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## Governance and the effectiveness of housing policies in Lima

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**Abstract.** The paper analyses how governance affects the effectiveness of housing policies. Understanding governance as a process that involves a wider diversity of public and private actors, the study reflects on the factors that restrict the success of the housing policy in addressing the needs of low – income groups in Lima. The research takes the experience of the homeless organisation *Movimiento de los Sin Techo* and its effort for addressing their housing needs during a specific political and social context in Lima. Through the analysis of the national housing policy framework, spaces of participation, and the strategies that actors employ, the study shows how

the effectiveness of housing policies is constrained due mainly to four factors: a housing policy designed with a top-down approach; the lack of intergovernmental coordination; the lack of institutional capacity; and the lack of accountability in spaces of participation. The paper suggests that the implementation of land management tools as well as the allocation of administrative capacity at the local level, the definition of a clearer institutional framework for intergovernmental cooperation, and the implementation of mechanisms for ensuring accountability are key measures to explore in more detail in order to improve the effectiveness of housing policies in Lima.



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## List of acronyms

- ABC: Savings, subsidy and credit  
ADI: Association of Developers and Real Estate Companies  
AVN: Acquisition of New Homes (subsidy modality)  
CAPECO: Peruvian Chamber of Construction  
CENCA: Urban Development Institute (NGO)  
CSP: Building on own site (subsidy)  
CGTP: Peruvian National Worker's guild  
FMV: Fondo Mi Vivienda (Mi Vivienda Housing Fund)  
JNSHP: Jesus Nazareno Special Housing Project  
MML: Lima's Metropolitan Municipality  
MST: Housing Movement ("Movimiento de los Sin Techo")  
MV: Home improvement (subsidy)  
MVCS: Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation  
PLAM 2035: Lima's spatial development plan



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# 1. Introduction

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Housing policies in the developing world during the last 30 years have gradually moved towards a vision in which the coordination of a broader scope of actors as well as an enhanced role of the local government are essential factors for their effectiveness. The idea of ‘good governance’, a new relation between public, private and civil society actors has echoed this shift. In that sense, this working paper is aimed at analysing the effectiveness of housing policies in Lima from the perspective of governance. The main objective of this research is to understand how governance processes affect the effectiveness of housing policies targeted to benefit low-income sectors. The study analyses what aspects constrain the emergence of a coordinated action that could increase the chances of the poor for accessing housing in Lima. As a way to diagnose the city’s governance processes, the research explores the experience of the homeless movement *Movimiento de los Sin Techo* (MST), as it provides a scenario in which civil society actors, local and national governments interact. For gathering data, the study used semi-structured interviews in Lima with local and national government officials, NGO’s, housing movement’s and construction chamber’s representatives, as well as focus groups with MST’s members<sup>1</sup>. In addition, secondary data was used for the analysis of the results of housing policies.

Chapter two presents a review of the main characteristics of housing policies in the global south since the 80s. This, in order to understand how housing policies have evolved in the past three decades, to highlight what are the current challenges faced and the issues of debate, and to understand the emergence of the trend of ‘good governance’ and decentralisation. Here, the review underlines the socio-economic factors that affect the implementation of decentralisation policies. As this relates to the ability of the state, it was necessary to provide a framework for the analysis of state capacity. In addition, as housing policies have shifted to consider the participation of households and civil society organisations in the decision-making processes, the study introduces a framework for understanding spaces of participation. Subsequently, the chapter distinguishes between two lines of thoughts for the

concept of governance: a normative and a theoretical. The main components of the normative view of governance, as understood in the development discourse, are presented here. Also, based on the theorisation in planning and in urban politics, the focus of the chapter moves to provide concepts for the analysis of governance, which form the analytical framework.

In chapter three, the study presents how housing policies are conceived and managed in Peru, the overall results of the housing programme targeted at low-income sectors (*Techo Propio* programme), the role of the municipalities, and the case of *Movimiento de los Sin Techo*. The rationale of this sequence in the presentation of the case relies on the fact that housing policies in Peru have a top down approach, in which the main roles are those of the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation (MVCS), the Fondo Mi Vivienda (FMV) and the private sector. After presenting how housing policy is organized, the main results for the case of Lima over the last 15 years are analysed. The study then outlines the role that municipalities have and introduces the experience of the MST in their efforts on promoting a pro-poor mechanism for accessing housing, particularly during the period of 2011-2014, when a leftist party had taken office at the local level.

In chapter four, based on the analysis of housing policies and the case of *Movimiento de los Sin Techo*, the study focuses on answering how *governance* is affecting the effectiveness of housing policies. Using the ‘web of institutionalization’ (Levy, 1996) as a diagnosis tool, the presentation of results has been divided according to the national government, local government and civil society levels. In each of them, problems have been identified following the components of the *web*. Finally, chapter five concludes that the lack of alternative mechanisms to ensure the provision of land as a way to increase affordability; an inadequate intergovernmental coordination; the failure of the decentralisation process; the lack of accountability in the spaces of participation; and, contradictions in actors’ visions of urban growth are the factors that limit the effectiveness of housing policies.

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## NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

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1. 14 people were interviewed for the research. The fieldwork took place in Lima during the first week of July 2016.

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## 2. Housing policies, decentralisation and governance in the development discourse

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This chapter starts by providing a review of the housing policies during the 1980s and the subsequent shifts until the beginning of the 21st century. The intention is to provide elements for understanding the main components of housing policies and their challenges. As it will be explained, new forms of governance are considered to be a key component for successful policies, including, for instance, an enhanced role for local governments. Finally, this section reviews related theories of governance in order to provide components for the theoretical framework.

### 2.1 Housing policies in the global south

In the 1980s, ‘non-conventional’ housing policies, characterized by projects of sites-and-services and slum upgrading, were abandoned, not only because of the evident failure of such projects but also the extended debt crisis and the subsequent ‘structural adjustment’ policies contributed to this shift (Fiori et al., 2000; Gilbert, 2007; Wakely, 1988). In coherence with this new context a new set of policies emerged, mainly promoted by the World Bank, aiming at enabling market mechanisms for the provision of housing as a way to promote economic growth. The focus was on institutional reform, deregulation and minimization of the state (Fiori, 2014). In this perspective, the discussion of poverty alleviation lost relevance: it was something that the ‘trickle down’ effect would take care of (Fiori et al., 2000). The focus was now on giving a more active role to the private sector, which was supposed to invest in low-income housing. In this approach, the role of the state was centred in macroeconomic control and in enhancing the finance sector (Wakely, 2014; Jenkins et al., 2007). In theory, the competition in the housing sector would lead to a reduction of the price of units (Gilbert, 2007). The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) promoted a policy of land titling, ideas formulated by De Soto in 1986 (Gilbert, 2002). It was supposed that land titling would increase the chances of low-income groups to access credit, and that the removal of inadequate regulations would confront informality (Ibid). However, land titling did not have the expected results (Gilbert, 2002; Payne et al., 2009).

By the early 1990s structural adjustment policies began to show their limitations, evidenced by the increase in the levels of poverty and inequality (Gilbert, 2007). This mo-

tivated a new shift in housing policies. The scope widened, searching for a more city-wide perspective in policy frameworks (Fiori et al., 2001). Whereas between 1983 and 1988 policies were informed by a retreat of the state in the housing sector, at the beginning of the 90s it was realised that the state had an important role to play in providing broader urban policy frameworks (Pugh, 1997). Previously, the role of the state was understood as one of facilitator (Fiori et al., 2000). The focus was now on “institutional reforms for the unblocking of markets”, which would allow the “alleviation of poverty” (Fiori et al., 2000: 27). The institutional reforms considered the improvement in the management of land markets and the promotion of urban infrastructure, the construction industry, financial systems and urban planning (Fiori et al., 2000; Pugh, 1997). In 1993 the World Bank outlined explicit guidelines of the ‘enabling the market’ approach. The focus was now on the development of property and mortgage finance, rationalisation of subsidies, provision of infrastructure, reduction of regulation, organisation of the construction industry and development of an institutional framework (World Bank, 1993). While in the previous decade the discussion about the relevance of subsidies was not in the agenda, at the beginning of the 90s it was accepted that adequately targeted subsidies were important (Jenkins et al., 2007).

Between 1990 and 1997, the most significant change in housing policies was the move towards a multidimensional approach, which is translated into a multi-sectorial formulation and implementation of policies (Fiori et al., 2000). Fiori et al. (2000:28) suggest that the “focus of *enabling* shifted away from the market and on to the issue of democratisation of the state and empowerment of civil society”. The role of the state was mainly centred in the promotion of decentralized and democratic institutions (Ibid). Pugh (1997) suggests that the role of the state widened. The reform of the state included the development of a “multi-institutional” government, partnerships with NGOs and the private sector, and the enhancement of the financial system (Pugh, 1997:1565).

Thus, at the end of the 90s, a new perspective in housing policies emerged, sometimes referred as the ‘emerging approach’ (Frediani, 2006). The novelty here was the importance given to the relationship between actors, a new understanding of governance in urban development. Fiori et al. (2000:29) suggest that what is new at the end



of the 90s was the “search for a virtuous cycle of synergistic relations” between the different actors. The authors suggest that such policies considered four components: institutional reform of the state, decentralisation, municipalisation, and democratization of institutions and systems of governance at the local level (Ibid). Here, policies and projects were informed by an understanding of a new policy approach to urban poverty, characterized by the following principles (Fiori et al., 2000:16-20):

- “Heterogeneity and sensitivity to the vulnerable”: to understand the poor as heterogeneous, which in terms of policy implies to target subsidies according to the specific need of vulnerable groups;
- “multisectoriality at project, policy and institutional levels”: the coordination of different sectors of public policy to attack urban poverty, which at the same time requires the reform of the state;
- participation, which refers to the inclusion of the poor in decision-making; partnerships, which refers to the creation of “structural mechanisms” for the cooperation between communities, public and private sector organisations and NGOs as a way to generate more alternatives; and devolution, which refers to the transfer of functions to lower levels of governments and civil society organisations as a way to empower them;
- “municipalisation”, referred to the trend of decentralisation motivated by the greater consensus on the importance of local government;
- and “city scale”, which highlights the importance of understanding the impacts of the intervention at a city scale level and the different dimensions that influence the results.

According to Fiori et al. (2001:30), the challenge for the implementation of this new approach “lies on the fact that institutional reforms and the democratisation of institutions (...) are, by definition, time and context specific”. As the authors suggest, the reforms “... are the materialization of concrete power relations and expressions of specific social and political circumstances and processes” (Ibid).

## 2.2 Current trends and debates on housing policy

Housing policies during the 21st century have continued the abovementioned trends. However, various authors recognise that housing is being used mainly as an

instrument of economic policy (Fiori and Santa Rosa, 2014; Wakely, 2014). Thus, housing policies in the 21st century have a double effect in the economic and spatial dynamics of cities: on one side, by being primarily driven by the private sector and supported by mechanisms of state subsidies, those policies are contributing to the commodification of housing (Fiori, 2014); and, by removing the restrictions on land markets, they are indirectly promoting a process of peripheralisation with serious implications in terms of urbanism (Fiori, 2014; Gilbert, 2004). Authors agree that those problems in housing policies are related to issues in the formulation and implementation of land policies (Fiori, 2014; Ferguson et al., 2014; Gilbert, 2009). As suggested by Ferguson et al. (2014: 46), “...the faster the economy and real household incomes raise, the greater the price appreciation of suitable parcels for residential development”.

The response of governments has been to fund mortgages at below market rates as well as direct demand subsidies and provision of free land or at discounted rates for developers in order to create affordable housing (Ibid). Often, these mechanisms have benefited only the middle class and the private sector, while they have been unsuccessful in reaching low-income sectors (Ibid). In other cases, sometimes more successfully, like in Colombia, local governments have created land banks (Gilbert, 2009). International development agencies and scholars have suggested the implementation of land tools to control land in order to increase the affordability of housing (UN-Habitat, 2007; Lipman and Rajack, 2011).

In addition, authors suggest that policies should entail a variety of approaches that include support to non-conventional housing policies (Wakely, 2014). However, they consider that the challenge is to find alternatives to promote approaches such as self-help building or incremental housing but being aware of the implications that those activities have in terms of urban sustainability (Van Lindert et al., 2014). As suggested by Van Lindert et al. (2014:401), incremental housing is most of the time an activity in the periphery of the city and, without assistance, it is very difficult to reach higher densities.

Also, research in the last decade suggests that locally-developed micro financial mechanisms (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005) and the promotion of rental housing (Blanco, 2014; Gilbert, 2007; Wakely, 2014) are key components to consider. Scholars and international development agencies stress the need for new forms of governance in which municipalities are a central implementing actor (Smets et al., 2014; Wakely, 2014; UN-Habitat, 2003). However, warnings emerge about the challenges that the implementation of decentralisation policies imply, due to a lack of institutional capacity at the local level (Gilbert, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2007).

### 2.3 Decentralisation, participation and state capacity

During the 1980s and 1990s the idea of democratic decentralisation gained acceptance in the development discourse (Blair, 2000). Previous attempts of decentralisation were mainly focused on decentralizing the public administration (Ibid). In the new vision, which coincides with the housing reforms at the beginning of the 90s, two components were of pivotal importance: participation and accountability. Through participation, decision-making processes would better reflect the needs of people; at the same time, accountability would be enhanced as a result of citizens taking part in decision making and monitoring the activity of local governments (Ibid).

Rondinelli et al. (1989:77) suggest that the extent to which success in the implementation of decentralisation policies depends on “the existence of, or the ability to create, appropriate political, administrative, organisational and behavioural conditions” (see table 2.1.). This has also been understood as ‘state capacity’ for the implementation of reforms (Jenkins and Smith, 2001). According to Grindle (1996:7; cited in: Jenkins and Smith, 2001), “a capable state is one that exhibits the ability to establish and maintain effective institutional, technical, administrative, and political functions...”. Furthermore, Grindle proposes four indicators to measure state capacity:

- institutional capacity, related to the ability of the state in setting the adequate public policy agenda;
- political capacity, related to the ability for setting the “effective and legitimate channels for societal demand making representation and conflict resolution”;
- administrative capacity, which is “the ability to perform basic administrative functions essential to economic development and social welfare”; and
- technical capacity, which means the “ability to set and manage effective policies”.

Other authors recognize that success in decentralisation depends on managerial aspects (number of agencies, financial issues), intergovernmental relations (central-local relations), the degree of organisation and representation at the civil society level and mechanisms for citizen participation (Devas and Delay, 2006).

Regarding the relation between participation and democracy, authors warn that the creation of new institutional arrangements for participation not necessarily leads to more inclusive political agendas (Gaventa, 2006; Porio, 2012). It is also necessary to consider how power relations are balanced (Ibid). According to Gaventa (2004) it is important to see how spaces for participation are cre-

ated and how different interests are embedded in those spaces. For the analysis of participation, it is more precise to understand those spaces as a “continuum” (Gaventa, 2006: 26-28):

- “closed spaces”: when decisions are taken by a certain number of actors or an elite without consultation;
- “invited spaces”: more open spaces in which citizens can take part; and
- “claimed spaces”: spaces created by the actions of citizens, by challenging authorities or creating alternative spaces by themselves.

**Table 2.1.** Factors affecting implementation of decentralisation. Source: Rondinelli et al. (1989: 58-78) Elaborated by the author.

Factors affecting Implementation	Requirement
Political factors	Political commitment for the transfer of functions
Organisational factors	Adequate allocation of functions in the levels of governments. This requires clear legal frameworks that stipulate: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The relationship between levels of government</li> <li>• The allocation of functions in the government agencies</li> <li>• Roles and tasks of the officials</li> <li>• Procedures for citizen participation</li> </ul>
Behavioural and psychological conditions	Willingness of officials towards decentralisation, sharing authority with citizens
Financial and human resource	Authority for actors to generate financial resources for the acquisition of material and human resources needed

### 2.4 How to understand governance?

Literature on governance distinguishes between two lines of thought: the normative view of the concept commonly referred as ‘good governance’, promoted by development agencies such as the World Bank and UN-Habitat; and the theoretical one, in which governance is seen as an object of study (Pierre, 2005). From now on the chapter considers the implications of the normative view, to then focus on creating a theoretical framework for the study of governance based on an institutionalist perspective.

The normative view of governance is commonly linked to notions like ‘partnerships’, ‘capacity building’ and ‘empowerment’ (UN-Habitat, 2002). In Habitat II (UNCHS, 1996:8), an ‘enabling strategy’ and partnership between the public and private sectors, between governments and civil society organisations, and between CBOs and NGOs were the approaches considered fundamental for sustainability and the improvement of living conditions. Habitat II (1996:89) also stressed the importance of increasing the “capacity of all levels of government” and civil society organisations. Empowerment for civil society organisations was understood as a result of participation in decision-making processes, in which accountability and transparency were the mechanisms to ensure a balanced distribution of benefits (Ibid).

**Table 2.2.** Principles of ‘good governance’. Source: UN-HABITAT (2003) Elaborated by the author.

Sustainability: the balance of economic, social and environmental impact
Subsidiarity: the transfer of the responsibility to the closest appropriate level
Equity of access to decision making processes and basic needs
Efficiency in the delivery of public services and in promoting local economic development
Transparency and accountability of decision makers and stakeholders
Civic engagement and citizenship
Security of individuals and their living environment

In the context of the promotion of ‘good governance’ in the 90s, scholars paid attention to the definitions of governance in order to overcome its common association with the concept of government (McCarney, 1996; Abbot, 1997). Thus, McCarney (1996) defined governance as “the relationship between civil society and the state, between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed”, which allowed to include other actors (civic and private) in the “public policy process” (Halfani, McCarney and Rodriguez, 1995:95-96; cited in McCarney, 1996). The discussion at this point was focused on un-

derstanding governance in urban contexts in the developing world, which meant understanding the implications it had for the relation between local governments and civil society. According to Abbot (1997:7), “the value of governance as a concept is that it establishes the principle that political decision-making is a shared process, which involves both the state and organs of civil society”. In that sense, Abbot (1997:4) suggested that a practical view of ‘good governance’ should have to include the “complementary construct” of “community participation”. This means to merge community participation with “administrative mechanisms of the state” (Abbot, 1997:8). In Abbot’s (1997) understanding, a practical view of governance has to consider the creation of organisational structures at the local level suitable for the inclusion of community participation, the creation of legally binding mechanisms for accountability, and the provision of resources needed for increasing the capacity of civil society.

Jenkins et al. (2007: 184) criticise the normative view of governance: “... the reality is that power relations, whether at local or global level, will tend to reproduce themselves to their own benefit ...”. In other words, the critique is that the approach can be seen as power-relations blind. Agendas are embedded of interests, and not necessarily the implementation of the principles of ‘good governance’ leads to better scenarios.

A theoretical construct of governance requires an awareness of power relations, and an institutionalist approach can help to overcome that limitation. Pierre (2011:20) defines governance as the “processes through which public and private resources are coordinated in the pursuit of collective interests”. According to Pierre (2011:3) “governance, unlike government, looks at the interplay between state and society and the state to which collective projects can be achieved through a joint public and private mobilisation of resources”. To understand governance, in this view, one should ask: “what norms and objectives guide local authorities?”; “which political, social and economic actors have defined those objectives?”; “who benefits from them?”; and “to what extent have those norms and goals become institutionalized at the local level of the political system?” (Pierre, 2011:16). Understanding governance means, in this view, understanding “how a city is governed and the political goals that a city sets for itself” (Pierre, 2011:138).

In addition, concepts formulated in Strategic Action Planning<sup>2</sup> can complement this theoretical construct of governance. From an urban planning perspective, through the lens of an institutionalist approach, governance is understood as “the management of the common affairs of political communities” (Healey, 2006:59). Healey (2006:58-59) suggests that the spatial planning efforts can be seen as an “example of governance activ-

ity”, which are aimed at “transforming” or sustaining “relational webs”. From this perspective, other authors have proposed analytical tools that can help to understand “relational social dynamics” (Ibid). Thus, the “web of institutionalisation<sup>3</sup>” proposed by Levy (1996:4) stands as a useful instrument for analysing relational social dynamics or *situations* and for opening possibilities of change, or to expand the “room for manoeuvre”. It builds upon an institutionalist understanding of the agency-structure relationship: it accepts the idea that “the context may shape what [people] can do, but how [people] respond help to shape the context too” (Healey, 2006:70).

A closer look at the notion of “room for manoeuvre” (Levy, 2015; Safier, 2002) reveals a ‘tripartite’ approach to social justice composed of *redistribution, recognition and parity of participation*<sup>4</sup>. This implies that social justice requires the elimination of material and discursive practices that reproduce inequalities, as well as ensuring equal and respectful conditions for participation (Levy, 2015:159-160). In that sense, theory developed in Strategic Action Planning provides mechanisms to formulate strategies aimed at the institutionalisation of social justice. At the same time, the principles that orient such theories can be used as a framework to analyse specific contexts (Levy 2007). Those approaches build upon a reframed understanding of what ‘strategic’ implies. Healey (2009:440) understands the notion of ‘strategic’ as “both integrative and as geared to efforts to change direction, to open new possibilities and potentials, and to move away from previous positions”.

Collective Strategic Action Planning considers this notion of ‘strategic’ and provides three indicators of the extent to what specific planning activities are ‘strategically’ performed (Levy, 2007): *synergy, multiplier effect* and the *expansion of room for manoeuvre* (Ibid). *Synergy* implies an exponential combination of the forces of civil society organisations and public and private actors. It is composed of “formal strategy-making components”, which are summarised in table 2.3 (Levy, 2007:3). The concept of *multiplier effect* refers to the creation of an extended “impact on the material and institutional dimensions of social justice” (Levy, 1996:3). Finally, the “expansion of room for manoeuvre” (Levy, 2015) implies the extent to what an institutional setting can be modified in order to reach social justice.

In conclusion, the concepts of Strategic Action Planning can be used as a diagnosis tool for analysing the extent to which, in urban contexts, actions are performed collectively and strategically. Being rooted in the concept of social justice, those concepts complement Pierre’s (2011) view of governance and help to be aware of unbalanced power relations and the extent to which the benefits of planning activity are equally distributed. In the following section, the analytical framework is built based on such theories.

**Table 2.3.** Strategy making components of synergy. Based on Levy (2007:4-12). Created by the author.

Strategy-making components of synergy	Refers to
Collective intent	A shared and clear vision of what is pursued. It implies the formulation of a reframing diagnosis for challenging dominant discourses about power relations. It seeks to impact governance structures.
Precedent setting	The demonstration of the viability of strategies implemented, in a way that can be replicated or adapted in other contexts.
Development of organisational and institutional capacity	The creation of more equal and robust relationships between poor communities and other civil society actors, governments and the private sector.
Dialogue and advocacy	Setting of mechanisms to communicate between actors in order to understand problems from different perspectives.
Public learning	The knowledge resulted from the planning experiences.

## 2.5 Analytical framework

As discussed, housing policies in the last 30 years have gradually moved towards approaches in which decentralisation and the participation of more actors are central components. Thus, the emergence of the concept of ‘good governance’ in the last decades echoes this new context. It implies the search of a new relationship between actors that can be effective for improving living conditions of the poor.

This research sheds lights over the conditions in which a greater number of actors are supposed to be involved. From an institutionalist understanding of governance, the study looks at the interplay between structure and agency (Healey, 2006). This implies to pay attention to how actors perform their roles in specific contexts. This perspective accepts that structures imply a certain degree of “room for manoeuvre” for agents, but at the same time agents can shape ‘structures’ and expand the “room for manoeuvre” (Levy, 2015).

As the purpose of this study requires to track decision-making at different levels, Pierre’s (2011) definition of *governance* stands as a useful concept as it refers to governance as a process in which a collective ac-

tion is implied. Thus, *governance* is understood as the “processes through which public and private resources are coordinated in the pursuit of collective interests” (Pierre, 2011:20). This requires looking at the conditions that contribute to or restrict the emergence of collective interests. For this, concepts developed in strategic action planning stand as a useful complement for the analysis of processes.

The main question of this research is the following: how is governance affecting the effectiveness of housing policies? To answer this question, it is necessary to look at the following elements:

1. Policy frameworks: what are the policy frameworks in which actors intervene? What processes and relations imply those frameworks? The review

of housing policies at the beginning of this chapter provides a wider framework to understand the context for the case here presented. To diagnose processes, the ‘web of institutionalisation’ (Levy, 1996) stands as a useful tool.

2. Spaces of participation: what are the spaces of participation and how are they created? For the analysis of the spaces of participation, the ‘continuum of spaces’ (Gaventa, 2006) provides relevant categories.
3. What are the strategies that actors employ in order to expand the ‘room for manoeuvre’? The ‘web’ (Levy, 1996) and the principles of collective action (Levy, 2015) provide relevant elements to diagnose and analyse the response of actors.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

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1. Habitat II was the second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements that took place in Istanbul in 1996.
2. In the academic literature, 'Strategic Action Planning' has emerged as a planning approach that entails a more active role of civil-society groups and citizens in the production of the city. In the last decade, authors such as Albrechts (2012),

Healy (2009), and Levy (2007) have tried to outline principles for this approach, using the experiences of civil-society groups in the global south and reframing concepts of previous planning theory.

3. The web is composed of 13 elements (see Appendix 1)
4. Levy takes this idea from Fraser (1998)

### 3. Housing policies, decentralisation and governance in the development discourse

In 2001, a new policy framework gave the Peruvian state a role of facilitator in the provision of housing (Calderón, 2012; Fernández Maldonado, 2010) and in 2006, the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation (MVCS) established the National Housing Plan<sup>1</sup> ‘Housing for everyone’ (NHP), which was approved for the period of 2006-2015. It considered that ‘living conditions’ could be improved at the same time than housing could serve as a factor of economic development (MVCS, 2006:44). The main characteristics of this housing policy framework are here presented.

#### 3.1 The housing policy: role of national level agencies


Two actors in housing policy became central: the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation (MVCS) and Fondo Mi Vivienda (FMV). MVCS is responsible for defining the principles of housing policy and for designing the subsidies policy. In 2002, the MVCS initiated a new policy framework that consisted on an ABC scheme (savings-subsidy-credit). Such mechanism implies that beneficiaries have to demonstrate they can save a certain amount; then, subsidies are provided by the state in order to increase the opportunity of the beneficiaries in accessing the housing market; finally, beneficiaries access credit through a private financial company that provides them with the rest of the funds for purchasing or building their houses (Fernandez-Maldonado, 2014) (see figure 3.1.).

The FMV is a second-tier finance public bank that operates as a private entity in the financial market. The FMV’s official objectives are the “promotion and financing for the acquisition, improvement and construction of social housing” (FMV, 2016). FMV is in charge of the implementation of the ABC scheme. Since 2002, two types of ABC schemes are implemented: *Mivivienda* credit, which targets the middle class, and *Techo Propio* programme, which targets low-income sectors (Fernandez-Maldonado, 2014). The *Techo Propio* programme consists on a subsidy, which is provided for households with a monthly income lower than US\$ 565. The amount of subsidy has varied over the last 15 years (see table 3.1.)

#### Results of the housing policy

During the last 15 years, the housing policy has not been successful in addressing the housing needs of the low-income sectors (Calderón, 2012; Fernandez Maldonado,

**Figure 3.1.** Functioning of the subsidy mechanism. Elaborated by the author<sup>2</sup>



**Mechanism of the subsidy**

1. The MVCS stipulates the subsidy policy. For the case of *Techo Propio* it stipulates the amount of the subsidy, the amount of the required savings and the top price of the house that can be built or bought by the beneficiaries with the subsidy (see table 3.2);
2. Once beneficiaries are registered in the *Techo Propio* programme they get a voucher (document) as a proof of having the subsidy.
3. Once beneficiaries have chosen a house from one of the developers (for AVN modality) or have hired a contractor (for CSP & MV modality), the FMV pays the money of the subsidy to developers and contractors. Beneficiaries do not receive money. For the rest of the cost of the house, beneficiaries can access to mortgages from a private financial institution.
4. In order to increase the capacity of financial institutions to lend money, the FMV delivers credits to financial institutions for a period of 20 years. It also works as a ‘guarantor’ for financial institutions in *Techo Propio* and *Mivivienda* credit: in case mortgage is not paid to financial institutions, the FMV covers between 1/3 and 2/3 of each credit.

\$=subsidy // \$=credit/loan

2014). The total number of credits provided by *Techo Propio* in Lima over the last 15 years reaches a modest number of 27,919 (*Fondo Mi Vivienda*, 2016)<sup>4</sup>. The PLAM 2035 (IMP, 2014) identified that the housing deficit in low-income sectors by 2014 was 109,567 houses<sup>5</sup>. In that sense, if we consider the 27,919 housing subsidies delivered by *Techo Propio*, this programme in its three modalities during the last 15 years has only addressed around 25% of the housing deficit in low-income sectors<sup>6</sup>.

**Table 3.1.** Table 3.2: Modalities of the Techo Propio Programme<sup>3</sup>. Source: Diario El Peruano. Elaborated by the author.

Modality (abbrev. in Spanish)	Consists on...	Maximum amount of subsidy provided		For a house or improvement of a maximum price of	
		2002	2016	2002	2016
<b>AVN:</b> acquisition of new homes	Subsidy for the acquisition of new houses for beneficiaries that do not own a house or plot	3600	10360	8000	25900
<b>CSP:</b> building on own site	Subsidy for building houses for beneficiaries who own plots	2800	5625	8000	16983
<b>MV:</b> home improvement	Subsidy for beneficiaries who own a house and would like to improve it.	1200	2790	8000	3032



Nonetheless, the housing policy has been successful in reaching the demand of the middle class (see graph 3.1) and in reactivating the construction industry (Calderón, 2012; Fernandez Maldonado, 2010). But the reactivation of the economy has generated the collateral effect of increasing land prices (Calderón, 2012). According to CAPECO (in: IMP, 2013) land prices between 2003 and 2013 have increased 839%.

Representatives from MVCS declare that the reason *Techo Propio* fails is due to lack of land in Lima, as it often has legal problems, most of it is private and its price hinders the engagement of the private sector. According to CAPECO's representatives, although there are legal complexities for obtaining land, the main reason reported is the inability of the state to develop alternative land management tools for the involvement of the private sector and to provide water and sanitation infrastructure.

The response of the state has followed two strategies at different moments: subsidising developers through selling land, commonly in the periphery, at lower-than-market prices for the development of housing projects; and

increasing the amount of subsidy provided to households in each modality (i.e. in comparison with 2002, the amount of the subsidy for the AVN modality has been tripled by 2016 - see table 3.2.) (Calderón, 2012; Fernandez Maldonado, 2014). However, none of those actions has increased the provision of housing for low-income sectors. In 2015, the unsatisfied demand of housing in Lima was 435,129 (CAPECO, 2015). The 35,71% of unsatisfied demand accounted for houses priced under US\$ 30,000 (Ibid), which is the price that the AVN modality of *Techo Propio* works with (US\$ 25 900) (see table 3.2.), but the number of houses offered by the private sector in Lima for less than US\$ 30 000 was only 103 (Ibid).

As a result, low-income population has continued accessing housing in the periphery of the city through the informal market and mostly using incremental building (Fernandez Maldonado, 2010; Calderón, 2009; BBVA, 2011). The relative success of the CSP modality, in comparison with the other two (see graph 3.2), is coherent with this fact: dwellers are building their own houses in their own plots. Specialists suggest that, to overcome those challenges, it is necessary to enhance coordination

**Graph 3.1.** Mi Vivienda products Vs. Techo Propio subsidies in Lima. Source: Fondo Mi Vivienda (2016). Elaborated by the author.**Graph 3.2.** Techo Propio subsidies by modality in Lima. Source: Fondo Mi Vivienda (2016). Elaborated by the author.

between housing policies and local governments, create land value capture mechanisms, and provide additional support for incremental housing and financial mechanisms (Fernandez-Maldonado, 2014).

### 3.2 The role of Lima's Municipality (MML) in the provision of housing

To understand the role of the municipality in housing it is necessary to look at the laws that regulate its activity. Three laws are key:

1. in 2002, the law #27680 ('Decentralisation constitutional reform law') devolved functions to municipalities, such as the management of their own revenue, the implementation of development plans, and responsibilities in the provision of housing, water and sanitation, transportation and security. Also, this law provided a more democratic framework for the activity of the state, considering civic participation as key for development.
2. in 2002, the law #27783 ('Principles of decentralisation process') established the principles of the decentralisation process; the functions of the regional governments and the way functions and resources are devolved from the national government to the regional, provincial and district governments.
3. in 2004, the "Organic law of municipalities" (law #27792), which established the following important aspects in relation to MML:
  - a. The MML is responsible for defining the way land is used -zoning- and determine the urban expansion areas (...) (Law #27792; Chapter IV, Article 161).
  - b. The MML is responsible for designing and promoting the "implementation of municipal housing programmes for low-income sectors" (Ibid).
  - c. It regulated the structure of the MML. According to this law, there are three main bodies within the MML:
    - i. The council (representative body): composed of the mayor and the councillors
    - ii. The municipality (executive body), composed of the mayor (official representative) and the administrative arm of the municipality
    - iii. The Metropolitan Assembly (consultant and coordination body), which is composed of the mayor, the 43 district mayors, and civil society representatives of Lima province. This is the participatory space of the municipality.

However, despite the fact that these laws have established the devolution of functions, the transfer of functions has not been completed. At the same time, although the

legal framework since 2004 stipulates that municipalities can implement social housing programmes, the MML had not formulated an operational framework for developing those types of programmes until recently. As it will be described in the following sections, this was a result of the interaction between *Movimiento de los Sin Techo* and the municipality.

### 3.3 The case of Movimiento de los Sin Techo

The purpose of introducing this case is to provide an example of the limitations found in *governance* in Lima and of the current housing policy framework. The case will be analysed in more detail in chapter 4.

#### Stage 1. Creation of the movement

The history of *Movimiento de los Sin Techo* started in 2001. It emerged as a campaign, promoted by Ruben Flores, to claim for more affordable mechanisms for accessing housing. The campaign adhered more than 4 thousand people and became a movement. In the same year it achieved a negotiation table with the government, although nine months later, negotiations stopped. The government's view was that *Techo Propio* programme could be an alternative for them but the MST found it inadequate.

MST continued campaigning and developing partnerships with other groups that were also fighting for more inclusive policies, such as the CGTP (Peruvian National Worker's guild). However, the housing policies did not change in the following years and land prices rose. They attempted to negotiate with the government but without any significant achievement.

**Box 3.1.** Main components of the housing law proposal for low-income groups (Parliament). Source: Congreso de la República (2013)

- Municipalities shall design and promote municipal housing programmes.
- The MVCS shall provide technical assistance to local governments for the creation of municipal housing funds.
- The transfer of land from the MVCS to the municipalities for the creation of land banks.
- The creation of an intergovernmental commission in which the MVCS and municipalities coordinate to formulate new housing projects, urban upgrading, urban renovation and resettlement programmes for high risk areas.



## Stage 2. Opportunities emerge

In 2011, just before a new national government took office, MST presented a document listing their demands to the elected president, but without any success. MST realised they needed to create partnerships with NGOs in order to be able to debate with authorities and government officials. That is how MST linked with the NGO CENCA (Urban Development Institute). With their support MST could develop a law proposal for the parliament (see box 3.1). However, this law has not yet been debated.

Simultaneously, at the beginning of 2011, Susana Villarán had won the municipal elections with *Fuerza Social*, a confluence of different leftist groups that had agreed in a development agenda for Lima. In this context, the MST contacted Marisa Glave, a councillor of *Movimiento Tierra y Libertad*, one of the parties that composed the confluence. As Glave mentions, MST's demands were coherent with the aims of the Municipality in the field of social development. However, their initial proposal was thought more as a sites-and-services project, which was something Glave and the Municipality did not agree. This idea clashed with the compact urban growth vision of the Municipality. After negotiations, the MST, CENCA and Marisa Glave (MML) agreed that the proposal should focus on promoting an urban compact growth model, which implied the construction of buildings instead of houses.

Working in coordination with MST and CENCA, the Municipality finally formulated a municipal social housing programme (see Box 3.2), which was legally recognised by the MML in December 2012. However, the programme has not been implemented.

**Box 3.2.** Characteristics of the municipal housing programme. Source: Operation Guidelines Emilima (*Manual de Operaciones de Emilima*)

### Main objective: to promote access for adequate housing of low-income sectors in Lima.

- Specific objectives:
  - Improvement of living conditions in the central area of Lima
  - Promotion of an adequate residential densification in popular-urban areas through an effective governmental action.
  - Development of new housing complexes for low-income sectors.
- The regulation of the programme considers the following:
  - Use of the subsidies Techo Propio Programme. If it is necessary the Programme could propose alternative mechanisms for financing.
  - Coordination with the MVCS in order to strength cooperation.

## Stage 3. Searching alternative strategies

The delay in the implementation of the programme disappointed MST supporters and the movement lost more than three thousand members. As the members had already started to save money to buy their houses through the municipal programme, they decided to use that money to collectively purchase land. They bought hillside land in the periphery of the city, in Collique - Comas. They have created there, with the support of CENCA, the *Jesus Nazareno Special Housing Project* (JNSHP).

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. This plan was starting in 2001 as a mid term to test its efficacy, but was formally launched in 2006 (Fernandez Maldonado, 2014; MVCS 2006)
2. The author appreciates the support of Rodolfo Santa Maria for the explanation of the subsidy mechanism.
3. Data in US\$. Considering the currency change the calculation has been made using a reference value of US\$ 3.05.
4. Since the beginning of Techo Propio until June 2016.
5. There is not accurate data of the evolution of the housing deficit in Lima since the last census in 2007, but the calculation of PLAM 2035 (IMP 2014) can be used to estimate the results of Techo Propio
6. It is important to note that this does not necessarily mean that subsidies provided have reduced the housing deficit. The subsidy has been commonly used for the construction of a small area on

the beneficiaries' plot (30 - 40 m2), and in many cases households have continued building the rest of their houses without any technical support.

7. Refers to the difference between the number of households demanding houses and the number of houses supplied at the market, for each level of price (Capeco, 2013).
8. Since the beginning of Techo Propio Programme (mid 2003) until June 2016
9. PLAM 2035 (IMP, 2014) recognised the lack of information to calculate the extent of self-help and incremental construction, but identified that 2/3 of the total cement annually sold is used for this type of construction.
10. The analysis of the aspects that have limited the implementation of the programme is presented in Chapter 4.

## 4. Analysis and results

In the previous section the characteristics of the housing policy have been outlined in order to understand the context in which agents operate. At the same time, the experience of MST showed the actions that civil society organisations undertake to promote changes. In this section, the study focuses on answering how governance is affecting the effectiveness of housing policies. Once *governance* is understood as the “processes through which public and private resources are coordinated in the pursuit of collective interests” (Pierre, 2011:20), it is necessary to look at to what extent a collective interest can or cannot emerge. The analysis is divided into three categories (central government, local government and civil society), and uses the *elements* of the “web of institutionalisation” (Levy, 1996) to present the results (see Annex 2).

### 4.1 Findings at the national level

At the level of the national housing policy, key issues that affect poor peoples’ access housing are the price of land (Calderón, 2012) and the failure of the decentralisation policy. Both aspects are related. The National Housing Plan, while formulating its dual objective strategy (of promoting the construction industry and addressing the needs of housing of the low-income sector) falls in a contradiction (Calderón, 2012). Calderón (2012) shows that the activity of the state in supporting financial institutions and the construction industry has the effect of ‘moving-upward’ the price of land, which restricts the involvement of the private sector in developing housing for low-income groups. As a result, the state and the market enter in a vicious cycle of increasing land prices and increasing subsidy.

This problem is exacerbated when the state does not apply land management tools and when a failure in implementing the decentralisation policy restricts the ability of municipalities to manage land. In relation to the application of land management tools, according to MVCS’ representatives, the state does not have a land policy, and attempts on regulation have found limitations due to a lack of capacity in the ministry. Also, misunderstanding by the part of authorities in the ministry about the implications of approaches to land management has been a limitation. In that sense, the lack of institutional capacity at the national level restricts the effectiveness of housing policies.

In relation to the decentralisation process, the MML cannot make use of the land that is in its territory. As stipulated by the Organic Law of Municipalities (law #27792), the MML has as functions to control and define land use and to design and promote municipal housing programmes. However, the MVCS has not transferred the land to the MML<sup>1</sup>.

According to the decentralisation legal framework, the transfer of functions is coordinated between the central government and municipalities in special spaces designed for that purpose. Marisa Glave declares that during the initial months of Villarán’s mandate an attempt was made to complete this task. This space for intergovernmental coordination was a result of the political pressure that the MST put on the MVCS through a protest in front of the MVCS’ building demanding the implementation of a decentralized housing policy. However, the coordination did not work. The factors that contributed to the failure of this intergovernmental coordination were the lack of *political commitment* from the MVCS’ authorities and the fact that decisions agreed upon are not legally binding. Also, representatives from the MML and the MVCS agreed that there are tensions between these institutions. Those tensions are rooted in the fact that the MVCS has not devolved functions to the municipality and that mayors have been, more often, from an opposition party. In addition, Glave (2016) suggests that the transfer of functions is a contested issue, because a powerful government in Lima could counteract the power of the central government. In sum, the implementation of the decentralisation policy depends on *political commitment*.

The lack of intergovernmental cooperation has serious implications for the effectiveness of housing policies. On one side, by being managed at a national level, the housing policy is disconnected from land management, meaning that MML does not have the functions to operate over its territory. On the other side, the lack of intergovernmental cooperation between ministries restricts the move towards a multisectoral approach. As MVCS’ representatives declare, “*the MVCS can only build roads and water and sanitation projects (...) it is impossible to coordinate between sectors because each sector (ministries) has its own priorities*”. As mentioned by officials, this coordination depends on authorities’ political will. In addition, representatives suggest that municipalities, according to law, could apply a multisectoral approach, in the sense that they could coordinate between ministries, but a lack of capacity at this level restricts that

possibility. This situation implies a limited institutional and administrative capacity in the state, which restrict the effectiveness of housing policies.

To understand the decision-making processes that shape the way in which the policy is implemented, it is also necessary to look at the relations between actors. In other words, how the decisions that affect the implementation of the housing policy are taken. In that sense, two types of spaces can be distinguished in which the private sector and civil organisations interact with the government: (1) 'claimed spaces', in the sense that those are produced by the demand of actors; and (2) 'invited spaces', or more open spaces where different actors can take part (Gaventa, 2006). In the first type, in the relation between private sector and the state, CAPECO's representatives declare that "there are no 'mandatory' spaces of coordination between actors (...) therefore, it depends on the willingness of the authorities or on special requirements". CAPECO tries to generate those spaces in which they can participate. Considering that the housing policy tries to promote the engagement of the private sector in the provision of housing, it is more likely that those spaces work better for the aims of the private sector. In contrast, for the case of civil society organisations, Esther Alvarez (CENCA) suggests that the chances for reaching agreements and their implementations depend on the political context. Commonly, civil society organisations, as in the case of the MST, take advantage of political elections to generate *claimed spaces*. The national housing law (see Box 3.1) promoted by the MST is the result of this type of space, in which the actions of the MST and allies contributed to 'open' a space at the Parliament.

In relation to 'invited spaces' (Gaventa, 2006), an important space of participation at the national level is the National Agreement (NA). The transitional government created this space in 2001 and gathers members of parliament, authorities of the three levels of government and civil society organisations. As part of the NA, civil society organisations can take part for discussing and agree on housing topics. This space contributes to expand the 'room for manoeuvre' (Levy, 2015) as different organisations take part, and if agreements are not implemented there is chance to challenge politicians. However, the effectiveness of those spaces depends on the political context and on the power of the campaigns for demanding the implementation. Currently, the MST uses an instrument of accountability of the NA, called 'the governability pact'<sup>2</sup>, to pressure mayor Luis Castañeda<sup>3</sup> to develop the municipal housing programme.

## 4.2 Findings at the local level

The role of MML is analysed here using the case of the municipal housing programme promoted by the MST outlined in section 3.3. As it has been suggested, the

political context during the first year of Villarán's mandate facilitated the formulation of a more popular agenda. In the light of the experience of the MST, this context can be divided in three stages:

First stage: in the period between 2002 and 2011, before leftist parties took office both at the municipal level and at the national level, there was a lack of political commitment in the municipality. The MST did not have support from authorities.

Second stage: the situation changed in 2011, when the opportunity for the MST to support Susana Villarán's candidacy translated into a more fluid connection between politicians and the movement. At this stage, there was a strong political commitment from the municipality in implementing social reforms.

Third stage: this situation changed again in 2013 due to a revocation process in Lima. According to Peruvian legislation, citizens can collect signs in order to set a referendum to remove authorities. This occurred during Villarán's mandate. Although the mayor was not removed from the municipality, she lost important political support in the council, which was formerly given by councillors of Fuerza Social confluence, including Marisa Glave, who was removed due to the revocation. According to municipal representatives, after the revocation process, Villarán shifted the focus of the activity of the municipality towards the implementation of projects that could give her more political support. Thus, a more popular political agenda was abandoned.

Each of those stages imply different contexts in the relationship between citizens and authorities, and have influence in the implementation of decisions by the municipality. In the relationship between citizens and authorities, it is necessary to evaluate the spaces of participation. The MST experience, in the first stage, evidences the existence of *closed spaces*. As Esther Alvarez, Marisa Glave and Ruben Florez declare, the Municipal Assembly, where civil society organisations are supposed to participate, was not working because the previous mayor did not have the political will to enhance it. In addition, Glave and Alvarez declare that, in the Assembly, the interests of the 43 district mayors overshadowed the demands of civil society organisations. At the same time, the agreements in the Assembly lack accountability to participants, because they are not legally binding and depend on the political commitment of the authorities.

This situation changed in the second stage, when there was *political commitment* in Villarán's mandate for the implementation of a more urban social agenda. As Glave declares, "*in Villarán's mandate, it worked (the Municipal Assembly) because we were very keen in making it work ...*" Thus, this space of participation be-

came an *invited space* (Gaventa, 2006). In addition, the MST had a direct relation with Glave. As a councillor, Glave had the responsibility and the function to establish participatory mechanisms for the inclusion of civil society organisations (10th article of Law 27972). The municipal housing programme was the result of that cooperation. However, the revocation process of the Mayor restricted the implementation of the project and effectively closed such space. As it has been outlined previously, the revocation contributed to the abandonment of the urban social agenda.

The reasons for failure in the implementation of the programme are not only due to a lack of *political commitment* produced by the loss of spaces of participation that had been created during the time Glave was a councillor, but also due to issues related to an inadequate *mainstream of responsibilities* and the lack of clear *procedures*. First, the incomplete transfer of functions for managing land, explained above, contributed to this failure, because there were not well-defined responsibilities. The intention was to promote the transfer of functions from the MVCS to the MML simultaneously to the creation of the municipal programme, but as it has been mentioned, the intergovernmental coordination did not work. Second, although the law considers that municipalities can develop social housing programmes, the organisational structure of MML was not ready to deliver this type of programme. The municipal housing programme was finally allocated at the municipal real estate company (EMILIMA), but this organisation had to create a new area. At the same time, EMILIMA required the transfer of economic *resources* from the General Management Department of the municipality. This factor delayed its implementation.

Another constraint that the implementation of the municipal housing programme faced was related also to a lack of *procedures*. The idea of the MST was to use their own labour force to build their houses in land provided by the municipality. Municipal officials declare that, according to the legal framework, the municipality cannot transfer land to specific groups or organisations because government agencies have to be neutral in the provision of resources. The development of those mechanisms required significant changes in legal frameworks, something that was difficult to think of in the revocation context. In that sense, this refers to a lack of administrative capacity and adequate procedures for the cooperation between civil society and the state.

Finally, it is important to mention another constraint, which is referred to *policy and planning* at the local level: the lack of development plans or their inadequacy. During Villarán's mandate, the development plan for the period of 2012-2025<sup>4</sup> was created through a participatory process, something that had been postponed by the previous Mayor. However, although the plan con-

sidered the participation of civil society organisations, municipal representatives suggest that the plan did not consider the participation of technical areas in the municipality, which reduced the possibilities of translating the vision into specific projects (Glave, 2016). Also, during Villarán's mandate, the municipal government realised there was a need of a spatial plan that could link the development vision with the use of the space. PLAM 2035 was formulated with that aim and included the participation of representative bodies of the private sector, such as the Association of Developers (ADI) and CAPECO, but civil society organisations were mostly absent in this process. The plan was published by the end of Villarán's mandate, but the current mayor has not officially recognised it. Without a spatial plan in the city, the operation of the municipality was limited, and without a participatory planning approach, it was not possible to legitimize a new vision of urban growth.

### 4.3 Findings at civil society level

The actions of the MST can be seen as an attempt to institutionalize social justice, in the sense that they are aimed at the redistribution of the benefits of housing and the recognition of a specific need of the low-income sector. At the same time, this constitutes the *collective intent* (Levy, 2015) in which MST builds itself. For addressing their needs, the strategy of the MST has aimed at enacting laws at the national and local level. Both laws proposed (see box 3.1 and box 3.2) require the completion of the decentralisation policy and the coordination between the MVCS and the MML for their implementation. However, the experience of the municipal programme has shown that the coordination between government levels depends on the political context and that the lack of well-defined procedures constrains its implementation. The challenge for civil society organisations is to find mechanisms to overcome those limitations.

Strategies aimed at *precedent setting* (Levy, 2015) could counteract those limitations. Those strategies have to be oriented to demonstrate viability in order to generate *synergy*. Strategies aiming at generating *synergy* require sustain coherence built upon a *shared vision* (Levy, 2015). However, within the MST there seems not to be a *shared vision* of what mode of housing and urban growth the city should follow, and about to what the extent the strategies of the movement should be coherent with the compact model. For instance, a board member of the MST declares: "*I think that the idea of the compact city is in doubt, because I believe it doesn't bring any benefit to low-income groups*". In addition, MST members underline the fact that low-income population prefer plots: "*our people are not interested in apartments in housing complexes, they want a plot (...) because when you buy an apart-*

*ment and your family grows, you just cannot tell your family to leave*". This disjuncture between, on one side, what the formal market produces and what the urban growth model aims at, and, on the other side, the people's needs or aspirations, poses complex challenges for the provision of housing. Furthermore, this fact confirms the need to foster more adequate spaces of participation in which a shared vision could emerge.

At the same time, in terms of *precedent setting* (Levy, 2015), once the municipal programme is not implemented, the strategy of the movement has changed to start a low-density project in peripheral land ("JN-

SHP"), which contradicts the basis of its first attempt to set a precedent. Although this can be understood as a response to the need of housing, in terms of *precedent setting* it implies an important challenge for producing synergy between actors at different levels. As Gustavo Riofrio<sup>5</sup> suggests, the housing movement in Peru has historically been focused on claiming access to land, while the construction of the houses has commonly been left on a second place. The lack of land and the awareness on urban sustainability issues imply a new urban context in Latin American cities. This contradiction can interfere with the strategy of precedent setting currently employed by the MST (the JNSHP).

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. The land in municipal areas are currently managed by the Sociedad de Bienes Nacionales (SBN), a national entity related to the Ministry of Housing Construction and Sanitation.
2. It consists on a document signed by the new mayor in which commits to continue with the reforms implemented by the previous administration.
3. Luis Castañeda won municipal elections and was mayor of

Lima for the 2015-2018 period.

4. Participatory Development Plans ("Plan de Desarrollo Concertado") guide the policies and activity of the municipalities. It proposes objectives and consider areas of development.
5. Gustavo Riofrio is a Peruvian urban sociologist and he was adviser for the MML during Villarán's mandate. He was interviewed for the purpose of the research during the fieldwork in Lima.

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## 5. Conclusion

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The research finds that a lack of alternative mechanisms to ensure the provision of land as a way to increase affordability, an inefficient intergovernmental coordination, the failure of the process of decentralisation, the volatility of accountability in the spaces of participation and contradictions in actors' visions of urban growth model are factors that restrict the emergence of a coordinated action in order to ensure housing for low-income groups. First, when housing policies are implemented mainly as a tool for economic growth and disconnected from land policies, the collateral effect is the reduction of housing affordability for low-income groups. In that sense, land management tools are important instruments that need to be explored in more detail.

Second, the fact that intergovernmental coordination relies in political commitment of the authorities generates a fragmented housing policy. Thus, the housing policy is centrally managed and by sectors. When there is intergovernmental coordination, a lack of accountability leaves decisions at the mercy of the political contexts. Civil society organisations need to generate mechanisms to control and monitor the implementation of decisions of those spaces of intergovernmental coordination. Accountability on those spaces should be thought not only to the government agencies involved in the coordination, but also to the civil society organisations that are affected by those decisions. The experience of MST shows that civil society organisations can promote intergovernmental cooperation by using the political context strategically.

Third, the failure of the decentralisation policy has serious implications for the provision of housing. Without having the function to manage land, the scope of action of the municipality is limited. At the same time, the lack of administrative capacity at the level of the local government constrains the implementation of decentralized housing programmes. The absence of administrative offices that can be responsible for implementing municipal housing programmes and the lack of clear

procedures for it restrict the possibilities to set a precedent. Civil society organisations have to be aware of that limitation while defining their strategies.

Fourth, the lack of accountability to participants in spaces of participation at the local level reduces the chances to generate alternative mechanisms for the provision of housing. Although there is a regulatory framework that sets participatory mechanisms, participation has not been institutionalised. The effectiveness of those spaces at the local level depends on political contexts and the ability of civil society organisations to alter power relations. In addition, considering that the housing policy is mainly focused on enabling the market, the spaces of participation claimed by the private sector are more effective for the aims of developers and construction companies than the spaces claimed by civil society organisations.

Finally, the disjuncture between, on one side, the actions of civil society organisations for setting a precedent and, on the other side, the discourses of sustainability and desired urban growth paths, reduces the chances of finding sustained cooperation between those actors. Contradictions at the level of civil society organisations of what type of housing is needed limits their ability to negotiate and set precedents that can be replicated. Those contradictions are rooted in the lack of spaces for participatory planning that could lead to a legitimate and collectively built vision of urban growth and on the fact that those spaces rely only on the political will of authorities.

This study has shown that the processes through which a collective interest could emerge are not working properly in Lima. A solution implies fostering new spaces of interaction where a common understanding of the problem as well as the differences can be evidenced. All the actors agree that land is the bottleneck, and this can be the basis for starting the dialogue. In this context, civil society organisations have an enormous potential to enhance those spaces, but a reframed collective vision at this level is a prior condition for expanding the *room for manoeuvre*.

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
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## Annex 1. Elements of the web of institutionalization

Elements	Refers to...
Women's and men's experience and interpretation of reality	How people conceive themselves
Pressure of political constituencies	"the extent to which political constituencies are involved in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of policies, programmes and projects"
Representative political structure	The extent to which groups have support of political representatives and officials
Political commitment	The extent to which there is political commitment to recognise claims
Policy/Planning	The extent to which policy frameworks recognise demands or claims of actors
Resources	The extent to which there are resources or the willing of provide them to support policy
Mainstream location of responsibility	"The clarity of the location of responsibility" for the inclusion of a specific approach in policies. (i.e. social justice)
Procedures	Adequate procedures for the implementation of policies informed by principles of the approach aiming to institutionalise
Staff Development	The degree of training of members of staff and the extent to what they have opportunities to access to training
Methodology	The extent to which methodologies include a specific approach in policies
'Delivery' of programmes and projects	The extent to which programmes are delivered. If those programmes are not delivered, the institutionalisation has failed. Delivery is understood top-down and bottom-up.
Research	Research aimed at developing better strategies, which is based on the learning gained through practicing.
Theory building	The "accumulation of knowledge"

## Annex 2. Diagnosis using the web of institutionalization

Based on Levy (1996:3-23). Elaborated by the author



## Annex 3. List of Interviews

Name	Organization
Esther Alvarez	CENCA: Institute of Urban Development.
Ruben Florez	MST President
Eusebio Cabrera	MVCS - Director of Urbanism and Urban Development at MVCS
Rodolfo Santa Maria	Fondo Mi Vivienda - Real Estate and Social Projects Manager at Fondo Mi Vivienda
Richard Soria Castillo	JNSHP -MST Secretary
Cesar Ascuña	JNSHP - MST Fiscal
Karina Galindo	JNSHP - Secretary
Susana Paz Jiménez	JNSHP - MST Vice-president.
Martín Iparaqué	Resident at JNSHP
Daniel Ramirez Corso	MST- Secretary
Laura Lozada	MML's former official at EMILIMA
Gustavo Riofrio	MML's former consultant at MML
Marissa Glave	MML's consultant and Urban Sociologist. Member of Parliament
Guido Valdivia	Councillor at MML during Villarán's Mandate. Director of the Peruvian Chamber Construction (CAPECO) and former Vice-minister at MVCS



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