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MAINSTREAMING ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES INTO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: WHAT'S REALLY GOING ON BETWEEN THE STATE, NON-GOVERNMENT ACTORS AND DONORS IN UGANDA?

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Social Development Adviser
CSEED - Department for International Development (DFID)
20 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0NF, UK

Email: L-Joshua@dfid.gov.uk

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1. INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW, ARGUMENT AND THEMATIC STRUCTURE

1.1 Overview

Since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a shift in structural adjustment programmes from an exclusive focus on economic growth to the inclusion of institutional reforms. This process of harnessing institutional reforms alongside economic reform, which Robinson [1994] termed the New Policy Agenda, has become a preoccupation of many development theorists and practitioners in Latin America and Asia, and more recently in the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The New Policy Agenda, which encourages interaction between the state, non-government organisations and donors[1] [defined as the key actors], has began to take root in Sub-Saharan Africa too, but the patterns and characteristics of its implementation in this part of the world are less well documented. This study, which is based on a extensive review of the nomothetic literature and on field-based ideographic data, overcomes this omission by delineating, depicting and analysing interaction between key actors in Uganda.

1.2 The Argument in Outline

I argue that the theoretical framework associated with the New Institutional Economics, which emphasises the creation of an enabling state, underpins Robinson's conception of the New Policy Agenda; and that the New Policy Agenda which emphasises good governance, institutional reform and poverty alleviation is in contrast with adjustment policies based on the New Political Economy which emphasised the individual and sought to reduce the size and role of the state. A fundamental feature of New Institutional Economics propounded by North [1989, 1990, 1995] is that it retains the fundamental assumptions of neo-classical economics [scarcity and competition], and attempts to incorporate a theory of institutions into economics. North does this by focusing on transactions costs between different actors, and by distinguishing between institutions [rules] and organisations [actors].

However, while transactions costs may constitute and important element in decisions made by organisational actors, it is unlikely to be the sole factor that guides and informs the way organisations conduct their affairs. In an attempt to overcome this weakness in New Institutional Economics, and a tendency towards ignoring issues of power and the predisposition of different actors in an established or emergent social hierarchy, I draw on the sociological theory of Giddens [1986] and Mouzelis [1995, 1997], which focuses on the reflexive interactions between structure [rules] and agency [actors] and deploy these as heuristic devices for analysing interactions between institutions and organisations in the context of adjustment.

I then argue that the implementation of the New Policy Agenda is being mediated through popular participation and institutional capacity building, and that the adoption of these technologies by the IFIs and bilateral donors has brought about the mainstreaming of alternative strategies to adjustment that were traditionally associated with Northern Non-Government Organisations. The incorporation of these technologies into mainstream adjustment policy posses dilemmas for different actors as they struggle for positions of co-presence within an emergent hierarchy that has accompanied the transition of Uganda from a state that exhibited predatory characteristics to a state that is based on inclusive rule-based systems of government.

Against this background, it is important to clarify the usage of the terms 'state' and 'government' in this study. According to Young [1988] at a formal level the 'state' is perceived as possessing the following characteristics: territoriality, sovereignty, nationality, is a participant in the global system of juridically equivalent units, has a set of institutions of rule, a legal system, and the embodiment of an idea that is both abstract and personal. Thus the state encompasses the government, for the government of a given country is the system of institutions through which the state acts. Government is often treated as a monolithic concept; however separate parts of government may differ greatly in their priorities or approach. In some Sub-Saharan African countries, where one-party or military rule has been in place since independence, the state, government, political parties and the military may appear almost synonymous. However, under the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda [GoU 1995] the government is subordinate to the state, and a single government department cannot, at least

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[1] Reference to donors is restricted to IFIs like the International Development Agency of the World Bank, and bilateral donors like DANIDA. It does not include multilateral UN agencies whose numbers and purposes are too varied to capture in a study of this nature. However, there is evidence [Deacon et al 1997] to suggest that the approach of the UN agencies towards structural adjustment has broadly fallen in line with that of most bilateral agencies.

theoretically, affect the state significantly. This study will therefore refer to interaction with the state when speaking in institutional terms and to government when referring to organisational issues.

Given that the New Policy Agenda focuses on creating rule-based conditions that enhance the capacity of the state to extract, penetrate, regulate and appropriate [Migdal, 1988:15], the reform of the state and the government overlap at both institutional and organisational levels. Where this happens explicit reference will be made to ways in which key actors interact with both institutional and organisational issues.

Bratton [1989a; 1989b; 1990] was one of the first authors to develop a model for , analysing interaction between governments and non-government organisations in Africa under conditions of adjustment. But with the incorporation of the New Policy Agenda times have moved on, and this study triangulates economic and sociological theory with modifications to Bratton's analytical model by: delineating the different types of Non-Government actor involved in the adjustment process; exploring the prospects and implications of closer interaction between different key actors; examining the external and internal influence of donors on these interactions; and focusing on the reflexive posture of government, non-government actors and donors in the context of mainstreaming alternative strategies to adjustment. The primary objective being to move beyond description to an interpretation and an explanation of what is really going on in Uganda.

1.3 The Thematic Structure of this Study

The analysis begins in chapter 2, and is divided into three main parts. The first part conceptualises the ways in which institutional reform has become harnessed alongside the economic focus of structural adjustment to form the New Policy Agenda; and the ways in which the technologies incorporated into structural adjustment have become mediums for mainstreaming alternative strategies to adjustment. This chapter thus addresses the strengthening of institutional structures and organisational frameworks as a means for creating an enabling state.

This is followed by an outline of the research questions which focus on interaction between the institutions of the state and other key actors; a delineation of the organisational interaction between foreign and local non-government actors; and an outline of the transformational challenges confronting the state in Sub-Saharan Africa. The second part covers the framework used to inform and guide the analysis of interaction between

institutions of the state and other actors. The third part, outlines the way the horizons of experience among different actors is used as a methodological tool to collate, analyse and synthesise the data.

Chapter 3 moves to examine shifts in the approach to economic reform and the relegitimation of institutions in Uganda. The chapter considers particular periods in Ugandan history, outlines the different dimensions of the reform programme that has taken root under the National Revolutionary Movement [NRM] - which assumed power in 1986- and argues that the NRM plan has developed a reflexive relationship with the New Policy Agenda; and examines the way relegitimation is defined and depicted by government departments, the World Bank and bilateral donors like DANIDA. It concludes that while reforms have opened-up previously closed organisational spaces in Uganda, a regularity framework has yet to emerge in a manner and form that generates confidence in a tapestry of emergent institutions.

Chapter 4 takes is cues from the foregoing arguments, and presents the evidence on how institutional reform creates and configures the spaces for reflexive organisational interaction between government, non-government actors and donors. It examines the institutional structures that currently govern the relationship between the state and non-governmental actors, and outlines the initiative by the Government of Uganda to reframe the rules that govern these interactions. It then concludes that the nature of interaction within organisational spaces are prefigured by the scarcity of organisational capacity and by competition over resources; that different actors are seeking to create new conceptions of institutional identity and organisational solidarity; and that the technologies of alternative strategies to adjustment are shaping the spaces for co-presence between government, non-government actors and donors at different levels of an emergent organisational hierarchy that aims to link the state with communities at the grassroots.

Chapter 5 brings the study to a close and argues, in light of the foregoing analysis, that in a country with Uganda's socio-economic characteristics there is a need to focus on a state with citizens. It supports this argument on the basis that the different strategies for establishing co-presence adopted by key actors are not internally inconsistent with good governance, and that in Uganda the New Policy Agenda has retained characteristics associated with the New Political Economy which threaten the overarching objective to reduce the depth and scale of poverty. To stem this threat different levels in the emergent organisational hierarchy need to be explicitly brought together in a manner that sutures the strategies of key actors. Indeed, in the course of

mainstreaming alternative strategies to adjustment the government's policy review on non-government organisations the state must ensure that subsequent regulation captures vital capacities to control the emergent hierarchy, and do so in a manner that does not undermine the social, political and economic rights of Uganda's 20 million people.

2. MAINSTREAMING ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES INTO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: A CONCEPTUAL, ANALYTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Conceptual Framework

Harnessing Institutional Reform into Structural Adjustment

The term structural adjustment was until the beginning of the 1990s primarily linked to the New Political Economy [NPE] which sought to shift economic policy from a stance permitting state intervention in the economy towards a neo-liberal position aimed at minimising state intervention by giving the market greater influence in the allocation of resources. Mosley [1990: 4] observes that structural adjustment in the 1980s went furthest in respect of policy instruments which could be manipulated within the central bank or the ministry of finance without any need for legislative sanction or complex institutional planning. Indeed it has been argued [Joshua: 1996: 22-23] that the philosophy behind the NPE rested on three central empirical propositions: that individuals are the principal actors within the political economy; that individuals are rational actors - who make cost-benefit calculations across a wide range of options; and that individuals maximise their options by making trade-offs between goods. As empirical propositions they are neither true nor false; only useful or useless in advancing arguments about social, political and economic phenomena.

However, for the International Financial Institutions [IFIs] - namely the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank - who drove this empirically derived agenda the main structural problem was market distortion resulting from state intervention in the economy. According to Engberg-Pedersen et al [1996: 4] for Sub-Saharan Africa this approach assumed that the root cause of economic ills lay not in colonialism and its form of integration into the world economy, but in post-colonial policies adopted by newly independent states.

Engberg-Pedersen [1996:15] argues that two tactical tools were used to push through the strategic economic objectives of structural adjustment. The first was an extension of aid conditionality which meant that the granting of aid

by the IFIs and bilateral donors was tied to whether recipient countries adopted certain recommended policies; and the strengthening of aid coordination which developed in situations where there were multiple bilateral donors for particular countries, and where total aid flows were significantly greater than those of the IFIs sponsoring structural adjustment. Under these circumstances conditionality could only have a chance of working when bilateral donors linked the release of funds to decisions made by the IMF and the World Bank. For this reason, the IFIs played a major role in creating mechanisms for aid coordination which gave enforcement of conditionality a central role. The main mechanism for enforcement is the annual Consultative Group[2] meeting for each recipient country which forms the basis for individual Country Assistance Strategies [World Bank 1997a] .

However, Sub Saharan Africa's economic performance throughout 1980s did not, despite structural adjustment, significantly improve and that there were considerable gaps between the reforms promised and what was delivered. Indeed, Korten [1990:53] links this gap to the emphasis given to growth-centred development, and observed that: "the architects of structural adjustment have concerned themselves only with those structures that promote growth. They have partially or totally neglected those that determine whether growth will be just, sustainable, or inclusive".

As a consequence of the tensions created by the gap between promises and delivery under structural adjustment donor attention in the 1990s increasingly turned to questions associated with the representativeness of African governments, the degree of accountability and openness in their political and economic management processes, and the extent to which the latter were influenced or informed by public discussion. According to Robinson [1995: 3] this shift represented a merger of policy currents between the World Bank and its preoccupation's with questions of financial accountability and administrative efficiency; and those of bilateral donors whose interests were bound up with democracy, human rights and participation. The result has been that neo-liberal economics became harnessed alongside western notions of liberal democracy to create what Robinson [1994] termed the New Policy Agenda [NPA]. This agenda, which incorporates recipient ownership[3] of reform and problems of

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[2] Records of the Consultative Group are "not public documents" - personal correspondence from Rosetta Grimm, External Affairs Department, World Bank, Washington D.C. June 24 1998.

[3] Edberg-Pedersen et al [1996: 21] observes that while IFIs have increased their verbal emphasis on the desirability of

governance, institutional reform and poverty alleviation into adjustment policy has been recognised as critical if the process of adjustment is to be managed effectively and produce equitable and politically sustainable results. At the heart of this merged agenda are the principles of 'putting people first' and 'putting the first last' which constitute what Chambers [1986; 1997] refers to as a 'new paradigm' that embodies decentralised administration and empowerment of the poor. The 'new paradigm' resonates with Schien's [1987: 9] approach towards process consultation, which emphasises the empowerment of people to solve their own problems, and parallels Hamdi's [1996:7] point about creating development practice that respects the depth of indigenous knowledge, and grants recognition to the limitations of outside knowledge. In a speech to the donor community in Paris in 1990, Wilfred Thalwatz, Vice-President of the World Bank's External Affairs Department, set out the Bank's approach towards the NPA:

> The end of the Cold War Offers an historic opportunity to shape a new, more people oriented pattern of world security and development . . . . The World Bank has learned from its experience of development that popular participation is important to the success of projects economically, environmentally and socially.
> [cited in Feeney 1998:12]

It is within the context of limited donor capacity to implement an adjustment agenda concerned with the promotion of popular participation, that IFIs and bilateral donors turned to non government organisations [NGOs] and grassroots organisations [GROs] as the preferred organisations for the design and implementation the new approach [Arrossi et al 1995: 37; Robinson 1995: 2]. The focus on NGOs as the vehicles for creating the capacity for popular participation was articulated in a World Bank publication in the following manner:

> The building of social capital and the emergence of a strong civil society are essential ingredients in achieving long-term sustainable development at the national level. Enhancing the capacity of indigenous NGOs through operational collaboration may well generate a development impact which surpasses immediate project goals.
> [Malena 1995: 64]

The NPA, with its accompanying focus on institutional transformation through collective participation and capacity building, brought

dramatic shifts in the traditional roles performed by NGOs precisely because, as Chambers [1986: 29] argues, many voluntary agencies put the last first and were propelled into the position of championing the new paradigm. However, Goetz and O'Brien [1995: 23] observe that aside from designating NGOs as the vehicle for ensuring that the poor's perspective are expressed at policy-making levels, there are no clear institutional mechanisms for enhancing the involvement and effectiveness of the poor in the civil society. As a result development practitioners and academics[4], have devoted increasing attention to collective participation and capacity-building approaches which incorporate both the provision of social services [supply-side interventions] and the articulation of preferences [demand-side interventions][5] by emerging Southern NGOs [SNGOs] and established Northern[6] Non-Government Organisations [NNGO] as they struggle to re-position themselves within this new agenda. Hulme and Edwards [1997:13] go as far as saying that times have moved on and that NNGOs are in danger of loosing their 'space' to influence donor and southern-state policies through operational collaboration, lobbying and advocacy as donors shift their attention to SNGOs and GROs.

According to [Pieterse 1998] the loss of 'space' is based on the premise that 'alternative' development agenda's traditionally associated with NNGOs have become embedded and incorporated into the mainstream. The process of incorporation is captured by Griesgraber and Gunter [1996: xiv], who state that "The new approach includes the values of equity, participation and environmental sustainability as well as improved physical well-being". Unlike Edwards and Hulme [1997], Pieterse [1998:350] argues that the mainstreaming of what was their agenda gives NNGOs a more significant role in capacity building in which they:

> look both ways, at local grassroots development and at global alternatives. These different functions overlap and intersperse and are not

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[4] See Endnote 1 for an overview of the mainstream literature that addresses the changing role of NGOs in development published over the last decade.

[5] Clark [1997:43] defines supply-side approaches as - the concentration on delivery of services or development projects; and demand-side approaches as - helping articulate preferences and concerns so as to become active participants in the development process. Supply-side approaches have traditionally been associated with NNGO activity intended to fill gaps in services which the public sector does not cover or in supplementing government provided services [Fowler 1998: 165]

[6] The term Northern NGOs refers to NGOs which have their headquarters in the Northern Hemisphere but work in southern states.

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broadening ownership, they have been cautious even in their efforts to promote ownership within governments.

necessarily incompatible, but rhyming them requires making them explicit ... and an effort at synthesis, which equires more reflection on local/global and micro/mega interconnections than is [traditionally] associated with alternative development literature.

In addressing ramifications of the NPA on interactions between institutional and organisational issues among the key actors three trends are noticeable in the literature: firstly, a tendency to either concentrate on issues confronting individual NGOs, or on global processes which are detached from country specific contexts[7]; secondly, little use is made of established economic and sociological theory to analyse interactions between actors; and thirdly, authors have tended to focus on processes within Latin America [Arrossi et al 1994; Bejar and Oakley 1995] Asia [Tandon 1996; Harper 1996; Mawer 1997] and Eastern Europe [Elliot 1996; Buchowski 1996; Sampson, 1996]   The patterns and characteristics of institutional and organisational interactions between key actors in Sub-Saharan African countries is less well documented[8], and this dissertation seeks to overcome these tendencies by examining what really is going on in Uganda[9] under conditions unleashed by the NPA. The study therefore focuses on:

a] interactions between the Ugandan state, NNGOs, emerging civil society actors - like SNGOs and GROs - and donors in the context of reflexive institutional and organisational transformation;

b] the development of a theoretical framework for understanding interaction between the Ugandan state, NNGOs, emerging civil society actors and donors by relating nomothetic and ideographic data to the concerns of institutional theory. The framework principally looks towards the work of Douglass North on New Institutional Economics [NIE], and towards the work of Anthony Giddens and Nicos Mouzelis on Social Integration and System Integration.

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[7] These observations are clearly demonstrated in most of the individual contributions to the volumes on NGOs edited by Edwards and Hulme [1992; 1995, 1997].

[8] The recent exception being Munchungunzi, D and Milne, S, [1995] and their study of 95 SNGOs and CBOs in East Africa - See Chapter 4.

[9] Uganda has much in common with many Sub-Saharan African countries attempting to recover from long periods of economic decay, civil strife and predatory government. With this history in mind, Uganda is representative of systemic conditions that prevailed in many Sub-Saharan African countries, and the decision to choose it as a focus of study was linked to the fact that Uganda is described as one of the lead reformers in Africa [Oxfam: 1997: 6], and the fact that it offers a rich tapestry for exploring the dynamics of the NPA.

From Economy to Institutions

The relevance of institutional theory to the debate on the role of state and other actors is linked to the driving force behind the NPA in that it directs attention to the effectiveness of the state, and moves away from the neo-liberal paradigm of NPE with its focus on individual actions and minimising the role and size of the state in relation to the non-state economy. Douglass North [1995: 17-26] defines NIE as a framework based on an attempt to incorporate a theory of institutions into economics by building on, modifying and extending neo-classical theory to permit it to come to grips with and deal with a range of issues heretofore beyond its ken. What it builds on is the fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition. What it abandons is instrumental rationality - the assumption of neo-classical economics that has made it an institution free theory. What North's definition suggests is that mainstream economics has ignored, at considerable cost in terms of realism, the issue termed transactions costs. The normal assumptions of mainstream economics has been that transactions between economic actors are relatively costless. For example, it assumes that actors have to expend few resources finding out about one another, negotiating, or that the goods and services are of the correct quality. However, once analysts begin to take seriously the possibility that transactions costs could be high, not only does the traditional intellectual edifice of economics look vulnerable to criticism, but more importantly the patterns of interaction, and the rationale underpinning such interaction, become central concerns, and cease to be peripheral considerations. Moore [1998: 41] argues that while NIE is not intrinsically state-friendly, it is order-friendly in that it emphasises the economic benefits of institutional arrangements that help bring down transaction costs, transparent, effective, accessible, legal and judicial mechanisms, reliable, stable financial systems; the 'credibility' of government policies, the general stability and predictability of the policy and institutional and policy environment; and the range of other services that are, in most circumstances, best provided by governments or depend on government support of some kind.

The key issue in Moore's description of NIE is the enabling role of the state which counteracts the neo-classical position. The importance attached to NIE is most strongly reflected in the World Development Report 1997 [World Bank 1997], which drew heavily on the work of Douglass North and acknowledged that past reforms have tended to emphasise economic fundamentals to the exclusion of social and institutional basis needed to ensure sustained development and to avoid social disruption. Indeed the report argues that

"For human welfare to be advanced, the state's capability - defined as the ability to undertake and promote collective actions efficiently - must be increased [1997b:3 original italics]. The relevance of NIE to development theorists is strengthened by the fact that strategies for the promotion of collective action are based on a distinction between institutions and organisations: the former are defined by North [1990:3] as "the rules of the game in a society, which structure incentives in human exchange to ensure individual compliance with collective dimensions through appropriate incentives or sanctions"; and to development practice by the fact that the search for conceptual clarity is as Edwards [1994: 287] states "inevitably circumscribed by the real-life variation of a world in which simplistic dichotomies and generalisations have little meaning or utility". Thus it is institutions that circumscribe the framework for collective action, while the action itself takes place within organisations which operate to produce services for their members and outsiders. In other words NIE distinguishes between rules [institutions] and actors [organisations].

North's distinction between rules and actors resonates with sociological conceptualisations of the paradoxical relationship between structure and agency and the transformative potential of agency. The paradox is captured by Giddens [1986:17] who argues, that on the one hand, institutions can be seen as sets of rules, forming 'virtual order', or what Mouzelis [1995:76] refers to as the paradigmatic dimension of society. On the other hand, institutions are observable regularities, sets of practices extended in time and space [Giddens 1986:17], or what Mouzelis [1995:77] refers to as specific 'synigmatic' configurations. The first is internalist, because following the rules and norms rests with the normative orientation of the actors. The second is externalist because the behavioural regularities constructed through institutions are based on objective social processes. The distinction is critical to understanding the reflexive nature of the NPA - because from the internalist perspective, an institution depends on its significance and the way it is embedded in the value system of actors which make-up their identities; and from the externalist perspective, institutions give pattern to social structure, and constitute processes which are an ordered sequence of events over time[10].

Research Questions

The incorporation of institutions and organisations into structural adjustment has profound implications for the pattern and form of interaction between the state, non-government actors and donors, and calls for a sharper understanding of

how patterns of interaction are shaped and sustained in the light of the NPA. Given that it is the operational qualities attributed to NNGOs that have become mainstreamed into the adjustment agenda the study will also explore and analyse the ways NNGOs[11] have interacted with the state, SNGOs and GROs in Uganda. With these observations in mind the central research question of the study focuses on: how the institutional spaces opened-up by the New Policy Agenda are interpreted and occupied by the state, non-government actors and donors during processes of organisational transformation in Uganda.

NGOs in the New Policy Agenda

Discussion about the role of NGOs within the NPA is the subject of much confusion, and care must be taken in defining and delineating the dimensions used to depict and characterise the term NGO. Indeed until the late-1980s the term was largely restricted to NNGOs which had secured important positions in the implementation of supply-side projects in Southern countries. With a growing focus on institutional issues this restricted frame of reference began to change in the early 1990s, and was accompanied by a growing propensity among IFIs and bilateral donors to establish, fund and collaborate with SNGOs alongside more traditional forms of support to NNGOs[12]. The shift by donors towards directly funding SNGOs to implement supply-side projects led Bebbington and Riddell [1997: 123-124] to suggest that this was the harbinger of an inevitable trend that reinforced the shift of NNGOs into demand-side interventions.
Although SNGOs may view increased financial support positively in that it creates opportunities to expand their programmes and widen their influence, the increased reliance of IFIs and bilateral donors on SNGOs concerns some development practitioners. For example, Edwards and Hulme [1992a: 215] observe that "with greater access to resources comes a preoccupation with growth, a tendency towards bureaucratisation, and an increasing danger of becoming contractors for the international system and its agenda." Such a trend also affects the way southern states' perceive SNGOs. According to Allen [1990] the legitimacy of the state and its linkage to its citizens

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[10] See Endnote 2 for a short summary of the origins and re-emergence of institutional theory in economics and sociology.

[11] Named references to NNGOs in the Ugandan context will be restricted to two of the UK's largest NGOs: Save the Children Fund and Oxfam. These two NNGOs are among the largest operating in Uganda, and a synopsis of their approaches to programming in Uganda is outlined in Appendices 1 [SCF] and 2 [Oxfam].

[12] In 1993 15% of the British Aid Budget was channelled through NGOs [Brett 1993:270]; and according to OECD data [cited in Hulme and Edwards 1997:6] aid channelled through NGOs increased from US$2.8 billion in 1980 to US$ 5.7 billion in 1994. However, this level of increase is considered a gross underestimate in that OECD figures exclude funding from the US, and multilateral agencies such as the EU, the World Bank and the UN [ODI 1995:1].

can be weakened if resources go to NGOs at the states expense. These changing images of NGOs resonates with the popular concept of "scaling-up", which refers to NGOs trying to increase their impact through direct and indirect approaches [Clark 1991]. For both SNGOs and NNGOs scaling-up can be delineated into two types: "direct" scaling-up which refers to working within the system, by supporting structures such as government programmes or training government staff. In contrast, "indirect" scaling up denotes a dialogue, established through workshops and the dissemination of the NGOs experiences to other actors. In an effort to clarify the strategic approaches available to NGOs Edwards and Hulme [1992b] evaluate four approaches to scaling-up: working with government, operational expansion, lobbying and advocacy, and supporting local level initiatives. They incorporate many models for scaling up in their distinction between:

> additive strategies, which imply an increase in the size of the programme or organisation; multiplicative strategies, which do not simply imply growth but achieve impact through deliberate influence, networking, policy and legal reform, or training; and diffusive strategies, where spread is informal and spontaneous.
> [Edwards and Hulme 1992b:15]

The opportunities to pursue one or more of these scaling-up strategies and influence larger systems opens the door for very different interactions between state, foreign and local non-government actors and donors. However, many of the models for analysing these interactions either ignore or are not sufficiently cognisant of the complex factors that are likely to influence institutional relationships between these actors. Batkin [1992], for example, describes five possible relationships for an NGO with a government. The NGO can supplement the government, substitute for the government, or act as an operational partner to government. The NGO can build civil society and act as a model for the government. Batkin's typology is too mechanical and assumes a coherent, organised, and capable state which accepts almost passively the activities of NGOs without taking account of the context in which these interactions take place. Indeed the plausibility of these relationships may be challenged in Sub-Saharan Africa by the factors of deteriorating state, a repressive regime, or a cash-strapped government which resents the presence and resources channelled by donors to NGOs.

The work of Micheal Bratton [1989a, 1989b and 1990] is more useful for analysing these relationships in Africa, in that his work goes beyond the simple construction of a typology. Bratton defines the key issue between government and NGOs as "a political tension between the government's urge for order and control and the NGOs quest for organisational autonomy", he thus gives weight to factors such as the type of political regime and type of voluntary activity. Bratton's central argument is that the amount of space granted to non-government activity is determined "first and foremost by political considerations", especially to concerns of national sovereignty and regime stability; and less by economic and social considerations. Bratton [1989a: 576] acknowledges that donors are "increasingly enamoured by NGOs", but maintains that governments will view the shift in donor funding tendencies in political rather than economic terms. Even though it might appear cost-efficient to allow NGOs to "relieve government of some of the burdens of service delivery", governments would still prefer control of donor funds, and they may worry that "NGOs are accountable to, and may act as proxies for, foreign interests".

The possibility that non-state actors may act as proxies for foreign interests demands the delineation of characteristics associated with NNGOs, and how these differ from SNGOs. NNGOs are classified as belonging to the voluntary sector of non-governmental and non-profit organisations, which is defined by Bebbington and Farrington [1993a: xiii] as "a promising but not yet firmly established 'third sector'. . . [which] is different but interacts with both the public (state) and private (for profit) sectors." This classification may be useful at a specific sectoral level, but the utility of conflating foreign and local NGOs into a 'Third Sector' when looking at structural adjustment is limited; according to Carroll [1992:11] the conflation hides important institutional differences between various types of non-governmental actor, with differing capacities to influence policy and to implement projects. To overcome this definitional impediment Edwards and Hulme [1992b: 14] devised a global typology[13] of NGOs which delineates the sector into Northern NGOs like Save the Children Fund and Oxfam, which have headquarters in the northern hemisphere; 'intermediary' NGOs in the South [SNGOs] who support grassroots work through funding, advice and advocacy; and grassroots organisations [GROs] of various kinds which are controlled by their members. Each of these 'types' of non-government actor have distinctive modes of operation and membership. The key differences between NGOs [northern and southern] from GROs is institutional in that the former are defined as legally constituted and formally structured non-

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[13] There is considerable confusion in the literature about what constitutes an NGO, and has led to a proliferation of typologies - see Bratton [1989b 407-430], Clark [1991: 40-41] and Meyer [1995: 1277-1289]. While the variety of typologies do provide insight into the complexity of the NGO sector, most create overlapping categories which limit their analytical usefulness.

profit organisations which exist to meet needs beyond those of their own members; while the latter are often informally structured and exist for the benefit of their own members and/or communities [World Bank 1997b:9]. Although these definitional distinctions are helpful in conceptualising what NGOs are, it must be recognised that as actors NNGOs, SNGOs and GROs are far from homogeneous; their size, resources, and agendas differ dramatically, and they are committed to very different approaches and causes.

Indeed for NNGOs involved in international development, their role has changed and evolved over time. Korten's [1987] model of NGO evolution, cast in terms of three generations, appears frequently in the literature. The first generation focused on relief and welfare, the second on local self-reliance and the third on sustainable systems of development or "people-centred development". Although this model suffers by its focus on the linear progression of NGOs, it nevertheless echoes with the "scaling-up" debate identified by Edwards and Hulme [1992b]. While it is not possible to construct a picture of a typical NNGO, one can at least acknowledge some of the alternative development strategies associated with NNGOs. According to Lorgen [1988] NNGO supply-side interventions were characterised by: access to local institutions and community groups; flexibility and innovation, especially in response to emergencies; decentralised and democratic structures; encouragement of participation; greater levels of efficiency than larger bureaucracies; a tendency to work closely with nationals or partner organisations; and a willingness to listen to and work with their partners. NNGOs were also perceived as being more likely to extend support to marginalised groups, and their operations were viewed as having an ability to maximise access to the poor.

If NNGOs are being forced to incorporate demand-side interventions it has to be recognised that donors implicitly expect SNGOs to fill the supply-side vacuum created by NNGOs. This expectation assumes that SNGOs will share the same characteristics as their northern counterparts. In reality SNGOs are constrained by their relatively small size and face many limitations. Annis [1989: 209] characterises the impact of their small size in the following manner: "in the face of pervasive poverty, . . . 'small scale' can merely mean 'insignificant'." Bebbington and Farrington [1993b: 203] also note that SNGOs may feel that they are being used to "to compensate for any reduction in the public sector, in part subsidising structural adjustment programmes." More importantly Diamond [cited in Makumbe 1998: 311] notes that civil society organisations in Africa "too often are crippled by the same problems of poverty, corruption,

nepotism, parochialism, opportunism, ethnicism, illiberalism, and willingness to be co-opted that plague society in general."

On the other hand critics of NNGOs note that their supply-side interventions were often planned for short periods of time without sufficient consideration of sustainability; as Hanlon [1991: 253] observed: "a multiplication of projects does nor necessarily represent a multiplication of development. Other criticisms of NNGOs focus on the legitimacy of their work, or "right to intervene in the development process" [Edwards and Hulme 1992a: 213]; and that they are not sufficiently representative of the poor [Hulme and Edwards 1997:1]. Fowler [1998a: 32] also notes a growing concern that with the mainstreaming of alternative strategies - which has been accompanied by a culture of sub-contracting - a real danger exists for opportunism, resulting in "phantom" NGOs (PHANGOs) or "briefcase" NGOs (BRINGOs). These weaknesses and limitations are not widely articulated in the literature, but have important implications for the way NNGOs and SNGOs position themselves in relation to civil society actors like GROs. Indeed the legitimacy of NGO positions is as much an ethical consideration as it is an operational one.

Civil Society Actors and the State

The term 'civil society' which originated in the writings of Hegel, Gramsci and Marx [cited in Sassoon 1983 and Geremek 1992] has with the merged policy agenda of the IFIs and bilateral donors gained increasing currency in international development circles[14]. However, Bebbington and Riddell [1997:108] note that the term 'civil society' is a notoriously slippery concept, based on the different ways it is defined and applied in practice. Bratton [1989b:417], for example emphasises the need for a neutral definition of civil society and offers the following:

> an arena where manifold social
> movements . . . and civic
> organisations from all classes . . .
> attempt to constitute themselves in an
> ensemble of arrangements so that
> they can express themselves and
> advance their interests

The problem with this definition is its very neutrality and a failure to locate civil society into a historical, political and economic context. Jorgensen [1996:36] takes a Bratton's definition a step further by defining civil society as comprising "organised activities by groups or individuals performing certain services or trying to influence and improve

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[14] See Endnote 3 for examples of World Bank texts that incorporate the potential of civil society, and for the way the Bank defines civil society as institutional capital for collective action.

society as whole, but are not part of government or business". On the other hand, UNDP [1993:45] defines and delineates the term in the following manner:

> civil society is together with the state and the market one of the three 'spheres' that interface in the making of democratic societies. Civil society is the sphere in which social movements become organised. The organisation of civil society, which represents many diverse and sometimes contradictory social interests are shaped to fit their social base, constituency, thematic orientations [e.g. environment, gender, human rights] and type of activity. They include church related groups, trade unions, co-operatives, service organisations, community groups and youth organisations, as well as academic institutions.

The dispute over the definition appears to rest on whether 'civil society' is distinct from or overlaps with the state and the market. According to Biggs and Neame [1995: 35] simplistic definitions of civil society create the danger that donors may think that SNGOs and GROs "can ensure the 'delivery' of democracy and civil society - that they are goals to be achieved rather than processes and arenas that continually evolve". Some NNGOs increasingly recognise that their support of national or local organisations can be a way of strengthening civil society in Southern countries[15]. Strengthening and involving SNGOs can be seen as beneficial to civil society because SNGOs themselves are part of civil society and also because the work of SNGOs can strengthen other institutions of civil society [Bebbington and Farrington 1993a: 11]. Indeed guidance to donors issued by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD][16] ascribes a central role to the financing of SNGOs and civil society programmes as a counterweight to government. But civil society need not necessarily stand in opposition to the state, as Beckman [1998:56] argues:

> for the notion of 'civil society to make sense it must involve some structuring of relations that distinguishes it from just being 'society . . . it is the relationship with the state that is the structuring principle. Civil Society does not exist independent of the

state; it is situated in rules and transactions which connect state and society

Indeed an economically weak state may seek to reduce transactions costs by providing a more open and supportive atmosphere in which civil society can flourish, and in countries where democratic structures are incipient or non-existent Batkin [1992: 67] lauds the ability of SNGOs and GROs to "nurture representative systems" in civil society and as models for the state. Improved survival and longevity of these actors may increase their leverage, for "as long as rural organisations come and go, the state is more able to weather their pressure [Bebbington and Farrington 1993a: 12]. Others feel this is asking too much of SNGOs and GROs. Bratton [1989b: 430] labels the promotion of democracy through civil society "vexed", a question that seems too big for Africa" and recommends looking first at whether the organisations of civil society are themselves run democratically. Concerns about the accountability of civic actors like SNGOs and GROs in Africa is echoed by Makumbe [1998: 311] who states that "a major weakness of civil society in Africa is that some of the civic groups are themselves sadly undemocratic in both their organisational structures and their operations".

NNGOs do however have a choice in whether or not to engage with local non-government actors. Fowler [1998a: 154] defines the choice thus, NNGOs can either sit in the middle of interactions between groups by focusing on supply-side projects and add to transactional costs; or they can change their role to act as relational brokers and linkage makers between the state and local non-government actors. However, regardless of the perspective of NNGOs towards SNGOs, it is ultimately the state that determines the space available to foreign and local non-government actors, and I will now turn to a brief analysis of factors that have influenced the state's approach towards non-government actors in Africa.

Transformation and Change: The State in Sub-Saharan Africa

Contextualising the interaction between institutions and organisations demands that we understand the internal and external challenges facing many Sub-Saharan African states. Nearly all states in Sub-Saharan Africa suffered extreme economic setbacks in the 1980s which were not alleviated by the initial IFIs approach towards structural adjustment, Krugmann [1995: 130] observes that Africa in the 1980s was in the midst of difficult and complex development crises, the analysis of which was often restricted to purely economic

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[15] See endnote 4 for an example of Save the Children Fund's position towards the emergence and proliferation of SNGOs.

[16] See endnote 5 for OECD guidance on donor approaches to civil society entitled Participatory Development and Good Governance [1995].

phenomena in line with the NPE[17]. Insufficient attention was given to institutional issues where states tended to:

> intervene in self-serving (and inefficient) ways, with limited accountabilityand without much popular participation in decision-making processes...... highly centralised authority, and often autocratic rule, have reflected governments' perceived need to exercise tight control over people and resources .....
>
> [Krugmann 1995: 131]

The causes of the crises in Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly structural rather than contingent, since the crises was almost universal and could not simply be attributed to particular national circumstances. Indeed the decreasing ability of many states to provide minimum levels of well-being to their citizens led NGO theorists like Fowler [1991: 62] to conclude that African states had "failed the test of effective performance". However, Fowler's statement fails to take account of the linkages between colonial and post-colonial institutions which created the pre-conditions for a predatory state which is characterised by Bevan and Ssewaya [1995:12] as "a state where normally law abiding people ignore the law since salaries are not paid, resources are misappropriated, bribery becomes institutionalised, and taxes are not collected".

The characterisation of the crises as a predatory condition brought about by highly centralised authority reflects North's [1981:59] claim that: "it is the successes and failures in human organisation that account for the progress and retrogression of societies"; and while structural adjustment programmes were the universal remedy for this crises, the impact of adjustment differed from country to country. It is in this vein that Bebbington and Farrington [1993a: 7] caution against sweeping criticisms of donors, because:

> in countries were the state bore predatory characteristics public sector retrenchment often merely formalised a de facto situation in which the state had already collapsed and was doing little or nothing of significance for the middle and lower income groups.

According to Mamdani [1998] the weaknesses in the institutional and organisational structures of states' in Sub-Saharan Africa are derived from two sources: the first, post-World War 11 colonial

reform that was Africa's last attempt at continent-wide democratic transition; the second was the global influence of liberal ideas, especially following the collapse of Soviet-style communism[18]. Mamdani also argues that from the former sprang pluralism and from the latter rights; and observes that in the build-up to independence pluralism was too often equated with its political dimension. As a result:

> the same reform which recognised the existence of political movements undermined the autonomy of social movements. By cultivating the former but suffocating the latter, the reform drove a wedge between political and social movements, and created a post-Independence environment for the emergence   of state-parties, at first several, and then one . . . it is this highly restricted notion of pluralism which prepared the soil for single-party dictatorships in a growing number of African countries . . . only an understanding of pluralism that incorporates its social and ideological moments alongside its political
> moment can check this tendency.
>
> [Mamdani, 1998:85]

It is therefore possible to trace linkages between the mainstreaming of alternative strategies in adjustment - with a focus on linking economic reform to institutional processes concerned with participation, capacity building and good government[19] - to wider global realignments in geo-political relations.   In fact it was in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union that the1990 World Development Report [World Bank 1990] first reflected this change in strategy with its emphasis on building capacity to reduce poverty.   According to the 1993 progress report on Poverty Reduction [World Bank 1993b: vii] implementing the strategy involved:

> supporting policies that encourage growth that fosters the efficient use of labour, which is one asset the poor have in abundance. Equally important is supporting policies that provide the poor with better access to

[17] For example, Sandbrook, R. [1985*] The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*, and Zaki Ergas (ed) [1987] *The African State in Transition.*

[18] Mamdani [1998:83] argues that on the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union lessened the weight of geopolitical factors in shaping western policies towards Africa; on the other hand, the end of superpower rivalry over the continent has 'orphaned' many a government in Africa.

[19] The British Overseas Development Administration [now DfID] Technical Note no 10 on 'Good Government' identified four components to this agenda: legitimacy of government; accountability of both political and official elements of government; competence of government to formulate appropriate policies; and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

basic social services, including primary education, family planning and primary health care . . . [W]here necessary, these measures should be supported by safety nets to protect those people who are unable to take advantage of growth or those who might be adversely affected by the adjustment process

In other words the focus on institutional capacity building to alleviate poverty, albeit within a growth-centred model, added momentum to the diminution of the NPE agenda. Indeed according to Goetz and O'Brien [1995: 23] the entry of participation and governance into policy formulation is primarily concerned with increasing "the capacity of local communities to perform functions which the state has not managed effectively, such as the delivery of social services." Indeed the emphasis donors place on capacity building as a medium for addressing governance and participation should weaken predatory regimes. But as Brett [1992:2] observes, it is easier to destroy bad institutions than create good ones; and the process will only succeed if it is followed by the creation of political institutions that are, sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent to absorb and order the participation of these new groups and to promote social and economic change. In Sub-Saharan Africa the emphasis placed on building the capacity of government and non-governmental actors was confirmed in the World Bank's [1997b:53] assertion that "African government must be at the centre of efforts to reduce poverty in their countries . . . [T]his shift will bring new challenges for governments and donors and justifies a broad based, participatory process of policy formulation". The assertion represented a shift from an exclusive focus on expenditure to include the content of welfare provision, and concern about distributional outcomes[20] of public spending [World Bank 1995b]. Udsholt [1995] notes that even in poor countries like Uganda, the analyses of the state's role in poverty alleviation and service provision has began to focus on the basic questions of what rights people have to welfare, who should provide the services and the types of institutional and organisational capacity that needs to be created and strengthened.

2.2 Analytical Framework

Taking my cues from economic and sociological theories on institutions I deploy these as heuristic devices to explore and analyse the spaces opened up for interactions between the state, non-

governmental actors and donors in the context of the NPA by triangulating these devices with modifications to Bratton's analysis. The approach will be underpinned by the view that mainstreaming alternative strategies into structural adjustment involves a reflexive process that has profound implications for the way institutional and organisational interactions are sutured between the state, non-governmental actors and donors in Uganda. Jordan [1996: 107], taking his cues from Giddens and Mouzelis [cf. Page11], operationalises the concept of reflexivity as being:

> a general process driven by social, political and economic change, by which actors, confronted with the erosion, or transformation, of established patterns of belonging, readjust existing notions . . . to new conceptions of identity, solidarity and institutional foci of redress.

Bebbington and Farrington [1993a:123] capture the essence of reflexivity as they consider the option for non-government actors to 'dance' with the state: "The decision to dance, or not, is ultimately a country-specific one". Thus it is assumed that the level to which alternative strategies to adjustment have been mainstreamed will be highly contextual, and that non-government actors will shape their 'dance' in a manner that is unique to the context.

Bratton's model of analysis was devised in 1989, and times have since moved on. Therefore my approach to exploring and analysing interaction between the key actors differs in four significant ways from his model. First NNGOs are differentiated from SNGOs, while Bratton' framework makes no explicit distinction between these two actors. SNGOs are much more vulnerable to control by the state than are NNGOs [this also applies to control by donors because unlike NNGOs - which raise their own money from private donations - many SNGOs are more or less totally dependent on donors]; this partially explains Bratton's emphasis on "counterstrategies" and OECDs emphasis on NGOs acting as a "counterweight". SNGOs face many challenges if they decide to enter a closer relationship with government; the NGOs suffer a threat to their identity and their autonomy, and their cohesion can be weakened as new internal tensions develop [Bebbington and Farrington 1993a: 49] Although these problems may also pertain to some NNGOs which are highly dependent on donor funding, they are more specific to the situation of resource-poor SNGOs, and reinforce the need to differentiate between NNGOs and SNGOs.

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[20] See Endnote 6 for summary of World Bank concerns about distribution in the context of market failures and policy constraints on Southern states.

Second, the emphasis given to institutional transformation under the NPA may result in closer interactions between key actors, which goes beyond the counter-strategy role that Bratton allocates to non-government actors. For example, NNGOs may work to train government staff and SNGOs maybe asked to assist in the development or reorientation of a government or donor's programme. Indeed, Clark [1991: 76] notes that "even 'bad' governments have 'good' departments with which NGOs can work". Bratton does group such approaches under the heading "selective collaboration". I will therefore consider institutional transformation as part of a reflexive process that leads to negotiation of co-presence by both government and non-government actors, rather than restricting the process to a simple struggle between government control and non-government actor autonomy.

My third refinement of Bratton's model is an emphasis on the importance of other actors to the government-NGO relationship. It appears somewhat misleading to focus on this relationship quite as narrowly as Bratton does. Esman and Uphoff [1984:281 in Bebbington and Farrington 1993a] warn against the 'image of the monolithic regime', especially in light of internal divisions generated by structural adjustment. The influence of donor coordination and conditionalities can exercise huge influence on the spaces for interaction between the state and non-government actor, which are shaped by the structures of government, and the level to which decision-making is centralised or decentralised. In other word the 'dance' is most likely to be predicated on the presence or absence of space created by the state.

Fourthly, I draw into focus the involvement of NNGOs and SNGOs in interventions aimed at institutional transformation and organisational development. This aspect of NGO activity adds an interesting twist to NGO-government relations because it inspires debate over the appropriate role of the state and the reflexive posture of government, non-government actors and donors in the context of mainstreaming alternative strategies to adjustment.

However, for NNGOs their involvement in institutional transformation has provoked Kothari [1993] to charge that by being co-opted into the mainstream growth-centred agenda of IFIs and bilateral donors they loose their ability to critique adjustment policy. Kothari's charge can, can also be extended to SNGOs and GROs but his argument presumes that the interactions between the IFIs and non governmental actors is taking place in a non-reflexive context. Indeed Giddens [1986:16] argues that within hierarchical space "all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence

the activities of their superiors." But the shift in the adjustment policies of IFIs nevertheless poses a dilemma for the ways in which non-government actors engage in direct or indirect approaches to scaling-up their institutional interventions. As Edwards [1993:4] notes "the ever changing balance between public and private provision complicates dialogue because it becomes more difficult to see what sort of 'capacity' [of government or of civil society] needs to be strengthened - the capacity to provide services, or the capacity to regulate them or a mixture of both?". In other words, while different groups of actor can actively engage in the construction of their own social worlds, the circumstances, as Marx [1962:252] observers, are not necessarily of their own choosing.

2.3 Methodological Framework

The central research questions for this study are rooted in a nomothetic review of concepts and categories developed by both development practitioners and academics. However, in order to probe the generalisations depicted in the literature the research effort was complemented by an ideographic field-based study to collect primary data in the form of interviews with NNGOs, SNGOs, government ministries, the World Bank, UNDP, DANIDA - the leading bilateral development donor in Uganda, and policy research institutes in Uganda in June 1998[21]. This fieldwork process enabled the author to conceptualise and contextualise accounts which captured the meanings and experience of interaction between the key actors.

To facilitate the process of generating insights into the meanings and experiences, interviews paid particular attention to the way institutional issues where characterised, and the way organisational interactions between key actors were defined and depicted in Uganda. The rationale for choosing this qualitative approach was based on a desire to create what Richardson [1990:23] describes as a framework pitched at an immediacy of experience, unmediated by external interpretation; and to draw on the ideas of Carey [1989: 64-65] and Denzin [1992:27] by using communication to mediate between the personal and the structural. The objective being to gain insights into how key actors do things together, and how "social things hang together" [Rorty 1979: xiv]. The strength of this approach is that individuals are interviewed in sufficient detail for the results to be taken as true, correct and believable reports of their views and

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[21] See Appendix 3 for interview itinerary, organisational profiles, and the process that was followed before and during fieldwork in Uganda.

experiences[22]. These strengths are exemplified by the dimensions of the subject areas that were covered, and the depth to which issues were probed which, in turn, enabled areas of agreement and dissension to emerge. Denzin [1983: 136] contends that things exist only in interactions between persons, and that institutional structures provide the horizons of experience against which the actual content and form of experience are sketched and lived. Fowler [1998b: 170] also makes the important observation that development problems "nest with each other".

To capture the 'nesting' of interactions between key actors the 'grounded theory' method, developed by Strauss and Corbin [1990], was used to analyse the ideographic data. This method involves the use of thick descriptions to provide a framework for interpretation, and for moving beyond description to explanation by capturing the meanings and experiences that have occurred in field situations. Under these conditions the method uncovers the means that inform and structure the subjects experiences[23]. According to Denzin [1989: 33] a thick description has the following features: it gives the context of an act; it states the intentions and meanings that organise the action; it traces the evolution and development of the act; and it presents the action as a text that can then be interpreted. Overall the methodology helps strengthen theoretical formulations of reality by creating a systemic framework that synthesises and integrates nomothetic and ideographic data. In keeping with this approach the next chapter contextualises issues by delineating and analysing the dimensions that characterise economic and institutional transformations in Uganda.

3. ECONOMIC REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL RELEGITIMATION IN UGANDA

3.1 Overview

Uganda achieved political independence from Britain in 1962 and at the time its economic and social indicators were similar to Malaysia's [GoU 1997a: v]. In the 1990s with a population of around 20 million and a per capita income of around US$ 220 Uganda is one of the poorest countries in the world and its social indicators are below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa[24]. However, over the last twelve years Uganda has embarked on a dual process of economic growth and institutional reform which is unique in Sub-Saharan Africa. These reforms have been shaped by preceding historical events, and the evolution of the Ugandan state in the twentieth century can be categorised into four broad periods[25]: first, the imposition of external hegemonic control formalised under the Uganda Agreement of 1900 in which the Baganda - the dominant ethnic[26] group [from which the country's modern name is derived] in the south - conceded to British authority; second, the initial dominance of expatriate interests and the suppression of African interests between 1900-1940, followed by the Africanisation of colonial structures in the 1940s and 1950s through the devolution of powers to local government; third, the dissolution of the post-colonial state between 1964 and 1986 under Milton Obote [1962-1971 and 1980-1985] General Idi Amin [1971-1978][27] both of whom used their regimes to create a predatory state by strengthening the army; maximising the personal wealth of Ministers and undermining devolved institutional structures; and fourth, from 1986 onwards the creation - following a five year civil war waged by the National Resistance Army [NRA] - of an economically liberal and decentralised rule governed state[28] under the NRA's political-wing the National Resistance Movement [NRM] headed by President Museveni. The NRM was originally rooted in the ideology of Marxism and dependency theory. But according to Byarugaba [1997:43] after its military victory in 1986 it put national reconciliation ahead of ideology, and subsequently included a broad range of social groupings in an effort to upgrade economic capacity and establish institutional reforms.

Taking 1986 as its starting point this chapter is interwoven with ideographic data, and is divided into two inter-related sections which outline the trends created by key reforms that have been

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[22] Hakim [1987] also observes that if qualitative research is dismissed as a weak alternative to a survey this is because the validity problems in survey data are largely invisible and regularly overlooked as a result, particularly by economists and statisticians who routinely work with large datasets and official statistics. Indeed, Bryman [1988:108-109 cited in Hammerseley 1993] suggests that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is really a technical matter whereby the choice between them is to do with their suitability in answering particular research questions.

[23] See Endnote 7 - The author has used this approach to guide and inform previous research studies, and is therefore aware of its theoretical and methodological contribution to understanding and explaining interaction between actors.

[24] *The World Development Report* 1997 [World Bank 1997b] places Uganda as the Worlds 14th poorest nation, and the *Human Development Report* 1997 [UNDP 1997a] ranks Uganda 159th in its human development index. See Appendix 4 for selected economic and social indicators for Uganda.

[25] See Brett, E.A.1995, 1996; Bevan and Ssewaya 1995; Engberg-Pedersen 1996; World Guide1997/98; Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998.

[26] See Endnote 8 for profile of Ugandan ethnic classification.

[27] See Endnote 9 for short account of instability that prevailed between the fall of Amin in 1979 and the emergence of Obote's second regime in the 1980s.

[28] See Appendix 5 for political and administrative map of Uganda which demarcates Uganda into 45 separate decentralised administrative districts.

instituted by the IFIs, bilateral donors and the NRM under structural adjustment. The first part outlines the economic reform processes which dominated structural adjustment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, while the second part focuses on institutional reforms which have been harnessed alongside a continuum of economic reforms throughout the 1990s. Harnessing institutional reform alongside economic reform has made adjustment in Uganda highly complex, given that it has taken place against the background of continued insurgency by rebel movements[29]. According to Nabuguzi [1994:18] this means that structural adjustment in Uganda has been forced into dealing with a home-grown relegitimation exercise intended to re-root the state and reconsolidate its institutions. In other words, it is the relegitimation of the state that has opened-up the spaces for interaction between the key actors. The spaces created by acts of relegitimation are overlapping, but for reasons of clarity they are delineated into separate themes.

3.2 Economic Reforms: Growth in the midst of Poverty

When the NRM government came to power in 1986 its leaders inherited a shattered economy, but with Marxist inclinations they were deeply opposed to adopting an IFI imposed adjustment programme. However by 1987, with inflation running at over 147 percent and a real GDP decline of 2 per cent [Brett 1996: 316], resistance waned and a three year Economic Recovery Programme was agreed with the IFIs. The main reason for accommodation with the IFIs was that the economy could not recover without donor support and the donors refused to supply financial and technical support without a change in approach. The twin tools of donor conditionality and coordination, coupled with increasing levels of security and a coffee boom, had been so effective in reversing the economic decline that by the early 1990s the government had become a partner rather than a follower of the IFIs economic reform agenda[30]. According to Harvey and Robinson [1995: 12] the pattern of economic policy making changed not only because President Museveni became more favourably disposed to private sector interests, but also because business associations had become more adept at producing well argued policy papers and lobbying ministers and civil servants[31]. However, while growth was recorded in official statistics, and gross aid flows to

Uganda were averaging US$500 million per annum [World Bank 1995c: 17], debt service payments and government parastatals[32] were consuming an ever growing proportion of government revenue and there were no significant improvements in the living standards of the majority of the population, particularly the poor[33]. Indeed a household survey to assess poverty was completed in 1992 and followed-up by monitoring surveys each year thereafter [Appleton 1998:3]. These surveys revealed that the highest incidence of poverty was in the northern part of the country [a factor that tended to reinforce political instability], and was predominately a rural phenomenon. The challenge posed by the character and scale of poverty was compounded by the demographic structure of the population [with 61 percent aged under 19 years of age] and the high dependency ratio which is reinforced by the effects of the AIDS pandemic on communities and families[34]. Against the background of the scale and depth of poverty in Uganda, the World Bank in 1990 launched the Programme to Alleviate Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment [PAPSCA] which was designed as a narrowly-targeted initiative for groups directly affected by adjustment. The programme was budgeted at US$108 million, but only US$ 36 million was raised from donors and the programme was supposed to be implemented by NGOs [Udsholt 1995: 45]. However, while some NNGOs like World Vision became implementers others like Oxfam and SCF declined to take part. Oxfam [1991:8] for example, took the view that "for a northern NGO to utilise funds that must be repaid to the World Bank by yet unborn generations of Ugandan's raises some serious ethical questions". In the event the World Bank [1993b:125] found that PAPSCA led to "a marginal collection of projects of varying quality spread far too thinly to have a broad impact on poverty".

In 1997 the Government devised the Poverty Eradication Action Plan [PEAP]. The plan - which prioritises education, health, infrastructure, agriculture and labour, and takes its cues from the

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[29] See Endnote 10 for short account of security concerns and sources of insurgency.

[30] See Endnote 11 for an overview of factors that influenced change in government position: economic growth, donor aid flows and the contribution of NNGOs.

[31] See Endnote 12 for overview of privatisation programme.

[32] In 1996 debt service payments amounted to US$184 million, or more than a third of government revenue [Oxfam International 1996: 2]; the parastatal sector consumed between US$150-250 million per year, or about a quarter of the budget [World Bank 1997d:5].

[33] The dissonance between macroeconomic growth and its impact on poverty was reflected in the World Bank's report entitled: Uganda Growing Out of Poverty [1993b], which classified 66.3 percent of the population as living in absolute poverty on less than US$110 per annum; and of these 86.2 percent were living in relative poverty on less than US$55 per annum.

[34] See Endnote 13 for a brief discussion on the dependency ratio and the scale and characterisation of the AIDS pandemic in Uganda.

Blantyre Statement[35] [World Bank 1996: 163-169] - seeks to redress the failures of PAPSCA by harnessing macroeconomic policy with on-going process of decentralised institutional reform. Its primary aim is stated as being to reduce the population living in absolute poverty to less than 10 percent, and of those living in relative poverty to 30 percent by 2017 [GoU1997a:1]. The institutional structures for implementing the plan are delineated between central and local government; the principles are based on the protection of human rights, equity and access by the poor to basic services, and the methods are channelled through capacity-building measures to be undertaken by NGOs and GROs[36]. However, in interviews with the World Bank the role envisaged for NGOs and GROs is less clear cut because:

> the government is not yet clear about what it expects from the non-government sector and civil society. The Bank's thrust is to push the field into contact with the people across all social sectors through an expanded private sector which includes for-profits and not-for-profits. The government has to realise that in many areas of the country there are no NGOs, and there are no public services and since the public sector is so inefficient the private sector is the only solution. So in underserved areas the Bank will encourage the private sector and no distinction will be made between the NGOs and the for-profits.

Indeed on questions of decentralisation, access and equity, which are central tenets of the PEAP, the Bank's view is that:

> access is a non-issue because in so many areas there are no public service. Even when government funds services like health, staff steal[37] or sell the drugs, or patients are

asked to pay for drugs that are provided by the government . . . [A]nd, while the Bank recognises that there is a difference between a willingness and ability to pay, the districts will have to decide on who qualifies for subsidies. The Bank is planning to assist the government with the development of district profiles to determine how centrally allocated grants will be distributed and targeted under decentralisation. The private sector of both NGOs and for-profits will have a role here as project implementers.

In other words, the depth and scale of poverty is such that in the short-to-medium term the Bank's priority is create spaces for the participation of for-profit and non-profit actors in the delivery of services. This agenda is based on the premise that the state does not have the revenue-base or the technical capacity to meet social needs on the scale required to eradicate poverty. However, in pursuing this agenda the Bank confuses privatisation - with its focus on changing relationships between the state and market - and decentralisation - which focuses on institutional arrangements within the public sector. Indeed it does not take account of different transactions costs that are involved in using for-profit and non-profit actors. According to the Social Sector Department [SSD] in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning [MoFEP], the Bank's approach is blinkered because:

> it fails take account of a weakness of the private-for-profit sector in that it will not seek to influence the policy agenda, and thereby an opportunity to add value to the reform agenda in a manner that international NGOs have attempted to do, and which local NGOs will probably want to do, will be lost.

Indeed, the Poverty Monitoring Unit [PMU] of the MoFEP concurred with this view, but argued that:

> The whole issue of NGOs is in a state of flux. On the one hand there is no distinction between local NGOs and GROs at the district level, and on the other hand, at national level there are very few effective indigenous NGOs. So you cannot lump all the NGOs together, the international NGOs are in class of their own. In fact up until now the internationals [NGOs] could go out and do what they wanted, Uganda was essentially an open space for them. But we are

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[35] See Endnote 14 for Summary of the Blantyre Statement on Poverty Alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa.

[36] The plan posits the role of NGOs and GROs in a political and social setting which "allows and promotes participation of civil society . . . in decision-making and management of local level development schemes in accordance with the principles of good government . . . .[N]GOs, CBOs and the poor will be involved in the process of planning, implementing and maintaining local-level services." [GoU 1997a: 21-22].

[37] According to a survey conducted by Ablo and Reinikka for the World Bank, it is estimated that 70 percent of drugs supplied by the state are siphoned-off by staff for their personal gain [1997:20]. Overall the level of corruption in the public system is thought to be on the increase, and in separate interviews with the Economic Policy Research Centre [EPRC], the Makerere Institute for Social Research [MISR] and Uganda Debt Network [UDN] it was alleged that tracking studies conducted by the World Bank suggest that 65 cents in every $ of donor assistance is siphoned-off.

now, through the PEAP, defining the space they will work in.

3.3 Institutional Reforms: From Political Movement to Constitutional Government

During the war waged by the NRA against Obote's second regime, the political-wing [NRM] mobilised and politicised the areas it controlled into local units known as Resistance Councils [RCs]. According to Kisakye [1996: 37] the RCs laid the foundation of a local government system which the NRM extended to the whole of the country after gaining power in 1986. The fundamental principles of the NRM were framed around a Ten Point Plan [TPP] which it has subsequently used as a platform for the creation of a state characterised by democratic accountability, popular participation, self-determination and self-governance[38]. The TPP, which emphasised economic and institutional reforms, in effect provided the IFIs and bilateral donors with a framework that was broadly complimentary to a process of mainstreaming alternative strategies to adjustment in accordance with the NPA.

The creation of an enabling state under the NRM can be delineated by a number of key institutional changes, including: constitutional reform, civil service reform and decentralisation. These changes have had a significant impact on patterns of interaction between key actors, and this section delineates the institutional and organisational changes and analyses the challenges they present.

Constitutional Reform

In keeping with the TPP, constitutional reform has been a central plank of the NRMs political programme. It was against this background that a 21-member Constitutional Commission was established in 1988 to prepare a draft constitution by 1991 and recommend a timetable for its introduction. The consultation process - which involved the Commission visiting 870 sub-counties - was mainly supported and funded by DANIDA, and according to the Danish Embassy in Kampala the process could only begin after the security situation had improved, and focused on "promoting human rights by drawing-in community ideas and views, and feeding these into the draft constitution so that ethnic tensions that characterised the 1980s could be avoided". The establishment of the Commission was followed by nation-wide elections to various political bodies in 1989 in which candidates could stand for office but without affiliation to political parties. The

Commission submitted its report to the President in 1992, and recommended that elections to a Constituent Assembly be held to debate the draft constitution[39]. Elections to the Assembly were held in 1994, and the NRM gained two-thirds of the seats. According to Harvey and Robinson [1995: 10], the NRMs successes were in the southern half of the country, while the opposition candidates performed well in the Northwest and Northeast were anti-government insurgency was strongest. In October 1995 the new Constitution of the Republic of Uganda [GoU 1995] was approved.

The new constitution draws heavily on the TPP, and enshrines the following principles as official State policy: decentralisation and devolution of government functions and powers to people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs [Article 2 (iii)]; fundamental human rights by guaranteeing and respecting the independence of non-government organisations [Article 4 (ii)]; the right to development through State encouragement of private initiative and self-reliance [Article 10], and designates the State's role as being the establishment of measures that protect and enhance the right of people to equal opportunities in development [Article11(iiii)]. In effect the constitution provides the basis for the creation of an enabling state and seeks to avoid a reversion to the predatoriness that characterised past regimes. Elections under the new constitution were held in May 1996, and Museveni was elected president; and a new parliament - dominated by NRM supporters - was elected in July.

Civil Service Reform

The reform of the civil service has been an on-going process that commenced in 1988 when the NRM appointed a Public Service Review and Reorganisation Commission [PSRRC]. The commission reported to the NRM in 1990 and called for significant reductions in staff, an increase in salaries [linked to a living wage], and for public services to be based on Results Oriented Management [ROM]. In 1993 the World Bank [1993b:104] estimated that there were 97,854 civil servants. By 1994 following a rapid process of downsizing Ministries 14,000 civil servants had been dismissed, and over 40,000 'ghost workers' - who had been used to artificially inflate the payroll - had been eliminated. According to Harvey and Robinson [1995: 30] the redundancy package for civil servants was funded by donors to the tune of US$15.6 million.

As a means of improving civil service efficiency, the World Bank established the Uganda Institutional Capacity Building Project in 1995

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[38] See Endnote 15 for outline of the NRMs Ten Point Programme.

[39] See Endnote 16 for overview of electoral processes and level of dissent towards NRM position on non-party based politics.

which aims to strengthen the capacities of personnel within central and local government. According to the consultants assigned to this project [CIETinternational 1996: 8] the emphasis is on the phased introduction of ROM through National Service Delivery Surveys across all 45 districts. The objective being to establish effective mechanisms for the monitoring and evaluation of performance. In April 1998 the government completed its final review of ministerial staffing, mandates and responsibilities in light of the greater delegation of functions to districts[40]. The final review involves further reductions in the number of civil servants, and a further streamlining of line-Ministry functions as responsibilities are decentralised in accordance with the 1997 Local Government Act [see below].

Decentralisation

The RC system created by the NRM during the civil war was formally established as system of governance in the 1987 Resistance Councils and Committees Statute [GoU 1987]. The statute spelt out the powers, functions and roles of a five-tier system that linked the grassroots to central government[41]. The system paved the way for the creation and establishment of a decentralised system of local government that has evolved - and been supported by donors, primarily DANIDA[42] - since the early 1990s. According to Beavan and Ssewaya [1995: 13] in the early years the RC system involved hundreds of thousands of people, which did not allow for clear systems of reference or effective controls over officials. Indeed according to Brett [1993b:8] the system of corruption and inefficiency that was so wide-spread in local government under Obote and Amin is also true of many councils in the RC system because education and information flows are so limited and ties of personal dependency so strong, that the opportunities for abuse by both politicians and officials are extensive.

In order to create a more effective balance between state power and improved economic

management, the Local Government Statute of 1993 [GOU 1993] was introduced. This was designed to pave the way for responsive and accountable decentralised administration which would bring decision making closer to the population[43]. This statute allowed for an increasing number of districts to absorb responsibilities for recurrent budgets and local revenue raising at RC3 and RC5 levels. Evidence from evaluations [Villadsen 1996: 60-78] of decentralised districts indicate that technical and management capacity is extremely varied, and revenue generating abilities severely constrained by high dependency ratios and the absence of a significant monitised economy from which to extract local taxation. The consequence has been that interaction between districts and non-government actors on the supply-side has become rooted in a hierarchy which places NNGOs at the pinnacle, followed by umbrella-type SNGOs [which work with NNGOs] in the middle and GROs at the bottom. According to the Decentralisation Secretariat of the Ministry of Local Government [MoLG], the hierarchy is based on the fact that at district level NNGOs are seen as 'donors' and not as partners. NNGOs have achieved this position on the basis that they have achieved power and privilege by:

> working through 'big men' at the centre due to weak planning and control at government level. So when you come to the districts the staff there become onlookers, because the foreign NGOs have already negotiated their positions at the centre and most of the districts are too weak to resist the foreign NGOs. On the other hand, all NGOs are expected to implement government policy and be complementary to government. The issue that will in future define the relationship between foreign NGOs and local NGOs and the government is whether a policy of divestiture or delegation is pursued in a given sector. So for example, there is no reason why rural extension services could not be privatised, while a medical centre or hospital is run by an NGO according to government rules and regulations. The important thing to remember in Uganda is the dominant role of the state in both private and public sectors and without the state not much happens, most foreign NGOs take this as fact.

However according to the SSD in the MoFEP the influence of NNGOs on central and district levels

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[40] IMF [1997: 10]

[41] RC1s = Village; RC2 = Parish based on 10-15 RC1s; RC3 = Sub-county based on 10-15 RC2s; RC4 = County based on 5-10 RC3s; RC5 = District based on 2-8 RC4s. The NRMs structure that links local with central government is not unique, and resonates with the system of administration that has evolved in Botswana - which is Sub-Saharan Africa's most enduring democracy - where the Kgolta [village assembly] is linked to a village development committee [VDC] which feeds into local councils and then into districts. The latter then provides links into central government [See Clayton, A. 1995: 12-15].

[42] Between 1993-1997 DANIDA committed over DKK100 million - approximately US$16.6 million - to Phase 1 of decentralisation process. A further DKK 71 million - US$12 million - has been committed to Phase 11 to the year 2000 [DANIDA 1997:59].

[43]Not all donors have taken a benevolent view of the Ugandan government's approach to decentralisation - See Endnote 17 for views from within USAID.

of government is not expected to change for the foreseeable future given:

> the limited capacity at both levels. In fact if you look around you will see that it in many cases it is the innovations of international NGOs that have been adopted by Ministries and districts. The work of Save the Children Fund on the Children's Statute and the Poverty work done by Oxfam are two examples . . . . [T]he key issue that international NGOs are going to have to address is whether they will become part of a trend where they act as contractors for the state or donors alongside the private for-profit sector. What's not clear in all this is whether local private-for-profit contractors will be able to deliver services more efficiently than international NGOs or emerging local NGOs.

In spite of uncertainties over the capacity of districts to cope with the fiscal and technical demands of decentralisation, by 1996 nearly all 45 districts had been incorporated into the programme; and in 1997 the government passed the Local Government Act 1 [GoU 1997b] which created Local Councils [LCs] using the five-tier pyramid established under the RC system. In keeping with Article 2(iii) of the 1995 Constitution, the Local Government Act [LGA] gives "full effect to the decentralisation of functions, powers and responsibilities and services to all levels of local government" [Article 2], which are managed by locally constituted Executive Committees "responsible for all the supervision of the implementation of policies and decisions made by its Council" [Article 27]. In addition, and in keeping with Article 11(iii) of the constitution, the LGA formally relegates central government line Ministries to the strategic functions of inspection and monitoring, and offering technical advice, support, supervision and training within their respective sectors [Article 97]. However, interviews with the MoLG revealed that:

> The centre will have leverage on the districts through consolidated grants and equalisation grants[44] which are designed to compensate districts that lack the revenue base from which to plan and administer services . . . but this process is hampered by

resistance from line-Ministries who are reluctant to transfer their responsibilities, and by the fact resources are not released by the centre to enable districts fulfil their functions, and at the same time line-Ministries are restructuring which will result in the further loss of service delivery functions.

The decentralisation process has profound implications for donor-district interaction in that donors can now deal directly with districts. The implications, according to the MoLG, are that:

> Districts will have to cope with the project cycles, financial planning and reporting requirements of different donors, and they will have to contend with the planning and integration of different donor agendas. The difficulty for districts will be to ensure that they create horizontal, as opposed to vertical, programmes that will avoid disjunctures. These are problems that need working out between LC1 to LC5. . . .[A]t the moment there is duplication between donor co-ordination mechanisms. This will need to be clarified and districts will need assistance in compiling information on the activities of both international NGOs and donors, although I suspect that problems in compiling this information is likely to be with foreign NGOs who are more prone to secrecy.

The idea that districts, with their scarce managerial capacity, can effectively coordinate NNGO and donor activities and meet their conditionalities does not stand-up to scrutiny. Indeed the prospect of decentralising NNGO and donor coordination holds two possibilities: either NNGOs and donors will increasingly pick and choose the districts they work with and exacerbate regional inequalities; or they will by-pass the Executive Committees in each district and negotiate directly with line-Ministries in an attempt to reduce their transaction costs. According to the SSD in the MoFEP:

> Decentralising donor coordination is a vexed issue, in fact many donors are likely to be weary of dealing directly with districts . . . . [t]he current practice is for donors to contact line-Ministries with a formal project proposal, a grant format is then drafted and submitted to the Development Committee [DC] for approval. The DC now uses the PEAP criteria for project approval, and assesses projects by sector to

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[44] The formula for the allocation of equalisation grants to districts had, at the time of writing, yet to be worked out. However, the Appropriation Act 1997 [GoU 1997c] does make provision for districts to receive consolidated grants from central Government. The consolidated grants are based on crude economic and social measures which are not sensitive to variations between districts.

avoid donor overcrowding and to determine whether projects fit with decentralisation and participatory criteria. What needs to happen, if donor confidence[45] is to be maintained is that nation-wide objectives are set for each sector and then districts will need to sign-up to these, and then line-Ministries and donors can support the programmes by sector. This is essential if the reform process is to remain on target and if conflicts over districts and sectors are to be avoided. The real difficulty with coordination is that the DC has no real oversight into what the majority of international NGOs[46] are doing and they are currently free to negotiate their   programmes directly with line-Ministries. This is a matter the government will have to address with both local and international NGOs.

It is clear from this assessment that civil service reform and decentralisation are likely to increase the transactions costs associated with organisational decision-making, and the impact and consequences of the reform processes were defined and depicted along two dimensions by a former official in the MoFEP[47]:

At the macro level:

> The process has been oriented in favour of technically strong Ministries which can fulfil the conditions in terms of planning and can focus on priority areas. Workshops have been conducted in clusters of districts to assist in planning, and to exchange information but this has been of limited value due to human and financial constraints in the districts, no support from the centre, and no provision for skill sharing between strong and weak districts. What decentralisation has done is produce a squeeze on the centre, therefore there is no need for strong centre to provide services, because the centre has been allocated the role of policy

formulation, monitoring and evaluation.

At the micro level:

> What has happened, and will continue to happen, is that the disparities between districts have grown because LCs are able to set their own salaries and better-off districts are able to attract the best staff from the centre, and poor districts loose out and are increasingly marginalised or 'colonised' by foreign NGOs who are losing interest in working with the centre. . . . [O]verall decentralisation is trade-off between service delivery being managed at the local level where districts and CBOs know the real situation on the ground and are able to make plans to meet needs; and a greater dependency on donor support to create equity and participation among districts which have no capacity to deliver given their weak revenue base. These are issues that donors have address as well as government because it is donors that fund 70 to 90 percent of the costs of decentralisation and also fund most of the NNGOs at the expense of building the capacity of districts and local groups.

Two themes can be deduced from the analysis presented by the MoLG and the MoFEP: the first, is that there is an emergent hierarchy being formed which locates key actors into unequal positions of influence. At the top are the macro actors [composed of the state, the IFIs and bilateral donors]; in the middle are meso-level actors [comprised of subordinated institutions of government - LC1-LC5, and non-governmental organisations - NNGOs and SNGOs], and at the bottom are micro actors [comprised of civil society groups - GROs]; secondly, there is the issue of donors funding NNGOs at the expense of directly investing in the capacity of local districts and non-government actors. Interaction within the hierarchy was characterised and delineated by DANIDA as falling along two dimensions: funding and organisational credibility under conditions of decentralisation:

> We fund Danish NGOs to the amount of DKK 110 million [US$18.3 million], and we expect them to channel these funds to build the capacity of SNGOs and local community groups. We do this because we have to meet the shortage of capacity within DANIDA, and because NGOs are more professional than government. If you

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[45] The DC meets monthly, but the approval process is very slow and can take up to 12 months between the submission of a proposal and its actual approval. The delay allegedly rests with line-Ministries who do not submit projects in time.

[46] The only time NGOs are subject to the scrutiny of the DC is when NGOs are included as an integral part of donor proposals.

[47] The interviewee is now Secretary General of the government's National Council for Children [NCC].

look at the budget support we give to government it just goes into a big pot with no real tangible results. There is also the question of visibility in that NGO projects can be filmed and reported back to Denmark to demonstrate and show people the effectiveness of Danish assistance.

There is clearly a paradox in DANIDA's approach where on the one hand investment is made in institutional reform, and yet doubt is expressed in the level of confidence that can be invested in the organisational structures generated by such reforms[48]. Indeed while DANIDA recognises that the lack of confidence in local actors does nothing to improve the effectiveness of central and local government[49], the agency claims it is caught in a dilemma created by the government's approach to decentralisation which lacks institutional credibility:

> The key issues are what role for line-Ministries?, what role for districts?, and what role for local NGOs and community groups in civil society? The danger that the government faces is that unless it clarifies these roles and responsibilities donors will continue to lack confidence in capacities, which leads donors to increase funding through the international NGOs.

In other words, one of the most important requirements for donor action is knowing about institutional regularities and the employment of these regularities to inform projects and strategies; and without 'regular' local institutions interaction becomes unintelligible, and has profound effects on the way confidence is expressed and in the way processes are defined and pursed by modifying actors like donors.

3.4 Summary

The major themes in this chapter have focused on an analysis of Uganda's transition towards an enabling state, and the ways in which government and donor agenda's towards adjustment have converged around the TPP and the NPA. Central

to this agenda has been growth-centred development, poverty alleviation and the opening-up of previously closed spaces through the creation of decentralised institutions and inclusive organisations. This agenda has clearly achieved some institutional benefits, in terms of increasing the potential of communities to influence matters which affect them by reducing bureaucratic obstacles to change, prioritising poverty and in seeking to bring service provision more closely in line with local needs and priorities. However, in a country with socio-economic characteristics like Uganda it is obvious that the reflexive processes unleashed by economic reform and institutional relegitimation have profound organisational implications for both government and non-government actors, the most notable being: a need to strengthen confidence in the organisational capacity of state institutions; the threat posed by growing social and economic disparities between districts; and the need to develop new conceptions of institutional identity and organisational solidarity between central and local government, and between different groups of non-government actor and donors. For both NNGOs and SNGOs the evidence suggests that these reflexive process will impact on the ways they seek to define their meso-level spaces either as part of an emerging private sector [as the World Bank would prefer], as part of the public sector, or as a hybrid of both. Overall it is clear that changing interactions under the NPA will require discursive mobilisation, and that capacities for organisational modification will be unevenly distributed between macro, meso and micro actors. Indeed access to centres of power, organisational technology and financial resources are most likely to shape capacities for modification. It is with these issues in mind that the next chapter delineates and analyses the manner in which 'new' institutional frameworks are transforming interaction between macro, meso and micro actors in the context of an emergent hierarchy of organisational co-presence in previously closed spaces.

4. HORIZONS OF EXPERIENCE: ORGANISATIONAL HIERARCHIES, CO-PRESENCE AND TECHNOLOGIES

4.1 Extraction, Penetration, Regulation and Appropriation

Uganda has clearly engaged in a process of institutional relegitimation which has focused on shrinking central government and on the creation of subordinated and decentralised rule-based government that brings the state into closer proximity with citizens. In effect structural adjustment under the terms of the NPA has sought to bring about both economic reform and the creation of new and emergent organisational

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[48] The source of this paradox may rest with omissions in DANIDA's overall development cooperation policy. Indeed, Udsholt [1996: 32] observes that while DANIDA puts poverty reduction to the forefront of its global development policy - which was revised in 1996 - he notes that "neither the Danida-NGO strategy, nor the various policy documents related to private sector development have so far dealt in any substantive way with how [Danish] NGOs or Danish companies may contribute to poverty reduction".

[49] See Endnote18 for observations on corruption, documented concerns about its scale and the government's attempt at an anti-corruption drive.

hierarchy that enhances the capacity of the state to extract, penetrate, regulate and appropriate [cf. Migdal, page 3] Under these conditions, this new and emergent organisational hierarchy is grounded in making adjustments that facilitate the re-creation of rules and regulations for both supply-side and demand-side interventions. Indeed it is the creation of conditions that facilitate rule-based extraction, penetration, regulation and appropriation that forms the very essence of the transition from a predatory to enabling state; and means that the state has to focus not only on "a question of what to do, but also of how to do it." [World Bank 1997b: 158]

However, the orientation of the New Policy Agenda in Uganda is reflexive and has not been about the creation of a new and emergent organisational hierarchy based solely on the state's ability to extract, penetrate, regulate and appropriate; it is also been about achieving these things alongside the incorporation of capacity building and collective participatory action by a range of other key actors [cf. Arrossi and Robinson page 7]. In this context co-presence at ordinate and subordinate levels of the emergent hierarchy becomes critical to the relegitimation of institutions [cf. Giddens page 24]. In fact co-presence in the spaces created for new conceptions of institutional identity and organisational solidarity [cf. Jordan page 22], means that the power to influence hierarchical space will largely depend upon the emergence of vertical and horizontal networks between macro, meso and micro actors in a manner that enables one group to become partially involved in the activities of another group.

In effect popular participation and capacity building have become part of the retinue of 'technologies' for the creation of amplified spaces within which organisations compete, with varying degrees of success, to internally and externally extract advantage, penetrate the space of other actors, regulate the activities of other actors and appropriate positions for themselves in the emergent hierarchy. Indeed Mouzelis [1995: 126] argues that "To talk about micro-macro, or about participant-social-whole linkages without taking account of social hierarchies is like trying to swim in an empty pool".

Looked at from this point of view, for an organisation to be effective under conditions of co-presence requires the generation of a network of social relations, where the ability to intervene effectively becomes a struggle within internal and externally ordinated and subordinated space. Indeed it is the emergent organisational hierarchy, the formation of internal and external networks,

and the processes of institutional relegitimation that provide the horizons of experience against which the actual content and form of experience within these spaces is sketched and lived by key actors in Uganda [cf. Denzin page 25], and enable one to interpret and explain what really is going in Uganda. But these horizons of experience also nest alongside [cf. Fowler page 25] a parallel struggle between macro, meso and micro actors to create spaces for co-presence under conditions of scarcity and competition [cf. North page 10]. In the Ugandan context the former concerns organised capacity - given the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the country; and the latter refers to competition over financial resources - which are predominately controlled by external donors and NNGOs.

The incorporation of horizons of experience under conditions of co-presence is crucial to understanding how Schien's and Chambers aspirations for the 'new paradigm', and Hamdi's dichotomy between respect for indigenous knowledge and recognising the limitations of outsiders knowledge [cf. page 7] really do resonate in the Ugandan context. Focusing on dimensions to the horizons of experience among different groups of actors is clearly central to generating understandings about the acts of commission and omission under the NPA, and the marginalisation of these internal and external experiences would either lead to the impossibility of moving from description to interpretation and explanation, or beyond what Mouzelis [1995] describes as teleological accounts of social phenomena.

This chapter, which is divided into four parts, therefore attempts to delineate the horizons of internal and external experience of meso actors in relation to other actors, and how these experiences have been shaped by institutional changes brought about by constitutional and civil service reform, and decentralisation in the context of scarcity and competition. The first part explores the institutional spaces provided by the state for non-government actors, and the organisational spaces that non-government actors have sought to create and amplify in the emerging hierarchy; the second part, on the ways NNGOs have sought to position themselves within the emerging hierarchy; the third, focuses on how NNGOs and SNGOs define the co-presence of donor agendas which have mainstreamed alternative approaches to adjustment - particularly the co-presence of the World Bank; and the fourth, focuses on how local non-government actors define the opportunities and constraints on their interaction with other meso-level subordinated institutions of government and with NNGOs.

4.2 Institutional and Organisational Spaces in the Hierarchy

According to the Office of the Prime Minister [OPM 1997a][50] there are an estimated 2000 registered NGOs and Community Based Organisations in Uganda. This represents an increase of 1200 from 1992, when 104 of these groups were identified as NNGOs [De Connick cited in Harvey and Robinson 1995: 15]. The legal framework supporting both SNGO and NNGOs is based on the Non-Governmental Organisations Statute of 1989 [GoU 1989], which was later elaborated under Statutory Instrument No 9 - the Non-Governmental Organisations Regulations of 1990 [GoU 1990]. Under the 1990 Statute government responsibility for NGOs is assigned to Minister responsible for Internal Affairs which administers the NGO Board[51], and the Statute differentiates between 'foreign' and 'Ugandan' NGOs [Article 2]. In order to qualify for registration all NGOs have to submit a written work plan for the consideration and approval of the Ministry responsible for Planning and Economic Development [Article 5]. However, the qualification requirements for NNGOs also requires, among other things, that they obtain a recommendation from the diplomatic mission in Uganda of the country from which the organisation originates [Article 5(c)]; while Ugandan NGOs have, among other things, to obtain recommendations from the RC2 and RC3 levels in the area where the organisation intends to operate [Article 5 (b iiii)]. The Statute also places certain restrictions on NGOs that prohibit them from making direct contact with people without prior notice [Article 12 (a)], and limit operations to approved geographical areas [Article 12 (d)]. The Statute to all intents and purposes currently forms the basis of external and internal interaction between the state and non-government actors, and was promulgated a short-time after a period when according to the Permanent Secretary[52] in the OPM:

> NGOs, both local and foreign, were considered at best a nuisance and at worst a security risk by the government of those days. Their activities were suspected and came under the great surveillance by the authorities. But the return of relative

peace in the country since 1986 has offered an opportunity for many NGOs to spring forward to peacefully operate.

> [OPM 1997b:1]

In other words, concerns about regime stability voiced by Bratton [cf. page 14] have shaped the space granted to non-governmental activity in Uganda. Indeed relative improvements in internal security coupled with progress on the implementation of institutional reforms stimulated the OPM in 1997 to commission UNDP to undertake a policy review of the non-governmental sector with a view to "assisting the Government of Uganda to update and refine national operational policy framework on Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), through an in-depth review of the NGO sector including statutory provisions and the Government/ NGO coordination relationships" [UNDP: 1997b:1]. In a letter to UNDP[53], the OPM instructed the review to address a number of questions, including whether NGOs "must discuss with government their proposed interventions in terms of national priorities and the locations of their projects as they try to address the problems of regional development priorities?" According to the Ugandan NGO Forum[54] the review has been established against the backdrop of a four year two-dimensional struggle for co-presence in the emerging hierarchy: between local NGOs and the government over representation at national level; and between NNGOs and SNGOs over roles and responsibilities. These struggles were depicted in the following manner:

> Prior to the formation of the NGO Forum which includes both NNGOs and local NGOs, the foreign NGOs were meeting in their own forum, and the local NGOs in another group. DENIVA[55] had sought to bring both groups together but the word 'indigenous' in its title created tensions with misgivings by the NNGOs who were allocated observer status with no rights or say in the course of events. In May 1995 DENIVA created a forum for topical fora on policy issues affecting NGOs, government and donors which excluded NNGOs and created a dispute[56]. Consequently the

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[50] OPM, Director Aid Coordination Unit, Presentation to Review of NGO Policy for Uganda at UNDP 28 October 1997.
[51] According to Kwesiga and Ratter [1993: 17] the NGO Board includes representatives from internal intelligence gathering organisations who are expected to monitor and vet NGOs seeking registration. They also point out that while formal control over registration rests with the NGO Board, responsibility for monitoring and co-ordination of NGOs falls under the OPM.

[52] OPM [1997b] Speech by Mr Peter R.K. Ucanda at the Meeting of the Commonwealth NGO Young Leaders, Fairway Hotel, Kampala, August 1st 1997.

[53] OPM [1997c] Support to Review of National NGO Policy for Uganda, 25 August 1997, Ref No OPM/05/1/1. See Endnote 19 for full ToR for the Review.

[54] See Appendix 3 for brief on NGO Forum.

[55] See Appendix 3 for brief on DENIVA.

[56] See Endnote 20 for outcome of prior attempt at establishing National NGO Forum.

beginnings of the NGO Forum were laid with the support of Oxfam, which at the time was chair of the NNGO group. To clarify the agenda between DEVIVA and the emerging NGO Forum we embarked on a consultation process between 1995-1996 which culminated in a conference convened in January 1997 and brought together 10 NNGOs, including Care, Action Aid, Oxfam and SCF, and over 600 local NGOs and community groups where the organisations present voted that international NGOs should stand for elected office in the Forum. We wanted the President [Museveni] to open the conference, but the government declined on grounds that the Forum was not a registered body, its official status was unclear and that there were some security concerns about the role of NNGOs in the Forum . . . [B]ut the real problem is that there is suspicion on both sides, the government recognises that NGOs are necessary institutions for its decentralisation programme, but by placing the NGO Board in the Ministry of Internal Affairs suggests to us that security concerns prevail. On the other hand the local NGOs want to be partners with government, but they have not been able to define their terms for the type of partnership they want.

The creation of the NGO Forum can essentially be seen as a process of developing an organisation which would allow NGOs to amplify their space in the emergent hierarchy and counterbalance state controls as defined in the 1989 and 1990 NGO Statutes. But the struggle for institutional space between the state and non-government actors was characterised by the Uganda Debt Network [UDN][57] as not being solely about security concerns, but also about control over scarce resources the types of capacity that need to be built at the district level:

> In theory, at the macro-level, the state is prepared to fund local NGOs, but in reality it does not have the means to do so, and at the micro-level there is a lot of work to be done with districts. Many districts don't know how to relate to local NGOs and GROs, they see them as clients who are asking for money, while they equate the

NNGOs alongside donors. The challenge for us in the NGO world is to enable the districts to see local NGOs and GROs as 'social investors' in the same way that districts see commercial enterprises as 'capital investors'. All this talk about national security and NNGOs is basically about power and control and a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities between NNGOs, local NGOs and districts.

The struggle for amplified space within the context of competition for control over resources and capacity resonates with Allen's [cf. page 13] observation that the legitimacy of the state is weakened if resources go to NGOs. Indeed, according to the PMU in the MoFEP the ability of the state to extract, penetrate, regulate and appropriate resources is:

> the real agenda, in that government needs to exercise control over the foreign NGOs who have tended to pick and choose the areas they work in, which for them reduces their transaction costs and increases their claim to making impact. On the other hand, some districts are being marginalised and if the government is to retain its credibility, particularly in those areas where security is being eroded, it needs to bring the foreign NGOs under its control. The government needs the NNGOs to work with districts on service delivery, and with decentralisation there is less need for them to work with line-ministries. In fact you will find that many of them have already lost their space because the bilateral donors and the World Bank have a big influence on many line-ministry functions and so the foreign NGOs are being forced to encourage the participation of communities and build capacity at district level, which is were all NGOs will have comparative advantage.

Readjusting spaces for co-presence in Uganda, and where NNGOs should focus their interventions resonates with the debate between Edwards and Hulme [cf. page 8] who argue that NNGOs have lost their space to influence southern-state policies; and Pieterse [cf. page 8], who argues that co-presence gives NNGOs more significant influence as alternative strategies to adjustment are mainstreamed. It is to this debate that I next turn with an exploration of how Oxfam and SCF have adapted to adjustments for co-presence, and

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[57] See Appendix 3 for brief on Uganda Debt Network

whether these NNGOs are in fact "looking both ways, at local grassroots development and at global alternatives" in the context of the emergent organisational hierarchy.

4.3 Transformations in the Space of NNGOs

It is clear that the capacity for institutional transformation is unevenly distributed between macro, meso and micro actors, and that meso actors - like NNGOs - are being configured within new centres of power that are strategically shaped by the state and the IFIs.   On the one hand this configuration holds forth the potential loss of role for NNGOs as meso actors with the capacity to interact with the macro level; and on the other, it creates opportunities for the reconfiguration of privileged space at the meso-level of subordinated decentralised government. However, as Mouzelis [1995: 146-147] points out, hierarchies can be employed as 'technologies' in the "construction, reproduction and transformation" of 'macro-spaces' by macro actors. Which raise the following questions: how are NNGOs like Oxfam and SCF adapting to structural constraints and opportunities for transformation when confronted with the forces of co-presence?; and what are the implications for their supply-side and demand-side interventions?   According to the Country Representative for Oxfam in Uganda:

> Oxfam places capacity-building at the centre of its strategy, because capacity building is seen as a means to an end though precisely what end is not clear at the moment, because it is difficult to judge what role the state wants to play and what it expects of civil society. But for us it involves working with government, districts, local NGOs and CBOs. The inclusion of government is a new departure for us in Uganda because traditionally we have focused on NGO and CBO sectors. Although the thought of working with central government in Uganda terrifies us when hear what other internationals [NGOs] like SCF have contend with.

However, in order to cope with the transformation of scaling-upwards to work with government, while at the same time retaining a footholds in both the meso and micro levels, Oxfam is:

> currently restructuring its programme and as such we plan to withdraw from health and disability sectors because its too operational on the supply-side and too overstreched in terms of the components that we are covering . . . [S]o we are in the process of creating

a strategic plan for guiding our work with local NGOs and CBOs and to look at ways of offering our partners longer term support and moving away from stop-gap funding which lacks sustainability. . . [t]he overall idea is to gradually phase-down our operational activities and focus more on our achievements with debt relief and poverty alleviation under PEAP, and we want to use the research and capacity-building activities like Participatory Poverty Assessments with DFID and the MoFEP[58] to lobby donors and government.

For SCF, on the other hand, the approach was couched in the following terms by its National Social Welfare Advisor:

> In SCF our programmes are no longer aimed at providing a service, but about enabling government structures to improve delivery, improve access and improve quality. This differs from the position we were in a few years ago when there were intensive service oriented projects aimed at sanitation, support to children's homes and detention centres and hospitals. Projects were too dispersed and the Fund [SCF] had no means of using its experience of project implementation . . . [O]ur policy work on the Children's Statute[59], our input into the National Programme of Action for Children, the development of National Training Guides and restructuring health care provision are examples of how we have shifted away from service delivery..... but we are now having to shift our attention to how these things will be implemented at the districts

However, according to SCFs Country Programme Director the process of transformation from the delivery of services to the development of regulatory policy with central government and now to districts has not solely been strategic, but has also been reactionary in that the dynamics of institutional subordination had not been foreseen, and so SCF:

> is increasingly having to focus on work at local level in the districts, primarily with district level government, because it is becoming

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[58] See Endnote 21 for outline of Oxfam's involvement in this programme.

[59] See Endnote 22 for outline of SCFs involvement in the Children's Statute.

too cumbersome at national level . . . [t]he approach we are trying to adopt is to assist districts to work out models suited to their needs given the differences in their capacities. [O]ne of the big problems is that there are just too many districts and some of these are just not viable, the second problem is that decentralisation has moved too far too quickly and the districts just don't seem to be connected with the centre because the process has created too many tensions between government departments, so what you have is a lot of competition which undermines policy making with the ministries.

The disjuncture between the centre and subordinated government organisations was characterised in the following manner by the Commissioner with responsibility for the Department for Child Care and Protection [DCCP] in the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development [MoGLSD]:

> The real difficulty is with finance and capacity, the districts are fatigued by the process and speed, and are handicapped by the low resource envelopes. These difficulties are compounded by the variations between districts, and the Ministry's agenda is to get districts to focus on an holistic approach. But the government is trying to do too much while staff size is being cut. So we now have to see our role as creating and increasing the number of actors, creating awareness about where these new actors might exist and looking at household entitlements. But at the centre we need the NNGOs to help us facilitate these things and workout relationships between the LC1 to LC5 on matters like the National Social Welfare Policy.

The impact of contraction at central government level, coupled with low resource envelopes at district level resonated with the account given by SCFs National Social Development Advisor

> Our partners in the ministry are being starved of resources while the National Council for Children is seeking to attract over $1 million in donor funding. In fact the department for Child Care and Protection which has been responsible for implementing the Children's Statute is being reduced to about four or five members of staff and has an

operating budget of $40,000. So you can see that functional management tasks which the state is allocating to ministries does not pull donors, but at the local level there is space being created by the devolution of operational responsibilities, but the scale and pace of decentralisation raises two fundamental problems. The first is capacity-building, so if you take the new rules and regulations under the Children's Statute these have to be spread to 45 districts which between them have 40,000 LC1 courts. The second, is the emphasis given to participation which is asking local community groups and NGOs to become more active. For SCF this is new territory because we are only just beginning to learn how to work with these groups[60]. But the real problem is the assumptions behind participation, because it takes for granted that people who are struggling to make ends-meet can do all these things, and its difficult for us to see how this can be done.

Taken together the views articulated by both Oxfam and SCF suggest that both NNGOs are engaged in the art of extracting, penetrating, regulating and appropriating space brought about the forces of co-presence, and consequently are having to adjust their implementation techniques [i.e. their technologies] to retain their privileged space [cf. Mouzelis page 48]. However, adaptation is shaped by their prior position in the hierarchy. For Oxfam establishing co-presence is about scaling its technologies upwards to work with the macro level and vertically to other meso level actors, while attempting to reduce the scope of programme presence at the micro-level; while for SCF establishing co-presence is about scaling its technologies downwards from the macro level to engage with other actors at the meso level and the micro level, while attempting to retain programme presence at the macro level. In this sense, both Oxfam and SCF are engaged in multiplicative strategies which are not simply about expanding their geographical presence in the form of 'colonising' districts [cf. MoFEP page 38], but about reducing their transactions costs by seeking to achieve co-presence in more narrowly defined arenas of the emerging hierarchy through deliberate influence, networking, policy and legal reform [cf. Edwards and Hulme page 13]. However, in adopting this approach both Oxfam and SCF have been forced by macro actors to shift away from supply-side interventions towards demand-side interventions and adapt their

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[60] See Endnote 23 for examples of SCFs venture into work with SNGOs and community groups.

traditional strategic approaches [capacity-building and popular participation] to working with an extended range of actors hitherto beyond their respective ken. But the problem identified by both Oxfam and SCF is one of uncertainty about what their engagement - as meso actors - with these processes are destined to achieve [cf. Edwards page 24]. Indeed according to an economist at the EPRC[61]:

> For policy implementation to be effective there has be organisations whose competence is equivalent to the tasks they perform, but in here in Uganda participation and capacity-building have become big themes, which have been pushed by the donors. But you have to question the value of this approach[62] to Uganda where the poor are struggling to survive and where at one extreme over 50 percent of the population is under 18 years of age, and at the other extreme you have the elderly who are struggling to cope with vast numbers of grand-children whose parents have died of AIDS. At the same time in the rural areas the men don't work and spend most of their time drinking while the women work for 16 to18 hours a day in the fields. So which women will have time to participate in all these fora that are being created? Basically what the poor want is health care, clean water, education for their children and responsive officials like extension workers. Everybody knows this, but still participation and capacity-building is somehow seen as a panacea for problems that basically demands a strong state that can manage available resources effectively.

The analysis presented by EPRC suggests that the terms 'participation' and 'capacity building' have irregular meanings between different actors. Indeed Fowler [1997: 188] suggests that all too often insufficient attention is given to distinguishing whether the terms are seen as means [which focus on strengthening], processes [which focus on enabling] or ends [which focus on achievements]. Given that 'participation' and 'capacity building', which are clearly becoming mainstreamed in

Uganda, were traditionally associated with the alternative strategies of NNGOs [cf. Griesgraber and Gunter page 8], the next section focuses on an analysis of the extent

to which there is an emerging regularity of meaning attached to participation and capacity building between the approaches of NNGOs, local SNGOs and IFIs, like the World Bank. Kothari [cf. page 23] has argued that by involving themselves in the mainstreaming of these processes NNGOs risk being co-opted into the growth-centred agenda's of the IFIs, rather than their agenda being mainstreamed; and that as such they risk loosing their ability to critique adjustment policy. However, this situation would hold only in a completely unreflexive context, and it is unlikely that the risk of loosing the ability to critique policy - in the context of amplified space - would be ignored by either NNGOs or SNGOs. In other words, has the mainstreaming of alternative strategies to adjustment resulted in uncontested institutional and technological regularities among key actors?

4.4 Contested Terrain's and Ownership of the Agenda

It is apparent from the interviews with line-ministries and the World Bank [See Chapter 3] that there are different perceptions about the role of NGOs, and whether they are to be equated alongside modes of operating associated with the private sector, or whether they are distinctive from it. Indeed when asked what lessons the Bank had learnt from its experience of working with NGOs in the implementation of PAPSCA [cf. page 29] the response was "you are harping on about history, PAPSCA is a closed chapter . . . . Yes, we learnt lessons and those have been incorporated into our projects and policies.[63]" But what has been incorporated and how? Indeed, at the onset of mainstreaming strategies associated with participation and capacity-building in Uganda, Oxfam's strategic plan for 1992-1995 [1992:8] expressed concern about the Bank's approach, because:

> For NGOs to become social welfare contractors to the World Bank and the government is perhaps also for their independence to be (fatally?) compromised. If this process

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[61] See Appendix 3 for overview of EPRC. The interviewee is in the process of completing a research study into poverty alleviation in Uganda for Action Aid.

[62] Brett [1992: 85] Also questions the basis of this approach, and sees a danger in that it fails to recognise the need for technical competence and material as well as social incentives, and overestimates the effects and costs of democratic controls in communities where there are low levels of education, and high levels of inequality, hierarchy and patriarchy.

[63] Officially the Bank claims the lessons it learnt were that: the participation of key stakeholders, particularly beneficiaries, increases project ownership; NGOs that will support project implementation must be selected through a competitive process; projects with decentralised implementation arrangements need suitable project management structures and implementation arrangements; and projects need built-in monitoring and evaluation systems [World Bank 1997e: 9].

captures the NGO sector as a whole, as in Uganda it appears to threaten to do, what implications will this have for NGO development work on behalf of the poor.

In a similar vein, but from a slightly different angle, SCF [1994:10] observed that:

> payment of 'volunteers' by [donor] agencies and NGOs has started to undermine the natural role of informal welfare relationships. At local government level and above, 'development' activities seem in some sectors to be reduced to a perpetual workshop, which perhaps fulfils donor requirements to produce 'process indicators', but little more.

These observations raise questions about whether the terms 'participation' and 'capacity-building' are being used by NGOs and the IFIs - like the World Bank - to refer to the same set of agenda's [cf. World Bank interview pages 30-31]. Indeed institutional modification of terminology is one option for shaping a process, and in this way the future can be changed by changing the present so that some actors are able to secure for themselves a 'hegemonic' future in the context of co-presence. Terminology can in this way be cognitively appropriated and shaped by powerful actors in the emergent hierarchy. According to the account of SCFs Programme Director, who was one of two NNGO representatives invited by the World Bank to advise on the content and implementation of an IDA US$34 million Nutritional and Early Childhood Development Programme [NECDP][64], he was:

> just amazed at the staggering lack of self analysis, absolutely staggered. I mean they operate on a two-faced process. If something's going okay its all because of the Bank, if its not its because of the Ugandan's. I have found the whole process of dealing with the Bank deeply depressing because they are engaged in a dishonest process of claiming to be participatory and consultative and want to build capacity, but in reality they are just locked into a traditional mode of arrogance.

The currency associated with 'participation' and 'capacity building' suggests there is a difference

between the emphasis given to these terms by NNGOs like SCF and Oxfam, compared with that of the World Bank [cf. Biggs and Neame page 17]. Indeed the account suggests that the World Bank places greater emphasis on ends rather than means and processes, and in doing so is prevented from respecting the depth of indigenous knowledge, and also from recognising the limitations of outsiders knowledge [cf. Chambers, Schein and Hamdi page 7]. This analysis resonated with accounts given by local SNGOs towards the World Bank's approach:

Participation

According to DENIVA:

> The World Bank is a curious animal in that when its gets frustrated with what NGOs are saying it argues that the government is the main stakeholder and therefore marginalises the NGOs. At the same time it has co-opted the language of the NGOs and is now using words like 'process' 'participation', 'capacity building' and 'civil society'. It has even created NGO liaison officers, but these are essentially public relations officers who say all the right things, but ensure that the Bank does what it has always done.

For the UDN, and its interactive experience with the Bank:

> Participation is all tokenistic. For example, this year they took the Country Assistance Strategy to districts, spent two-days in each place, told people about the plan in World Bank language like 'core poor' and 'absolute poor'. . . [B]ut from the World Bank's perspective the write-up was very fanciful and suggests they involved the districts and civil society in its formulation. I mean, I was there and I know what was said. Participation has to be two-way, they have to listen to what people have to say, but they are not prepared to do so.

Capacity Building

According to DENIVA:

> The Bank is an arrogant animal, it works on the premise that the populace can't understand macro-issues that impact on their lives. Yet at the same time it claims it wants to build the capacity of these

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[64] See Endnote 24 for summary of NECDP and SCFs critique of the World Bank's approach to participation and capacity building.

communities. For example, I was at a meeting recently where a Bank representative said the Bank's relationship with people was like that between a mechanic and a car. He said when the car breaks down and you can't make it work you look for a mechanic. The fact that you call a mechanic means that you don't know how to fix it. In a way he saw the Bank as the mechanic and the car as the people. I asked him that when the car breaks down the second time, would he call the same mechanic? I never got a reply.

The difficulty of creating a common institutional regularity with the Bank's approach to capacity building was depicted and characterised by UDN in the following manner:

> The problem lies with the Bank's approach which is project dominated and to implement this they create parallel systems within government with different salary terms and conditions for the staff they employ who are often recruited from the same government system that they claim to be strengthening. So the state is further undermined since it is left with the weakest members of its establishment to actually implement the reforms. When it comes to the NGOs the Bank simply refuse to take account of overhead costs, and expect the NGO to subsidise these costs from somewhere else. So what ever way you look you see that they are actually undermining capacity in the public sector and the NGO sector.

Indeed from the experience of SCFs National Social Welfare Advisor, the Bank:

> makes assumptions about northern and southern NGOs in that it is just assumed that Northern NGOs will support the local ones and issues of power are basically persona non-grata . . . [t]his is creating a disaster waiting to happen because the Bank is not addressing the political relationship which interfaces at the point of responsibility and ownership between government and people.

Underpinning the assumptions made about NNGOs and SNGOs is a view that the IFIs, like the World Bank, work on the basis of prescribed agenda's and ideas that are developed in other contexts far removed from those of Uganda[65]. Indeed according to SCFs Country Programme Director SCFs approach to both 'participation' and 'capacity building' is based on the:

> the need for change based on its experience in Uganda, which is tied to the realities of Uganda. That's not to say that learning cannot be shared between what SCF does in the other 50-odd countries we work in and what we do here. But it is definitely not about directly applying some idea that has drifted in from Mexico or Indonesia or wherever, which is the impression you get when you talk to the Bank.

This view was resonated with the experience of Oxfam's Country Representative, who argued that:

> It may take years to reach the point where poor communities can successfully make use of the capacities they have been acquiring overtime. You have to look at these things over a 10-12 year time period in a place like Uganda. But what I find here is that Uganda is being turned into one big aid bazzar where donors like the Bank inject large amounts of money and expect things to have happened yesterday so that they can move on to the next item. The same goes pretty much for most of the other donors too.

What is clear from this analysis is that NPA has clearly unleashed a common set of terminology's which give regularity to institutional technologies that define a rationale for co-presence. However, NNGOs and SNGOs alike take the view that it is a cynical exercise of the World Bank co-opting the vocabulary of alternative strategies traditionally associated with NNGOs. This would suggest that the technologies under discussion have different relevance's for different actors. Put another way, terminology's [which are part of technologies of construction, reproduction and transformation] are 'subjective' since their meanings are derived from how the actors reduce the complexities of change to a relatively coherent set of realities best suited to their purposes for extracting advantage, penetrating the space of other actors, regulating the actions of other actors, and appropriating the terminology. In this sense, and from the perspectives of NNGOs and SNGOs, by stressing ends [cf. ROM page 33] at the expense of means and processes the World Bank is seeking to

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[65] Indeed the *World Development Report* 1997 goes to considerable length to explain the futility of adopting a one-size fits all approach to decentralisation and intergovernmental arrangements [World Bank 1997b: 120-122].

maintain and build 'hegemonic' space for itself within the emergent hierarchy.

The analysis of the organisational terrain also suggests that NNGOs and SNGOs are engaged in common reflexive struggle for co-presence in the emergent hierarchy. This may be true up to a point, but NNGOs - like Oxfam and SCF - have also been engaged in the amplification of their own distinctive space through the deployment of *multiplicative strategies* [cf. page 13]. However, where do NNGOs draw their own legitimacy and mandate from in the emergent hierarchy [cf. Edwards and Hulme page 16]; and whose interests do they represent when they seek co-presence with SNGOs in fora like the NGO forum and with other meso level actors, while at the same time retaining or building links with macro and micro actors? It is to these questions that the next section addresses itself.

4.5 Opportunities and Constraints: SNGOs and GROs in the Emergent Hierarchy

Munchungunzi and Milne [1995] conducted the largest study of NGOs in East Africa comprised of 95 NNGOs, SNGOs and CBOs from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda[66]. Among their key findings were that the SNGOs wanted real opportunities to influence northern institutions - including NNGOs; that while the south was always expected to account to the north, the reverse was not true; and most of the SNGOs and CBOs equated NNGOs with donors and not as partners. Indeed, in the sample from Uganda most of the GROs were affiliated to umbrella-type SNGOs which had financial linkages with NNGOs. This hierarchy reflects a relative weakness among local civil society actors [meso and micro] to exercise influence over the agenda's of NNGOs and donors.

In a recent workshop designed to assess the poverty impact of DFID aid to Uganda [DFID 1998], 22 Ugandan SNGOs delineated their experience of working with donors. The SNGOs - like those in the 1995 study - lumped all international agencies together, and included NNGOs as part of this category. In terms of outcomes only three items were listed as positive [two of which related to capacity building and one to funding], while twelve items were listed as negative. Among the latter were: interventions were short-term and tailored to what is in vogue internationally; the replication of "success" stories are made out of context i.e.. from Bangladesh to Uganda; the arrogance - which was both

institutional and personal; and the fact that donors come with set ideas - with only token input from local scene. The SNGO responses resonate with the question posed by Saxby [1996:49] "what would remain of the 'partnership' if one took away the money, that is, took away the aid relationship?", and with Bratton's [1990: 90] observation that "Poor people themselves have no control over material and institutional conditions under which they exist . . . the poor lack the political "clout" to make their own preferences stick."

While NNGOs in Uganda tend to describe their interaction with SNGOs as being one of 'partnership'[67] within an amplified space, the reality for SNGOs suggests that it is characterised by ambivalence and by a degree of mistrust towards the NNGOs as meso-level partners. Indeed, Edwards [1997:7] posits that, "cooperation is difficult between unequals, and partnership impossible". In Uganda ambivalence and mistrust by SNGOs towards NNGOs coalesce around the way the SNGOs experience their interaction with NNGO agenda's, the way NNGO go-about establishing co-presence with SNGOs at subordinated levels of government, and the way NNGOs use their privileged access to centralised institutions of power to further their own agenda's.

Interaction of Agendas

For UDN interaction between NNGOs and SNGOs was characterised in the following manner:

> Some of them are involved in building local SNGO capacity like Action Aid, Care, Accord and Oxfam which give grants and offer support. But Oxfam has proven unreliable, because it tries to establish groups but only gives short-term financial support for like 6-12 months[68]. So what you find is that many of their initiatives fold after they have been created. But most of the NNGOs focus on capacity-building with a pre-determined agenda that they have obtained donor funding for. So most of the SNGOs become the vehicles for the success of the NNGOs and the link between NNGOs and SNGOs is artificial because it is based on money and not on common agenda's. For example, Oxfam helped to establish UDN with a grant of US$10,000. So Oxfam helped us to start, but we marginalised Oxfam from our initiative once we began to become successful. It has to be said

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[66] Among the 95 organisations surveyed, 24 were from Tanzania, 22 from Kenya and 49 from Uganda. Among the sample 13 were NNGOs, seven of which were based in Tanzania, six in Kenya. None of the NNGOs in Uganda were included in the sample.

[67] See reference to partnership in SCF and Oxfam's programmes in Uganda - Appendices 1 and 2.

[68] See Interview with Oxfam Country Representative - page 47.

that NNGOs will, if given the opportunity, erode the powerbase of SNGOs particularly if you rely on a single NNGO. Our agenda in UDN is to broaden our local resource base like forging a relationship with the Uganda Manufacturers Association, developing our own capacity and selling an interest to NNGOs which they can buy into. So recently you find SCF and others signing-up to join us, rather than us going to them with our begging bowl. It's hard work, but we are gradually succeeding.

According to the Community Development Resource Network [CDRN][69] erosion of local power by NNGO agendas pose three problems which constrain civil society actors at the grassroots level:

> At one level most donors focus their activities towards SNGOs on training which they channel through NNGOs, so the NNGOs are seen as 'daddies', and you know when fathers speak in Uganda the children keep quiet. At the second level most SNGOs have nothing original to offer, and where they do like the CBOs, their agenda's get parked aside and gets dominated by the international body. For example, there was a CBO that had started looking at ways of supporting orphans through shared care in the community. The community was the focus of the activity, but the NNGO came along and wanted to focus on orphans exclusively, and the CBO wanted the money. In the end the CBO lost its community focus and began focusing on the orphans. The third thing is what I call the formalisation of SNGO agendas, which has two main aspects: firstly, their technical presentation which is weak and the requirement for logframes [Logical Frameworks] makes things even more complicated because it is difficult to translate the meanings of the technical language into local languages; secondly, the dictatorship of NNGOs, because NNGOs require so much reporting on how funds are used that it adds undue burdens on SNGOs and CBOs that they are detracted from their mission, and if they should fail to provide the reports they get criticised and marginalised. So to overcome these problems what many SNGOs and

CBOs do is employ 'ghost' writers to write their proposals and their reports, and these bear no relationship to what the groups plans to do, or actually does. But NNGOs, just like other donors, respond to reports and not to the reality.

Co-Presence in Decentralisation

According to the NGO Forum, there is space for NNGOs, SNGOs and GROs in the decentralised system, but this involves a trade-off which NNGOs must encourage if they are to fulfil their mandate towards partnership with both meso and micro actors:

> In the short-term there is a risk that NNGOs will increase their powerbase in the districts, but this has to be counterbalanced with the reality that many local NGOs and CBOs at the district level are only slowly developing the ability to manage funds and the capacity to engage in dialogue with districts. So in the short-term Uganda will have to live the dominant position of NNGOs, but in the longer-term the NNGOs will have to develop modalities for their exit strategies.

A less sanguine view is taken by DENIVA towards the way NNGOs engage in defining their interactions with SNGOs and CBOs. However, DENIVA argues that these interactions have been moulded by the way the state has sought to implement decentralisation, which ignores the socio-economic realities of Uganda:

> Decentralisation has to be based on rules and regulations between the government and the governed, hence power is at the centre of the process and the battle in Uganda is who has power to do what?. The situation is difficult because the process is built on a system which has not been democratic or based on natural justice. And it is difficult to create conditions of natural justice when the opinions or views of the population are not sought. But it's not simple, because aspirations of the people are not self generating, but are influenced by levels of education. The struggle is therefore to avoid being taken advantage of by other powers like NNGOs, and to convince the population about their stakeholder relationship with the state. So what has to happen, and DENIVA encourages this, is to get the CBOs to

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[69] See Appendix 3 for Outline of CDRN.

ask why is this NNGO here? what are their interests?. The SNGOs have to work with the CBOs and the districts in a manner that prevents the NNGOs from imposing their agenda's.

However, according to CDRN creating popular awareness and preventing the imposition of NNGO agenda's is difficult in the context of decentralisation, because

> while decentralisation has pushed CBOs in to the limelight, and there are monthly planning meetings with the LC3 level, one would expect that this would put the CBOs in touch with the local NGOs, but there are problems in that the districts rely on extension workers to make the links with CBOs. But there are only 1 or 2 extension workers per sub-county [LC3], and many of them are not paid for six months or more; and as the state delayers at the centre workers are not going to the districts. Instead the best of them want to work with the NNGOs, and the NNGOs who are expanding to the districts are recruiting them. So what I see as I travel round the country is the simultaneous weakening of the state at the centre and at district level.

The interpretations and explanations of reality expressed above suggests that NNGOs are not horizontally accountable to other meso level actors or vertically accountable to micro level actors. Indeed, if anything the shift from supply-side to demand-side interventions is widening their privileged space for extraction, penetration, regulation and appropriation within the emergent hierarchy vis-à-vis other actors[70].

Privileged Access to Centres of Power

According to DENIVA, NNGOs are using their privileged space to gain access to financial and political power for their own purposes rather than encouraging and supporting SNGOs and CBOs:

> NNGOs have to recognise that SNGOs and CBOs are both the constituents and the indicators of their success. So they have to recognise that Uganda's success is the success of the NNGOs in both Uganda and in the North. But the current relationship

between both of them is unequal. They call themselves development organisations and if you read their brochures they litter them with words like 'partnership', but in reality they are donors - so how do you expect receivers of their largesse to criticise them? The second aspect is that NNGOs are bidding for contracts, which they use to corner the market and dominate districts. The third aspect is that the NNGOs have access to the formal powerbase in this country, including the President and MPs [Members of Parliament][71], and some use MPs to influence the award of World Bank contracts. So official government policy towards NGOs is all about NNGOs, but this is not made explicit; and you will find that the vast majority of the NNGOs are used by MPs to buttress their powerbase in their constituency. So the MPs are not going to ask the NNGOs to do things differently.

The ways in which NNGOs use privileged space was echoed by UDN, who defined the ways it was used as a consequence of the continuation of predatory characteristics by the state[72], which inadvertently enabled NNGOs to focus on:

> building their empires[73] in the district because they are the majority investor, and the MPs for these districts visit the NNGOs on behalf of their constituents and lobby the NNGOs to do this and that which reinforces the powerbase of the NNGOs and to act as power-brokers with SNGOs. One cannot entirely blame the NNGOs for doing it this way, because with the prevailing level of corruption where 65 cents in every $ goes astray the state is clearly failing to establish its credibility with the citizens, and the capacity of many SNGOs and CBOs is low. But at the moment not many NNGOs are even trying to change this outside of some very narrowly defined project.

However, for the Ugandan Children's Rights Network [UCBN], interaction with NNGOs, while characterised by ambivalence and mistrust towards their intentions, is more reflexive because:

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[70] Indeed it is notable that neither Oxfam nor SCF [or indeed other NNGOs in Uganda] have sought to foster, develop and incorporate local management committees into their overall country management structures as systems for ensuring acceptability, responsibility and accountability for their presence in Uganda.

[71] See Interview with representative from MoLG and reference to 'big men'- page 34.

[72] See reference to Bevan and Ssewaya - page19; and Endnote 18

[73] See interview with former staff member of MoFEP - page 38.

we build our national presence on the back of the districts where other members of ISCA like SCF UK and Red Barnet [SCF Denmark] work, like in Luwero, Kasese, Guru, Mukero and Kampala which helps to give us profile. At the same time we get large grants from the ISCA members like Redd Barna [SCF Norway], but they don't dictate what we do. But we do have concerns because if we bid for money from the European Union or Comic Relief[74] we feel these donors will ask the NNGOs about us, but the donors don't ask us about these NNGOs when they want to do something in Uganda, and if you are biding for the same pot of money for a project as the NNGO, what is to stop the NNGO from saying to the donor that you are no good?

A number of key themes emerge from the analysis of the interaction between SNGOs, GROs and NNGOs. Firstly, that SNGOs are engaged in a process of increasing the size of their programmes and of their organisations, and as such they are predominately pursuing additive strategies as a means of reducing their transactions costs of establishing co-presence with other actors. Secondly, GROs and other micro-level actors are engaged in diffusive strategies, where co-presence is informal and spontaneous particularly at subordinated levels of government at LC1-LC3. Thirdly, the multiplicative strategies of NNGOs are defined, for the most part, as increasing the transactions costs and constraining the opportunities for SNGOs and GROs to establish vertical and horizontal co-presence within the emergent hierarchy. This suggests that the current regulatory NGO framework in Uganda, with its emphasis on surveillance, needs to be re-sutured with rules that offer appropriate incentives and sanctions [cf. North page 11] to ensure macro, meso and micro actors take account of the collective dimensions that stem from their legitimate acts towards establishing co-presence.

4.6 Summary

This chapter has established the context in which macro, meso and micro actors have sought to interactively engage in the spaces created by the new and emergent organisational hierarchy brought about by the NPA in Uganda. Underpinning the analysis has been a focus on the ways different actors have sought to extract, penetrate, regulate and appropriate these spaces within a reflexive framework of co-presence linked to a retinue of technologies that include popular participation and capacity building.

Central to this analysis has been the way actors define the horizons of their experience against the backdrop of the emergent hierarchy, the formation of vertical and horizontal networks to amplify their spaces, and the processes unleashed by institutional relegitimation. However, these experiences have also been shaped by the scarcity of organised capacity within Uganda, and by competition over financial resources which are under the control of external donors and NNGOs.

A number of key issues emerge from this analysis: the first is that the institutional and organisational spaces are constrained by a regulatory NGO framework that is no longer suited to the emergent hierarchy; secondly, that the capacity for institutional transformation is unevenly distributed among actors at the meso level, and consequently NNGOs have embarked on multiplicative strategies which has involved working with a range of actors hitherto beyond their respective ken; thirdly, that while the NPA has unleashed a common set of institutional technologies that define the rational for co-presence, it has also led to a struggle for control, between the SNGOs and NNGOs on the one hand, and the World Bank on the other, over the agenda, ownership and meanings attached to popular participation and capacity building; fourthly, that while NNGOs and SNGOs share a common agenda towards the 'subjective' meanings of the technologies central to the NPA, the SNGOs and GROs part company with the NNGOs over the way NNGOs interpret and act upon the struggle for spaces of co-presence in the context of decentralisation. However, while SNGOs recognise the scarcity of capacity that exists in Uganda and the fact that they are competing for resources, the manner in which NNGOs capitalise on privileged space increases the transactions costs and constrains the opportunities of emerging civil society actors in the context of establishing co-presence with the state and donors. These factors are primarily internalist in so far they reveal the value system of actors, but they rest alongside externalist factors [cf. page 11] that give pattern to the emergent social structure which is characterised by: the shadow of predatory characteristics retained by the state; concerns that the sequence and pace at which institutional reforms are being implemented in Uganda is undermining the very creation of an enabling state; and the need to clarify how and in what manner meso-level actors should become involved in private for-profit contracts with the IFIs and bilateral donors.

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[74] Comic Relief is a British-based organisation that raises millions of pounds from the public through events like 'Red Nose Day'. It then distributes funds - as grant-aid - to both NNGOs and SNGOs in the South. Comic Relief is itself non-operational.

5. CONCLUSION: FOCUSING ON A STATE WITH CITIZENS

The preceeding chapters have sought to describe, interpret and explain the New Policy Agenda, and the ways in which it has harnessed economic reform alongside institutional reform by mainstreaming alternative strategies to structural adjustment traditionally associated with NNGOs. These issues have not been dealt with in the abstract, but have been located within the horizons of experience of key actors in Uganda. To achieve this broad objective the study has been rooted in the economic and sociological theories of institutions and organisations with modifications to Bratton's model. The triangulation of these heuristic devices has offered new opportunities for constructing understandings of interaction between the state, non-governmental actors and donors, which can be applied to contexts outside of Uganda.

It is clear that while this study has generated fresh insights into the ways in which alternative strategies have been mainstreamed into structural adjustment, the lens of Bratton's original model is too narrow to allow for a rigorous analysis of the different dimensions that characterise interaction between the key actors. Indeed the importance of the IFIs and bilateral donors and their interaction with the state, as well as with foreign and local non-governmental actors is crucial to understanding what really is going on in Uganda. Clearly, simple generalisations about the nature of these interactions is not feasible, and it is in this regard that reflexivity becomes a powerful analytical tool for delineating and characterising the ways in which different groups of actors make adjustments and form new conceptions of identity and solidarity; and create amplified spaces as a means of engaging in the emergent hierarchy. However, without an empirical analysis of the kind deployed in this study, which mediates between the personal and the structural, the actual content and form of these experiences would be lost.

Clearly Uganda has embarked on a process of creating conditions that facilitate rule-based extraction, penetration, regulation and appropriation, and it has been the capacity to relegitimise institutions that forms the very essence of Uganda's transition from a predatory state to an enabling state. However, the scarcity of organisational capacity and competition over resources has acted as a constraint on the state. When these two constraining factors are combined with the technologies of the NPA, institutional relegitimation clearly has very different meanings and consequences for key actors. At the macro-level for government departments, it has meant scaling-back at the centre with a significantly reduced capacity to implement policy and ensure access and equity in service provision through

subordinated levels of government; for the IFIs and bilateral donors it has been about creating efficiency within the public sector, and expanding opportunities for the private sector which includes not for-profit actors; for district-level government it has become a matter of ensuring they have access to funds from which ever source it comes from, and consequently stand the risk of being 'colonised' by other actors; for NNGOs, like SCF and Oxfam, it has meant adapting to become meso-level actors based on multiplicative strategies that enable them to reduce their transactions costs by focusing on a narrower range of activities and by seeking to build or retain co-presence with the macro actors, and at the same time build links with other meso actors and micro actors like GROs; for SNGOs it has become a matter of creating amplified spaces with NNGOs in an attempt to pursue additive strategies which reduce their transactions costs, strengthen their organisations and expand their programmes in attempt to establish co-presence in the emergent hierarchy; for GROs it has been about the creation of diffusive strategies where co-presence is spontaneous and informal, and with funds channelled through macro and meso level actors which often increase their transactions costs and effectively constrain the very essence of their spontaneity and informality.

The evidence shows that these different strategies are not internally consistent with an agenda that purports to promote mutual accountability, responsibility and acceptability between the state and its citizens. Indeed it suggests that in Uganda the NPA - with its emphasis on equitable and political sustainable results [cf. page 7] - has retained characteristics associated with the NPE which emphasises minimising the role and size of the state [cf. page 10]. Moreover, the struggle for co-presence is being conducted under conditions where the internal rules - as contained in the 1989 and 1990 non-government organisation statutes - are incompatible with the articles enshrined in the constitution; the tasks laid down in the local government act; and more recently with the objectives of the PEAP. At the wider externalist level, the absence of organisational regularities; the predatory characteristics retained by the state; and the sequence and pace at which institutional reform has been implemented compound these internal inconsistencies, and increase transactions costs between actors in a manner that threatens the overarching objective to reduce the population living in absolute poverty to less than 10 percent and those living in relative poverty to 30 percent in 20 years time [cf. page 29].

The manner in which the state reconciles the internal and external factors is crucial, and the review of NGO policy commissioned by the OPM must tackle these issues without fear or favour to foreign and local vested interests intent on

expanding their spaces for co-presence at the expense of engaging and mobilising grassroot actors. Indeed, while the review needs to take account of reflexive interaction between actors, it must aim to suture the strategies of different actors in a manner that fits with the socio-economic realities of Uganda. The ultimate outcome from the review must therefore be to ensure that in mainstreaming alternative strategies to adjustment regulation captures vital capacities that enable the state to control the emergent hierarchy; and that the social, economic and political rights of Uganda's 20 million adults and children - which lie at the heart of the NPA - are not undermined through acts of commission and omission by organisations seeking vertical and horizontal spaces of co-presence.

Chapter 2

1] Sources focusing on the role of NGOs in participation and capacity building over last decade include: Korten 1987; Bratton 1989; Fowler 1991; Clark 1991; Hanlon 1991; Edwards and Hulme, 1992; Bebbington and Farrington, 1993; Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Clayton 1996; Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Bebbington and Riddell, 1997; Fowler 1998a and 1998b and Pieterse 1998.

2] The resonance between the current focus on institutions in both economics and sociology has emerged from two very different traditions. In Sociology it's current manifestation is rooted in Lockwood's seminal 1964 work [*Social Integration and System Integration*] which, as the title suggests, called for analytical integration of social and system integration as a basis for studying society in a manner where both the interactive and systemic aspects of social order would be taken into consideration. Lockwood's call was rooted in classical Marxist theorising of the 1850s, in which the integration of capitalist societies is thought to be based on a matching articulation between productive forces and the relations of production. For Lockwood, the problem of social integration cannot be fully understood without taking account of the ways in which changes in both the normative and realistic conditions of action are usually the unintended consequences, or system effects, of the interrelations of a society's economic, political, and religious subsystems [Lockwood 1992: 8]. For Mouzelis [1997:113-114] Lockwood's approach offers logical congruence because 'social integration' refers to co-operative and conflictual relationships between actors; whereas 'system integration' describes the compatibility's and incompatibilities between parts that are always viewed as institutionalised complexes portraying different degrees of durability and malleability.

The importance of institutions in economics has a history dating back to the 1930s when Ronald Coase produced his seminal papers on the *Nature of the Firm*, which argued, from a neo-classical economic perspective, that institutions are formed to reduce uncertainty in human exchange, and that with technology, institutions determine the costs of transacting. According to North [1995: 19-20], New Institutional Economics takes this argument a step further by adding institutions as a constraint , and analyses the role of transaction costs as the connection between institutions and costs of production. It extends economic theory by incorporating ideas and ideologies into the analysis, modelling the political process as a critical factor in the performance of economies.

However, North argues that institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules. **In other words, New Institutional Economics offers a theory of development based on institutional change that corresponds with a coherent approach in sociological theory towards social integration and system integration.**

3] The incorporation of 'civil society' into the policies of IFIs is reflected in the following World Bank documents*: Governance and Development [1992], Investing in Health [1993a] and Putting Institutional Economics to Work: From Participation to Governance* [1995a]. The latter states "In the developing world 4,600 international voluntary organisations are now active and supporting approximately 20,000 indigenous non-government organisations. . . .[P]olicy is useless without an institutional machinery capable of implementing it. The travails of the economies in transition, as well as those of Sub-Saharan Africa. illustrate this simple proposition. Self-help and internal determination are the keys to success. . . . [N]ew institutional capital created by the voluntary sector has come into play in the search for effective institutional-development strategies [p18]

4] Save the Children Fund's *Global Programme Strategy* [1997a:4] takes cognisance of this development in the following manner:

> The end of the Cold War has seen the growing strength of organised civil society in the form of local NGOs, church groups, environmental movements, women's movements and community organisations. Involving themselves both in service provision and advocacy, such grassroots organisations have had significant impact in some regions of the world, both North and South. They are able to take on much of the traditional role played by international NGOs [INGOs] and, in some cases, the state, and are increasingly being funded by donors to do so. Consequently, INGOs, such as Save the Children, now need to learn to work with these organisations as their partners, supporting institutional development, capacity-building, and advocacy work.

5] The OECD document entitled: *Participatory Development and Good Governance* [1995:12] is

premised on a normative view of civil society, and states that:

> Basic to democratisation is the development of a pluralist civil society comprised of a range of institutions and associations which represent diverse interests and provide a counterweight to government. Interaction between the formal political and civil society contributes to, and also requires, a responsive government, which is one of the characteristics of a functioning democracy. Supporting pluralism, e.g. the development of autonomous civil associations, professional and interest organisations, is an important step in fostering democratisation.

6] In the context of convergence between 'alternative' and 'mainstream' development, and the emerging significance of NIE, the Bank defines these concerns in the following manner: dissatisfaction with distributional issues in the absence of intervention in which market failures may leave many households facing acute poverty; the lack of alternative policy instruments - particularly where comprehensive income taxes are generally not a viable option; the need for fiscal restraint and the sharp trade-offs this makes government face notably inputs into basic schooling and health care - where provision is expensive and information [particularly on the extent to which the poorest benefit] is expensive to obtain [World Bank 1995b:1].

7] The author has used the grounded theory approach in the following studies: Joshua, L.C. et al [1985] *Neighbourhood Watch: The Eyes and Ears of Urban Policing?* Occasional Paper in Sociology and Social Policy, No 6, University of Surrey, 1985; Joshua, L.C. [1992] *Perspectives: Drug Trafficking and Liberal Economics*. African Woman: Quarterly Development Journal, Vol.6. 1992 pp 10-15; Joshua, L.C. [1993] *Strategic Planning for Social Welfare and Criminal Justice in Nigeria*, Report No 5539, Overseas Development Administration; Joshua, L.C.[1994] *Children in Transition: Developing a Strategy for Central and Eastern Europe*, Save the Children Fund. Joshua, L.C [1996] *Nigeria, Drug Trafficking and Structural Adjustment: Overcoming the Impediments to Dialogue* in Green, P. (ed) Drug Couriers: A New Perspective. London: Quartet Books; Joshua, L.C. and Woollard, C. [1997] *Private Fostering: Development of policy and practice in three English local authorities*. Department of Health/Save the Children Fund.

Chapter 3

8] Uganda is composed of over 28 ethnic groups. It is possible to make a crude ethnic classification between the Nilotic peoples who inhabit areas north and east of the Nile - such as the Acholi and Langi; and the Bantu peoples who inhabit areas south and west of the Nile - such as the Baganda (Mutibwa 1992: xix]. Under colonial rule the British pursued a policy of recruiting security forces from among the Nilotic peoples, thereby initiating military and political dominance over the south by the north in the post-colonial period [e.g. Obote and Amin], which was not reversed until the largely Bantu-based National Resistance Army [NRA] under the leadership of Yeoweri Museveni seized power in 1986.

9] Between the fall of Amin - which was brought about by a joint offensive by Tanzanian and local opposition forces in the Ugandan Liberation Front [UNLF] - and Obote's second regime Uganda fell under the authority of the National Advisory Council which was initially led by former academic Yusuf Lule and later by Godfrey Binaisa. Both of whom were deposed by the army. A military commission, under the control of General David Ojok assumed power and orchestrated elections which led to Obote's second regime.

10] Although the internal security situation has improved since the late 1980s, it should be noted that anti-NRM insurgency continues to afflict populations in the northern and south-western parts of the country. The violence - which has created a significant numbers of internally displaced persons and involved the abduction of over 12,000 children to act as combatants - stems from three main sources: the West Nile Front [a pro-Amin group]; The Lords Resistance Army [which is supported by the Sudanese government in Khartoum]; and the Allied Democratic Forces [composed of disparate groupings operating from bases in the Democratic Republic of Congo - former Zaire]

11] This change in government position from resistance to a partner in adjustment can be accounted for by three factors: **rapid annual GDP growth rates** of 3.2% in 1991/92; 8.4% in 1992/93; 5.3% in 1993/94; 10% in 1994/95; 8.5% in 1995/96 and 6.5% in 1996/97 [World Bank 1995c: 92 and GoU 1996: 13]; **by significant donor support** - for example in 1994/95 and 1995/96 external donors contributed over 90 percent of funding for the development budget [GoU 1996: 76]. The largest multilateral donor is the World through its IDA-arm followed by the European Union. The largest bilateral donor is Denmark - through its aid-wing DANIDA; and the **contribution of NNGOs** to supply-side interventions - the largest of which include Oxfam, Save the Children Fund, Care and Action Aid - who inject about US$125 million per annum [World Bank 1995c: 18].

12] In 1986 the government owned more than 150 companies. most of which were making heavy losses. In 1992 the World Bank provided credit to finance the Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Board [PERD]. According to Brett [1996: 322] the operations of PERD met with strong resistance, and it took the personal intervention of   President Museveni, and the threat by donors to withhold the disbursement of funds, before the enabling Statute was passed. However, according to the World Bank [1997d:5] state divestiture from industrial plant and financial services is hampered by the fact that divestiture costs exceed the proceeds that will be generated. The IFIs have therefore adopted a 'soft' touch towards privatisation and called for a donor-supported retrenchment fund which would operate in a manner similar to that extended to retrenchment in the civil service. In other words rather than push through reforms as a matter of ideological driven imperative, the IFIs are seeking externally generated subsidies before reconfiguring the balance between the public and private sector which reflects the order-driven principles of NIE.

13] It is well established that high fertility contributes to poverty, in that it strains the budget of poor families and reduces resources to feed, educate and provide health care to children [Birdsall and Griffin 1988]. With a total fertility rate of 7.3, Uganda has the fourth highest rate in the world, and it is projected that the country will have highest dependency ratio in the world by the early part of the next century [World Bank 1993: 14]. The socio-economic impact of HIV and AIDS in Uganda has been widely documented, and while deaths from the disease [via sexual contact between adults or through neonatal transmission to children] are not expected to have a significant impact on population growth it will have a significant effect on the dependency ratio. The Food and Agricultural Organisation [1993: 5] observes that AIDs will have accounted for the death of nearly 3 million Ugandans by the year 2011; Oxfam [1996: 6] estimates that some 1.5 million Ugandans are currently infected and the World Health Organisation estimates that almost 900,000 children will have lost their mothers as a result of AIDS by 1998. Daphne Topouzis [1996: 14-15] captures the characteristics of the dependency issue and how it compounds poverty through the use of case studies, for example: Joseph 33, has AIDS. His 30 year-old wife, who also has AIDS, has been sick for nearly two years and has gone back to her family to die, leaving behind 4 girls, 4, 6, 7 and 10 years old. *Joseph has been sick for two years. His sister and four brothers also died of AIDS. The household is now*

headed by his mother, but the family lives with Joseph's brother whose wife left him sometime ago. Joseph's own house recently collapsed but he could not repair it because he was too weak. His brother can hardly manage farming his own land single-handedly; he is unable to tend to Joseph's land and their mother is too old and frail to help them on the farm. Most of her time is taken up caring for the children and Joseph.

Uganda's high dependency ratio has profound implications the generation of government revenue to pay for public social services, particularly when 81 percent of the labour force of about 6.2 million is employed in agriculture - a significant proportion of which is not linked to the monetised economy. At the same time the AIDS pandemic has eroded technical and managerial capacity among both public and private sector workers engaged in the formal economy.

14] The Blantyre Statement on Poverty Alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa emerged from a 10-day seminar in Blantyre, Malawi convened in July 1994. Participants at the seminar consisted of representatives from eleven African countries - ranging from the large [Nigeria] to the small [Uganda] - as well as donors, academics and NGOs. The objective was to examine how the policy environment for poverty alleviation could be improved and how the implementation and institutional constraints surrounding poverty alleviation could be overcome. The Declaration placed emphasis on the following: the poor are not passive actors in the development process; pro-poor policies must be matched by equal attention to resource and institutional commitments; improved donor and host country collaboration; and that the multidimensional nature of poverty means that it cannot be overcome by technical approaches alone [summarised from Appendix 6: World Bank 1996].

15] The NRMs Ten Point Programme embraced the following dimensions: **Democracy** - which should be parliamentary and participatory; **Security** - with an emphasis on ensuring basic human rights and ending state inspired violence; **Unity** - based on the elimination of all forms of sectarianism; **Independence** - aimed at defending and consolidating national independence; **Self Reliance** - based on independence and sustainability; **Social Services** - with an emphasis on provision and physical restoration; **Corruption** - and its elimination; **Survival** - with policies based on the maximisation of welfare; **Foreign Policy** - aimed at fostering regional integration based on human rights and democratic principles; **Economic Strategy** - focused on the creation of enabling approach to state involvement [adapted and modified from Kisakaye 1996: 37-39].

16] The NRM decided that elections to the Constituent Assembly would be held on a non-party basis and by using a secret ballot as opposed to open voting. This decision was in line with the Constitutional Commission's proposal that 'movement politics' should continue for a further seven years, at which point a referendum would be held on whether multi-party politics should be introduced. The United Peoples Congress [Obote's former party] and the Uganda Patriotic Movement [a left-wing movement formerly allied to the NRM during its guerrilla war against Obote in the 1980s] boycotted the elections in response to the NRMs insistence on the fact that candidates should not stand on party-political platforms. Interestingly, donors have not laid down conditions for the return of multi-party democracy, but appear, unlike elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, to have accepted the Government's transition programme without question.

17] In an internal USAID memorandum from Norman Olsen dated May 16 1995, the following observations on decentralisation are made: *"Decentralisation is seen as a way of practising the ancient art of 'divide and rule -- ie., delegating authority to a level sufficiently local, and buttressing the decision-making authority with small amounts of resources, in an effort to prevent larger aggregates which might challenge central authorities from getting together. It has in practice served many central governments as a way of off-loading the responsibilities for the expensive service-provision portfolio that many of them would just not have to deal with. It is a way of deflecting political conflict to the local level".*

18] *The World Development Report* [World Bank 1997b:158] notes the corrosive effect of corruption on the capability of the state. Danida has taken a keen interest in the government's attempts to clamp-down on corruption and is co-funding an anti-corruption unit [which goes under the title of the Integrity Project] housed in the office of the Vice-president. In the recent reshuffle of ministers, a new post of minister of State for ethics and integrity has been created to lead the drive against corruption [*Museveni may appoint foreigner to cabinet*, The Monitor, June 22 1998]. SCFs Country Director's Annual Report on the Uganda Programme [1997c: 1] refers to growing public recognition that corruption is a major problem. This recognition is reflected in press reports [*e.g. Top UEB managers sent on forced leave, The New Vision, Saturday, June 13, 1998;* and *Mpingi finance boss vows to fight corruption*, The New Vision, Wednesday, June 24, 1998] and in letters from members of the public to newspapers [e.g. Uganda needs independent ethical council, O.O. Businge, The New Vision, Saturday, June 13 1998; Corruption, Lammeck Mwebe, The New Vision, Saturday, June 20 1998; and *Here's how we shall*

curb corruption in Uganda, Anne Nakiryowa, The New Vision, Tuesday, June 23 1998].

Defining the nature and determining the scale of corruption in Uganda is a difficult task. Indeed the way economists and sociologists define and depict corruption compounds the problem. For example, Arora [1993], an economist, writing about what constitutes the Public Interest links corruption to the principles of demand and supply in that it enables public officials to use their official domains to serve themselves, and at the same time to benefit the corruptee who is caught up in a situation of scarcity. Arora [1993:3] argues that:

> by treating corruption as a transaction which not only involves two parties, but also benefits both the system, because of its capacity to correct imbalances in demand and supply goals . . . tends to undermine the coercive aspects of corruption transactions, on the other hand, and non-conjuctive corruption on the other . . . [T]he negative implications of corruption for the system are easily dismissed in this perspective.

Werlin [1994], a sociologist, on the other hand, tries to develop a generic definition of corruption which he defines as ". . . partisanship that challenges statesmanship" [1994:547]. He formulates this definition within a framework which sees a tension between the pursuit of power [competition and partisanship] and the maintenance of a regulative framework within which competition takes place. He equates statesmanship with effective political leadership, and with the ability to integrate social relations with the **institutional** and **organisational** factors involved in soft [persuasive] and hard [coercive] forms of power. The concept of 'soft' refers to the mindset of the participants - which include, among others: acceptable goals, independent spheres of authority, and effective supervision [1994:550]. It is the absence or weakness of these factors that contribute to his definition of poor statecraft. The utility of this definition [compared with that of Arora] to the creation of an enabling state is that Werlin differentiates between **primary** and **secondary** corruption. According to this dichotomy, primary corruption is partisan behaviour that challenges statesmanship but still respects it in that it is not without regard for legal and formal norms of official conduct, and as such it is both manageable and meaningful within the regulatory framework [1994: 554]. Secondary corruption, on the other hand, is defined as " . . . partisan behaviour that is carried out in the absence of viable statesmanship (respect for legal and normative requirements). There is little concern about punishment or feelings of guilt and

disgrace inasmuch as the political system facilitates or condones corruption" [1994:550].

While it is clear that neither the TPP nor the Uganda Constitution condone corruption. But it is possible, from Werlin's dichotomy, to argue that a major part of the explanation for the apparent increasing level of corruption in Uganda lies in the perceptible organisational transformations that have taken place which makes the populace more aware of its nature and scale. However, without concerted action to manage corruption the objective of bringing the state closer to the people will be undermined by rising levels of popular cynicism. Indeed it suggests that the Ugandan state has not fully shed its predatory characteristics.

Chapter 4

19] The Terms of Reference of the NGO Policy Review [UNDP 1997c:2] are delineated as follows:

a] the need to define the context that governs NGO operations in Uganda
b] the need to define the nature of co-ordination - technical and operational
c] the need to define roles for NGOs at national and district levels
d] the need to define partnership between Government and NGOs
e] the need to provide clear definitions of Non-Governmental Organisations [NGOs] and Community-Based Organisations [CBOs] and a distinction between international NGOs and local NGOs.

20] The first attempt to convene the National NGO Forum in October 1995 was postponed at the request of the Office of the Prime Minister [OPM]. A number of reasons are sighted for this postponement including, the lack of consultation within the NGO Sector, the lack of clear objectives for the Forum, and poor communication between the organisers and the OPM.

21] **Oxfam's** involvement in the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project aims to bring the perspective of the poor into national and district planning for poverty reduction in Uganda. The project is funded by DFID and the World Bank to the tune of over US$1.5 million over a three year period; and is designed to support the PEAP objective of eradicating mass poverty from Ugandan society through empowering households to earn decent incomes and facilitate the improvement of their quality of life. Oxfam has overall responsibility for the implementation of the project, and is contracted by DFID on behalf of the MoFEP, and reports to the Poverty Monitoring Unit

[PMU] which is located within the MoFEP. As part of the programme Oxfam is expected to build the capacity of local NGOs partners with a view to eventual handover [DFID 1997]

22] **SCFs** Social Welfare programme which is implemented alongside the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development [MoGLSD] - which until recently was known as the Ministry of Gender and Community Development. The programme works in the following areas: legislative and policy development; capacity building with government and NGOs; training, programme development and Juvenile Justice. The programme has evolved since 1989 and culminated in the passage of the Children's Statute in 1996 which draws on the OAU Charter on the Rights and Welfare of African Children and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which was ratified by Uganda in 1990. SCF is now part of the National Streering Committee which was established to co-ordinate, monitor and implement the Statute across the whole country. In line with the subordination of responsibilities to districts, SCF is now working on district plans for the implementation of the Statute. The lessons learnt from this process are being shared with other countries in Africa and Asia [SCF: 1997d].

23] SCFs scaling-down activities towards working with SNGOs and GROs is demonstrated by the following: The National Association of Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS [**NACWOLA**] which is national NGO with branches in Kampala, Jinja, Iganga Kamuli, Mbale, Pallisa, Kumi, Soroti, Tororo, Hioma, Lira, Kigum, Arua, Entebbe, Luwero, Mbarara and Masaka. SCF offers technical assistance on an initiative entitled 'The Memory Project' - which supports women with HIV/AIDS in the process of communicating with their children about their disease and its consequences. SCF contributes US$15,000 and channels its technical assistance towards enabling NACWOLA to scale-up their activities as the organisation transforms itself from one based on 'volunteerism' to one based on 'professionalism'; Uganda Child Rights Network [**UCRN**] - like NACWOLA, UCRN is a national NGO which is partly funded by a grant of US$31,000 from three members of the International Save the Children Alliance [see Appendix 1] - Norway, Denmark and the UK. It is comprised of 17 SNGOs and 8 NNGOs working in Uganda all of whom pay subscription and membership fees. UCRN works on policy development and training and presented the alternative report to the UN on the situation of children in Uganda under the reporting requirements of UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It uses materials developed by the Save the Children Alliance and translates and adapts them to Ugandan conditions. A new addition to SCFs scaling downwards has been the inclusion of local management committees at the LC1 level

into a DFID-funded **Peri-Urban Programme** that covers eight LC1 zones [with populations varying between 10,000 - 30,0000 per zone] in one parish [LC2 level] of Kwempe district of Kampala. The programme focuses on both service delivery and capacity building in health, sanitation and drainage. Each management committee which will consist of 5-10 persons will be elected through LC1 forums comprised of landlords, traders and tenants.

Interviews with SCF staff working on these programmes [See Appendix 3] revealed that SCF had no overall strategy towards working with SNGOs and CBOs and the initiatives largely focused on discrete projects. Indeed, according to the SCF project manager for the Kwempe programme, the inclusion of local management committees in Kwempe was at the insistence of the district. In this sense SCFs approach towards working with local non-government actors has not been strategic but reactive to the NPA.

24] The Nutrition and Early Childhood Development Project [NECDP] was designed to complement the Ugandan National Action Plan for Children [UNAPC] and the Poverty Eradication Action Plan [PEAP], although the original conception predates both of these initiatives and was based on data compiled in the Philippines. Given SCFs involvement in the development of the Children's Statute and in UNPAC the Fund was invited by the World Bank to sit on an NECDP Task Force [comprised of bilateral donors, SNGOs and government departments and academics] that would assist in the development and design of the programme. Officially the Bank claimed it wanted to involve stakeholders, listen to beneficiaries, create community-based solutions that would be self sustaining; and use NGOs as change agents.

However, in reality the Task Force was sidelined and teams of international experts [none of whom were African] were brought in from time-to-time, and when they were out of Uganda there was no reference point within the Bank. The plan devised by these international consultants gave a very restricted focus to nutrition and early child development, and was rooted in the notion that 2 volunteers per community would work with 18,000 people across 12 districts; and NGOs were expected to absorb US $1 million per district. No assessment had been made of the capacity of districts and local NGOs to take on board the tasks or absorb this amount of money which individual NGOs would have to bid for under contractual arrangements. The plan was sent to Washington prior to consultations with the Task Force and had expanded to include 20 districts. Given the Bank's approach to participation, SCF wrote an eight page letter - which was supported by UNICEF - to Bank representatives in Washington and Uganda [30 April 1997] documenting the process and its contradictions. The letter concluded that "All members of the Task Force - civil servants, UNICEF, international and national NGOs - are all despairing of the likely impact of the project without further modifications . . . . [A]ll are watching the birth of an unloved orphan project from a disgruntled distance." [SCF 1997e: 8]. **In June 1998 the Ugandan Parliament - which has to approve all loans in excess of US$10 million - blocked the project**. However, in spite of its reservations about the process SCF submitted a bid to run the programme in two of the twenty odd districts. According to the Country Programme Director, this was because "we felt we could do a good job, and because we didn't want another agency coming into these two districts where we were already working and taking everything over" [cf.: reference to NNGO 'colonisation' and 'empire building' at district level - Pages 38, 60].

Appendices

Appendix 1: Save the Children Fund in Uganda

Overview

Save the Children Fund (UK) was established in 1919 after World War 1. In the early years of its formation SCF focused on work in the UK, Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. It withdrew from countries in Europe are after the communist take-over in 1948, but retained its work in the UK and began increasingly to focus on colonial and emerging states in Africa and Asia. Its founding principles are rooted in the Rights of the Child which was adopted by the precursor to the modern United Nations - The League of Nations - in 1925. The principles enshrined in Rights of the Child were later incorporated into the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child [UNCRC] which was ratified by UN member states in 1989. In recent years SCF has had an annual operating budget in excess of US$144 million, and works in over 55 countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Europe [including the UK]. SCF (UK) is a member of the International Save the Children Alliance [ISCA] - which has its headquarters in London and incorporates over 25 independent SCFs from both northern and southern countries that subscribe to promote children's rights.

Uganda Programme

SCF started working in Uganda in the late I 950s. Its programme was disrupted during the political turmoil that prevailed during the Amin era, but in 1979 SCF was invited to return and worked in health (with a focus on immunisation and renovation of the Mulago hospital, relief for people displaced by the civil war). In the 1990s its work has primarily focused on health and social welfare. SCFs strategic plan for Uganda [1997-2001] places **children's rights** as the core focus of its programme, delineates this into five strategic themes: children's rights with a focus on implementation, monitoring and reporting on the UNCRC; access to social services for vulnerable children in the context of decentralisation; health - HIV/MDS; emergency preparation and vulnerable populations; food security and nutrition.

The plan notes that SCF in Uganda has worked principally with government at national and districts levels. In the changing national and global political climate, the plan observes that expectations of what government can achieve are decreasing, with increasing dependence on community self-reliance and the development of private (for-profit) and local NGO service providers [p.1 1]. The plan also notes, that the way SCF works in Uganda will be underpinned by **partnership, capacity building and participation**. And observes that "while we have some experience of working with communities and Ugandan NGOs in specific sectors and geographical areas, more efforts needs to be made to develop these approaches, to understand the complications of forcing partnerships with these disparate groups and develop effective and affordable ways to build capacity at district, sub-county and community levels".

Unlike Oxfam, SCF has only limited involvement in supply-side operations, and has for the main part restricted its programme to demand-side [legal reform, government policy and organisational development] interventions. It's significant policy achievements have focused on the Children's Statute, the development of the Uganda National Plan of Action for Children [UNPAC] and National Social Welfare Policy. Its operational budget for 1997/98 is in excess of US$2.4 million, of which SCF contributes about US$600,000 from its own resources. Main sources of donor funding to SCFs programme in Uganda is from DFID, the European Union, USAID and Comic Relief.

Appendix 2: Oxfam In Uganda

Overview

Oxfam (UK and Ireland;) was established in 1942 during World War 11. It's operations initially focused on famine relief and post-war reconstruction in Europe and Russia. It subsequently withdrew from these regions and began focusing on Africa and Asia. Its operating principles are based on a vision of the world 'where all people have sufficient food and water; can have a roof over their head; have sustainable livelihoods; have access to basic education and health care; have their human rights respected; are free from persecution for their beliefs; decide their own future; suffer no armed conflict". Today Oxfam (UKI) has an operating budget in excess of US$160 million and works in over 70 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Middle East and Europe [in 1996 it commenced work in the UK]. Oxfam [UKI] is a member of Oxfam International - which has

its headquarters in Washington D.C. and is comprised of 10 independent agencies from northern countries that subscribe to a common mission statement.

Uganda Programme

Oxfam started working in Uganda in the early 1960s but withdrew its operations during the political turmoil that prevailed during the Amin and Obote eras. It returned to the country in the early-1980s. Oxfam's strategic plan for Uganda [1996-2000] identifies **poverty** as the core focus of its programme and aims to build the capacity of poor people, especially women, to secure sustainable livelihoods and access to basic rights' [1996: 26]. Within this framework four supply-side strategic aims and objectives are identified: integrated community-based heath care; disability; education; food security; emergencies and conflict resolution. On policy [demand-side] related work increasing attention is beginning to focus on: poverty reduction; debt reduction; health and education; and trade. Oxfam is currently developing its work with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning [MoFEP] on Participatory Poverty Assessments. The background to this initiative is linked to the significant and successful campaign Oxfam launched on the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative [HIPCj; a campaign on which Oxfam worked closely with the MoFEP for the inclusion of Uganda in the first round of debt relief.

The strategy is underpinned by ways of working that focus on **capacity building** and **partnership** with civil and governmental partners. In 1995/96 Oxfam had an operational budget of approximately US$6.4 million. The main sources of donor funding for Oxfam's programme in Uganda is from DFID, the European Union, and UNHCR. Compared with NNGOs like SCF - the plan observes that Oxfam's programme in Uganda is significantly more supply-side oriented; and notes that "the nature and spread of our development work does mean that we may have a broad but shallow view with limited specialist knowledge and expertise [p23].

Appendix 3: Fieldwork Itinerary, Organisational Profiles and Interview Process in Uganda

During the field work conducted in June 1998, representatives from a variety of government departments, donors, NNGOs, SNGOs and research institutes were interviewed. This appendix gives a brief summary of organisational profiles, and the process that guided and informed the fieldwork process.

Save the Children Fund

Richard Mover, Country Programme Director, Save the Children Fund [SCF]
Diane Swales, National Social Welfare Advisor, Save the Children Fund [SCF]
Lucy Shillingi, HJVAJDS Advisor, Save tile Children Fund [SCF]
Jennifer Bukhole, Project Manager, Kwempe Pen- Urban Programme [SCF]
See Appendix I for organisational profile of SCF in Uganda.

Makerere Institute of Social Research MISR/, Makerere University

Patrick Mulinawa, Deputy Director.
This Institute used to be known as the East African Research Institute [EARI] which was established during colonial times and had a strong anthropological orientation. The Institute deteriorated during Uganda's political crises; it was rehabilitated with a grant from the World Bank during the late 1980s and renamed MISR. It now focuses on land reform, social policy, political processes and NGOs.

Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning [MOFEP]

Mark Williams, Social Sector Advisor.
The MoFEP is one of Uganda's most influential ministries of state. It has had a chequered history with its two 'wings' - Finance and Economic Planning - merged and demerged on several occasions. In 1998 the two wings were remerged as part of the government's effort to streamline central line ministries.

Margaret Kakande, Head of Poverty Monitoring Unit
The Poverty Monitoring Unit is part of the MoFEP, and is charged with the implementing the Poverty Eradication Action Plan [PEAP]; and administering the Uganda ParticipatoryAssessment Project [UPPAP] which is funded by DFID and the World Bank.

DANIDA, Danish Embassy

Daniel Iga, Programnze Officer
DANIDA is the aid-wing of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Danish volume of aid relative to GDP has been significantly higher than most OECD-members for more than two decades. It surpassed the average DAC in the 1970s, exceeded 0.7% in 1978, and has stabilised at 1% of GDP since 1992. DANIDA is the largest bilateral development donor to Uganda.

Community Development Resource Network [CDRN]
Afonica Kapirir, Programme Officer
CDRN was established in 1994. It is a Ugandan NGO which aims to promote the effectiveness of local organisations NGOs and community-based organisations] engaged in community development. Its objectives are to enhance the capacity of local organisations through training and organisational support through participatory methods. It also works with UNICEF, SCF, OXFAM, ACCORD and government departments.

World Bank

Harriet Nannyonjo, Operations Officer Social Sector.
As the largest multilateral donor to Uganda the World Bank occupies a central position Its operations in Uganda are governed by the Consultative Group, and most of its funding is channelled through the International Development Association [IDA] Credits extended under IDA have a ten year grace period, repayment is spread over 35-40 years at virtually 0% interest. In accordance with the Bank's 1996 Review of the Focus on Poverty Reduction, its Country Assistance Strategy for Uganda
places poverty alleviation at the forefront of policy advice and interventions.

Uganda Debt Network [UDN]

Zie Gariyo, Director
UDN is an advocacy and lobbying coalition of Ugandan NGOs formed in 1996. It was established with grant of US$10,000 from Oxfam and has been active in advocating and lobbying for debt relief for Uganda under the initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Country's [HIPC] of the World Bank and the IMF. A number of NNGOs are members of UDN.

Uganda Child Rights Network [UCRN]

Virginia Uchowa, Deputy Director
UCRN was established in 1996 as a break-away from the Uganda Community Based Association for Child Welfare [UCOBAC]. UCRN is an umbrella NGO that works with government ministries, SNGOs, CBOs and donors. Its work focuses on the United Nations Convention of the Child, the OAU Charter of Child Rights and the National Plan of Action for Children. It is funded by members of International Save the Children Fund Alliance and by membership fees from 17 SNGOs and 8 NNGOs.

Economic Policy Research Centre [EPRC]/, Makerere University

Tinka Bonga, Economist
EPRC is an applied policy research institute headed by Dr Fred Opio. It publishes an Economic Research Bulletin twice a year, and undertakes numerous economic and social policy studies for multilateral and bilateral donors, for government departments and NNGOs. It also contributes to an MA programme in Economic Policy and Planning at Makerere University.

Oxfam

Kathleen Glancey, (Country Representative, Oxfam.

See Appendix 2 for organisational profile of Oxfam in Uganda.

Uganda National NGO Forum [UNGOF]

Rauxen Zedriga, Co-ordinator.
The NGO Forum was established in 1996 to represent SNGOs, GROs and NNGOs. It is comprised of a two-person Secretariat, a 15-member National Executive Committee, a General Assembly representing all NGOs, and a National Council comprised of all districts, 26 representatives working on 13 thematic working groups; 7 representatives from local umbrella networks and 10 representatives from NNGOs.

United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]

John Okello, Programme Officer, UNDP
Jens Nielsen, Programme Officer, UNDP
UNDPs programme in Uganda can be delineated into six main sector priorities: governance and decentralisation; poverty and sustainable livelihoods; environment, gender, HIV/AIDS and private sector development; These are grouped into two main thematic areas: decentralised governance and private sector development, which are operationalised through a two-pronged strategy that consists of policy dialogue and capacity building.

Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations [DENIVA]

Professor Kwesiga, Executive Director.
DENIVA was established in 1988. It is a network of Ugandan NGOs and Community Based Organisations, and has over 200 members. Its aim is to contribute to the strengthening of the NGO sector to participate and influence socio-economic and political transformation for sustainable development. It is composed of a General Assembly - which is the supreme governing body, and has a Board of Directors composed of nine elected members. Its operations are directed by a Secretariat appointed by the Board.

Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development [MoGLSD]

Mrs Otchago, Commissioner.
The MoLSD was until very recently known as the Ministry of Gender and Community Development. It remit is on the social sector and covers community health, youth and children and vulnerable groups. The new ministry is akin to the old Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare with an appendage of the former ministry of Gender and Community Development. The departments of Youth, Disability, Elderly and Child Care and Protection, Legal Affairs and Women's Programmes have been abolished. Debate over the final remit of the 'new' Ministry and its relationship with the National Council for Children [see below] was continuing at the time of writing.

Decentralisation Secretariat, Ministry of Local Government [MOLG]

Mr Wagaba, Chief of Division, Investment and Development Planning
The MoLG is responsible for implementing the Local Government Act of 1997. The decentralisation secretariat was established in 1992 and given the responsibility for operationalising the devolution of executive and financial responsibilities from line ministries to districts. The decentralisation process has been managed in three phases: 1993/94-12 districts; 1994/95-14 districts and 1995/96 - all remaining districts.

National Council for Children [NCC]

Harriet Alugewa, Secretary General
The NCC is a government QUANGO initially established in 1992. It was moribund for several years but revived in late 1997 after the Children's Statute of 1996 was passed by Parliament. It has subsequently been granted a remit covering advocacy, resource mobilisation and monitoring of children's issues across all ministries. The current Secretary General was previously a member of the Task Force for the Implementation of the Children's Statute in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development - which has recently been re-merged with the Ministry of Finance to form the MoFEP.

Interviews: Process
Prior to undertaking field work in Uganda discussions were held with representatives from SCF and Oxfam in the UK. I was also granted access to the documentation held by both organisations in the UK and Uganda. These processes enabled me to obtain insights into approaches to programming and into some of the practical issues confronting structural adjustment in Uganda. Against this background, I was able to build a picture of SCFs and Oxfam's key partners', which, in turn, helped me to identify the initial range of organisations that were targeted for interview.

On arrival in Uganda I spent the first working-day obtaining telephone numbers and contacts in the various target agencies and contacted them directly from the offices of SCF in Kampala. I identified myself as a researcher from UCL and gave a brief overview of the subject areas I wanted to explore. No difficulties were encountered in setting-up meetings in spite of 'cold calling'. This was partly due to the fact that interaction between the state, non-government actors and donors was the subject of a UNDP/ODI policy review - scheduled to start in July 1998 - instigated at the behest of the Office of the Prime Minister. DFID had also conducted workshops on the subject in May 1998 as part of its review into poverty.

Most interviews lasted between 60-90 minutes, and were primarily aimed at mapping the terrain, identifying areas that needed exploration and identifying further leads that were pertinent to the focus of the field work. Interview notes were written contempreanously and transcribed daily onto a lap-top computer Attempts were made to meet with the NGO Board in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Office of the Prime Minister and the World Bank's NGO Liaison Officer. But the schedule was too tight to accommodate these interviews.

**Appendix 4: Uganda: Economic and Social Indicators**

Economic Indicators

GDP Growth [average 1990-1995]	6.6	
GDP [1995, million $]	5,655	
Aid [as % of GDP]	19.2	
International Debt [value in million $]	689	[1980]
	3,564	[1995]
Total External Debt as % of GDP	54.6	[1980]
	88.0	[1995]
Multilateral Debt [as % of external debt]	11.5	[1980]
	61.8	[1995]
Health Expenditure [as % of GDP]	1.6	
Education Expenditure [as % of GDP]	2.6	
Military Expenditure [as % of Health and Education]	18	

Social Indicators

Life Expectancy [years]	42
Population Growth Rate [%]	2.8
Fertility Rate [per female]	7.1
Infant Mortality [per '000]	121
Under Five Mortality [per '000]	185
Poverty [% of Population on less than $1.00 per day]	50
Urban Population [as % of total population]	12

Sources World Development Report 1997; Human Development Report 1997.

Appendix 5: Political and Administrative Map of Uganda

Source: Modified from World Bank [1997e]

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