Transcript: Thinking differently about the World: Before the West with Prof. Ayse Zarakol

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: [00:00:00] Welcome. In this third episode of Imagining Turkey series, we are hosting Ayşe Zarakol.. Ayşe Hocam, welcome. 

Ayşe Zarakol: Happy to be here. 

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: I'd like to start with actually your contribution. As a group, we have read your amazing book, Before the West, and your entire scholarship, but especially your latest book, Before the West, is written as an intervention to both international relations, theories and to the way somewhat both media and lay people imagine the world in the way we have seen it.

So shall we start with maybe talking about this? What is the intervention you are offering as a maybe simple introduction for today's conversation?

Ayşe Zarakol: Sure. My goal was to, provide, an alternative history,, that people could think with, especially international relations scholars, but in general, social scientists.

Because, you know, for decades, we've [00:01:00] been criticizing, social sciences for being Eurocentric. And these criticisms are well made and in general, I think, well received, so you know, our various fields, are full of, I mean, not necessarily everybody's comments, but there are many people who are looking for alternative ways to think about the world.

But we don't have those alternative accounts yet. And the book came out of my own dissatisfaction with just, criticizing. I thought, I need to, Offer an alternative. As we say in Turkish, you know, putting your hand under under the rock. So that's, that's, that's where the project came from.

So, you know, what's the next step after we've criticized existing accounts for being Eurocentric? So in the book, I'm trying to, offer a history of international relations that doesn't start in Europe, that doesn't start in the West, it starts somewhere else, in this [00:02:00] particular case, Asia, Eurasia, and then tries to, develop a narrative, a connected narrative of Asia, Eurasia, that doesn't privilege any one actor or any one corner of the space, and then connects also with the European narrative, of course.

So that's what I'm trying to do. 

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: It's not in my questions, but, this conversation is taking me to, to another level right now, right at the beginning of your introduction, you kind of try to develop a narrative that decentralizes but also does not necessarily centralize any particular part of the world.

So in my observation People want to centralize themselves to understand others. So how do you kind of navigate through this? How do you gain intelligibility when you are kind of decentralizing every possible potentially nationalist narrative?

Ayşe Zarakol: Um, I mean, it's difficult, so you have to be quite reflexive about it, which is why in the book I also have an epilogue where I consider my own positionality. Am I doing this right? Am I [00:03:00] talking about Eurasia? Am I talking about especially the Turko Mongol, narrative because I'm from Turkey?

So you have to be, I think, quite aware that we all have this tendency, of course, because, you know, what's familiar is more accessible or relatable, as you say. I think the solution is to, to keep the account, whatever account we're developing as, as relational. So, rejecting this identity of imagining, countries or nations or even religions as trans historical because it's never one thing, you know, things change over time as they're exposed to other things, and they're not, not provincialized, the, the narrative and also not get like, too seduced by present day identity divisions and try to imagine maybe the world as it would have been experienced by, the people of the time period you're writing about, but it's difficult.

I agree. 

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: Thank you. It's really exciting. Actually, I was also thinking how. [00:04:00] Not many scholars have actually been offering those alternative readings while it became kind of like almost, as you said, an accepted fact that we are critical. Yes, Eurocentric is problematic. It's reminded me of an anthropological conversation I've been developing in a number of occasions when it comes to decolonizing anthropology. Yes, we understand anthropology is a Eurocentric project, has started as a very European colonial project, and has taken a different direction from there.

But then how are we going to offer some materials for the students so that they can go beyond the Eurocentric theories? And there's an amazing scholar, I really look up to him, Hassan Khaj. And he kind of talks about how certain critiques are enabling certain others are disabling and how do we find the right tone.

And I do find [00:05:00] your scholarship very enabling. So I hope like today's conversation will kind of lead to that angle. 

Ayşe Zarakol: In response to what you said, I mean, the important thing is not to replace one ism with another ism.

Like, so we don't want to get. Eurocentrism and put some other, provincialism in its place. . So you just have to be aware of that danger. 

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: And you do, I remember reading very reflexive parts in your book on, you know, neoism, but also Sinism. 

Ayşe Zarakol: Yeah. You know, privileging Chinese accounts or modern day China, like nationalist Chinese accounts, like, so we just have to be, aware of, you know, where fighting Eurocentrism can sometimes take us in, in terms of present day political projects.

Meryem Zisan Koker: Thank you you explain the rise and fall of multiple world orders from the 13th century to [00:06:00] 18th century. And I'd like to ask what the world order is. In basic sense, can you elaborate on your particular intervention to the term in the international relations literature?

Ayşe Zarakol: Thank you. Uh, I get this question a lot. I define world order as the man made rules, understandings. and institutions that govern and pattern relations between the actors of world politics.

But what I'm really saying like in lay terms is you know, essentially what we call international order now. , , and I distinguish this from structure. So things beyond our control, they're not ordered, uh, but things that's, you know, institutions, rules, uh, norm, the, these things that we create deliberately, even if they don't function in the ways that we create or intend, this is, this is the order part.

Uh, and we call this now international order, but I didn't want to use the word international because what I'm writing about, is a time before nations and [00:07:00] nation states, really. Uh, so what I'm talking about in the book are, orders of houses. I call them great houses. And, so I call them world orders to, , to create a commensurability so we can compare our international order with these other orders, INTERHOUSE orders.

And the, the word that captures both, is world orders, orders with world covering ambitions. It's what I'm getting at.

Hazal Aydin: Um, so, when we were reading your book, we saw that you were, like, using this concept of ontology and ontological fabric quite a lot, and it was something that I, uh, Encountered in your articles as well and which kind of was striking to me, we are actually really interested in delving into this a little bit, both like in broader terms and particularly in relation to Turkey.

So first of all, how do you locate the term ontology in international relations to understand the global relations. [00:08:00] And how does it help us understand the shared histories, interconnectedness and cultural exchanges across geographies that are actually deemed already isolated and completely unrelated in our national imaginations?

And maybe we can tie this to how this concept helps us understand Turkey's positionality in international relations.

Ayşe Zarakol: Thank you. I mean, I suppose I use the word ontology in different ways and different works, but. If I had to summarize, , like, why do I use that word as opposed to some other world? So, referring to what the world is made of, right? What people think is the world is made of. And you can call that, you know, philosophy, habitus, like, religion.

I mean, we have different terms for how people understand and imagine the world. And I'm trying to find a word, I suppose, that captures all of that. So, I mean, in the specific example of Turkey,, you know, it's not enough to say, you know, [00:09:00] it's Islam, it's not enough to say, like, uh, you know, uh, Persianic, uh, ecumenic, it's not enough to say, like, Byzantine influences, right, so it's capturing all sorts of things that come together in unexpected and hybrid ways that kind of shape how people that live in that geography kind of look at and understand the world, I suppose, would be what I'm getting at.

Um, yeah, so that's, that's where I would start, I think. And of course, I mean, we have specific uses for the term in international relations, so we have the concept of ontological security, which refers to You know, while it came out of, international relations for much of 20th century was very focused on physical security, that arguing that countries cared about their physical security, territorial integrity, and then came along, uh, people wanted to say, well, it's [00:10:00] not, security is not just about that.

It's about also who you are, like ontology, like how you know yourself, how you know the world, so certain dynamics that are physically very threatening could be ontologically secure because that's all you know, like, so if you're like, in an abusive relationship, let's say in a domestic household with like your husband, you may be physically threatened.

But because that's all you know, that may be the like you still cannot leave that situation because you're getting some ontological security from it. There is a predictability to it. Uh, similarly countries may be in conflict dyads. They could be physically threatening each other, with like invasion, but they may that the conflict may be ontologically secure because again, they define themselves in relation to this enemy. That's then, you know, helps them make sense of their identity and why they exist. So that's another specific, uh, use of the term, uh, in international relations, and I've written about [00:11:00] ontological security. In relation to, for instance, you know, state, state crimes, historical crimes. Like, why do some states have difficulty apologizing for past crimes?

It doesn't matter that much because it threatens them ontologically. It contradicts how they imagine themselves in the world, their place in the world. Uh, so that sort of thing, yeah. I, I mean, I'm happy to talk more about it, but that's, you know, these are some of the, uh, Uses off of that concept.  

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: i think i will follow this a little bit. further than because i'm Really interested also. Um In the particular way you locate turkey in this interconnected global world and turkey's ontological realities.

Um, and, uh, in different work, you referred to Turkey as ambivalent and, and in another work, I think twice in both of your books, you referred to Turkey also as like liminal. , shall we [00:12:00] discuss this a little bit, further with you?

Ayşe Zarakol: Sure. I mean, so what, uh, creates ontological insecurity? is not, again, fixed in time. So it depends on how categories are organized. Uh, and in, in modernity, you know, especially with, with 19th century onwards, we, what we have is an international order with the West at its center, its core. And, , if you're like in that core, if you find yourself in that core, You tend to be ontologically more secure, like your place in the world, uh, is both higher status and also more, like, clear, like, how, what your place in the world is.

I mean, that doesn't mean everybody, like, every country that the general person would consider Western is ontological. I mean, in some ways, like, nobody can fully achieve, , perfect ontological security, you could still be in the core and have issues, so you, you [00:13:00] never get it, but comparatively speaking, they have it perhaps a little bit easier.

And then, uh, everybody else outside of that core, uh, is ontologically more insecure partly because of, like, status hierarchies, but also because Uh, the other categories, I would say, don't have clear labels. So we, we have the concept West, but then we say non West. You know, it's like always not that, you're like not European.

Right, so like Asia or East or Global South, like these categories are not as, they don't seem to be, As immediately available, or like their substance or like their what's in it is, uh, not as obvious. They don't seem to be as endogenously driven. I mean, not that any of these categories are endogenously generated, but West creates that illusion that it is, So if you're not West, then you're already like your identity is already fuzzier and a bit more uncertain. [00:14:00] Uh, and then if you happen to fall extra middle of West and not West, uh, like if it, it is possible that you could go either way, then that creates even more ontological 

Ayşe Zarakol: uh, insecurity. So for these reasons, you know, one could say, I think Turkey perhaps has more ontological insecurity than other places whose identities are, seem to be more like better, more easily defined, 

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: it's because of this liminality then? 

Ayşe Zarakol: Yeah. Well, but it's not just that , but it adds to it, you know, there are all these other sources as well.

I mean, part of the reason , why I wrote the book. before the West is, I mean, even though the categories are problematic, like when you use the terms West, East, I mean, already you're like reproducing some of these problematic categories. But at the same time, I thought, wouldn't it be, you know, maybe better if the category East had its own history and it wasn't just not [00:15:00] West, or it wasn't just like part of this amorphous, like global South, like the East.

Uh, quote, unquote, has its own history, has its own shared, uh, special dynamics. So, like, trying to kind of prop up that label, that category. Um, uh, and then maybe people, uh, or countries, uh, more easily associate with it because then it's not such a source of insecurity then because it seems to have some shared maybe positive even, not entirely positive obviously, but something substantive maybe as opposed to just a negation of not worse.

No, 

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: it's definitely substantive because it's kind of like, although as anthropologists I've never heard, uh, the, the term or concept ontology to be used to understand nations like international relations, sometimes such a foreign field to us. Right. But it does make the, like when, when I'm reading your work, it always makes sense [00:16:00] to me.

And also like I kind of helps me to think about how these kind of new types of. connectivity is offered by new globalization processes are actually inherently threatening those ontological realities of different nation states as well, kind of, and it explains all these kind of the new political anxieties leading to new types of populisms.

At least that kind of, that's not the topic of your your book at all, but it does give me the substantive, that's what I mean by substantive, it does give me some tools to think further on my own area. 

Hazal Aydin: Yeah, while we were discussing these, uh, like these problematic yet, uh, Their categories of like the East and the West.

Um, I wanted to again to ask a question about Turkey, which has like these competing modernist, let's say, political projects currently that associate Turkey either with Europe [00:17:00] or the West in general, or Asia, the East or the Middle East. Uh, yet as , in this work and in your other work, you, uh, talk about Turkey's ontological insecurity as a state that is, that's coming from being neither Europe nor Asia, and, uh, Turkey's this geographical, historical, political position create this ambivalent self.

So what do you think it would mean to see Turkey's? Heritage or let's say ontology, uh, as both European and Asian or like a synthesis or a blend of that contrary to nationalists or Islamist political imaginations. Can we suggest an alternative ontology for Turkey that would exclude neither or? Maybe it's neither or, or either of them.

So, what do you think? 

Ayşe Zarakol: Yeah, I mean, I guess that's, that's how I try to think about it. So, uh, I mean, the tendency in Turkey is either to over identify with the West and kind of [00:18:00] like erase anything that's like, you know, uh, It gets in the way of that, you know, there's been a lot of experimentation with that, especially in the 20th century, which I've written about in my first book, uh, After Defeat.

Or to, as a reaction to that, you know, kind of idealize like what's not Western, uh, or, you know, thinking like this, you know, what's not Western, you know, maybe what's really associated with Islam or like, like, this is the authentic part of Turkey or like, you know, but in my ideal world, , countries find security ontological security, kind of like people, you know, we kind of have to accept everything that's has led us to this moment, you know, the many different sources of our identity without judgment, you know, in some ways, because like the combination of it is what makes one unique and interesting and, uh, a specific, uh, [00:19:00] actor, , in the world.

Uh, so, when I'm writing about, you know, , in the book, when I'm arguing in Before the West, when I'm, arguing that the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century Didn't care so much about Europe. It was much more oriented towards this competition in that's coming out of Asia like the older Chinggis and sovereignty models, etc.

It's not to say like Europe doesn't matter or Islam doesn't matter It's just here's another vein that's been overlooked and I'm emphasizing it because it's been overlooked like if we could just accept all these myriads of influences Uh because they're all part of the story Again, you know, when I say without judgment, I don't mean to say we cannot have personal preferences as to which of these veins is more preferable, etc.

But it's history, right? It's all, like, whether we like it or not, it's contributed. So we kind of have to embrace, or accept at least, that these are, uh, you know, parts of, uh, the [00:20:00] identity. Uh, of this geography. And then once you accept it, kind of as you, as an individual, if you accept the things that make you who you are, uh, then you're not apologizing for it, or you're not trying to compensate for it.

And that's, uh, You know, as close as I think as we can get to ontological security, if we cannot fully achieve that. 

Hazal Aydin: Yeah, since we've touched upon this, I don't know, the East and associating with the East and associating with Islam or just like focusing on one way in that made you, you, let's say, , so one of the interventions you offer is to lessen the effect of Islam in like analyzing these geographies or these empires.

But in my reading of your book, In your work, you discuss three posthumous houses and their universalist claims of sovereignty in the Eurocentric perspective, like there's this idea that Islam is the common ground and determinant of the political actions and claims of these empires, but you argue that Islam is rather secondary if [00:21:00] it's not like irrelevant in comparison to their shared sovereignty model.

Can you elaborate on this? both through historicity and your critical intervention to the hegemonic understanding of Islam as the sole determinant of political authority in these geographies, in these empires.

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes, the book downplays, the importance of, not so much the importance, but I don't talk about Islam as much as would be expected. . When we, when we generally talk about the Ottoman, , Safavid and the Mughal empires, the traditional way is to refer to them as Islamicate empires, or sometimes gunpowder empires.

But what I'm doing in the book instead is to tell a story where, , I'm saying the way that they were acting, chasing universal sovereignty, the source of this is actually , the most direct influence that's causing this is the Timurid and before that, uh, the Genghisid model, you know, that's where it's coming from.

And I think I will stand by that. , it's, it's not that [00:22:00] these, uh, Islam did not play an important role in these empires, especially in, the general practices of the subjects and so on. But, , the model that I'm delineating in the book, the Chinggiset model, sovereignty model, that's so centralized around, you know, the person of the ruler, where the ruler has, you know, It's essentially unlimited power, including lawmaking power.

That's actually a very old model that we find much more in antiquity. These, you know, godlike rulers, emperors, and then that, that kind of goes away. And I would say one of the reasons it goes away is Islam, but also similar, uh, you know, religions of the book, because they act as a check.

On this type of power, like an earthly person having that much power is actually you know, not allowed, in religion because, you know, power is in the other world, right? It's, it's with Allah, it's with God. So, A [00:23:00] person cannot act as a god, a truly devout person.

So Islam is always a check on this type of limitless empire, one person having so much power. So without the Mongol or Timurid infusion into Islamic geographies, I don't think this model would have made such a strong comeback. It's the hybridization of these two things that produced these empires. And as a result You know, in the 16th century, you have nominally Muslim sultans that are actually putting themselves above everything, above sharia, uh, above, you know, making laws, uh, and that's, that's a bit problematic.

And then later it's checked, like this power is again checked by the ulema and so on. But there is a moment where, you know, that's, uh, they're acting in ways , , That are, uh, that are, uh, in contravention, I think, of, you [00:24:00] know, , the earlier, uh, Islamic model. , so that's what I'm saying. That doesn't mean, you know, again, it's, Islam is not a big part of the story, but I'm kind of pointing to an overlooked angle.

Uh, I mean, it's not always overlooked. It's not like others haven't noticed that before me, but kind of, you know, again, underlining something that doesn't often come up in these discussions, more simplistic discussions of, you know, Secularism versus Islam, like we've lost, you know, kind of, we've flattened all these different sovereign arrangements into like a binary, but there are actually many different influences and sources.

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: And that's amazing. Thank you. 

Meryem Zisan Koker: You've been exploring the concept of sovereignty and linking the conversation on Turkey to your approach to sovereignty.

How does sovereignty evolve in the context of world order for the Ottomans? And, um, where are the Ottomans in this new model you offer?

Ayşe Zarakol: What I'm trying to do in the context of the book, and I suppose [00:25:00] internationalism in general, there's this idea that sovereignty was invented by, by Europeans, that it doesn't really, like, predate The concept doesn't really predate 16th, 17th century, uh, European politics, uh, and I, I'm just against this, uh, all of my research agenda is against this because I think, uh, of course, I mean, the word, like, the particular word, like, the term has its own history in, like, you know, European languages.

But what it captures, you know, this authority, like, ruling arrangement, I think that's one of the most, uh, fundamental dynamics of, you know, political order. And I don't think it's anybody's invention. I mean, that doesn't mean there's always sovereignty, like, there are arrangements also without, you know, a sovereign, uh, you, you'll know, like, uh, David Sneath, who's an anthropologist, who's at also Cambridge, [00:26:00] whose work I use in this book, you know, he's written about headless state and so on.

So, uh, I'm, I'm not saying everything is sovereignty, but what I am saying is, uh, we shouldn't, reserve the term for nation states, which is a particular sovereignty arrangement with a particular history attached to, you know, modernity. We need a broader understanding of what sovereignty is. So I associate it with centralization and centralization of authority.

And if you define it that way, then you find many different sovereignty packages in many different geographies. And. In the book, uh, I'm looking at one particular model that I say was very influential in Eurasia and especially, I mean in Eurasia especially, but also globally from 13th to the 17th century, so much so that I think One could argue, even the European model in some [00:27:00] ways, triggered by its influence.

And the way the Ottomans figure into that story is, I mean, they partly, have this heritage themselves. I think they are like the house of Osman because they also have roots in that geography. But then it's kind of brought back, like reanimated with the influence, especially of like Timur and that competition.

After that point, 15th, 16th century, what we see in the case of Ottomans is kind of an experiment with sovereignty, which, as I say, is, again, very much located in the person of the ruler, uh, you know, most, you know, obvious example being later in the 16th century, Kanuni, like, He's called the lawgiver, like, , when you're reading about that in primary school, like, it seems, like, of course he's the lawgiver.

Why wouldn't he be the lawgiver? But within the Islamic context, [00:28:00] it's actually odd for the Sultan to be the lawgiver. the lawgiver, uh, he shouldn't be making laws at all, right? So it's, it's that, that influence, that particular sovereignty, uh, model, uh, again, hybridized through, with Islam is what we find, uh, in early, uh, early modern era, uh, Ottoman Empire.

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: Thank you. There's a lot to talk about your book has received, , five awards across different areas of social sciences. And it's quite, like, the impact, academic impact is quite high. But when I'm reading, and we were talking about it when we were discussing your book.

With colleagues and with friends, uh, Zisan and Hazal here, that it is a very approachable book also in terms of its language. So , it is addressing lay people, some somewhat educated lay people. , it is designed to be approachable. So I feel like you want to leave a [00:29:00] mark, I think my wrap up question is, would you like to share the positive impact you have envisioned while authoring this book? 

Ayşe Zarakol: Thank you. That's very nice to hear. , I thought about writing it as a trade book for a more like completely general audience, but then it was, Too difficult to do so so it ended up being an academic book That's hopefully written in an accessible way because I think I still had too many academic fights to fight in my head 

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: I really personally find it's very important because now we think we still think Being accessible is just making things open access But if nobody can read it or nobody can understand, but I did see your book when I was in Cambridge.

It's part of this on the window, right? Book, books of the year. And it was there , it was like presented to the public as, as those, you know, liked and enjoyed by the editors, . So, it has another, accessibility. Um, so yeah, that's why I'm very [00:30:00] interested in what you want to accomplish.

I really want to hear, your vision in that. 

Ayşe Zarakol: Yeah, I mean, that's very, that's very important to me. That's always important, especially, uh, with books. I mean, less so in articles, but I, I always, try to write in a way that will maximize the readership. So in this book, I thought, okay, if I can't write a trade book for the, for a general audience, because I'm still attached to my like terms, like sovereignty and my footnotes and so on, , at least maybe I can write in a way that, , other, academics who are not international relations, scholars can read it and enjoy it.

Because, I mean, we all have this issue, but international relations is a particularly bad case of it, because we have like very esoteric debates that nobody else even sees the point of. 

So that's, you know, trying to avoid that as much as possible.

But yeah, I mean, what I was trying to do is. to create this connected history. And then once you put it out there, then others can, you know, read into it what they want to. And of course, I'm relying so much on the works [00:31:00] of, , historians, historical sociologists, or historical anthropologists. But my advantages, , whereas all of those, uh, disciplines, I mean, with the maybe exception of historical sociology, like, uh, really emphasize specializing in a particular time period and place, in international relations, we can kind of move around.

So I thought what I could offer people is an account, , that takes the,, bird's eye view and connects, things that are not time periods and places that are not traditionally connected. But at the same time, of course, , , I want to be, sensitive to, , location as well.

I don't want to completely lose sight of that. , so I thought that's, , what I could offer, you know, uh, this synthesis. , that was my goal.

Dr. Sertaç Sehlikoglu: Thank you very much. We have enjoyed. this tremendously. Thank you for joining us today. Thank you for being an important pillar in the makings of the Imagining Turkey [00:32:00] series. 

Meryem Zisan Koker: Yeah, we appreciate that. We enjoyed the process of reading your book and discussing it and like having this fruitful conversation here with you. And thank you so much for joining us today. 

Hazal Aydin: Thank you. I will just repeat what my colleague said, but I really appreciate that you've made us like an international relations book both in terms of its content, in terms of its writing and approach, I said, okay, I can read international relations, I guess.

So thank you.