

The Bartlett
Development Planning Unit



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Refugee Spaces

*A Bartlett Materialisation Grant
Project Report*

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www.refugeespaces.org

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Refugee Spaces

A Bartlett Materialisation Grant Project Report

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1. Introduction

1.1 Context

Despite numerous migrant waves in the past two centuries, the current influx of refugees into Europe has been framed by very specific narratives. From humanitarian calls for action to warnings of impending collapse, Europe thinks of itself under a crisis, at a political breaking point that justifies extreme discourses and measures.

Refugee Spaces is an open platform that aims to stimulate debate and demystify the phenomena through examining the evidence rather than speculating on the so-called crisis. Through the mapping and analysis of the openly available data provided by institutional and governmental sources, the platform attempts to create a platform for spatialising the political and security measures designed to contain migration and the mobility of refugees.

Migration and displacement are a constant worldwide phenomenon. Although European governments have portrayed the recent wave of arrivals to the continent as an onslaught, Europe currently hosts only 158% of displaced migrants, with none of its countries being close to the top-hosting countries in the world.

However, Europe remains a highly sought destination, particularly for asylum-seekers. Different countries have different approaches though, which has created a complex dynamic across the continent. Local politics influence larger transnational agreements, while regional treaties are adapted or rejected according to political calculations.

At the continental level, there are a series of agreements and treaties that operate in parallel. These have been superseded or rejected by member states, particularly when negotiating refugee quotas and border control politics. Official statistical analyses have settled on large scale territorial data, with indicators being descriptors per country but rarely per city or urban regions. The visual narrative of the “crisis” is pan-continental, rarely specific or nuanced.

1.2 Place

Migration is transformative and disturbs –through movement and presence– the fabrics of space. And although people are in constant displacement, the urban

environments adapt and shift to accommodate these fluxes. Migration leaves a series of legacies, economies of place that become part of a city’s template.

The study argues that gathering evidence to extract the characteristics of these economies is fundamental. With a combination of urban data analysis and localised studies of spatial phenomena, this project aims to uncover the consequences of migration at different urban scales, measuring and visualising its impact on local economies. Although flows and migration data seem to be available, these usually focus on movement trends rather than on the material transformation of space.

Researching distinct economies can help contextualise the legacy of migration, and reframe the logic of analysis. Observing what is transformed at the urban level, what new processes have emerged, what interests acquire importance and what new networks are being built. This should contribute to an informed, evidenced reconstruction of migratory discourses and an opening for further contributions to map the multiple transformations taking place in European cities.

To better understand the impacts of refugees in local urban environments, there should be a constant feedback between larger policies and city-level indicators. This should contribute to open up alternative perspectives on the social, territorial and economic transactions between local citizens, transient populations and policy makers, suggesting to reshape the ways in which the refugee crisis is currently represented and narrated.

It is understood that migration and refuge are in a permanent state of flux, so this platform can only represent a snapshot of a specific period, in part constrained by reliability and availability of the data. Since we started this project, migration has played a more influential impact on political issue across Europe and the rest of the world, becoming sometimes the centrepiece of polarising campaigns and radical partisanship.

Brexit, the surprising success of populist agendas in some important elections across Europe and elsewhere are just a few examples of how migratory issues have been used, and manipulated, for radical

change. Security borders and sovereign intrusion have expanded to Africa and Asia; the policing of the Mediterranean is now an established security regime; and humanitarian initiatives, to help refugees in peril, have been often criminalised.

1.3 Scales

The narrative shift about the impact of migration is, necessarily, a simultaneous zooming exercise. It needs to consider the larger continental implications while acknowledging the particularities of a specific city, a specific place. To understand the local scale, we need to frame the larger political contexts.

In the maps of this platform, the project attempts to demonstrate some analysis of the spatial responses and administrative infrastructure to deal with migration and

refugees. The maps and analyses emphasise the territorial relationships that link mass movement with urban hotspots in four selected countries: France, Germany, Greece and Italy. Further countries can be added to the platform in the future. At the urban scale, the project identifies urban clusters/regions that are integral to current migration influxes, exploring their different strategies for reception and control.

Refugee Spaces has been funded by The Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG). The project is a collaboration between the Development Planning Unit (DPU), Space Syntax Laboratory (the Bartlett School of Architecture), and the Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis (CASA). The information presented on this report is not intended to be a conclusion, but a departing point, in an effort to track the spatial and economic impact of migration on European territories. We hope and anticipate that the output of this project could be used as a base for further research and collaborative work on European refugee and migration.

2. Methodology

Starting from a series of questions around the local economies and spatial forms caused by migration¹, the research attempts to collate fragmented data (contained in official reports, statistical data bases, etc.) into a composite analysis. The purpose is to develop a systemic appraisal of information, where different data indicators are selected and turned into visualisations, trying to make sense of some of the larger impacts of migration while attempting to gauge what is *actually* happening through more specific case-study analysis. The research wishes to help counter misinformation and stereotypes around number of arrivals, asylum requests and refugees in the European cities, as well as around the cost of assistance, hospitality, rescue and securitisation.

Some of the underlying questions and research motivations that have driven the data mapping are related to:

- finding reliable numbers measuring the migration crisis (opposing false counting on one side, without diminishing the importance and relevance of the phenomenon) (RQ1);
- mapping the actual spaces of migration (tracking the phenomenon beyond spatial narratives linked to emergency responses to the crisis –hotspots, camps, etc.– by profiling and comparing the various reception systems in European countries) (RQ2);
- revealing the actual costs of migration (opposing false myth of cost, by showing the investments in the local economy/welfare, as well as unpacking existing hidden costs) (RQ3).

All processed information are freely accessible on a web platform that aims to contribute discussions about current migratory perceptions, while also acting as an analytical source for local policy makers and planners, NGOs, and citizens' science.

2.1 Output: The platform

Digital data visualisation is certainly becoming an integral dimension of research, offering an opportunity to develop complementary, engaging syntheses of

analysis. The frequent use of digital information to describe social, economic and spatial dimensions confirms not only its value, but also its ease of access and open-ended nature. Interactive graphics and data-based sites are constantly shared through multiple social media platforms, spreading information outside of the academic realm and into wider audiences.

There is, however, a risk of diluting the analytical strength of research in lieu of producing reductive visuals that are aesthetically driven. For this reason, this platform should be considered the culmination of what aims to be a comprehensive research rather than an end. Some provocative examples, albeit with different objectives and limitations, can be seen at The Refugee Project² or The Migrant Files³, where broad research initiatives found in platforms a powerful medium to share their respective findings and conclusions.

Considering the limitations of time and budget, the present research is not aimed at the creation of a new database based on first hand research; it is rather aimed at collating and re-representing existing data currently fragmented in several disparate sources. As stated, the platform will attempt to be a systematic repository of information made available by governments and NGOs. As means of context, the research has reviewed a set of existing web platforms that map migration –however, most of them rely on single-sourced data mapping (ie UNCHR historical dataset on migration flows). Additionally, many platforms show the location and distribution of camps, but none shows the location of the premises where refugees and asylum seekers are accommodated, detained, or in transit.

Some of the differentiating factors around this platform would be:

- putting together cross-country data, so far never shown together beyond national boundaries;
- exploring a continental perspective over the national one to overcome administrative limits within which the refugee crisis has been managed so far;
- focusing on the urban scale, as most existing data at the national level are disaggregated at the urban

(or regional) level. This is a deliberate and intentional effort to move away from abstract centralised representations that can be easily manipulated, and instead get closer to the ‘lived and perceived’ situation offering urban stakeholders a useful tool to inform urban understanding and policy;

- contesting assured ‘facts’, particularly those related to the numbers and costs of the refugee crisis (ie the counting of arrivals/border-crossings);
- informing policy on migration through a spectrum of evidence, particularly in relation to how budgets are spent.

In general terms, the platform offers the basis for understanding migration within cities. Rather than simply following the trail of migration, our approach is to look at the impact the phenomenon has on the city. Data can show military, financial and political agreements at the larger continental scale, but it is equally valuable to consider the story of the political legacies in space in these small cities suddenly at the front of the migratory discourses and debates.

2.2 Input: Data collection

Data analytics. Relevance and limits

Counting the bodies and mapping the flows have so far been the main response in terms of knowledge production, in NGO campaigns and policy-relevant research. Data analytics are used by governments and large organisations (Frontex, UNCHR, IOM, etc) to monitor and control movements, arrivals, border crossings and violation, asylum seekers requests and transfers. Media frequently uses data to frame narratives and discussions around migration, influencing circuits of power and political discourses, which in turn either raise compassion or exacerbate xenophobia. How data is used and represented influences public perceptions of migration in Europe; hence the need to monitor its collection, aggregation and interpretation.

Considering how central data has become for policy making, its manipulation remains challenging; it reveals only partial aspects of what is a complex reality and promotes quantitative analyses over qualitative ones. As Tazzioli (2015⁴) reminds us, grounding the government of migration on politics of numbers might dehumanise migration and render it a normalised spectacle. By questioning data analytics as a biopolitical tool, this research aims to expose the reality of what EU policy on migration generates.

Data coverage

Data and analyses presented in the platform cover different periods of time, depending on data availability and sources. In visualisations that examine the phenomenon looking at Europe by using national data (main sources: Eurostat, UNHCR), the datasets extend from 2010 to 2017. In visualisations that focus on the regional and/or urban level of analysis and which refer to country-specific data for Germany, Greece, France and Italy, the periods covered by the datasets vary and are case-specific.

For the reception systems of Germany, France and Italy the most complete dataset is collected for years 2015 and 2017. The period covered captures the year in which the refugee crisis became a phenomenon in EU. Data from 2015 and 2017 are far more consistent, accurate and complete compared to either 2014 and 2016 – for different reasons. Yearly country data for 2018 are not yet available, and therefore have not been considered at all. As the refugee ‘crisis’ peak was in 2015, data before 2014 in some countries are not available/relevant. For reception in Greece, the most complete dataset available is for year 2017.

The demographic data shown in this report and in the platform include refugees and asylum seekers only. The source for this dataset is UNHCR⁵. The platform does not offer specific data on origin, age and gender of the refugees. The definitions of reception, detention and expulsion centres are different according to each country and reflect each country’s nomenclature and policy as explained in the case study analysis section. Given the diversity of administrative devices and technical and humanitarian measures aimed at containing migrants, the research wishes to comprehensively include all premises where refugees and asylum seekers are accommodated, detained or in transit. So-called reception centres appear to be designed to aid and shelter, although their “residents” – migrants and asylum seekers – obviously have no option other than remaining there. Most of the centres shown in the platform are permanent ones, open and operative at the time of the research. As a fundamental decision within the scope of the research, the platform does not look at the deaths on the border.

The wider geographical scope of the platform is shown in Figure 2.1 below. Data were collected at four scales (continental, national, regional and urban). At continental, national and regional level, have been a mixture of wider databases and specialised sources; at local scale, information was developed from experiences by citizens, aid workers, local authorities, was obtained through fieldwork observation and interviews. This data was collected in Calais (France),

Figure 2.1. Geographical scope of platform. Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG) team Elaboration.



Figure 2.2. European countries where information has been collected. Source: Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG) team.



Mannheim (Germany), Athens (Greece), and Brescia (Italy).

This research highlights the urban scale as an important point of view to analyse migration issue, to overcome limitations of regional and state-level data – which currently appear to be the norm for statistical units analysed by Eurostat, states, and other organisations who collect data for policy-making). The Brookings report reminds us,

“dominant focus of EU decision has largely been on the immigration policies and perspectives of host countries. As priorities shift to longer-term economic and social integration, there is equal pressing need to focus on the role and actions of host cities. The reality is that refugees disproportionately settle in large cities, where they have better job prospects and social connections. Ultimately, it is in those communities rather than national government that will grapple with accommodating and integrating new arrivals.” (Katz et al. 2016)

Sources

The research is based on a composite multi-source analysis. The information stored in the database is taken from diverse sources: official reports from Interior Ministries, the European Commission and international bodies including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), reports by civil society (at the international, regional, national or local level), field investigations (interviews, visits, etc.), press articles, etc.

Our main sources for statistical datasets are, so far, Eurostat and UNHCR. The use of different sources to analyse a single variable can present difficulties, for the coherence of calculations done based on data registered to develop the maps. For example, in relation to the same variable, the figures published by the Eurostat agency on the number of refusals of entry per year for a given country sometimes differ from those provided by the Interior Ministry of that country or those gathered by an NGO. While it is sometimes difficult to harmonise different sources, we have agreed on a hierarchy of sources for the database.

Regarding the information recorded on the “country” data-sheets (annual figures on arrivals, refugees/asylum seekers in the centres, etc.), the first sources are figures from European bodies (Eurostat, European Commission, etc.), since in principle efforts to harmonise data have already been undertaken by these bodies. Where these are not available or enough, we use the figures provided by national bodies (interior

ministries, etc.).

Data sourcing/collection in Greece, Italy, France and Germany demonstrated that in general:

- Governmental agencies and media use Frontex’ data on border crossings to calculate yearly arrival figures – leading to miscalculations, which in turn leads to the perpetuation of the myth of a “migratory invasion” of the EU. As Sigona⁶ and AEDH⁷, amongst others, point out, Frontex figures should be interpreted with much caution for at least two reasons. The first one is that border crossings can be multiple, and therefore it is not a reliable way to account for arrivals; the second one is that the refusals to entry can be multiple, and therefore, again, cannot be a reliable way of capturing numbers of refugees and migrants attempting to enter Europe⁸;
- There is little consistency on the data nature, sampling and collection process in each country, as well as on where the information is stored and the level of accessibility. Data on arrivals are collected at border; data on asylum requests and number of refugees are collected at the border and in the centres. Overall, the level of reliability is low. Data have different time periods; they are used to interpret patterns in migration but they can actually refer to change in border policy. Double counting is possible, as well as undercounting. All the information for each entry in the platform can be traced to its original official source;
- Easiest documents to be accessed are national governments or NGOs statistics on asylum requests and number of refugees per centre, because they are of public records; however, data are not consistent amongst countries. France has the most accurate compilation of information regarding location and governance of the centres – around 700 within the national borders. In Italy we mapped a bit less than 300 centres. Available official data are incomplete, particularly because the centres denominated CAS (around 3,000) do not show in any list, document or report. In Germany we mapped some 100 centres; despite wide accessibility of data, information available proved difficult to be compiled as migration management is highly decentralised (each of the 16 federal states has different measures and diverging policies on how to collect and publish data on reception centres) Thus, across the country there is no comparable information available on reception arrangements (see also country profiles for more details);
- There is a general lack of comprehensive updated

maps that show the location of centres and their evolution over time; while on the contrary there are quite several platforms showing camps, detention centres, flows of migrants and deaths in the Med⁹.

Mapping phases and indicators

The mapping process consisted of two stages: a first round of data collection (location, distribution, typology and demographics of centres) in four countries, its collation, systematisation, and spatialisation; and a second round of data collection (national and international budgets for migration, and 'refugee crisis'; international cost of securitisation; hidden costs) in the same four countries.

Some of the indicators that have been considered so far are:

- a) Number of asylum seekers and refugees in EU and in each EU country between 2010-2017 against resident population (sources: UNCHR; OECD; Eurostat);
- b) (urban/rural) location, distribution and typology of detention/reception/expulsion centres in four countries (composite sources);
- c) demographics - size of the centres by numbers of asylum seekers and refugees in each centre; percentage of refugees in each city, against the % of local population (Eurostat for resident population numbers for regions/departments, multifarious country-specific sources for asylum seekers/refugees numbers at regional/department/urban level);
- d) governance of the centres - whether they are run by government or NGOs (multifarious country-specific sources).

In terms of demographics, we have also considered the number of arrivals per year (by sea, land or airport if known); although, as mentioned above, this counting has proved misleading (data gathered by Frontex from each country is unreliable as border-crossings are multiple).

The second round of data collection included indicators around national, international and EU funding for migration and/or refugee crisis per state/region, including humanitarian intervention and emergency, relocation, border policy, integration/hospitality (spending or budget of each reception/detention centre; overall figure per year and per capita/per refugee if known – the latter is particularly relevant to show much goes to the municipality and how much goes to the refugees, as there is a return in the local economy/welfare); European and state funds allocated to border surveillance (patrol, training, creation of border camps and extraterritorial camps), protection and relief (rescue, humanitarian aid, etc).

We acknowledge the above list of metrics implies a level of simplification, as each indicator opens several different issues and questions, particularly given the heterogeneity of migration management in each country. Not all the data gathered is suitable to be spatialized at the urban level – either due to sensitivity of the information (and related ethical implications¹⁰) as well as inherent complexity of disaggregating national data at the small scale (due to limit of research capacity and timeframe allocated to the project).

Fundamental choices have been made on what to represent and what not. To prepare a product as consistent as possible, we decided to represent only data related to asylum seekers, as there exist actual numbers, costs and location. For this reason, where there is a lack of data or inconsistency between sources (in each country), these has been highlighted and gaps were appropriately represented when relevant.

A third round of data collection was planned to cover the local scale and focus on measuring potential indicators which are harder to determine in larger scales (land uses, housing markets, tourism rate variation, flow of donations, job market and unemployment rates, crime rates). The limitations of the project's budget limited the capacity to analyse fieldwork findings, although preliminary collection of data was done in four localities:

1. Calais-Dunkirk (January 2016)
2. Brescia (February 2016 and 2017)
3. Mannheim (August 2017)
4. Athens (August 2017)

Challenges encountered during data collection and ethical concerns

As already mentioned above, the overall aim of the project is not to create new data based on primary research but rather recombine and manipulate existing one. This has proved difficult under several aspects. Beside the inherent fragmentation of data sources and the heterogeneity of the systems of classification, these type of data sets are in constant flux, and such oscillations are not easily captured.

Selecting the most relevant indicators has allowed us not only to map the phenomenon, but also to generate statistics and compare different situations across countries. However, this synthesis and mapping have limitations. Quantitative work might simplify urban realities and technical criteria not always matches the complexity of practices carried out in smaller scales. For this reason,

the website considers essential to include descriptive and qualitative documents that allow, as far as possible, to add information layer that is often missing in maps and graphs. Furthermore, the use of data analytics raises several questions related to the responsible management of personal information, especially of vulnerable groups, such as refugees.

- Data overlooks singularity and specificity. Showing data around numbers of refugees at the border or in the centres bears the risk to normalise a phenomenon, decreasing its political relevance. For this reason, data analysis should be complemented by fieldwork and analysis of qualitative data;
- Tracking down the location of the centres for reception or detention, can expose refugees to risk of being persecuted. To avoid this, and as a fundamental measure, the exact address of the centre is not disclosed in any maps shown in the platform.

Visible and invisible economies

One of the more sensitive challenges of establishing a transparent methodological approach and data collection strategy for the project - and eventually, for an open access digital platform - has been to consider the ethical implications of the use of 'visible' and 'invisible' data sources. The comparative analysis of 'visible' and 'invisible'

data has led to the observation that there may be a range of criteria which officialise or discount a crossing/settlement status, some of which are stated below:

- The provision of fake identification documents;
- Involvement of smuggling cartels in the flow of migrants;
- Multiple counting of the same asylum seeker while crossing more than one European border as multiple entries into the EU zone;
- Circumventing border control and application procedures upon arriving at the first point of entry into the EU zone.

The fear of being registered by border control officers in a country which may not constitute as the destination of migrants has led to certain data, such as the ones covering the population and density of the Jungle refugee camp in Calais, France, to be inaccurate. In circumstances such as these, grassroots organisations and charities have had higher success rate at gaining trust within the refugee communities and thus, have been able to collect more accurate data regarding a closer approximation of population, age and gender, educational background, aspirations and finally, experiences of violence in the host countries. This is data which we have tried to reflect on considering the research, despite not confirming the validity of either datasets or sources.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. How many refugees are 'officially' hosted in our cities? What is the percentage against the local population? What is the percentage against the 'arrival' numbers? How are they accounted for? What is the actual cost of protection? and of securitisation? who is paying for it? how is the bill split and what is the impact on local economy? how does it affect the urban territory and its accessibility? are local businesses and land values changing? what is the effect on space? how is it reflected in urban planning?

2. www.therefugeeproject.org

3. www.themigrantsfiles.com

4. "the Mediterranean has become the focus for a practice of 'counting the dead' that has been at the core of databases set up by human rights groups, migration agencies and NGOs." in: The politics of counting and the scene of rescue Border deaths in the Mediterranean. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/665_The_politics_of_counting_and_the_scene_of_rescue_Border_deaths_in_the_Mediterranean [accessed Aug 23, 2017].

5. The platform also follows UNHCR definitions:

Refugees: total number of refugees and people in refugee-like situations, where:

- Refugees: Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1969 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection. In the absence of Government figures, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in 24 industrialized countries based on 10 years of individual refugee recognition.
- People in refugee-like situations: This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.

Asylum seekers: Persons whose application for asylum or refugee status is pending at any stage in the asylum procedure. An asylum-seeker is someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed.

6. Nando Sigona. Seeing double? How the EU miscounts migrants arriving at its borders <https://theconversation.com/seeing-double-how-the-eu-miscounts-migrants-arriving-at-its-borders-49242>

7. <http://www.aedh.eu/Frontex-s-performative-speech-Or.html>): "Thus, for 2016, Frontex indicates that migratory pressure on the EU external borders remained important, with the detection of over half a million irregular border-crossing (511,371). This is admittedly a decrease of 72% compared to 2015 (1,8 million), but for the Agency, the level of risk is still high, and superior to that of 2010

(104,060) or 2014 (282,933)... However, such data overestimates the number of migrants concerned, as Frontex itself acknowledges when it states that the 511,371 irregular border-crossing correspond, in reality, to the arrival of around 382,000 migrants on the European soil (which is somewhat higher than the International Organisation for Migration's estimate : about 364,401 in 2016[1]).

This number is indeed misleading as it does not represent persons, but border crossings. Therefore , the same person may be counted several times, for example if he or she has been detected as arriving on the Greek islands, and then another time as entering Hungary or Croatia. Thus , Frontex continues to base all its analysis on the number of border crossings, rather than that of arrivals...."

8. Furthermore, since last year, "the accounting of attempts to "irregularly" enter the EU no longer focuses on the number of persons refused entry, but on the number of refusals of entry issued at the external borders. A better way of "captur[ing] the number representing the workload for border control authorities", according to Frontex. However, the same person may be refused entry several times, at different borders, or even at the same border when migrants are obstinate in their projects... Accordingly, the figure put forward by Frontex of 206,656 refusals of entry issued by Member States in 2016, which would represent an official increase of 49% compared to 2015 is, here again, overstated – but without us being able to measure of how much !"

9. Few examples:

<https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/> : investigates the use of immigration-related detention as a response to global migration;

<http://en.closethecamps.org/>

<http://www.borderdeaths.org/> :show the human cost of border control with documented deaths between 1990-2013;

<https://explorables.cmucreatelab.org/explorables/annual-refugees/examples/webgl-timemachine/> : shows migration flows between 2000-2016 based on UNCHR dataset

10. See for instance the disclosure of addresses of centres. See controversy around the mapping of emergency shelters in Germany from 2015. It was a map apparently created by a group of neo-Nazis, eventually deleted by Google, as activist feared that this could lead to more attacks on the homes of asylum seekers. <http://www.dw.com/en/google-pulls-controversial-map-showing-german-refugee-homes/a-18592310> <http://www.dw.com/en/controversial-map-displaying-refugee-homes-causes-a-stir-in-germany/a-18589749>. Same in UK, there were attacks on homes of resettled refugees because their doors were red and fairly identifiable <https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jan/20/asylum-seekers-north-east-claim-identifiable-red-doors-houses>



3. Reframing the initial hypothesis

The first months of data collection, mapping and analysis have shown the disparate means European governments use to measure migratory trends. Having identified some of the main sources of valuable data, some initial conclusions can be drawn:

RQ 1) finding reliable numbers measuring the migration crisis (opposing false counting on one side, without diminishing the importance and relevance of the phenomenon);

1. Looking at the data on asylum seekers in Europe, Middle East and North Africa, there is an exponential increase between 2010-15. Germany, Sweden and Italy are the European countries with the highest number of asylum seekers in 2015. Sweden – with 157,000 asylum seekers in 2015, around 15 per 1000 residents - is a highly sought-after destination. Germany has practiced an open borders policy between 2015 and 2016, with a consequent peak of asylum requests (in 2015 around 420,600). Italy is a port of entry and usually a transit country, which justifies the relatively lower numbers (60,000 in 2015) but suffers from any changes in the border policy of other EU member states. Curiously enough, Greece has seen the number of asylum seekers halving between 2010 and 2015.
2. Looking at the data on refugees in Europe, there is an increase between 2010-15; though, if calculated against countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, the increase is rather small. The relative number is increasingly smaller if calculated against the resident population, especially comparing European and Middle East countries. Between 2010-15 Italy has seen an increase of refugee population of around 122%; while Turkey of around 32,200 % (the period is before the EU-Turkey deal).
3. Frontex acts as the official body currently providing overall figures on arrivals. Frontex data sets are collected from single EU member states and are based on 'illegal border crossings' or rejections to entry (by land and sea). As multiple border crossings in Europe are common, we assume multiple counting over one individual occurs repeatedly; therefore, the overall figure of "yearly arrivals" offered by Frontex is not necessarily accurate.

RQ 2) mapping the actual spaces of migration (tracking the phenomenon beyond spatial narratives linked to emergency responses to the crisis by comparing reception systems in European countries);

4. The EU system of reception, detention, and expulsion is a complex system of humanitarianism and control. Detention and reception centres alike are systems for the containment and control of refugees and asylum seekers. The very definition of reception and detention is not consistent across countries nor within the same states. The four countries analysed present great diversity of administrative devices and technical and humanitarian measures aimed at containing migrants; the research has attempted to comprehensively include all premises where refugees and asylum seekers are accommodated, detained or in transit, without clear cut distinction between detention or reception.
5. France has the most accurate compilation of information regarding location and governance of the centres – around 700 within the national borders. In Italy we mapped a bit less than 300 centres. Available official data are incomplete, particularly because the centres denominated CAS (around 3,000) do not show in any list, document or report. In Germany we mapped some 188 centres; despite wide accessibility of data, information available proved difficult to be compiled as migration management is highly decentralised.
6. The EU system of detention is not limited to EU territory and funding has gradually shifted from humanitarian response to border securitisation and externalisation. Large sums have been allocated to Libya and Turkey following agreements in 2016 and 2017 to set up and manage centres to intercept and detain migrants along the main migration routes outside the geographical territory of Europe¹. Accordingly, the mapping of the existing centres should not be limited to the European ones.
7. The distribution of the centres across urban and rural areas shows different trends in each country. Generally, hotspots, detention or expulsion centres are located close to (land or sea) border. The reception system in France, Germany and Italy is a "diffused" one with a high number of facilities located outside large urban zones (with the exception of Paris).

Figure 3.1. Number of asylum seekers: increase/decrease in 2010 and 2015. Source: UNHCR; Basemap: GISCO Eurostat (<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata>). Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG) team Elaboration.




Figure 3.2. Number of refugees: increase/decrease in 2010 and 2015. Source: UNHCR; Basemap: GISCO Eurostat. Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG) team Elaboration.





Figure 3.3. Ratio of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants in 2010 and 2015. Source: UNHCR; Basemap: GISCO Eurostat. Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG) team Elaboration.



8. The system of governance and management of the reception and detention system in the four countries shows a high degree of heterogeneity. Majority of the centres in France, where we have the most complete information, are run by the Immigration office (OFII) and Prefecture; and a significant number by local government and NGOs. Conversely, in Italy most locations are managed by Prefecture, local municipality and NGOs, while only a small number is run directly by the Ministry of Interior (hotspots and detention centres). In Greece most locations are run by the Hellenic Army and Ministry of Migration Policy (MoMP). In Germany, most of the mapped centres are run by the Department of Interior and Sport; initial reception centres are managed by federal states, while decentralised accommodations are run by the municipality.
9. The reception system counts on multifarious solutions for the accommodation of refugees and asylum seekers, not all of which are part of the 'official' system of reception run by Ministries, prefectures and NGOs - from the occupied buildings in Athens and Rome to Airbnb shared accommodations for refugees².
10. The privatisation of refugee related services is common to several countries in Europe. France and Italy outsource refugee detention to Multinational companies such as GESPA (*Gestion Etablissements Pénitenciers Services Auxiliaires*).

It is not uncommon that the profitability of the hospitality business (Abrogast, 2016) results in human right abuse; cases are documented in Italy (Amnesty International, 2016) and Germany³. Both in Germany and Italy, the information about who runs the centres remains opaque and there is no nationwide data on the way centres are operationalised.

RQ 3) revealing the actual costs of migration (opposing false myth of cost, by showing the investments in the local economy/welfare, as well as unpacking existing hidden costs);

1. Securitisation and externalisation of borders and related military operation have the highest relative impact on the cost of migration – highly exceeding resources allocated to humanitarian response⁴. Since its creation in 2005, the Frontex' budget has been steadily increasing. From 20 million euros in 2006, its annual budget reached 90 million euros in 2010, and 143 million in 2015. Today, it is of 300 million euros (AEDH, 2017⁵). Last September EU decided to substantially increase the resources allocated to Frontex by its integration into the new European Corps of Border Guards. Thus, its workforce has been doubled and a new intervention force of 1,500 border guards, capable of being rapidly deployed in the event of an "emergency" at the EU external borders, made available. The spectacular growth in budget and

staff of the agency runs in parallel with an increase of the death toll at the borders (Perkowski, 2012).

2. According to a study from the Transnational Institute, the business of border security - estimated of 15 billion euros in 2015, should be doubled by 2022 (Akkerman, 2016). The funds provided by the EU to member States to manage returns reached 674 million Euros between 2008-13 (The Migrant Files). The cost of detention is calculated differently in each country. For instance, Italy between 2005-11 spent 1 billion on detention (Lunaria, 2013). Comparing the public funds for reception and social integration with those for securitisation, the ratio is 1:2.
3. One of the inconsistent aspects of migration which affect the cost and economy around migration and seems to differ in quantity from one European space to the other, is the privatisation of refugee related services. This is one of the ways in which a state can reduce its costs in providing housing, security, detention or legal aid to asylum seekers. Instead, for-profit companies are invited to bid on the jobs, providing lower cost alternatives, and naturally averting higher costs which are incurred to the state if public servants perform the same tasks and duties of care.
4. The economic contribution of volunteers, small donors remains an essential part of a diffuse system of solidarity (or small-scale humanitarian intervention) that is hard to quantify. Some organisations started small and eventually grew during the "crisis". Helprefugee is a charity that operated/s in Calais and Lesvos (Athens). It raised over £2 million in funding and provide £1m of new donated goods. The group has also provided significant funding and support to other volunteer groups working in France and Greece, including MDM⁶.
5. Looking at refugees' per capita budgets, housing, food and welfare cost around 12,000 euros per refugee per year (with slight variation according to each country). The budget spent by each government is somebody else's income (from construction companies building refugee shelters, to language schools delivering classes and private landlords renting flats) which means there is a return in terms of income.
6. Governments have poor information in terms of how much they are paying out in benefits for refugees on the one hand and receiving by way of taxes and VAT on the other. Recent studies are demonstrating how refugees provide a net contribution to the economy through the taxes they pay over time, countering the notion that they are a drag on the economy due to a reliance on social benefits.⁷

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. According to statewatch, "An EU-funded project in Belarus is providing €7 million to establish "a fully-fledged irregular migration management strategy," including the construction of a series of 'Migrants' Accommodation Centres' throughout a country perhaps best-known for being Europe's last remaining dictatorship." <http://statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-belarus-camps.htm>
2. <https://www.internazionale.it/reportage/annalisa-camilli/2017/09/08/roma-case-occupate>; <http://moving-europe.org/24-06-2016-refugee-squats-in-athens/>; <https://www.airbnb.it/welcome/refugees>; <https://www.airbnb.gr/welcome/refugees>; <https://www.airbnb.fr/welcome/refugees>; <https://www.airbnb.de/welcome/refugees>
3. Aumüller, J., Daphi, P., Biesenkamp, C. 2015. Die Aufnahme

von Flüchtlingen in den Bundesländern und Kommunen. p. 47

4. See https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med_en, <https://wikileaks.org/eu-military-refugees/EEAS/EEAS-2016-126.pdf>, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-135_en.htm
5. <http://www.aedh.eu/Frontex-s-performative-speech-Or.html>
6. donations <http://odihpn.org/magazine/humanitarian-impulse-alive-well-among-citizens-europe/>
7. <https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/08/08/the-real-economic-cost-of-accepting-refugees> www.movinga.de/en/foreign-human-capital/ <http://www.businessinsider.com/refugees-pay-more-in-taxes-than-they-collect-in-benefits-2017-8?IR=T>






Figure 3.4. Number and type of mapped locations in Germany (2015), France (2015), Italy (2015) and Greece (2017). Note: detention Calais. Hotspots in Italy were introduced in 2015, and opened in 2016. Arrival Centres (*Ankunftszentren*) in Germany opened in 2015. Basemap: GISCO Eurostat. Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG) team Elaboration.

Number and type of mapped locations

Italy, 874 locations mapped, c.2017

- Centre for identification and expulsion (Cie)
- Emergency reception centre (CAS)
- First reception centre (CPA)
- Hotspot
- System for the Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR)

Greece, 54 locations mapped, c.2017

- Accomodation site for Asylum Seekers
- Collective Shelter
- Emergency response site
- N/A
- RIC
- Transit Site

Germany, 180 locations mapped, c.2016

- BAMF (Ministry for Migration and Refugees) Reception Centres (Ankunftszentren)
- First reception (Erstaufnahmeeinrichtungen, EAE)
- Refugee/Asylum seekers housing
- Refugee/Asylum seekers integration

France, 775 locations mapped, c.2015

- Administrative Detention Center (CRA)
- Administrative Detention Facilities
- Emergency Accommodation for Asylum Seekers (HUDA)
- Employment and integration center
- First reception
- Information and Orientation Office
- Integration
- Legal assistance for detainees
- One-stop asylum seeker service (GUDA)
- Provisional Center for Reception and Insertion (CPAI)
- Reception Center for Asylum Seekers (CADA)
- Reception Center for Asylum Seekers (CADA) and Temporary Accommodation Center (CP)
- Reception and Orientation Center (CAO)
- Reception facility for isolated foreign minors (Dispositif MIE)
- Reception for asylum seekers
- Reception for asylum seekers, housing, integration
- Reception for asylum seekers, housing, integration, RELOREF
- Reception for asylum seekers, integration
- Reception for asylum seekers, temporary accommodation
- Reception for asylum seekers, temporary accommodation, housing
- Reception for asylum seekers, temporary accommodation, integration
- Reception for asylum seekers, temporary accommodation, integration, RELOREF
- Reception for asylum seekers, temporary accommodation, transit, integration
- Temporary accommodation
- Transit center

on centres in Greece (7) are not included. CAO in France opened in 2015, to support the evacuation process of asylum seekers from 5; Special reception centres (*besondere Aufnahmeeinrichtungen*) were introduced in 2016. Source: Multifarious (see table for centres);




Figure 3.5. Locations of centres in urban centres, large urban zones, and rural areas. Source: Multifarious (different for each country) Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG) team Elaboration.

A map of Europe with a light blue background. The landmasses are outlined in a darker blue. Overlaid on the map are several colored dots representing mapped locations: red dots for urban centres, orange dots for large urban zones, and green dots for rural areas. The dots are most densely clustered in Western Europe, particularly in the British Isles and France. In the top right corner, there is a text box with a white background and a thin black border containing summary statistics and a legend.

Total number of mapped locations = 1,883
urban centres = 663
large urban zones = 299
rural areas = 921

Spatial units

- urban centres (cities and greater cities)
- large urban zones (functional urban areas)
- rural areas




Figure 3.6. Authority/governance in mapped reception/detention locations. Red to blue is based on the number of locations that a government in Italy are run by officials of the EU Border Agency (Frontex), the EU Police Cooperation Agency (Europol), the EU Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust). Basemap: GISCO Eurostat. Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG) team Elaboration.

Mapped reception locations: Authority & governance

Italy, 874 locations mapped, c.2017

- Police
- Police & NGO
- Regional authority & NGO
- State authority
- multifarious

Greece, 54 locations mapped, c.2017

- NGO
- Private
- Regional authority
- Regional authority & NGO
- State authority & NGO
- State military
- State military & NGO
- multifarious
- not available

Germany, 180 locations mapped, c.2016

- NGO
- Private
- Regional authority
- State & Regional authority
- State authority
- not available

France, 775 locations mapped, c.2015

- Police & NGO
- Regional authority & NGO
- State & Regional authority
- State and Regional authority & NGO
- not available

governance body is appearing to manage (the higher the number of centres associated with a name, the warmer the colour). Hotspots in Agency (Eurojust), and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) besides other bodies indicated in the map. Source: Multifarious;





Figure 3.7. Capacities of mapped location. Source: Multifarious; Basemap: GISCO Eurostat. Bartlett Materialisation Grant (BMG) team

Declared capacity for mapped locations

Italy, Greece, Germany, France

- Information not available
- 1 - 100
- 101 - 500
- 501 - 1,500
- 1,501 - 2,000
- 2,001 - 3,500
- 3,501 - 5,073





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