, The Mill-Taylor Collection, XXI ff. 68-9, London School of Economics and Political Science.

[49]F.B. Smith, "The Atheist Mission, 1840-1900," Ideas and Institutions of Victorian Britain, edited by Robert Robson (N.Y., 1967), 205-35.

[50]The manuscripts for the unpublished parts of Not Paul are in Box 74 ff. 35-222 (partly published as an Appendix in C.K. Ogden's edition of The Theory of Legislation [London, 1934]); Box 149; Box 161. On Bentham's hopes that his unpublished material would appear after his death, see his will in Box 155 ff. 23-38.

[51]Bentham's instructions to George Grote, Add. Mss. 29,807 ff. 12-13. Baumgardt's distinction between secular ethics and religion may be seen especially in pp. 82 ff. and 482-8 of his study.

* * * * *

"JOINT AUTHORSHIP" AGAIN: THE EVIDENCE IN THE THIRD EDITION OF MILL'S LOGIC

John M. Robson

Mill's System of Logic, like his Principles of Political Economy, was carefully revised, with a multitude of changes, large and small, occurring in each edition.[1] Study of the variants revealed by collation indicates a variety of factors bearing on individual changes and on

groups of changes, but in the absence of corroborating evidence, explanations of Mill's reasons for altering some parts of his text must remain hypothetical. Nonetheless, a concurrence of hints sometimes makes an inference possible, if far from certain.

The 3rd edition of the Logic provides an interesting case in point. It is fortuitous that, in both the Logic and the Principles, more changes were made for their 3rd editions than for any others. But it is surely not fortuitous that Mill did his most extensive revisions of his two major works in the same period of time, the 3rd edition of the Logic appearing in 1851, the 3rd of the Principles in 1852. One cannot help but remember that the most significant biographical episode in these years was his marriage to Harriet Taylor in the spring of 1851 (after her first husband's death in 1849), and that the early 1850s is the period in which her part in his writings is most evident and demonstrable.[2] While it is virtually certain that Harriet Taylor had no part in the original composition of the Logic,[3] we may infer, knowing what we do of their habits, that they together went through both the Logic and the Principles in 1851 and 1852,[4] giving what they would think of as definitive shape to the two works.

Certain of the variants in the 3rd edition of the Logic support this inference; in particular, those bearing on sexual equality are suggestive. The status of women was very much on their minds in these years: Harriet (with Mill's help) wrote her essay, "On the Enfranchisement of Women"; together they wrote a number of letters and leaders for newspapers on domestic cruelty and crime; and Mill wrote his declaration concerning marriage rights, and his tortured note concerning the validity of their marriage.[5] It might be argued, of course, that variants relating to this theme are Mill's work alone, for he certainly shared his wife's views; but he held them before 1851, when the changes discussed below were made, and my contention is simply that she influenced (or was "joint author") of these variants.

Most of the minor changes to which I refer, easily overlooked among longer and more complicated ones, consist of the substitution, in 1851 for the Logic, and 1852 for the Principles, of "people" or "mankind" for "men," and "a person" for "a man" or "he," in argumentatively neutral contexts. Unlike most other changes of a similarly minor sort, these were quite consistently made throughout both works.

Furthermore, in the first sentence of Section 2 of the important chapter "Of Liberty and Necessity" in the final Book of the Logic,[6] where the objectionable "he" was retained, a footnote was added to the 3rd edition, reading: "The pronoun he is the only one available to express all human beings; none having yet been invented to serve the purpose of designating them generally, without distinguishing them by a characteristic so little worthy of being made the main distinction as that of sex. This is more than a defect in language; tending greatly to prolong the almost universal habit, of thinking and speaking of one-half the human species as the whole." The note is striking enough in itself, but it takes on even more interest when one finds that it was deleted in 1862, after Harriet's death, in the most extensive revision of the Logic made after the 3rd edition.[7]

A few other changes made in 1862 for the 5th edition are also

suggestive. For the 2nd edition, in 1846, just after his break with Auguste Comte (to whose views on women he and Harriet took strong objection), Mill went through the Logic excising or rewriting many of the passages praising Comte's Cours de philosophie positive; in 1862 (and again in 1872) a few of the excisions were reinstated, and some complimentary references added. Probably not much weight should be attached to these later changes, for Comte had died in the meanwhile, and Mill was generally punctilious in heeding the nil nisi maxim; nonetheless one can surmise that it would have been more difficult for him to make the alterations had Harriet been casting a cool eye over the proofs.

The interpretation of another passage[8] is more complicated, involving as it does proof changes between the manuscript and the 1st edition, and two changes in the 5th edition, as well as the major changes in the 3rd. The passage occurs in Mill's chapter on his proposed science of Ethology, in which he cites various problems concerning the determination of laws of "the formation of character." As one example, he refers to interpretations of sexual differences in character. The manuscript reads:

"Women are observed to be different from men in a long series of qualities; but it becomes customary, perhaps, to give them an education more approximating to that of a man, and in the next generation the differences, though still real, are no longer the same.

But if the differences you think you observe between French and English, or between men and women, can be connected with more general laws; if they be such as would naturally flow from the differences of government, former customs, and physical peculiarities in the two nations, and from the physiological differences and diversity of social position in the sexes; then, indeed, the coincidence of the two kinds of evidence justifies us in believing that we have both reasoned rightly and observed rightly."

In the 1st edition the illustration was altered, with the "labouring classes" replacing "women," so that the first sentence cited became: "The labouring classes are observed to be different from the higher in a long series of qualities; but it becomes customary, perhaps, to give them an education more approximating to that of their superiors in stations, and in the next age the differences, though still real, are no longer the same." In the second sentence, "persons of station and persons of no station" replaced "men and women," and "diversities of education, occupations, and social position in the different classes of society" replaced "physiological differences and diversity of position in the sexes."

In the 3rd edition, however, the original illustration was restored, with altered wording. The first sentence now became: "A long list of mental and moral differences are observed, or supposed, to exist between men and women: but at some future, and, it may be hoped, not distant period, equal freedom and an equally independent social position come to be possessed by both, and their differences of character either entirely removed or totally altered." This reading remained through all subsequent editions, except that in 1868 (7th

edition) "entirely" was deleted between "either" and "removed," perhaps simply as redundant.

The revisions of the second sentence in 1851 resulted in the restoration of the manuscript reading, "men and women," a rewriting of the central portion, and the addition of a footnote, so that (with a change from "you think you" to "we think we," made in 1846), the reading in 1851 became: "But if the differences which we think we observe between French and English, or between men and women, can be connected with more general laws; if they be such as might be expected to be produced by the differences of government, former customs, and physical peculiarities in the two nations, and by the diversities of education, occupations, personal independence, social privileges, bodily strength, and nervous sensibility, in the two sexes;* then, indeed, the coincidence of the two kinds of evidence justifies us in believing that we have both reasoned rightly and observed rightly." The footnote read: "*Concerning the physical differences here spoken of, we ought not to omit to notice, that in placing them among the causes which produce differences in mental and moral character, it should by no means be supposed to be implied that they are ultimate causes. Those physical differences may be altogether the effects, as to a very great extent they can be proved to be, of a long course of external circumstances; and neither they, nor the mental and moral attributes which they tend to produce, may be more inevitable or indefeasible than any results of accident." But this was not to remain unaltered; in 1862, once again, there was reconsideration: the wording of the list of sexual diversities was altered, so that "social privileges, bodily strength, and nervous sensibility in the two sexes" became "and social privileges, and whatever original differences there may be in bodily strength and nervous sensibility between the two sexes"--and the footnote was deleted.

Why the change of illustration was made between the manuscript and the 1st edition is not known; it may be noted, however, that the only person, apart from Mill, who can be shown to have influenced the proof changes was Alexander Bain, who found one of his few differences with Mill in just this place.[9] But the main point to be made now is that once again it appears very likely that Harriet influenced the changes in the 3rd edition, and that Mill significantly modified passages concerning sexual equality in 1862, after her death.

One other interesting change in the 3rd edition, not bearing on the question of sexual equality, but possibly reflecting Harriet's influence, deserves mention. It will be recalled that Mill, who early in his career, like the other Philosophic Radicals, was an enthusiastic proponent of the secret ballot, later came to oppose it. In his _Autobiography_, when mentioning his _Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform_ (1859), in which his opposition to the ballot was voiced, he says that Harriet "rather preceded" him in this change of opinion.[10] In the "Early Draft" of the _Autobiography_, in a passage probably written before the end of 1853, he refers to Grote's annual motions for the ballot in the House of Commons, adding that Grote "continued to stick" to the ballot "long after the change of times had made it no longer desirable."[11] These comments enable one to give some weight to a revision in the _Logic_ in 1851. Remarking on the ambiguity in the common phrase "in-

fluence of property,"[12] Mill says that it refers, on the one hand, to "the influence of respect for superior intelligence, or gratitude for ...kind offices," and on the other, to "the influence of fear...of the worst sort of power...." "To confound these two," he adds, "is the standing fallacy of ambiguity brought against those who seek to purify the electoral system from corruption and intimidation." Until the 3rd edition, this sentence was followed by another, reading: "'The influence of property is beneficial:' granted, if the former species of influence and that alone be meant; but conclusions are thence drawn in condemnation of expedients which (like secret voting, for example,) would deprive property of some of its influences, though only of the latter and bad kind."[13] It is difficult to account for this variant on any other ground than that Mill had changed his mind, between 1846 (2nd ed.) and 1851, about the wisdom of the "expedient" of the ballot; the variant may then be cited as another probable witness to Harriet Taylor Mill's influence on the revision of the 3rd edition of the Logic.

NOTES:

[1]The Logic went through eight editions in Mill's lifetime, the 1st in 1843, the 8th in 1872; the Principles through seven, the 1st in 1848, the 7th in 1871. A full collation of the substantive variants in the Principles is given in Vols. II and III of the Collected Works (University of Toronto Press, 1965); the full collation of the Logic will appear in the forthcoming Vols. VII and VIII.

[2]See, for example, Appendix G of the Principles, Collected Works, III, 1026ff., and the newspaper writings listed in Ney MacMinn et al., eds., Bibliography of the Published Writings of John Stuart Mill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1945), 71ff., where Mill uses such phrases as "A joint production, very little of which was mine."

[3]See Jack Stillinger, ed., The Early Draft of John Stuart Mill's Autobiography (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 177, where Mill refers to Harriet's part in his "writings subsequent to the Logic," and Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill (London: Longmans, 1882), where Bain says that Mill "had no sympathy or help from her during perhaps the most intense and exciting work that he ever went through--the composition of the Logic."

[4]It may be noted that this was almost the only period of quiet domesticity they were to enjoy, and one in which Mill published comparatively little, though he began writing some of his most important works then or a little later. It may also be noted that while the sentence cited in the note above from the Early Draft does not appear in the final version of the Autobiography, Mill does in the later version remark that the Logic "owed little to her except in the minuter matters of composition"; this comment, taken with Bain's (and Bain was intimately involved in the original composition of the Logic), would bear out my contention that Harriet influenced the variants in the 3rd edition. See Autobiography (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924), 173.

[5]See F.A. von Hayek, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor (London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), 168, 169-70.

[6] 8th edition (London: Longmans, 1872), II, 424.

[7] The 4th editions of both the Logic and the Principles appeared, relatively little revised, during her lifetime, in 1856 and 1857 respectively: the 5th of the Principles, like the 5th of the Logic, appeared in considerably revised form in 1862.

[8] 8th edition, II, 456; Book VI, Chap. v, Section 3.

[9] See Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill (London: Longmans, 1882), 130-1, and cf. 146-7. Bain's contributions to Mill's Logic will be discussed in the Textual Introduction to Vol. VII of the Collected Works.

[10] Autobiography, 180.

[11] Early Draft, 155; for evidence concerning the dating, see ibid., 6-7.

[12] 8th edition, II, 391; Book V, Chap. vii, Section 1.

[13] At the same time, in the earlier sentence, "our electoral system" became "the electoral system".

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WHAT DID MILL MEAN TO POE?

Harriet R. Holman

This question has never been fully explored. A scholar familiar with both Mill bibliography and the content of John Stuart Mill writings available to Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849) would make a real contribution by applying his special knowledge to what Poe wrote of Mill. Persistence and caution are needed in equal amounts: the scholar must turn every stone, every pebble, every pinch of sand for himself if he is not to perpetuate old errors or find himself in one of the traps Poe laid for the unwary. For I believe that Poe was always ironic when he wrote of Mill, and he played cat-and-mouse with his readers by deliberately neglecting to distinguish between father and son.

A good place to begin would be the references assembled in Burton R. Pollin's Dictionary of Names and Titles in Poe's Collected Works (New York, 1968). The chief exhibit, I suspect, will be the recurring rough references to one Mill or Miller with his mill-horse Bentham occurring especially in the obscure and difficult Eureka, the ironic nature of which is only now being explored. See, for example, G.R. Thompson, "Unity, Death, and Nothingness--Poe's 'Romantic Skepticism,'" PMLA, LXXXV (March, 1970), 297-300. In "Hog, Bacon, Ram, and Other 'Savans' in Eureka: Notes Toward decoding Poe's Encyclopedic Satire," Poe Newsletter, II (October, 1969), 49-55, I have hypothesized that Poe directed his satire against all metaphysicians, especially Transcendentalists; if so, he may have numbered Mill with them, because Mill had softened the doctrine of his father by the addition of feeling. (In Eureka the word feel occurs again and again, with obvious overtones of irony.) There is a possibility that Poe had an anti-Scot bias and--Virginian as he was--included J.S. Mill among the Scottish train. But until these hypotheses have been fully tried by Mill

whether he was defending or attacking it. I try to shed some light on this matter by pointing out that he was at various times talking of three main types of syllogism, although he did not clearly mark where discussion of one ended and that of another began. The three cases are (1) the "hermeneutical" or merely formally valid syllogism, (2) the recapitulatory scientific syllogism which, when represented as a scientific proof, begs the question, and (3) the scientific syllogism, where the conclusion states a fact in accordance with the "formula" given in the major premiss.

In a chapter on Mill's mathematical views, I wish to show that he has indeed made a distinction (apparently unnoticed in his writings) between purely formal and applied mathematics, which renders his oft-challenged position more defensible. Furthermore, there is sufficient justification for his contention that experience is the source of applied mathematics; and it is only by abstraction, extrapolation (with requisite supplements), and selective departure from the empirical base that any other kind of mathematics develops. This interpretation of Mill prompts certain responses to arguments by Green, Frege, Wittgenstein, Barker, Jevons, and Gasking on the nature of mathematics.

A final study attempts to show that Mill's doctrines on modality, essentialism, and proper names are especially immune to the standard criticisms of Quine and others.

If I were to choose the points of greatest interest to the further development of logical theory which emerge from these studies, I would select the suggestions that quantifiers in a formal system can be eliminated in favour of ambiguous names and free variables and that modal logic take account of certain spatial modes.

JOHN STUART MILL AND SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE

C.C.R. Turk

J.S. Mill is taken as a test case of the reality of Coleridge's influence in the early nineteenth century. Mill thought Coleridge "more systematic...than Bentham" in 1834. He had read most of Coleridge's works, and was a close friend of the Coleridgean John Sterling. Mill used Coleridge's ideas from "Church and State," and learnt from Coleridge's eclecticism, his treatment of problems of method in sociology, his aesthetics, and his theology. There is enough evidence to show that Coleridge was an important idealist influence on Mill's thought, and thus that Coleridge's "seminal" influence was a real one, even on Mill.

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A NOTE ON KAUFMANN AND JUSTICE

Dennis Anthony Rohatyn

Walter Kaufmann's "The Origin of Justice" is both stimulating and sprightly.[1] On such an important topic it is a shame that so few prior contributions to the literature are extant. But I fear I must take exception to Kaufmann's interpretation of John Stuart Mill, which is quite unsound.

The problem is simple in scope: in spite of his own best intentions in this direction, Kaufmann is unable to divorce the genetic from the theoretical. Indeed, during the course of his exposition it becomes painfully clear that these are two inseparably bound strands, with mutual influence. As a result, Kaufmann is thrown into the same fix as was Hume in his Dialogues: there the issue was the nominal but (deliberately) unsuccessful attempt to cut off the question of God's "nature" from the one as to whether He exists. This means that at least some of Kaufmann's criticisms of the positions taken up will be inspired by dissatisfaction with the account of justice provided therein, and not (merely) with their validity as historical reconstructions. Confining myself to Mill, I should point to Section IX of Kaufmann's paper (pp. 234-7) as evidence for Kaufmann's own disappointment in Mill's purely philosophical (or ideal) theory of justice. As Kaufmann mentions Mill's "failures" repeatedly, and diligently cites numerous passages which he takes to be "false movés" on Mill's part, the ring is one of serious error, unmistakeably, although Kaufmann does leap quickly--and admirably--to Mill's defence, after having completed the dissection.

Kaufmann's own blunders are as follows: (1) selective quoting, and (2) over-fastidious attention to the letter of Mill's thought. The second is a common irritant in these word-conscious days; Kaufmann can console himself with the reminder that even so prominent a Mill scholar as J.C. Rees has been accused of it, and by an equally astute and perceptive (if anonymous) critic at that.[2] On this subject no more need be said.

The first charge is more serious. I do not agree with Mandelbaum that a comprehensive interpretation of Mill depends on taking all of Mill's published expressions, whether much or little-known, into account;[3] so *a fortiori* I do not hold Kaufmann responsible for such a fault, if it is one, in a survey article which moreover is trying to juggle several balls at once. That would be unfair. But I do blame Kaufmann for injudicious use of the material he presumably did have on hand. For one thing, I did not detect a single reference to *On Liberty*--more's the pity. I shall not carp about Book VI of the *Logic*, or *Representative Government*, or some other things, for that is already to go wading through piles of documents, which in my view is unnecessary, even if under other circumstances any major omission should be looked on with disdain.

This leaves us with *Utilitarianism*, which quite naturally is the text, albeit the sole text, chosen for concentrated study by Kaufmann.

Kaufmann's misfortune in treating this masterpiece is still one of excision, of ideas totally overlooked. I am sure that this happened involuntarily, as a consequence of the desire to hunt (only) for those things bearing on the origin of justice, rather than on justice itself. This is why Kaufmann later on is dismayed about the whole business, and it occurs to him to lament Mill's entire work as "untenable" instead of just the chronological portion on which Kaufmann's gaze was presumably fastened.

To mention the obvious: every student of Mill knows, or ought to, that the most famous thing the master had to say on justice is as follows:

"It appears from what has been said, that *justice* is a *name* for *certain moral requirements*, which, *regarded collectively*, *stand higher* in the scale of *social utility*, and are therefore of *more paramount obligation*, than any others; though particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice. Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to steal or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner. In such cases, as we do not call anything justice which is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By this useful accommodation of language, the character of indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of maintaining that there can be laudable injustice."[4]

This paragraph, which I have quoted *in extenso*, speaks volumes, yet Kaufmann never notices it. Even a snippet would be sufficient for some purposes. To list only a few of those: (A) Mill's theory of obligation; (B) As a corollary to (A), Mill's theory of self-regarding duties, or duties to oneself; (C) Justice in relation to Mill's meta-ethics and axiology; (D) The place and status accorded to rules (*vs.* acts) in decision-theory.

It is safe to say that both (A) and (C) have gone altogether unobserved as elements of Mill's own proper concerns in the field of moral philosophy. So Kaufmann's neglect puts him in good company. (B) has been the subject of occasional glimpses, by Marcus Singer, C.L. Ten, and a number of others, but it has never been emphasized how strongly and directly Mill is attacking Kant and the tradition which emanates from Kant, especially when it comes to (D), where the secondary literature is peppered with high and largely worthless output.[5]

It may interest Kaufmann to know that a good deal of what Mill has to say on the question of rules, principles and maxims (and their exceptions) is anticipated to the fullest in Hume.[6] A comparison between the two writers on a number of central issues suggests itself as a future project that would prove fruitful. I hope that Kaufmann, who has proven himself able and gifted in most respects, will continue to plow on fertile soil, and that he will drink deeply from Chap. v of

Utilitarianism on his next visit. This will content me more than scattered ruminations in a dozen sources. It will also, I expect, satisfy Kaufmann's desire to see adequate description (as in Mill's self-styled etymology) coupled with powerful persuasion, so that the heralded binding force or power of the norm will be able to supply its own "why" to the reader. Without trying to be impish, let me suggest Kaufmann's next title: "The Justification of Justice." That will complete the set.

NOTES:

[1]Walter Kaufmann, "The Origin of Justice," The Review of Metaphysics, 23 (December, 1969), 209-39.

[2]"The Wood and the Trees," Times Literary Supplement, March 10, 1961, 153.

[3]Maurice Mandelbaum, "On Interpreting Mill's Utilitarianism," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 6 (January, 1968), 35-46.

[4]John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (all editions), Ch. v, penultimate paragraph. Italics added.

[5]It ought to be remarked that Mill refers to Kant's Metaphysics of Ethics with profound admiration (Utilitarianism, all editions, 4th paragraph of Ch. i), and moreover deals at length and explicitly with the categorical imperative, in Ch. v.

[6]David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888), 497, 579.

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Winch, Donald, ed. J.S. Mill. Principles of Political Economy. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970. (Not the full text, but only Books IV and V, with Chapters i and ii of Book II, reprinted from the 1871 edition, plus a valuable introductory essay by Donald Winch.)

Forthcoming Publication.

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Review.

John Morley: Liberal Intellectual in Politics. By D.A. Hamer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. Pp. xvi, 412.

Professor Hamer has more information about, and less sympathy with, his subject than any previous writer on John Morley. He has made great use of manuscript collections of material by and about Morley only recently made available to scholars, and has put all students of Morley in his debt by assimilating these large masses of raw material and bringing them to bear on his subject in a lucid and coherent way. It is easy to understand how Mr. Hamer came to believe that by virtue of so much conscientious scholarly work he had earned the tone of condescension with which he treats nearly all the intellectual and practical efforts of Morley's long and diverse career. But I suspect that Hamer's hostility to Morley is less the function of great information than of an intense and currently fashionable dislike of the liberalism of John Stuart Mill, the chief influence on Morley's social and political thought (if not exactly, as Hamer argues, a surrogate father for the young man whose own father was separated from him by religious differences). For Hamer as for many others today it is a truism that to espouse the liberty and individuality defined by Mill is to bring antiquated machinery to the solution of modern problems. Ironically, this objection is almost never made to the ideas of Marx, whose thought was at least as distinctively "mid-Victorian" as Mill's, and whose Communist Manifesto was published in the same year as Principles of Political Economy. Hamer steers clear of Marx, but does find it reassuring to confirm his own criticism of Morley's anachronistic application of mid-Victorian liberalism to late-Victorian politics by invoking Harold Laski's diagnosis that what had gone wrong in Morley's career was that "he was content to stop at J.S. Mill."

The stated theme of the book, implied by its subtitle, is "the interplay between the political ideas and principles of John Morley and the various situations and problems in which he was involved as

a politician." This, it seems to me, is the right and even inevitable theme for any book about the whole of Morley's career. But the drama implicit in this theme loses much of its force if, on the one hand, it is assumed that ideas are never disinterested attempts to find truth, and, on the other, that Morley's preference, at a certain point in his life, of political action to letters was not an attempt to apply liberal ideas to practical affairs, but purely a form of psychotherapy. Morley, according to Hamer, "was an intellectual in politics, not so much because he wished to study the practical application of certain ideas as because he feared the consequences of excessive intellectualism."

Hamer's acerbic treatment of Morley's long concern with Ireland, a concern treated throughout this book as a sick obsession, will provide one illustration of his unwillingness to recognize the existence of a disinterested idea or moral passion. Hamer at first describes Morley's objection to coercive imperialistic policies in Ireland without voicing either approval or disapproval. He proceeds to trace the course by which Morley's plausible argument that no true Liberal could approve of such abominations in Ireland was transformed into the fanatical dogma--inadmissible in itself and impolitic for the Liberal Party--that it was impossible, in Morley's words, to "have liberalism in England without its application to Ireland." Hamer's treatment of Morley's involvement in the Irish problem is objectionable on two counts. He dispassionately reports Morley's principled objections to English policy in Ireland as if they were among the commonplace pieties of the Liberal creed, when in fact Morley deserves credit for reversing a tradition of callous indifference to Ireland that had endured for decades, not only among Morely's fellow men of letters, with the notable exception of Mill, but among Liberal politicians. Morley's elevation of the Irish question into the great issue of English politics is therefore seen by Hamer not primarily as a disinterested act to give the Irish justice, or even as an attempt to return the Liberal Party to its own best traditions but, at various points in the book, as a retreat into one corner of experience due to "an inability to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the whole," as a scapegoat for lack of progress in domestic reform, and even as the instrument of a masochistic urge to destroy his own party.

Of the merits of the Irish question, and particularly of Home Rule, Hamer has little or nothing to say; he seems to believe that an ethical sympathy in a political scientist would be an unpardonable mannerism of style. He is content to trace in detail the destructive effects of Morley's adherence to Home Rule on the Liberal Party, and he quotes with seeming approval Harcourt's remark that Morley had become "nearly incapable of any statesmanship which lies outside the four corners of that distressful and squalid island and . . . incapable of any eyes or any heart except for a handful of two or three million of distracted Irish."

Now, even if it is true that Morley's stubbornness over Ireland damaged his party and retarded certain domestic social reforms, it is also true that to judge his actions solely from this point of view is

to evidence a certain want of historical and even moral imagination. With benign contempt for the pitiable innocence of his subject, Hamer tells us that "Morley believed that there was an element of continuity in the transfer of interest from home rule to anti-imperialism" and that he tried "to create out of imperialism a great moral issue" because he believed that, as he once said, "right and wrong are in the nature of things; they are not words and phrases." In other words, Morley, naive Victorian that he was, still believed in intrinsic values, and political historians who are on their guard against the application of antiquated machinery to the solution of modern problems cannot be too severe with him for this deficiency of insight. Only, when we look at Ireland or at South Africa today, we may have second thoughts about the contemptibleness of the notion that "right and wrong are in the nature of things" and we may recall that Morley's next sentence was: "They are in the nature of things, and if you transgress the laws imposed by the nature of things depend upon it you will pay the penalty."

Many of the criticisms levelled at Morley in this book are, then, the criticisms of someone who seems at times to suppose that the vicissitudes of the Liberal Party are coextensive with those of the human race. But Hamer also has a more purely intellectual objection to Morley on the ground of his "contradictions," and he is adept at discovering them. There is, for example, the logical contradiction between Morley's insistence on the exclusive primacy of the Irish question before 1895 and his heated assertions in 1899 that the Imperialist obsession was diverting the attention of politicians from all questions of domestic reform; there is the inconsistency between his making Ireland always an issue of conscience yet warning against the evil effects of introducing "conscience" into domestic politics. "He seemed to be constantly contradicting himself," says Hamer of the Morley who left letters for politics, yet could never do so absolutely and could never be certain that he had not forsaken his true calling. All of these may indeed be logical contradictions, but life is not logic, and the fact that so many Victorians who moved from letters to politics were guilty of the same "contradiction" may suggest that Hamer has difficulty in accepting even normal complexity of mind. Nowhere does this uneasiness with complexity make itself felt more than in his dealings with the relation between Morley and Mill.

Hamer accuses both men of the blind worship of energy and power, and of "elitism." He adduces as proofs of these charges a smattering of sentences in which Mill and Morley express a preference for energy over impotence, or suggest that some people are brighter, and some ideas truer, than others. If we actually read the texts to which we are directed by Hamer's notes as illustrations of his charge that Morley admired power as an end in itself, we will find that Morley is guilty of this superstitious reverence for energy when he praises Turgot for continuing to strive even while recognizing that the world is not to be transformed in the twinkling of an eye, or when he writes that "Danton instantly discerned that the problem was to preserve revolutionary energy, and still to persuade the insurgent forces to retire once more within their boundaries." Mill is found guilty of

elitism for saying that "the initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals."

To some it must always come as a shock to discover that the great ideas of liberalism were conceived by men and not by angels. But to retaliate upon these men by calling them "elitists" and worshippers of power is surely excessive. "Elitist," we ask, in relation to what or to whom? When we talk of elitism and power worship in Carlyle, for example, we mean the invocation of force both to identify, and then to perpetuate the rule of, elites; and we know what Mill and Morley thought of Carlyle's doctrine of might makes right. Of course Mill admired energy, for he knew that the most impassioned natures have the greatest desire for finding truth and for making it prevail. But he also knew that "strong feelings require a strong intellect to carry them, as more sail requires more ballast." Morley, in his brilliant 1870 essay on Carlyle, held it to be the irony of that writer's career that while inspiriting his readers with an overriding passion for truth and for its application to social problems, his anti-intellectualism helped to discredit "the only instruments by which we can make sure what right is, and that our social action is wise and effective." Because Carlyle held "passionate assertion of the will" to be of higher authority than rational intelligence, his "misdirected and uncontrolled sensibility" ended in "mournful waste of [his] own energy." Morley maintained that this assertion of energy as an end in itself was the reason why, with writers like Carlyle and Rousseau, "we begin with introspection and the eternities, and end in blood and iron." If this be elitism, either let us have more of it or let us be tolerant enough to say that Morley's weakness was that he did not always reach the perfection of his own ideal.

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