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***Does Urban Risk Jeopardise Urban Development
Planning?***

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SELECTED LIST OF ACRONYMS AND COMMON CONCEPTS RELATED TO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND ECUADOR

Barrio	Neighbourhood, community
brown agenda	Environmental agenda with impact on human health, which is immediate in timing and local in scale
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CONAIE	Ecuadorian Confederation of Indigenous Peoples
Costa	Coastal region (to the west of Ecuador, where Guayaquil is located)
DPLAN-G	Office of Urban Development Planning of the Municipality of Guayaquil
El Niño	El Niño, or El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), is an anomalous oceanographic and atmospheric event in the equatorial Pacific Ocean that usually occurs every three to seven years and is characterized by an increase in the sea-surface temperature in the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean. ENSO is thought to be responsible for anomalous climatic conditions spanning most of the globe. Many of the resulting impacts of El Niño are negative, causing drought, famine, and floods.
extended household	A single adult or couple living with their own children and other related adults or children
gender roles	Reproductive role: Childbearing and child rearing responsibilities and domestic tasks carried out mainly by women to guarantee the maintenance and reproduction of the labour force Productive role: Work done by both men and women for cash or kind including both market and home or subsistence production Community managing role: Work undertaken primarily by women at the community level to ensure the provision and maintenance of such collective goods as water, health care, and education Community politics role: Formal political organizing undertaken primarily by men at the community level
GNP	Gross National Product
green agenda	Sustainability agenda with impact on health of ecosystem, which is delayed in timing and regional/global in scale
Habitat-LAC	UN-Habitat's Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILDIS	Latin American Institute for Social Research
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISDR	International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
Mestizos	Descendants of Indians and Spaniards in Ecuador
MIMG	Municipality of Guayaquil
nesting	An invisible intergenerational densification strategy facilitated by home ownership, in which young households without their own assets form separate households on their parents' land
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
nuclear household	A couple living with their own children
Oriente	Amazon basin (rainforest in the east of Ecuador)
RADIUS-project	Risk Assessment tools for Diagnosis of Urban areas against Seismic disasters
RAP	Rational Actor Paradigm
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
Sierra	Andean mountains (in Ecuador, where the capital Quito is located)
social fabric	Root metaphor for collective life; webbing of interdependencies embedded in expectations, obligations, actions and interactions
Suburbios	Squatter settlements (in Guayaquil)

Tugurios
UNCHS
UNICEF
WSSD

Inner-city slums (in Guayaquil)
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (now UN-Habitat)
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
World Summit on Sustainable Development

DOES URBAN RISK JEOPARDISE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING?

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

In the preparation for the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared on the subject of disaster reduction and sustainable development that: "More effective prevention strategies would save not only tens of billions of dollars, but save tens of thousands of lives. Funds currently spent on intervention and relief could be devoted to enhancing equitable and sustainable development instead, which would further reduce the risk for war and disaster. Building a culture of prevention is not easy. While the costs of prevention have to be paid in the present, its benefits lie in a distant future. Moreover, the benefits are not tangible; they are the disaster that did *not* happen" (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction – ISDR, 2002, p.1).

From the above statement one can conclude that danger is real, but risk is socially constructed. Key questions thereby are: How do risks reproduce social structure? How is risk embedded in the social fabric? Herein, risk reminds us of our dependency, interdependency, and vulnerability within the social fabric. That is exactly the angle from which I started to question the concept of risk in urban development planning.

This initial search brought me to the varying theories on risk. The analysis of those theories begged the question of how discourses are shaping the perceptions of and the responses to risk. In fact, it is rarely lay people who play a major role in the construction of risk objects at the level of public debates. Rather, expert knowledges embedded within organizational contexts and often mediated through the mass media, are central to the construction and publicizing of risk. In turn, it is the social and political roots of the urban risk discourses that currently forms the barriers for or widens the opportunities towards risk mitigation and coping strategies. The latter led me to the recognition of knowledge, power dynamics and communicative interaction in the risk discourse. However, the question at stake was how this model on risk discourse would relate to urban development planning. Herein, issues such as social exclusion, economic

and political marginalization and spatial segregation would definitely underlie the non-universality in the urban risk discourses in the face of rapid urbanization and globalisation.

This theoretical exploration of risk in the context of urban development made me focus on defining risk according to Giddens' structuration theory (in Healey, 1997). In fact, my understanding of the recursive relationship between structure and agency and its relevance to the concept of urban risk is based on the communicative approach to urban development planning. Based on Foucault's critic on scientific rationalism as well as Flyvbjerg's and Healey's comments on communicative rationalism as developed by Habermas (in Flyvbjerg, 1998; Healey, 1997), I was in search for the transformative power of alternative governance structures. Herein, the planner shall recognize that "the overt struggles for dominance over agenda formation and action programmes are being pulled out of the internal workings of government departments and agencies, to be played out in the open in new arenas and practices, e.g. partnerships, joint forums etc" (Healey et al, 2002, p.212). But how can democratic issues such as inclusion, participation, transparency and accountability be guaranteed? Obviously, there is a need for conditions and objectives. I found opportunities and constraints in – for instance – Friedmann's (1998) argument on the rise of civil society, insurgent practices discussed by Sandercock (1998), discursive practice discussed by Healey (1997), dialectical utopianism discussed by Harvey (2000), and in Appadurai's model of deep democracy (2001). However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate at large that discussion. In short, my model for urban development planning is based on the ideals of urban sustainability and social justice. However, those objectives or ideals are not the substantive goals of the planner. Rather, the planner will develop a methodology in order to expand the "room for manoeuvre" between the planner's context and those ideals. Based on my reflection, I argue that planning beyond the conflictive barriers of urban sustainability and social justice requires

a collaborative and strategic approach that enhances the sustainability of the ongoing interventions, which will continue dealing with power relations in the city. Thus, progress in urban sustainability and social justice is mainly expanding the abilities in the process of problem setting of what has so far been viewed as a conflictive development, as well as generating opportunities among all stakeholders for collaborative and strategic decision-making.

In the end, the developed concepts and framework on risk in the context of a communicative approach to urban development planning should be assessed against a contextual background. Therefore, I will do an assessment of both community development and urban policy vis-à-vis urban risk in Guayaquil, Ecuador. In part, this case

was selected because the need to reduce vulnerability to natural hazards through better urban development and construction standards is one of the issues that are high on Habitat-LAC's agenda (UN-Habitat's Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean). Moreover, through the study of an available asset vulnerability framework (Moser, 1997), findings can be contrasted with responses by households and communities that are in search for security, yet not capable of eliminating vulnerability. The study reveals how urban citizens can hardly cope with violence, environmental and social problems, which are now far more prevalent in Guayaquil since inequalities became much wider with the economic crisis and the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).

CHAPTER TWO: Urban development at risk: The challenge of ensuring adaptive potential in a communicative approach to urban development planning

There is a growing public awareness of common risks around the globe. Indeed, one of the most prevalent discourses, namely the risk society of Beck and Giddens, places risk at the core of the world transition: "The social world has become a world at risk, a world that makes transparent our vulnerabilities" (Jaeger et al, 2001, p.15). Furthermore, it is claimed that contemporary risk is not local but eco-systemic¹.

Due to rapidly increasing levels of urbanization and economic globalisation, it has been argued that urban areas are consequently becoming increasingly risky places to live, especially for vulnerable and/or low-income residents of cities in developing countries². Therefore, the following question emerges: To what extent does urban risk jeopardize urban development planning? Yet, a context needs to be set in order to discuss this question. Whereas the definition of urban risk will be developed throughout this theoretical part, urban development planning has in the introduction been defined with intent of social justice and urban sustainability through communicative interaction.

There are indeed diverging dimensions to the perceptions of – and the respective responses to – urban risk. At the one end of the spectrum, academic scholars argue that "risk-taking is a core element of a dynamic economic and innovative society" (Giddens cited in Caplan, 2000, p.6). However, their understanding of the risk discourse is biased by different approaches to structure and agency. The importance of this issue for communicative interaction in urban development planning will be explored in the following sections. At the other end of the spectrum, urban development policy researchers perceive that engagement in risk behaviour is not always a matter of choice (Moser, 1998). The latter statements reveal the vision that the concept of urban risk pertains both to constraints and potentials on social justice and urban sustainability in urban development. However, they beg the question of how urban citizens and communities can ensure adaptive potential to urban risk.

In answering the initial question if urban risk does jeopardize urban development planning, it is basic and necessarily to set a framework of communicative interaction and knowledge in the perceptions of and responses to risk. Such analysis of risk incorporates an awareness of the dimensions of power, including agency and structure, as well as control and resistance. That framework will be the base to diagnose to what extent there are potentials and constraints for social justice and urban sustainability in urban affairs at risk. Then, in reflection on how and why ensuring adaptive potential to urban risk, I will evaluate the framework towards developing elements of a strategy through the components of strategic thinking. Finally, the theoretical discussion on urban risk and urban development planning will lead to why and how this framework – with its potentials and constraints – can support the following proposition:

Enmeshed in ensuring adaptive potential to urban risk, urban development planning shall enhance communicative interaction and knowledge through the implementation of entwined criteria concerning the recognition of vulnerability, the strengthening of community organisation, building political inclusiveness and the preparedness of the institutional framework. Such communicative interaction and knowledge needs to incorporate an awareness of the dimensions of power, including agency, control and resistance if it is to promote urban sustainability and social justice.

Framework for communicative interaction and knowledge in the perceptions of and responses to risk

Yet, in parallel with those discussions, I shall define urban risk. In popular discourse, risk is the valued perception of a danger, threat, hazard or harm (Lupton, 1999). Major categories of risk are environmental risks, lifestyle risks, medical risks, interpersonal risks, economic risks and criminal risks. But in order to come to an operational definition in the context of urban development planning, I need to question who defines what, how and why with regard to risk. Thus, my interest goes to elements of structure and agency in the risk discourse. And furthermore, I seek what the potentials for

communicative interaction are in such risk discourse. Thereby, one of the most intriguing notions is the social construction of knowledge because it is not only a very powerful one but also limiting. Therefore, I argue for a contextualized and politicised analysis of risk. Herein the search for structure and agency in the risk discourse will be instrumental to unpack power dynamics and uncertainty in knowledge, as well as issues of culture, trust and value. The fact that this search is not evident nor straightforward is revealed by the risk definition in rational discourse, whereby risk is “a situation or event in which something of human value (including humans themselves) has been put at stake and where the outcome is uncertain” (Rosa cited in Jaeger et al, 2001, p.17). This agency-based definition virtually lacks the component of power and knowledge on the one hand and the component of culture, trust and value on the other hand. Herein, the potentials for communicative interaction are biased. Therefore, I will further explore not only this functionalist perspective and approach to risk, but also late modernist perspectives and responses to risk. Only then, can I integrate the features of communicative interaction and knowledge into the risk definition in the context of a communicative approach to urban development planning.

Functionalist perspective and approach to risk

The functionalist perspective and approach to risk has its roots in the rational action worldview as discussed by Jaeger et al (2001), which is atomistic, assuming that all social actions can be reduced to individual choices and that rationality is prominently a property of human individuals. It is also mechanistic, assuming that the world can be understood on the basis of the interaction of separate material bodies, including human beings. The so-called rational actor paradigm (RAP) is therefore a powerful and useful theoretical tool – but only under a restricted set of conditions. Thus, limits of uncertainty and knowledge development of RAP are to be understood in the fact that it is only applicable in settings that are socially structured to prefigure the conditions and actions assumed within the logical structure of RAP: settings where actors are engaged strategically with preferences and actions

whose gainful outcomes can be assessed – “that rational-choice principles are applicable to situations in which choice is institutionalised” (Smelser, cited in Jaeger et al, 2001, p.27). In situations of collective decision making or collective impacts of individual decisions, RAP will either lead to the treatment of organisations or social groups as “virtual” individuals as personae fictae, or to the extension of individual preferences to aggregate preference structures (Jaeger et al, 2001).

The statement of Caplan, namely that “risk is highly politicised, and the politicians constantly invoke science in their attempts to persuade the public that their policies are safe” (2000, p.1)³ obviously points at the deliberative process of the policy debates with regard to functionalist rationality. In fact, the functionalist approach to risk is by no means differing from the rational comprehensive planning theory, as analysed by Altshuler (1973) and Innes (1998). The model of “speaking truth to power” defines the role of science as the truth seeker and the creator of objective knowledge, and the role of policy makers as political actors in the manipulation of power.

Science has developed into a large and powerful institution where it has acquired prestige and value, particularly in Western society. Through its accumulated status, science has been able to set the standards and boundaries of what is and is not acceptable knowledge and practice (Garvin, 2001; Jaeger et al, 2001; Fischer, 1996). RAP is normative in nature and sees knowledge as superior to politics in the process of policy development. However, policy researchers have more recently advocated an approach that incorporates a diversity of views and has a more participatory nature. Herein, it is suggested that neither scientific knowledge nor politics must have superiority, and that the specific reality of peoples and places must take prominence (e.g. Healey, 1997; Fischer, 1996; Garvin, 2001). Nevertheless, the RAP is still prominent for the framework of communicative action and knowledge in the perceptions of and responses to risk. The dominant tendencies in environmental discourses and public policy, for instance, draw rather on the rational functionalist and scientific approach of “the environment as a stock of assets” or on an approach based on

systemic limits in the face of scientific uncertainty, namely “environmental system and its carrying capacity”, than on the more fundamentalist approach of “the environment as our world”, or eventually on the socially-constructed approach, namely “environment as a cultural conception”, which extends the challenges within the humanitarian socialist project with regard to the concept of sustainable development⁴.

Late modernist⁵ perspectives and approaches to risk

The risk society and the cultural/symbolic perspective of risk provide relevant alternative discourses for the discussion of urban development at risk. In contradiction to the functionalist perspective, they see risk as having become a central cultural and political concept by which individuals, social groups and institutions are organized, monitored and regulated. In other words, risk is associated with notions of choice, responsibility and blame.

The discourse of the risk society⁶ is embedded in the rapid social and economic change through globalisation, growth of information technologies, increasing individualism in society and rising inequalities. The first dimension of the risk society is in fact an extension of the analysis of individualisation. Increasing personal autonomy goes hand in hand with insecurity. Life in modern society has become more open-ended; there are more possibilities, but also more risks. Labour markets no longer offer stable, lifetime employment. Gender relations are in flux. Rapid technological change brings ethical and environmental uncertainties. The second dimension to risk society is the increasing scale and pervasiveness of environmental risks arising from industrial production. They arise both from relatively recent technologies – such as nuclear power, the production of synthetic chemicals and genetic engineering – and from the continuing expansion of old ones, such as fossil fuel combustion with its consequences in global warming. The risks society faces now are both global (respecting neither national boundaries nor class divisions) and pervasive, arising in the midst of everyday life, in foods, plastics and other materials. Many risks will have long-term effects; and some will be irreversible,

potentially altering the life conditions of future generations.

The increasing consciousness of the world as a whole due to social globalisation – which refers to the trans-national character of social processes and networks – offers opportunities to the limits of agency and structure in the deliberative process in this perspective. The more reflexive modernization calls into question traditional views of science, progress and development, as well as undermining political categories. With regard to his structuration theory, Giddens (in Jaeger et al, 2001) further argues that citizens orient themselves within a complex arrangement of traditions, individual routines and socio-cultural expectations. In other words, each individual actor is part of the forces that shape the future context of actions for others, but at the same time is bound by constraints that were constructed by past actions and choices of others. In this context, Beck has argued for the interdependence of highly specialised agents of modernization: “no single agent is responsible for any risk” (cited in Caplan, 2000, p.3-4).

By contrast, scientific knowledge barely understands some of these global environmental risks at all (Jacobs, 2001). So the risk is not a calculable probability of damage, but an unknown possibility. In these fields science is better characterised as one of ignorance than of mere uncertainty.

Another intriguing dimension in the risk society discourse is found in the universalistic claim (Beck in Blowers, 2000; Caplan, 2000; Giddens & Hutton, 2000; Lupton, 1999), namely that risk is a general condition of each individual, although some groups are more vulnerable due to the heterogeneity and diversity in society. In fact, further analysis of urban development at risk will support that issues such as social exclusion, economic and political marginalization and spatial segregation definitely underlie the non-universality in the perception of urban risk.

Anthropologist Douglas, and to a certain extent also cognitive psychologists like Slovic, argue for a cultural/symbolic perspective to risk (Douglas in Caplan, 2000; Douglas in Lupton, 1999; Slovic, 1999) because between private subjective

perception on the one hand, and public physical science on the other hand, there lies culture, a middle area of shared beliefs and values.

The cultural/symbolic perspective to risk emphasizes that in the deliberative process, the public legitimises supporting evidence by relating it to social and cultural realities – to a “received wisdom” that is embedded in social rationality rather than in the rational actor paradigm (ibid). Rational risk research ignores the conceptual, ethical and moral difficulties around the definition of equality and justice – and thus fails to acknowledge or address the related problem of how risk is to be judged acceptable or not (Slovic, 1999). Consequently, Douglas perceives it as pointless to concentrate on providing “better communication” or more education about risk to the lay public as a means of settling risk disputes, for the issue is not one of misguided perception but rather the result of clashes in political, moral and aesthetic judgements on risk (in Caplan, 2000; in Lupton, 1999).

Furthermore, Douglas (1994) emphasises in *Risk and Blame* the political use of the concept of risk in attributing blame for danger threatening a particular social group. She argues that risk is intimately related to notions of politics, particularly in relation to accountability, responsibility and blame. This intimate relationship becomes the power dimension in the cultural/symbolic perspective. Certain dangers are selected out from other for attention by a society and entitled risks for certain reasons that make sense to a particular culture, based on its shared values and concerns.

Model of communicative interaction and knowledge to risk

Now, the introduction of the model of communicative interaction and knowledge to risk will facilitate linking the exploration of the above range of risk analyses to a communicative approach to urban development planning. This model will be the key to unpack structure and agency in those risk discourses. Herein, the recognition of knowledge limits, power dynamics and deliberative processes will further be instructive for strategic thinking with regard to ensuring adaptive potential to urban development planning.

Whereas the risk judgements in the functionalist perspective and approach to risk is agency-based and atomistic, the late modernist risk discourses reveal that conceiving risk judgements on the basis of Giddens’ structuration theory can also clarify ideological elements in risk evaluation. In his inspirational essays on Development and Freedom, Sen (1999) assessed the general question of the importance of the informational base for evaluative judgements. This becomes obvious when Sen emphasises the included and excluded information of some standard theories of social ethics and justice. Therefore, Sen concludes that the character of an evaluative approach – and thus an ideology – may be strongly influenced by insensitivity to the excluded information. What is important for this framework is how his analysis reveals the knowledge limits when it is conceived as the processed information base of an ideology. That this – indeed – rational evaluative approach has still implications on the substantive freedoms of individuals/citizens at risk will be analysed in the next part.

In the post-modern conceptualisation of Foucault (in Flyvbjerg, 1998; Healey, 1997), the continuous power struggles between competing discourses mould the social and physical world, constructing rationalities and shaping individual identities by delimiting and conditioning thoughts and actions. So instead of seeking the ultimate truth of statements, Foucault asks how, why, and by whom, truth is attributed to particular arguments and not others. In particular, he analyses what types of thoughts, ideas, knowledges and practices become accepted, marginalized or silenced in given social conditions. This association of values and power in the construction of knowledge can be understood as the rationality of discourse. This power dynamics in the social construction of knowledge adds to the above discussed functionalist and late modernist perspectives and responses to risk an important relativity on the absolute link between knowledge and risk, be it scientific or local knowledge, incomplete or uncertain knowledge. With regard to the post-modernist conceptualisation of Foucault, one could conclude to pay further attention to power analysis in both communicative

interaction and knowledge development in the context of risk discourses.

What Douglas points at in the social rationality of her cultural/symbolic perspective to risk, is in the communicative planning process stressed by Innes view (1998). Namely, stakeholders in the communicative planning process rely on many types of information, and not primarily on formal analytic reports or quantitative measures. Apart from scientific knowledge, there is the participants' expertise, local knowledge in the form of stories told by the participants and finally intuitive knowledge. The latter can add critical interest and innovative ideas. What is particularly intriguing in Innes' view on the role of information in planning, is her argument for the collective creation of meanings construction, which can be conceptualised as the deliberative process of knowledge construction. The latter refers to the understanding that information does not so much directly influence decisions, as the institutions and practices through which policies came into being; and not so much the explicit opinions, as the participants' assumptions and their problem definitions. However, the Habermasian (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Healey, 1996, 1997) presentation of ideal conditions for communicative rationality, and his belief that consensual positions can be arrived at, has been contrasted by contemporary social relations that reveal deep cleavages of class, race, gender and culture. Even though, the deliberative process of knowledge construction in Habermasian critical theory does acknowledge that the conditions for universal discourse ethics are biased by structural unequal processes of economic globalisation, migration and urbanisation, wherein risk has become at the core of this world transition. Therefore, Habermasian universal discourse ethics⁷ can hardly function as a definite alternative to the post-modern model of the power dynamics in the social construction of knowledge. The methodology of strategic thinking – which I will discuss in one of the next parts – in part attempts to tackle those biases against communicative rationality.

In conclusion to this framework for communicative interaction and knowledge in the perceptions of and responses to risk, I suggest the following operational definition

of risk in the context of a communicative approach to urban development planning:

Risk is a situation or event in which human vulnerability has raised the level whereby their capacity to cope with hazards/inequalities has become uncertain and wherein (1) the rational evaluative approach limits knowledge to the processed information base of an ideology, thereby putting substantive freedom and capabilities of individuals/citizens at stake in urban development at risk; (2) knowledges and practices in risk mitigation and coping strategies are put in perspective in favour of power dynamics in risk discourses; (3) communicative rationality needs being coupled to a methodology of strategic thinking if it is to create conditions for political inclusiveness.

Potentials and constraints on social justice and urban sustainability in urban affairs at risk

This part directs the discussion on perspectives of and responses to risk into urban development. Based on the above framework for communicative interaction and knowledge, this part will diagnose to what extent urban affairs at risk offer potentials and/or constraints for the objectives I have defined for urban development planning, namely urban sustainability and social justice. This part will also identify the stakeholders in urban development at risk. Eventually, referencing to the risk definition will support the argumentation in the diagnosis.

However, I will first very briefly introduce the objectives I defined for urban development planning. Firstly, urban sustainability conceptualises the development conflict in cities. It is a presumably deliberate outcome of the competitive and growing city, the green city and the just city (Campbell, 1996). The development conflict presented by Campbell derives from the property conflict between raising urban productivity while reducing urban poverty on the one hand, and the resource conflict between urban productivity and its impact on the urban environment on the other hand. Yet, in contrast to Campbell's property conflict which merely focuses on social justice in terms of economic opportunity and income equality, the concept of social justice (in the just city)

comprises a twofold dimension, namely the distributive paradigm as well as the institutional paradigm. Social justice encompasses the just distribution of material resources (Harvey, 1988) in connection with just procedural issues of participation in deliberation and decision-making (Young, 1990). Consequently, the concept of social justice has two components in an urban context: the equal distribution of benefits and burdens among citizens in urban areas, and the elimination of mechanisms of domination and oppression of particular citizens in urban areas (ibid). However, the discourse on urban affairs at risk below express that the concepts of urban sustainability and social justice are entwined. The appearance of increasingly unfolding inequalities and the recursive relationship of risk and vulnerability are merely two themes wherein both concepts find articulation in the context of the discussion.

Urban sustainability and the development conflict

Obviously, the power dynamics of the risk society discourse is to be understood in its agenda which emphasises the urban – environmental – risks of the more developed cities or part of cities. They greatly discuss ecological sustainability, what has been called the green agenda⁸ (McGranahan et al, 2000) which comprises global environmental threats. However, urban living has always been accompanied by environmental risk⁹. By contrast, the powerful universalistic claim of the risk society that environmental degradation affects everyone has become contested in the environmental justice movement. Although claims that pollution is no respecter of class or income and that everyone will go down together if global warming occurs have had powerful effect in influencing public concern, class and ethnicity, as well as gender and age, almost always underlie worse environmental experiences (Hannigan, 1995; Haughton, 1999; McGranahan et al, 2001). Moreover, the hazards resulting in health risks or the brown agenda¹⁰ (McGranahan et al, 2000) as today experienced in the poorer parts of cities in the South¹¹ can not be disregarded from the socio-political context influencing urban risk. Indeed, citizens most at risk from

urban threats have been the most vulnerable ones – people lacking economic assets, political power and social resources (McGranahan et al, 2001). Although physical aspects are often rather local issues relating to, for example, inadequate water provision and sanitation, overcrowding, hazardous land sites and solid waste disposal than to the whole city environment and although the people whose interests are threatened live within the cities concerned, their socio-economic aspects are not. In addition, personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social climate, differences in relational perspectives and distribution within the family will all affect their well-being and the use they can make of a given bundle of commodities (Sen, 1999). Yet, for millions of poor urban dwellers, managing disasters and crises is an everyday occurrence, less noticed by outsiders but just as insidious (Sanderson, 2000; World Bank, 2001)¹².

Consequently, it should be highlighted that the risk society thesis neglects the key problem of inequality as a barrier for achieving sustainability (Blowers, 2000; Jacobs, 2001; Jaeger et al, 2001). The universalistic claim is thus not only a reflection of the power dynamics in the risk society discourse, it also reveals how inequality has become marginal knowledge in the rational evaluative approach of this discourse. Herein, not only a more diverse range of hazards biases the substantive freedom and capabilities of urban citizens to cope with urban development at risk, but also increasingly unfolding inequalities. How the international urban risk agenda recently launched action upon this issue is discussed in the next part on the just city. By contrast, what matters for both functionalist and late modernists is that nearly all risks are closely related to opportunities of economic dynamics and technological developments; thus risks are taken in order to expand future wealth and security (Wildavsky in Fischer, 1996). For instance, RAP claimed that the market mechanism would automatically establish a balance: market equilibriums are optima when all concerned parties interact according the rules of free enterprise (Jaeger et al, 2001). In short, the mechanistic and atomistic ideology has led to the following idea of control and resistance: the good outcome is guaranteed

by the right procedure. The very need to declare a goal such as sustainable development shows that things are not that simple. The current inequality in global distribution of income and wealth obviously involves an extremely unequal distribution of many risks and creates additional ones.

The just city

In reaction to the above-discussed inequalities, the development of the international urban risk agenda proves having taken on board notions of vulnerability, assets and capabilities and its interrelationships¹³. In part, this is due to extensive research based on communicative rationality and local knowledge. However, the challenge remains to further develop and support conditions for political inclusiveness of the most vulnerable citizens and to strengthen assets and capabilities of structure and agency in urban development at risk. This is in order to eventually ensure the adaptive potential of urban citizens in a communicative approach to urban development planning, as discussed in the next parts. Only then, the notion of vulnerability will catch its ambition, namely to get included into a development agenda with an intent of social justice, rather than, alternatively, being caught in the poverty discourse. Herein, the concept of risk lately seems to be a driving force for this transition in the ongoing discussion on vulnerability.

The two dimensions of vulnerability are firstly sensitivity, which is the magnitude of a system's response to an external event, and secondly resilience, which is the ease and rapidity of a system's recovery from stress. Moser (1998) defines vulnerability as insecurity and sensitivity in the well-being of individuals, households and communities in the face of a changing environment¹⁴, and implicit in this, their responsiveness and resilience to risks that they face during such negative changes. The link between vulnerability and capabilities – a concept that is in an innovative way introduced by Sen (1999)¹⁵ – is then set in the following definition that: “development is a process through which people's physical/material, social/organisational and motivation/attitudinal vulnerabilities (or capacities) are reduced or increased” (Anderson and Woodrow in Moser, 1998, p.3). Therefore, the ability to avoid or reduce

vulnerability depends not only on initial assets, but also on the capacity to manage them, or to transform them into (basic) necessities (Moser, 1998). Metaphorically, this talk regards people as primarily being vulnerable in a risk society to a wider context that also includes action, decisions about action, and provision of the means to develop and exercise capacities. It is eventually in this dynamics that Young (1990, p.16) argues for “the concept of social justice [which] includes all aspects of institutional rules and relations insofar as they are subject to potential collective decision.”

Furthermore, in the context of the just city, the main barrier in discourses influencing urban risk is to my view what Sen (1999) has discussed as adaptation and mental conditioning – meanwhile reducing the opportunity of people to approach the world with courage and freedom. In fact, one of the features of urbanization and industrialization is that as citizens we are individually responsible for the risks they create but since risks can only be controlled by collective action, as individuals we cannot prevent risk occurring and therefore continue to act irresponsibly (Blowers, 2000). This idea correlates with a distributional dimension of participation that tends to conceive of individuals as social atoms, logically prior to social relations and institutions (Young, 1990). Even though, the political pressure that is brought to bear in relation to risk disputes largely against exposing others to risk. The pressure is therefore centred less on individuals as being to blame and more on large organisations (Douglas in Lupton, 1999). Consequently, a fatalistic acceptance of risks is created over which we have no control and, with it, of the possibility that things will go wrong (Giddens in Blowers, 2000). This feeling of vulnerability has been exacerbated by a process of what Beck (in Blowers, 2000; Caplan, 2000; Giddens & Hutton, 2000) describes as “individualisation” whereby the reduction of welfare, the threat of unemployment and the dislocation of personal life have created a pervading sense of personal insecurity. Beck does not regard the condition as inevitable. Therefore, he refers to the idea of reflexivity by which individuals, confronted by the reality of their condition, are able to

undergo reflection and self-criticism, which leads on to self-transformation. This idea of reflexivity, however, requires attention for the earlier introduced institutional dimension of participation (Young, 1990) since individual identities and capacities are in many respects themselves the products of social processes, relations and power dynamics. In other words, it requires attention for social and political democracy (ibid). This reasoning comes close to Sen's (1999) search for conditions in which people have real opportunities of judging the kind of lives they would like to lead. In urban contexts, such reflection also involves struggles over re-conceptualising identities, of individuals, groups and particularities of places (Healey et al, 2002). Moreover, Healey argues that the new patterns of information flow, discussion and political mobilisation, generate alternative public arenas to the traditional public realms of urban politics. In this view, the interplay of structure and agency in institutional capacity-building needs to be understood as an ever-present multi-dimensional and mutually constitutive process leading to new opportunities in urban governance in above discussed complex contexts – and perhaps in urban affairs at risk?

Adaptive potential of urban development planning to urban risk

Based on the above-developed analysis to what extent risk discourses in urban affairs at risk offer potentials and constraints for urban sustainability and social justice in urban development, I argue that urban development planning is enmeshed in ensuring adaptive potential of urban citizens and communities at risk. Then, the questions remains what potential urban development planning possesses to make a singular contribution to the transformation of urban affairs at risk towards more sustainable and just forms of development. Herein, the search for collective action will draw on the framework of communicative interaction and knowledge in the perspectives of and responses to risk. For addressing the barriers and widening the opportunities bound to the framework and the diagnosis, I choose to initiate the strategy development through the methodology of strategic thinking because of the strength I found therein to couple the

communicative approach and social construction of knowledge in urban development planning to structure and agency in urban risk. Therefore, I will now discuss the adaptive potential to urban risk through the following components of strategic thinking¹⁶: systemic perspective, intent focus, intelligent opportunism, thinking in time, and process of public learning. As noted earlier, this methodology will prove to be a way to expand the scope of communicative rationality in the face of contemporary social relations that reveal deep cleavages of class, race, gender, age and culture. Thus, strategic thinking is a process of expanding the abilities of problem setting in conflictive risk discourses, as well as generating opportunities for collaborative and strategic decision-making.

Systemic perspective: the component for systemic view and understanding linkages

So far, neither the functionalist nor the late modernist discourses have addressed the urban dimension of risk. Consequently, it may be thought that political concern with global environmental and economic risks diverts attention away from cities worldwide. However, environmental, economic and social differences are not declining, but are being spatially restructured in cities (Giddens in Blowers, 2000). Moreover globalisation has reduced the scope of the action of national governments and leaves of great implications for cities (Sassen, 1994). Therefore, I argue that cities, as opposed to nations, comprise an important stake for both addressing the barriers and widening the opportunities bound to local-global linkages of urban affairs at risk. Moreover, if the current concern with risk is a product of globalisation, then it can result in new levels of inter-community discourse and a sense of vulnerability in being part of a world-system (Douglas in Lupton, 1999). In the cultural/symbolic risk perspective there is indeed an argument that only by changing the social organisation, risk selection and perception can be altered within complex society, where people who adhere to similar forms of social organisation would continue taking or avoiding similar kinds of risk (Caplan, 2000). Thus, the process of individualisation in urban communities is neither all pervasive,

nor complete. While aspects of the condition obviously affect everyone directly or indirectly as viewed in the risk society discourse, the impact will vary widely and, given the social inequality, which appears to have grown, the disadvantaged citizens will suffer most from a combination of urban risks. The unequal exposure to risks and unequal access to opportunities are largely a function of the principal systems of power operating in all societies, which are normally analysed in terms of age, class, gender, ability and ethnicity. These in turn may be seen as social structures of inclusiveness/exclusiveness rooted in (and mutually influencing) the patterns of economic and political systems at the city level, and beyond.

Intent focus: the component for political intent

The discussion on vulnerability and social justice brings attention to the pathways through which people and groups might shape their capacity to respond to risk and so brings the social and political roots of vulnerability into a sharper focus. In such a framework the primary subject study shifts from actual coping mechanisms to the underlying social and political relationships that constrain such action (Cannon, 1994; Hardoy et al, 2001; Pelling, 2002). This is important not only because it brings the analysis of vulnerability to a deeper level of social organisation, but also because it directly ties adaptive potential to urban risk into the urban development process. The latter is discussed above as the systemic perspective of the urban dimension of risk wherein oppression and domination are adverse conditions for the adaptive potential of citizens. Yet, many efforts – especially the ones from a functionalist approach – continue to be misguided: “in most countries it is extremely rare to find risk analysis to take account of the social, economic, institutional and cultural aspects of vulnerability” (Maskry in Sanderson, 2000, p.102). For instance, whilst the separation between city and disaster management continues, valuable opportunities for reducing urban risk will be lost¹⁷. However, some recent initiatives by intergovernmental agencies and donors are beginning to address the need. For instance, the UN-HABITAT (2002) “Risk & Disaster

Management Unit” describes since 1996 the need to improve sustainability of human settlements against future threats and risks. Yet with the exception of the World Development Report 2000/2001 (World Bank, 2001), the international debate remains rather silent on integrating measures for alleviating poverty with measures for reducing risks from disasters through the support of low-income households and urban community organizations in building and diversifying their asset bases (Hardoy et al, 2001; Moser, 1998; Pelling, 2002; Sanderson, 2000). These include well-known tangibles assets such as labour and human capital, less familiar productive assets such as housing, and largely invisible intangibles assets such as household relations and social capital (Moser, 1998). Obviously, strengthening the assets and capabilities of structure and agency in urban development at risk needs the revision of sectoral procedures in urban planning and risk mitigation. Herein, the recognition of vulnerability – in all its aspects – by all development practitioners can become a strategic framework to support collaborative interaction. Only then, a multiplier effect can result from transformative processes and alternative institutions concerned with urban development at risk, which are now dispersed over measures for alleviating poverty and measures for reducing health risks from physical hazards and weather-related risks.

Intelligent opportunism: the component for “room for manoeuvre”

Healey has extensively argued for a collaborative approach in order to expand the room for manoeuvre: “the power of dominant discourses can be challenged at the level of dialogue, through the power of knowledgeable, reflective discourse, through good arguments, through the transformations which come as people learn to understand and respect each other across their differences and conflicts, and as we learn to build consensus which respects differences” (1997, p. 67). Thus in a world where danger is real, but risk is socially constructed, it would be promising to foster public participation through the use of discourse methods. However, a better understanding of the processes by which

social agents emerge, evolve and possibly disappear is needed (Jaeger et al, 2001; Lupton, 1999).

Would a more democratically structured practice of expertise in urban risk similarly require a more participatory set of governmental institutions? Or, does the need emerge for new political innovations that can be brought about only through political struggles, particularly of the type advanced by contentious but participatory-oriented social movements - as it is often debated in political ecology spheres (Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Doyle & McEachern, 1998)? The current policy trend for the increased involvement of civil society¹⁸ actors in urban risk mitigation (Sanderson, 2000; Hardoy et al, 2001), should, however, not be at the expense of alienating local government and a broad public action approach to vulnerability. The recent policy agendas of privatisation and decentralisation have tended to reduce overall government responsibilities and budgets (Harris, 1997). At the community level, the contribution of local stocks of social capital¹⁹ to the building of resilience or human development more generally can be ambiguous: the inclusion of some in supportive social networks implies that others are excluded (Portes in Pelling, 2002). Thus, a central policy concern is how to build up local stocks of bonding social capital, which can hold individual groups and wider communities together, while also maintaining stocks of bridging capital between groups or people who have contrasting worldviews and lifestyles. This is needed to prevent the strengthening of privileged social groups and the alienation of others, which is liable to lead to inequality in accessing information or resources and so undermines adaptive potential. Indeed, social capital shapes key determinants of vulnerability²⁰ such as access to information and knowledge, access to political power and representation, patterns of reciprocity and exclusion, and institutional beliefs and customs (Cutter et al in Pelling, 2002).

Thinking in time: the component of tactics and multiplier effect

Because contemporary hazards are said to be the outcome of human action – principally the related events of modernization, industrialisation, urbanisation and globalisation – the drawbacks of such

events are continually confronted and challenged. Risks, in their contemporary meaning, are fundamentally based on decisions, principally made by organisations and political groups, which consider techno-economic advantages and considerations of utility (see framework and diagnosis).

Thus at the citywide level, the concept of risk colonizes the future in that the future, as envisaged in risk scenarios, determines decisions made in the present (Giddens in Caplan, 2000). However, one can often refer to the collective irrational choice theory (Connelly & Smith, 1999) in the socio-political context that determines urban affairs at risk. Basically, it means there is an incentive for continuing the production for individual benefit while risks to the society as a whole continue to multiply – similar to the debate of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin in Blowers, 1997). Yet, the discussion on urban development at risk suggests that individual choice alone – the key element of neo-liberal philosophy – cannot supply the social “goods” necessary to sustain a stable and meaningful life. For instance, immediate risk is often really significant at the level of communities and households in the rapidly urbanizing world (Hardoy et al, 2001). According to Beck and Sennett individual freedom – if it is to be extended – must be accompanied by the construction of new cosmopolitan community – otherwise the result is a generalised personal insecurity (in Giddens, 2000). The political aspects of risk and the self-critique that inspires the risk society discourse “produces a different kind of citizenship, *global citizenship*, in which traditional means of defining identity, based on local contexts, are exchanged for a focus on the world-wide perspective. This results in the generation of new alliances, of ad hoc activist groups, a new and different form of politics beyond traditional hierarchies” (Beck in Lupton, 1999, p.66). Thus Beck somewhat confusingly sees risk as simultaneously reinforcing positions of inequality and as democratising, creating a global citizenship. Nevertheless, based on the framework of communicative interaction and knowledge, the question remains how global citizenship as such can guarantee the removal of barriers to knowledge created by ideologies such as the neo-liberal philosophy. As long as the defined intent of

social justice and urban sustainability through communicative interaction are not reflected in planning/interventions in urban development at risk, one can hardly accept the level of preparedness of the institutional framework at stake.

Process of public learning

Eventually, the process of public learning would obviously tap into citizens' concern with the ambiguity of risk. In addition, the process of public learning might widen opportunities of communicative rationality in the risk discourses. The crucial point is that, in situations of ambivalence, agents do not simply try to choose optimal strategies on the basis of their expectations and evaluations – as suggested in the functionalist perspective of and response to risk. Rather, they define their evaluations, expectations, and strategies in a shared social process (Jaeger et al, 2001; Lupton, 1999). In epistemological terms, the question is how a reasonable argument about ambivalent utilities and probabilities is possible, and how to relate empirical data to norms and values (Fischer, 1996). Obviously, RAP is handicapped in creating mutual trust among diverse actors, building individual and social identity, achieving ontological security, or constructing solidarity among people (Jaeger et al, 2001; Fischer, 1996). As a result, institutional trust has been eroded and political legitimacy has been seriously jeopardized (Fischer, 1996; Garvin, 2001; Jaeger et al, 2001; Slovic, 1999). Through positive ignorance, lack of trust, perceived irrelevance, and differing models of agency, the public can explore collective forms of reflexivity. Indeed, these social phenomena are products of communication and mutual understanding, elements of social life that require mutuality – not simply strategic action – like in the process of collective sustained reflexivity.

By contrast, communicative rationality might offer further important payoffs in the process of public learning and empowerment in urban affairs at risk. For instance, it might create a synergy between vulnerable urban citizens and development practitioners, with the aim to meet felt needs and to prioritise. Herein, the mobilization of power is crucial if communicative rationality is to build in the condition for political

inclusiveness in the process of the social construction of knowledge on urban risk.

Criteria for communicative interaction and knowledge to urban risk

Based on the strategy development, I finally draw up the criteria for enhancing communicative interaction and knowledge in urban development planning to ensure its adaptive potential to risk.

- *Recognition by development practitioners of citizens' vulnerability in urban development at risk*
This criterion targets the inequalities that have risen for urban citizens, including those at the intra-household level, through lack of access to/control over the social construction of the risk discourse. Hereby, urban organisational development could benefit from the recognition of vulnerability – by using it as a strategic framework – to expand capacities of collective actors in urban affairs at risk.
- *Strengthening citizens' capabilities towards community organisation in community development at risk*
This criterion suggests that social capital – although of primordial importance in community development at risk since it may have the potential to access resources to enhance security and challenges vulnerability – cannot be taken for granted. Herein, also vertical linkages and partnerships as well as horizontal communication and actions between communities are at stake.
- *Building political inclusiveness of citizens in urban government/governance at risk*
This criterion primarily refers to the elimination of domination and oppression according to the institutional paradigm of social justice. Herein, political inclusiveness will in part be reflected by urban citizens participation in democratic structures. Yet, this can call into question longstanding notions of citizenship and identity. Thereby, it is necessary to stress that the awareness by all citizens concerning (differential levels of) intra-urban hazards and inequalities deriving from socio-ecological and political economic transformations is crucial for the emergence of political movements.

- *Preparedness of the institutional framework for planning/interventions to reduce risk in urban development*
This criterion comprises the analysis of the extent to which the defined intent of social

justice and urban sustainability through communicative interaction are reflected by planning/interventions in urban development at risk. Thereby, the focus is on institutional capacity.


CHAPETR THREE: Adaptive potential of urban citizens in Guayaquil: The challenge of urban development planning to the perceptions of and responses to risk

From the discussion on urban development at risk in the first part, it emerges that urban risk needs to be considered in particular times and places and through the voices of particular informants. Only then, one can analyse the challenge of ensuring adaptive potential in a communicative approach to urban development planning. Therefore, I have chosen to assess the adaptive potential of urban citizens in Guayaquil, Ecuador. In part, this is because the global economy, paralleled by global environmental changes and rapid urbanization processes, have led to prevalent economic crisis and hazardous environmental conditions which urban citizens in parts of Guayaquil can hardly cope with. Moreover, a rather unique, yet detailed, asset vulnerability analysis on urban citizens in Guayaquil has been done for the period from late 1970s till early 1990s²¹. The combination of both – critical information on hazards/inequalities and vulnerability – is crucial to point out the challenges to communicative interaction and knowledge in urban development at risk. So, this part will work through the criteria for enhancing communicative interaction and knowledge in urban development planning to ensure its adaptive potential to risk, as developed in the theoretical part. Although, in order to enable the consideration of global features as well as local ones in the assessment and discussion in this part, some introductory notes on and background to the case study in Guayaquil shall come first. The last remark to be made concerns the time frame and locality of this case study. Mainly, it covers the period 1978 till 1992 in Cisne Dos, a district in the south of Guayaquil. This is due to the limits of working with secondary data. As far as possible, references will be made to the relevance of this study for the situation today. Yet changes are prevalent, but little has been documented in English (Burgwal, 2002). And idealisations in the literature make it difficult to understand the real linkages (Sánchez, 2002). Further fieldwork would be necessary.

Intra-urban hazards and inequalities in Guayaquil deriving from socio-ecological and political economic transformations

Today, Ecuador has sunk into a deep economic crisis, whereby the policies of adjustment have been the most frequent solution. Although, the SAPs have had serious effects not just on the economic status of all Ecuadorians but also on the political instability and on the loss of credibility of democratic institutions, and eventually lead to an atmosphere of uncertainty, insecurity and instability (Flores, 1999). According to experts it would be the worst crisis of the last three decades. Indeed, dependence on oil revenues and external borrowing led to unprecedented growth during the 1970s (Bromley, 1977; World Bank, 1995), followed by stagnation and negative growth during the 1980s (Swyngedouw, 1997; World Bank, 1995). Furthermore, the distribution of wealth is highly skewed in Ecuador and has become more so over time, especially compared with other Latin American countries (Bromley, 1977; Latin American Institute for Social Research - ILDIS in Moser, 1997). One of the most important issues in Ecuador is the continued pervasiveness of poverty. In the *Costa*, the coastal region where Guayaquil is located, 44 percent of poverty is urban (World Bank, 1995). In Guayaquil itself, an estimated 70 percent of the population live in poverty (Cabrera, Martinez and Morales in Moser, 1997). However, the Office of Urban Development Planning of the Municipality of Guayaquil (DPLAN-G) estimated that in 1995 for instance, Guayaquil's GNP was about 20 percent of the GNP of the country (Argudo, 2000).

With approximately 2.5 million inhabitants today²², spread over 320 square kilometres of urban space situated on the Pacific shore of the country's humid lowlands in the southern part of the Guayas River basin, Guayaquil is indeed the biggest city in Ecuador, as well as its main economic centre and port (Argudo, 2000; Medina, 2001; also Figure 1). The hot and humid city has grown to the south, making artificial land fills with material from rock deposits on the marine estuaries that were originally covered by mangroves (Argudo, 2000; Moser, 1982). Cisne Dos forms one of the administrative units of Guayaquil on this south-western edge of the city, located



BOX 1: URBAN GROWTH GUAYAQUIL

Commercial activity in Guayaquil is focused around the forty gridiron blocks that broadly formed the Spanish colonial city in 1771. On the edge of this area are the inner-city slums, the *tugurios*. To the north, separated on higher hilly ground, are the predominantly middle- and upper-income areas. To the west and south, stretching towards the river estuaries, which bound the city, is an area of tidal swampland. Since it has little commercial value in its natural state, it provides the predominant area for low-income expansion. The squatter settlements or *suburbios* are heterogeneous in terms of housing structure, type of tenancy, density of population and provision of services. As in certain other Latin American cities, illegal invasion and settlement has been the means by which the poor in Guayaquil have obtained housing – by which is meant both land and some form of shelter (Moser, 1982). Note that Cisne Dos is now merely as densely populated as the city centre and that the area is now connected to the water-supply network.

Figure 1 (right topt): Map Ecuador (Roos & van Renthergem, 1997)

Figure 2 (top): Map Guayaquil (Author, drawn from Argudo, 2000; Moser, 1982; Swyngedouw, 1997)

seven kilometres from the central business district (Moser, 1997; also Figure 2). Also today, up to one-third of the population live in similar settlements in Guayaquil (Burgwal in Moser, 1997).

The spatial segregation and intra-urban differentials in urban services and land acquisition can explain some of the development conflicts that poor urban citizens encounter in their communication with public and private actors. Therefore, the urban risks in the settlement's formation and evolution can only be understood in terms of external socio-economic and political factors.

Prompted by rapid urban population growth, inner city development related to the petroleum boom, and lack of tenement rental accommodation in the early 1970s, squatters initially invaded small plots in the tidal swampland on which they constructed bamboo and timber homes on stilts (Moser, 1982). The marginal land in Cisne Dos was initially settled by young, mobile pioneers “moving from the inner-city slums or *tugurios* to avoid high rents and to try a secure home of one's own, i.e. becoming *de facto* home owners” (Moser, 1982, p. 171). However, there is an irony that takes grotesque forms in

those invasions. The physical conditions of the marshy mangrove land require the control and engineering of the estuary water by means of landfills or elevated housing and pathways. Yet, once these sites are occupied, the newly arrived city dwellers experience chronic problems with the public supply of potable water and other urban services. "Inundated by water during the rainy season and surrounded by saline and polluted estuary water all year round, they suffer from thirst" (Swyngedouw, 1995, p. 388).

As approximately 35 percent of the 2.5 million citizens still do not have access to adequate and reliable water supplies (UNCHS, 2001) and as the whole city suffers from chronic and absolute water shortages, access to and control over water has become subject to an intense social struggle. The unconnected part of the population have to make do with only 3 percent of the available water²³, delivered by a small army of about 400 private water vendors. But they have to pay a water price which is up to 400 times higher than that paid by the consumer connected to the water distribution system (Swyngedouw, 1995).

Clearly, nature and society are brought together to form an urban political ecology that combines the political and socio-economic with the ecological in ways that make them inseparable. Consequently, one should further reconstruct the urbanization process as a process of continuous socio-ecological and political economic transformation, whereby intra-urban inequalities are linked up with inter-urban differentials.

The city of Guayaquil grew on the basis of successive ecological conquests and the appropriation of rents from agricultural produce, respectively the cacao plantations from the 1890s till the 1920s and the banana bonanza in the 1950s, through which money was continuously recycled into a worldwide money circulation process (Swyngedouw, 1997). This process has radically altered the ecology of the urban-rural complex while incorporating ever-larger areas of Guayaquil into global money flow. The exploitation of the Amazon basin or *Oriente's* huge oil reserves from 1972 onwards signalled a new wave of ecological rent extraction and redistribution, however it was this time directed to the capital Quito in the Andean mountains or *Sierra* and eastwards into the *Oriente* rather than

towards Guayaquil in the *Costa* (see Figure 1). Indeed, the state institutions in Quito took the intermediating function for the oil economy²⁴ and so the political tide turned more in favour of Quito (Nickson, 1995; Swyngedouw, 1997).

Guayaquil has remained an industrial enclave with limited industrial employment. A series of economic recessions in the 1980s and 1990s, the earthquake of 1987 and the devastating effects of *El Niño*²⁵ (1982-83 and 1997-98) on agricultural rent extraction have further accentuated this spiral of decline (Cornejo-Grunauer, 2000; Swyngedouw, 1997; World Bank, 1995). Urban growth, therefore, has not only been a reflection of job creation but also of the agricultural sector's declining capacity to retain its population (Moser, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1997). For instance, after the disasters caused by *El Niño* during 1997-98, almost 300000 people immigrated to the city within the two years following (Argudo, 2000). Besides, in part reflecting Ecuador's diversity²⁶, many people of mixed Indian and Creole stock from the surrounding departments now live in Guayaquil's squatter settlements or *suburbios*, including Cisne Dos (Moser, 1982, 1987; Swyngedouw, 1997).

Financial flows to equip the city with the necessary infrastructure became thinner and the decline produced an urban crisis with catastrophic dimensions: absence of investment, rapid expansion of the city, land invasions, deterioration of urban services and damage to infrastructure, flooding, and chaotic management (Moser, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1997).

This analysis reveals that apart from the economic crisis, also "natural" disasters like an earthquake or *El Niño* can aggravate the inequalities experienced by the urban citizens in Cisne Dos, while declining the general economic productivity of the city Guayaquil as a whole. However, disaster research in Guayaquil, e.g. the RADIUS-project (Argudo, 2000), continues diverting attention to short-term anomalies in the city centre productivity. There is little reflection on ongoing intra-urban inequalities for urban citizens, e.g. in the *suburbios*, when analysing the impact of the disaster – as further discussed in the last criterion.

Application of criteria

Recognition by development practitioners of citizens' vulnerability in urban development at risk

Sectorial thinking and action by development practitioners makes them seldom analyse the distinctive features of urban vulnerability.

According to the recent applied research of Moser (1998), the distinctive features derive from the particular assets that the poor urban citizens control. Those are characterized by urban life, such as commoditization, environmental hazard and social fragmentation. The highly commoditized nature of the urban sector means that labour is the urban poor's most important asset (ibid). Further urban households pay for their food and shelter, and services such as transportation and education. Poor quality housing and inadequate water supplies, sanitation, and solid waste disposal are all environmental hazards that often have a particularly serious impact upon the poor urban citizens' human capital, health and well being (Hardoy et al, 2001). Eventually, community and inter-household mechanisms of trust and collaboration can be weakened by greater social and economic heterogeneity, associated with wider distributional ranges of incomes, opportunities, and access to infrastructure, services, and political influence in urban area (Moser, 1998; Portes in Pelling, 2002). While the latter aspects of social fragmentation will be discussed in the context of the next two criteria, this criterion will discuss in what way urban citizens and intra-household factors diminish or increase their capacity – in particular through labour, human capital and goods of collective consumption – to respond to conditions created by macroeconomic change. Therein, a key question is: "What risks do poor [urban citizens and] households take in order to withstand long-term economic crises, without irreversible damage to their net asset position?" (Moser, 1998, p.5) It is especially the focus of development practitioners on those linkages of aspects of citizens' vulnerability which are most relevant to the perceptions of and responses to risk.

Labour

A major source of vulnerability in Cisne Dos has been the labour market – which in part

reflects the adjustment policies discussed in the last part²⁷. There has been a general deterioration in the employment situation, related to the increasing casualization of work in the formal sector – especially in construction activities – and increasing instability and competition in the informal sector – particularly in retail activities. These trends have contributed to declining household income, with households responding by mobilizing the labour of additional household members. The average number of household members working has increased; women in particular use their labour to deal with declining incomes (Moser, 1997).

However, if social justice is an objective for urban development planning, then the recognition of citizens' vulnerability in urban development at risk will specify that the benefits of using labour as an asset have been uneven, largely differentiated by gender, education level, age and eventually household structure. In Cisne Dos, women and children usually fared worst²⁸, often generating only essential income in unsustainable informal activities, although some educated women were able to take advantage of new opportunities in formal sector white-collar employment. Moreover, women, with primary responsibility for expenditure-minimizing strategies, experienced increased pressure in balancing their time among different responsibilities²⁹. In part, this resulted in increasing school dropout rates among daughters, while sharing reproductive responsibilities in the household – which are likely to have long-term social costs (Moser, 1992, 1997).

Furthermore, individual poor citizens are not simply atomistic decision makers, but members of social groups, located within the social institutions of families and households. Hence, their capacity to respond to changes in the external environment is often determined by factors internal to the household. Changes in the household structure, composition, headship, care of children and elderly, and domestic violence – influence or mediate the extent to which households can respond to changes in the external environment. In Cisne Dos, the extension of households to maximize income

BOX 2: ENGAGING IN RISK IS NOT ALWAYS A MATTER OF CHOICE

Families acknowledge the positive aspects of home ownership and owning *de facto* a plot of land, in that it enables money previously spent on rent to be used for house-building, education, and consumer goods. However, the *barrio* plots are not always occupied immediately when acquired, but are held as future investment to be occupied when infrastructure has reached the area. The distance from the city centre, lack of running water, sewage, electricity, and above all, roads, all deter families from living on their plots (Moser, 1982). Women are most reluctant to move there because of the dangers and frightening experiences to children and themselves of the perilous system of catwalks, the considerable additional burden of domestic labour under such conditions, and greater economic dependence since those conditions force them to give up work. They become aware of their need for new forms of solidarity and support to improve the situation. Quickly, they develop complex social networks for mutual aid, which give rise to the *barrio* committees. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, those committees steered the consolidation of their *barrios* in Cisne Dos. This involved transforming the houses into more permanent structures, securing basic services and filling in the mangrove swamps (Moser 1982, 1987, 1992). The latter happened to be done primarily with quarried rocks and rubble yet to a much lesser extent with the city's garbage (Swyngedouw, 1995) – that is merely replacing one health risk for another one. Furthermore, some more contentious citizens happened to pirate the electricity by free capturing of light poles. Apart from being dangerous behaviour, those practices also increased conflicts in the neighbourhood since other *barrio* members paid for electricity (Moser, 1980, 1982, 1997).

pooling and space was an important strategy among two groups in particular: young single mothers or “hidden” heads absorbed into larger extended units while older female heads needed additional members to ensure their survival through help with income and reproductive labour. In turn, the extent to which vulnerability declines or intensifies varies, particularly since extended households were generally less well off than nuclear units³⁰ (Moser, 1997).

Human capital and goods of collective consumption
Even though the inhabitants of Cisne Dos lack land tenure security, housing emerged as an important productive asset. Indeed, negotiations with the local municipality to secure recognition and legal tenure for squatter areas tend to be complex up to the early 1990s³¹. However, relaxed land and building regulations make it possible for many settlers informally to acquire their own homes (Moser, 1982). Households owning their homes benefited from their use in two main ways. First, for some, ownership provided the means of running home-based enterprises that were important in preventing almost one-third of households from falling into severe

poverty. Second, ownership of land and housing made nesting³² strategies possible.

This was a critical factor in reducing intergenerational vulnerability, usually benefiting both the parental household and the adult children's family (Moser, 1997)

Investment in basic infrastructure provision in the community during the 1970s and 1980s gave households increased access to both social and economic infrastructure, especially educational facilities, water, electricity, infill, and roads. Increases in educational attainment – a prerequisite for well-paid employment – led to gains in levels of human capital and in economic productivity in Cisne Dos (Moser, 1997). Between 1988 and 1992, however, two main trends emerged. First, there was a marked decline in the quality of services, second the cost of social and economic infrastructure increased³³. This was accompanied by a shift to private sector provision, especially of health care and education. These changes in infrastructure provision affected households differentially. Those with access to electricity were able to use their homes for profitable home-based enterprises, and some could afford to substitute private sector facilities, especially in education and health, for poor

quality public sector infrastructure. Poorer households, on the other hand, suffered considerably from having to pay increasing sums for social and economic infrastructure (ibid).

Beyond recognition

The above brings three crosscutting issues to bear. Firstly, while coping strategies or adjustment responses within poor households can reduce vulnerability and prevent increased impoverishment during economic crises, not all urban households are able to adjust to the same extent. Secondly, it emerges from the analysis that development practitioners are not only to be viewed as governmental agencies or international agencies, but also as NGOs, private consultants and so on. Finally, the questions about long-term human capital development and about the ability to reduce vulnerability over time can be raised. In fact, the discussion on social capital in the next two criteria will further support the latter arguments. Moreover, the recognition of an asset vulnerability debate – as a response to macroeconomic crisis – rather than studies of short-term responses to “natural” disasters or other approaches to alleviating poverty, will provide linkages for stressing the relevance of social capital to the risk discourse in urban development.

One further example shows the relevance of those crosscutting issues in the context of urban development at risk in Guayaquil. Consultations with the poor³⁴ at the end of the century reveals that – in the face of an even deeper economic crisis and global environmental changes – citizens in the *suburbios* perceive no security whatsoever (Flores, 1999). For those urban citizens, men and women, insecurity is not only related to job insecurity nor only to delinquency and violence. Part of insecurity is the fact of not having the land titles legalized. A further cause for insecurity is tied to the environmental conditions, and low levels of education and health care.

Strengthening citizens' capabilities towards community organisation in community development at risk

Stocks of social capital were important in settlement consolidation and in negotiation for basic urban services in Cisne Dos. Women in particular played an important role in

mobilizing the community to cooperate in securing access to services and making basic improvements. At the inter-household level, women were also the main force behind the reciprocity and support networks revolving around childcare, credit, and sharing of space. Provision of urban services was obtained through intense community mobilisation and collective bargaining with different actors – local and national level politicians for land titles, for creation of solid land or infill, and for water mains and roads; the private sector for electricity and bus routes; international agencies and local NGOs for community services and schooling³⁵ (Moser, 1987). Thus, community based organisations (CBOs) or *barrio* committees have always negotiated to ensure the continued delivery of essential government services or their delivery through alternative community-based delivery systems. Cutbacks in public spending by the mid-1980s meant, for instance, that popular mobilization linked to political patronage³⁶ with intensive infrastructure provision at election time had ceased. At this stage, CBOs began to negotiate directly with multilateral programs providing economic opportunities and welfare support, such as the UNICEF Basic Urban Services Program, and international NGOs such as *Plan Internacional* who initiated community-managed development programs³⁷ (Moser, 1992, 1997; Segarra, 1997).

Thus, the existence of a widely known procedure of petitioning for services in return for votes by self-help committees proves a catalyst for initiating popular participation among newly settled communities (Moser, 1987). Firstly, they were short-lived, formed prior to elections and disbanded soon afterwards. Later they become a condition for international aid. In this context NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in community development, therein often bypassing the governmental agencies and clientelist practices, and immediately building long-term partnerships with a range of *barrio* committees. Although their participatory processes are often applauded, differences in access to NGO delivery systems within the community itself have been shown in Cisne Dos. Indeed, research proved that “the permanence of social capital cannot be taken for granted. Households link into communities in a virtuous-vicious circle, based on inter-household reciprocities. When households are

coping, they support others; when they themselves are depleted, they cease to support communities. "Changes in trust, in notions and patterns of reciprocity, and in norms of legitimacy and illegitimacy about different kinds of activities, are identified as contributing to the changing stock of social capital in Cisne Dos" (Moser, 1997, p. 82).

For instance, those NGO programmes are based on the voluntary unpaid involvement of urban citizens in the *barrios* of Cisne Dos on a regular long-term basis (Moser, 1992). This further reflects the official line of Guayaquil's Community Development Department, namely if community work were not to be corrupt it must be unpaid and voluntary (Moser, 1987). However, this conflicts with the reality that clearly shows community work to be both arduous and costly in terms of time, an unaffordable luxury in a low-income community. Especially women are spending more time on community management activities than before in order to negotiate participatory systems for the delivery of NGO services. Although, women's multiple responsibilities have meant that during economic stress they frequently have assumed a disproportionate share of productive and reproductive labour, their burden undermining other coping strategies (Moser, 1987, 1992, 1997). Nevertheless, women (and men) *barrio* committee leaders stress their commitment to help the community.

Despite the widespread involvement of households in Cisne Dos in both inter-household reciprocity networks and community mobilization, residents expressed concern with generally deteriorating standards of living, especially increasing crime and violence³⁸. Indeed, subsample perception data showed that women thought that personal insecurity was the second most pressing community problem after inadequate water supplies. Fears about personal insecurity involved both safety of property and personal safety from assault (Moser, 1997). For instance, women had to curb their mobility because they feared that transport was not safe, especially at night. This posed particular problems for younger women, attending night school to improve their educational level and chances of securing a job. The resulting lack of trust and solidarity in the community was exacerbated by the breakdown in cooperation between residents and local government

resulting from the closure of childcare centres³⁹ (Moser, 1992, 1997). Thus, research results indicate that social capital may be eroding, and that the sensation of insecurity changed the way people relate to citizenship.

In short, the capability of community based organizations to reduce vulnerability – e.g. to rectify the situation through negotiation and political lobbying, or to provide alternative services through community-based delivery mechanisms – may depend on stocks of social capital. Henceforth, Moser (1997) concludes that the extent to which economic crisis increases or erodes social capital may have important long-term consequences for alternative community-based delivery systems.

Building political inclusiveness of citizens in urban government/governance at risk

In common with low-income communities in cities throughout Latin America, the *barrio* committee attempts to influence the manner in which resources are allocated. This requires local committees to allow themselves to be co-opted by political parties which exchange services in return for votes and political support (Sepulveda in Moser, 1987). It also means, however, that the extent to which *barrio*-level mobilization is successful is largely determined by national political factors beyond the control of *barrio* residents⁴⁰ (Moser, 1987). The risk discourse is absolutely absent in this top-down conflict whereby the process of decision-making about consolidation and infill of the *suburbios* is predominated by political and economic interests rather than by those of local inhabitants. Further, the incremental infill did not require a long-term planning by the implementing agency, which the general political instability of Ecuador does not engender. Rather, "the method of fill allows each political regime to aid only those neighbourhoods that support it" (MacIntosh cited in Moser, 1992, p. 183; also Bromley, 1977).

Political parties further show detrimental power dynamics in communicative interaction in the co-option of women leaders. Ecuadorian political parties have become increasingly aware that women leaders, while fewer in number than male leaders⁴¹, have a particular importance. Since the majority of ordinary members of *barrio* committees are women, women leaders often have far greater

ability to organize them (Moser, 1987). Few women in leadership positions demand greater power beyond the community level into the men's world of power politics, and research shows that women rarely become elected municipal councillor or elected national congress representatives. Moreover, women recognize that the community is their most effective arena for action – viewed as a natural extension of the domestic arena, and in so doing accept that their power stems from their gender-ascribed roles as wives and mothers⁴² (ibid). This imposes limitations on such action since after their success in obtaining infrastructure for the community, most return to their homes. Obviously, no attempt is made to exchange their ideas with other citizens in Guayaquil or beyond through horizontal linkages of the *barrio* committees. Neither is there any interest to engage in the political discourse concerning urban risk since “in the *barrio* the decision concerning the choice of which party to support was based less on its political line than on the perception of its capacity to deliver the promised infrastructure in return for election votes” (Moser, 1987, p.180).

Consequently, political inclusiveness of urban citizens into the governmental institutions has yet to be built. After intensive research on mobilization in Cisne Dos, Moser (1987) argued that too little recognition has been given to the fact that residential-level women mobilization is one of the most divisive mechanisms of social control, reinforced not only by the state, but also, if unconsciously, by men of all classes. For this reason, she concludes, it is critical to identify the extent to which gender struggle and overcoming gender subordination may in the last analysis be one of the most important preconditions for popular movements (in which women play such a significant role) to be effectively transformed into political movements. However, there is – in my view – another important precondition for (political movements with an agenda of) building political inclusiveness. The extent to which awareness is raised by all citizens concerning (differential levels of) intra-urban hazards and inequalities deriving from socio-ecological and political economy transformations – as discussed in the introductory notes – is basic and necessary too. Then, struggles with both preconditions may well underlie the reason why till today there is little evidence of urban

political movements in Guayaquil (according to Sánchez, 2002). Besides, the right-winged clientelist practices have further consolidated the no land tenure policy during the last ten years (ibid). Nevertheless, the literature gaps leave me with uncertainty in concluding whether the lack of understanding the systemic perspectives by urban citizens, women and men, in Cisne Dos is virtually all pervasive. Herein, a systemic perspective that goes beyond the corruption of local politics is targeted. Yet, the anecdotal example in the documentary (Moser, 1980) wherein a construction worker from Cisne Dos only blames his relationship with his boss for his bad working conditions while standing and working on another bright skyscraper in the economically booming city centre, feeds the imagination⁴³. Furthermore, as social themes have diverted attention to actors in the field of indigenous people, the peasants, youth or elderly, social mobilization is now based on other kind of conflicts and places (Sánchez, 2002).

In addition to the struggles for political mobilization, the negotiation and lobbying between residents' associations, political parties, and local government also tends to result in conflictive situations within the communities themselves. For instance, whereas political leaders allocate resources to those *barrios* which can promise them electoral support, settlements with large populations have clearly greater negotiating power than those with few inhabitants. For these reason it is in the interest of committee leaders, and indeed the whole *barrio*, to increase the settlement's population. One way of doing this is to encourage the clandestine invasion of unoccupied plots (Moser, 1982). This is an obvious incentive for eroding social capital as discussed in the last criterion. Insecurity is increased in that those actions limit the length of time a *de facto* owner can risk owning but not living on his plot.

But are there other roots for emerging political inclusiveness of urban citizens into urban governance? As discussed in the last criterion, CBOs or *barrio* committees have engaged in partnerships with non-governmental development organizations. Moreover, international aid organizations are urging states and NGOs to work together in an effort to rationalize and coordinate public and private development efforts. Therefore, there is an argument that the civil-society-

focused international aid model is changing traditional patterns of representation. What political implications do the emergence of those vertical linkages have for participation, citizenship and political inclusiveness of urban citizens in Cisne Dos? Could NGOs intensify the risk discourse? Segarra (1997) argues that the issue of representation is less straightforward in Ecuador. The representative role for NGOs is problematic if NGOs claim to speak directly for popular sectors, or assume that their technical expertise overrides popular sector perceptions of their needs and wants. Sometimes NGOs are pressured into a more representative role than they actually care to take. International and state actors often find it easier to consult NGOs working in popular neighbourhoods rather than the series of small committees that compose popular organization in that area. Inadvertently, NGOs can “crowd out” the participation and voice of popular sectors.

Preparedness of the institutional framework for planning/interventions to reduce risk in urban development

This criterion comprises the analysis of the objectives of urban development planning and their reflection in the institutional framework. The level of preparedness for reducing urban risk concerns the following critical questions: What agenda is there for addressing inequality, and for reconciling the brown and the green agenda at the city level? Further, how do institutions influence or dominate the agenda? Finally, how does the civil society participate in the risk discourse? What is the level of adaptation and mental conditioning to urban risk? Before embarking on those questions, I will briefly introduce how the institutional framework conceptualises short-term responses to “natural” disasters. Thereby, the final discussion for a collaborative approach will be facilitated.

Responses to “natural” disasters
A “natural” disaster like an earthquake is merely viewed as a technical issue, which needs resources for physical improvements to ensure the adaptive potential. Indeed, according to the RADIUS-project (Argudo, 2000), disaster research in Guayaquil continues diverting attention to short-term anomalies in the city centre productivity. There is little reflection on ongoing intra-urban

inequalities for urban citizens, e.g. in the *suburbios*, when analysing the impact of the disaster.

According to Argudo, the occurrence of an earthquake in Guayaquil of magnitude equal or greater than the one in 1942⁴⁴ has one chance in two within the next 50 years. “However, the number of fatalities in the current conditions could be much larger, because the present vulnerability of the city has grown due to the aging of many buildings (in the financial centre), and also because of informal construction with heavy materials without seismic provisions (in the *tugurios*) and the lack of application of seismic design codes” (ibid, p. 14). This has inspired a municipal plan for to the urban recovery of Guayaquil’s central zone. In order to mitigate seismic risks of these mixed buildings in the *tugurios*, “one of the planned actions deals with the demolition of these structures due to their low cadastral value and other related social problems (informal commerce, insalubrity etc.)” (ibid, p.15). Argudo further excludes the buildings of the *suburbios* in his considerations because they would be safe enough⁴⁵, yet lacks to mention that their urban citizens have not yet (qualitative) access to the vital and essential systems of the city he describes.

Argudo further concludes that “the majority of deaths and the social post-disaster impact are produced as a consequence of the collapse of a reduced number of buildings, because of the damage to vital and essential systems of the city, and the lack of preparation and rapid response action” (ibid, p.16)⁴⁶. Yet also aspiring to raise the awareness of all urban citizens and their institutions towards better preparation and rapid responses, the collaboration by all citizens is not questioned, even though there might be an urban development conflict in the risk discourse here. For instance, in the context of weather-related risks like *El Niño*, “people living in urban margins, do not take into account whether they are on a river’s flood plain, an unstable hillside, a dry river bed in a flooding area, etc. when they build their houses... Therefore, most of the damage to infrastructure should not be attributed to *El Niño*” (Cornejo-Grunauer, 2000, p.4). The following will seek to what it might well be attributed.

Urban sustainability and the development conflict

Although the great majority of the urban citizens believe that the municipality itself has an important stake in local development because of its dual role, namely the administration and implementation of urban services and infrastructure, as well as the intervention in community development and social dynamics (Palacios, 1992), the question remains what the objectives and level of enforcement of that local development are.

Firstly, there has been a dominance of national economic planning over social, regional and physical planning for a long time (Bromley, 1977). Therefore, development has tended to be accompanied by a widening of socio-economic and inter-regional disparities, often strengthening, rather than weakening, inequalities in Guayaquil (see also introductory notes and first criterion). Further, these inequalities are related to the centralized nature of allocation and decision-making in Quito⁴⁷ (ILDIS in Moser, 1997).

Secondly, there is little evidence of the reconciliation of the brown and the green agenda (McGranahan et al, 2000) in Guayaquil. The majority of local plans have been for large-scale civil engineering schemes and urban development, but few plans have been followed (Bromley, 1977), so that urban expansion has continued to be haphazard (Argudo, 2000). There is thus a dominance of the productionist logic. What concerns the water supply, for instance, has resulted in a disproportionate emphasis on water production and transmission and relative negligence of maintenance and organisational reform (Swyngedouw, 1995). In particular, this logic avoids the thorny and controversial issue of a socially just distribution of an essential commodity, as well as the ecologically sustainable use of it.

The just city

From the very beginning and until today, urban development in Guayaquil has been dependent on both external financial sources – therefore, closely related to the capacity of the Ecuadorian economy to generate foreign currencies via export promotion – and on a combination of loans and subsidies from international agencies (Bromley, 1977; Medina, 2001; Nickson, 1995; Segarra, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1995). Thereby, the most

formidable barrier related to reducing risk in urban development could be the one of institutional conditionalities, and particularly their impact on the institutional principle in the concept of social justice.

Initially, Ecuadorian planning was as a symbolic charade: a means to get aid money without making any fundamental reforms or bringing visions to fruition. "Since the early fifties, a considerable number of national, regional and local development plans have been prepared and a complex civil service bureaucracy has been established for planning. This planning seems to have been attempted more because of international pressures than because of any serious Ecuadorian belief in the virtues of planned development. Almost all foreign advisors and development banks have strongly recommended planning, and in many cases, the preparation of comprehensive development plans has been a precondition of the receipt of economic aid" (Bromley, 1977, p. 65). For reasons associated with the nature of the local state and the widespread clientelist traditions of Latin America's local politics, this condition has rather facilitated a system running structural deficits and operating on ad hoc piecemeal and emergency interventions⁴⁸ (Bromley, 1977; Nickson, 1995; Swyngedouw, 1995), yet with little concern for the strategic reduction of citizens' vulnerability to urban risk. Moreover, the very condition of comprehensive development plans would in itself not generate the institutionalisation of social justice (see theoretical part). Finally, there is an argument that this condition accentuates centralising tendencies and favours the productionist logic (Bromley, 1977).

Since the early 1990s, there is a shift towards good urban governance as a conditionality attached to international aid. After a period of political and economic crises, Ecuador started to discuss how best decentralization processes could be implemented to accelerate physical and social investments, as well as improve the effectiveness of public policies (Paranhos, 2001). Therefore, the Municipality of Guayaquil (MIMG) and its DPLAN-G became a long-term partner of UN-Habitat. Since the late 1990s, the project was characterized by an institutional opening of MIMG to other local partners, both in the public and private sectors, which led to concerted processes to

define and agree on local policies⁴⁹ (Medina, 2001). However, launching an ambitious inter-institutional program for municipal development that in part seeks to introduce cost recovery and effectiveness in municipal service provision might encounter problems in carrying out reform initiatives in the clientelist-ridden environment of Ecuadorian public administration.

Collaborative approach

In conclusion, urban citizens have little participation in the risk discourse. Formal mechanisms to promote citizen participation in local government or in the planning process have proved largely ineffective and have operated instead as subtle means of social control through clientelism (Bromley, 1977; Nickson, 1995).

Perhaps the quoted plans and analysis assume a great ability of adaptation and mental conditioning to risk of poor urban citizens. The initiated “good urban governance” as applauded by international agencies seems rather to aim at the implementation of SAPs rather than on issues of addressing inequality or developing communicative rationality among development practitioners and urban citizens

for a collaborative risk discourse – including a vulnerability framework, sustainable community organisation and political inclusiveness. Guayaquil’s local development practitioners noticed for instance that the regularisation of land tenure in the *suburbios* has at length been bypassed by processes for the revitalizations of the financial and business city centre, even though it started up a decade ago (Sánchez, 2000). Moreover, responses to “natural” disasters seem to single out a particular type of collaborative approach to environmental change, namely the kind of short-term responses, without relating them to the risk discourse wherein also poor urban citizens and political conflicts have a stake. However, political and socio-economic conditions such as poverty and conflicts will have a major effect on how adverse the impacts will be. For instance, information on the evolution of the 1997-98 *El Niño* and its probable impacts were disseminated as early as July 1997. However, Ecuador’s political instability – four presidents between 1996 and 1998 – took its toll when *El Niño* came in 1997, and Ecuadorians, in general, were not able to cope with its impacts (Cornejo-Grunauer, 2000).

CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion

In this conclusion, I shall discuss an integrated answer to the initial question. Thereby, the theoretical exploration on risk discourses and the communicative approach to urban development planning on the one hand, and the critical analysis of the criteria for enhancing communicative interaction and knowledge in urban development planning to ensure its adaptive potential to risk in the case study Guayaquil on the other hand, will facilitate final comments on the extent to which urban risk does jeopardize urban development planning. It is necessary to reckon the way I conceptualised risk through the operational definition at the end of the framework for communicative interaction and knowledge in the perceptions of and responses to risk, as well as the kind of urban development planning I argued for in the introduction to this report. The latter has been argued further in the strategy development for ensuring adaptive potential of urban development planning through the components of strategic thinking. Not only will both arguments support my conclusion, the latter will in turn be an argument for the way I conceptualised risk and the kind of urban development planning I introduced.

Urban risk does not jeopardize urban development planning if there are high levels of adaptation and mental conditioning among stakeholders. At least it does not do so at a first glance. However, the ideals of urban sustainability and social justice might get jeopardized in the long term. For instance, the fact that urban citizens in Cisne Dos have little awareness of the differential levels of intra-urban hazards and inequalities deriving from socio-ecological and political economic transformations, does in part exclude them from the urban risk discourse. Furthermore, gender struggles at the community level and beyond make that urban citizens in Cisne Dos remain until today absent from mobilization beyond the level concerning goods of collective consumption. This reveals the delicate relation within communities between fluid processes of mobilization and relatively permanent rules of belonging and association. But why do those cleavages in terms of class and gender, as well as in terms of age and ethnicity, appear in Guayaquil? One could conclude that the social organisation in the city does not enrich citizens' (collective)

participation or empowerment. The latter mechanisms are indeed not rooted in the political or in the economic patterns of the city, namely the clientelist political pattern, and the macro-economic policies of SAPs aiming at countering the outcomes of Guayaquil's disfavoured position in the global economy. Urban risk does jeopardize urban development planning if risk is not part of an integrated approach to urban development planning, but is merely considered as a sectoral issue. In Guayaquil, there tends to be a separation between city planning and natural disasters or weather-related risk management. Thereby, valuable opportunities for reducing urban risks are lost, for instance in the case of the last *El Niño*. Also the seismic risk analysis took little account of the social, economic, institutional and cultural aspects of vulnerability in the city as a whole but merely concentrated on the productive city centre. Indeed, the recognition by development practitioners of urban citizens' vulnerability in terms of labour, human capital and goods of collective consumption in urban development at risk, could develop a more strategic framework for prioritising interventions. Basically, one needs to break through the barriers or knowledge limits created by ideologies as e.g. neo-liberal philosophy, rational actor paradigm, risk society etc. As noted earlier, the institutional framework has an important stake herein. The preparedness of the institutional framework has been conceptualised in this report as the extent to which planning/interventions in urban development at risk reflect the defined intent of urban sustainability and social justice.

Urban risk does not jeopardize urban development planning if social capital has the potential to access resources to enhance security and challenge vulnerability. In Cisne Dos, social capital has proved to determine vulnerability to a certain extent. Urban citizens mobilized in *barrio* committees in order to access political power in the form of clientelism, but they also managed alternative delivery systems through cooperation with international agencies, NGOs and so on. However, evidence from Cisne Dos proves that social capital cannot be taken for granted. The fact that cooperation is often based on voluntary work, for instance, leads to exclusion of the most vulnerable community members while it further skews the unequal

burden between men and women experiencing community development at risk. Moreover, certain conditions could erode stocks of social capital. In Cisne Dos, rising levels of violence calls for urban citizens to adapt using social capital. Obviously, bridging social capital between development practitioners and urban citizens who have contrasting worldviews and lifestyle is crucial if stocks of bonding social capital are to be sustained in the long run.

Urban development planning is jeopardized if urban risk discourses do not acknowledge the need for political inclusiveness in the process of the social construction of knowledge on urban risk. In this regard, communicative rationalities may lack conditions for the mobilization of power. Alternatively, scientific rationalism is biased by the brief that market mechanisms and economic development would automatically establish a balance among actors. Therefore, this report has argued for an analysis of risk that incorporates an awareness of the dimensions of power, including agency and structure, as well as control and resistance. Yet, experiences from Cisne Dos reveal that political inclusiveness is biased in a dual way. One, the civil-society-focussed international aid model does so far not produce new synergies for urban development planning with intentions of social justice and urban sustainability. Neither does the model of good urban governance reflect a more participative risk discourse for urban citizens at risk. Second, the absence of political movements not only in the *suburbios* but also in the whole of Guayaquil means that urban citizens' representation is reduced to clientelist practices which only involve popular movements. Herein, the risk discourse is jeopardized by political and economic interests at the governmental level, rather than being dominated by strategic choices in the development agenda.

So the extent to which urban risk jeopardizes urban development planning is related to the planning methodology. Herein, a crucial aspect is the process of expanding the abilities of problem setting in conflictive risk discourses, as well as generating opportunities for collaborative and strategic decision-making. I have argued the strength of the methodology of strategic thinking for

tackling knowledges and practices in risk mitigation and coping strategies which are put in perspective in favour of power dynamics in risk discourses. I have also argued for expanding the scope of communicative rationality, if it is to create conditions for political inclusiveness in the face of contemporary social relations that reveal deep cleavages of class, race, gender, age and culture. One of the important examples herein was that the development of the international urban risk agenda has taken on board notions of vulnerability, assets and capabilities. However, the analysis in terms of political intent in strategic thinking reveals that the challenge remains to further develop and support conditions for political inclusiveness of the most vulnerable citizens and to strengthen assets and capabilities of structure and agency in urban development at risk. This is in order to eventually ensure the adaptive potential of urban citizens in a communicative approach to urban development planning. Thereby, it has been argued that the concept of risk could be a driving force for a transition in the ongoing discussion on vulnerability towards a social justice discourse. Only then, the notion of vulnerability will reach its ambition, namely to get included into a development agenda with an intent of social justice, rather than, alternatively, being caught in the poverty discourse. Other examples discussed in the strategic thinking approach to urban development at risk related to tactics and to the institutional framework for ideals or objectives (such as urban sustainability and social justice) and to intelligent opportunism and social capital etc.

In short, this report has revealed what kind of urban development planning is relevant if risk is viewed as a discipline in Foucauldian sense. Moreover, experiences from Guayaquil evidenced the involvement of an extremely unequal distribution of many risks and the creation of additional ones, which obviously reflect the current inequality in the global economy. The final question is whether such risks – with constraints and opportunities for urban sustainability and social justice – will challenge our globalizing and urbanizing society to expand the room for the perceptions of and responses to risk in the nexus of structure and agency in urban development.

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ENDNOTES

¹ There is a large body of literature introducing risk as a central concept in society, see e.g. Beck, 1992; Blowers, 2000; Caplan, 2000; Douglas, 1982, 1994; Fischer, 1996; Giddens, 1991; Jaeger et al, 2001; Lupton, 1999; Pelling, 2002; Slovic, 1999.

² e.g. Hardoy et al, 2001; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies – IFRC, 1998; Moser, 1998.

³ Also discussed by Fischer, 1996; Garvin (2001) and Jaeger et al, (2001).

⁴ Healey (1997) identified those four discourses of policy debate which currently challenge environmental policy in Western Europe.

⁵ Late or post-modernity generally refers to broader socio-economic and political changes that have taken place in western societies since World War II. However, the debate on late and/or post-modernity in contemporary western societies is contentious. Post-modernity is – to a greater or lesser extent – about questioning of established thought, expression and practice, a deconstruction of tradition. I use the term late modernism to refer to risk analysis that is characterized by epistemological and methodological positions. Lupton (1999) differentiates herein between weak constructionist positions such as the functionalist structuralist approach (cultural/symbolic perspective of risk) and the critical structuralist perspective (risk society theory), and strong constructionist positions such as poststructuralist perspectives that build upon Foucauldian theory.

⁶ There is a large body of literature on the discourse of the risk society, which is independently developed and introduced by sociologist Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens. See e.g. Beck, 1992; Blowers, 1997; Caplan, 2000; Giddens, 1991; Jacobs, 2001; Jaeger et al, 2001; Lupton, 1999.

⁷ No party affected by what is being discussed should be excluded from the discourse (the requirement of generality); all participant should have equal possibility to present and criticize validity claims in the process of discourse (autonomy); participant must be willing and able to empathize with each other's validity claims (ideal role taking); existing power difference between participants must be neutralized such that these differences have no effect on the creation of consensus (power neutrality); and participant must openly explain their goals and intentions and in this connection desist from strategic action (transparency) (Flyvbjerg, 1998).

⁸ Sustainability agenda with impact on health of ecosystem, which is delayed in timing and regional/global in scale

⁹ In recent history however, the international urban environmental agenda tended to track the concerns of the affluent cities (McGranahan et al, 1996). When the most affluent cities in the world were rife with infectious diseases, the sanitary movement came to the fore. When the most affluent cities had addressed their most serious sanitary problems, but citywide pollution continued to grow, reducing ambient air and water pollution became the order of the day. Now that the quality of the ambient environment in many affluent cities has improved, but affluent urban lifestyles increasingly threaten the global environment, sustainability has become the watchword.

¹⁰ Environmental agenda with impact on human health, which is immediate in timing and local in scale

¹¹ If risks are the consequence of a natural hazard such as flooding affecting a vulnerable group, then the rapidly urbanizing cities and towns in Africa, Asia and Latin America represent the greatest concentration of vulnerable people there has ever been (IFRC, 1998; Hardoy et al, 2001; Sanderson, 2000). Indeed, the share of the world's population living in urban areas is growing, accounting up to nearly half the world's population. Increasingly, they are home to the world's poor, as well as its affluent (Satterthwaite in McGranahan et al, 2001). This represents phenomenal growth of an urban environment where "... up to half the populations of the largest cities of the developing world are in unplanned and often illegal squatter settlements". This unwanted demarcation is understood as the social geography of many towns and cities that "...reflects the vulnerability of different zones to natural hazards" (IFRC, 1998, p. 19).

¹² Experience of risk takes on quite different connotations in the South (Blowers, 1997). This may include the fires that wipe out squatter neighbourhoods, the devastation brought by HIV, the cumulative health problems resulting from poorly ventilated shelter or the long-term effects on children of pollution. Such less noticeable disasters erode livelihoods and cost lives. Furthermore,

it is no surprise that increasing urbanization correlates with increased risk, as unplanned growth rarely takes account of physical hazards (Cannon, 1994; Hardoy et al, 2001; Sanderson, 2000).

¹³ There is a growing body of literature on this approach by e.g. Cannon, 1994; Hardoy et al, 2001; McGranahan, 2001; Moser, 1998; Pelling, 2002; Sanderson, 2000; Sen, 1999.

¹⁴ Environmental changes that threaten welfare can be ecological, economic, social and political, and they can take the form of sudden shocks, long-term trends, or seasonal cycles (Moser, 1998).

¹⁵ Based on Sen's suggestion that any evaluative approach can hardly derive from only rational reflection, he examines the implications of focusing directly on the substantive freedoms of the individuals involved, and identifies a general approach that concentrates on the capabilities of people to do things – and the freedom to lead lives “that they have reason to value” – be it to a certain extent on an intuitive base.

¹⁶ I use the notion of strategic thinking as implemented by Caren Levy in her module on strategic intervention in urban development planning at the Development Planning Unit.

¹⁷ The inevitable consequences of authorities' allowing building on unsafe hillsides or in flood-prone areas will remain largely ignored until disaster strikes. Furthermore, disasters turn back the development clock, destroying years of effort and labour and perpetuating poverty for those already poor. On a city and national level, they destroy investments and infrastructure and drain national budgets and international development funds (Sanderson, 2000).

¹⁸ Civil society is usually defined as those social organizations, associations and institutions that exist beyond the sphere of direct supervision and control by the state (Friedmann, 1998). Friedmann states in his new political economy of planning that the politics of the civil society is to be “a struggle for inclusion, an opportunity for self-development, and a form of social justice that acknowledges the different priorities and needs of different groups” (1998, p. 37).

¹⁹ Social capital is used to describe organized and informal reciprocal mechanisms of trust and collaboration. The term is applied to two kinds of horizontal relationship: between individual (bridging capital) and links that facilitate community organisation (bonding capital). It is also applied to vertical ties between local and extra-local actor (linking capital) (Putnam, Putzel and Naryan in Moser, 1998; in Pelling, 2002; in Sanderson, 2000). The perverse effects of social capital include corruption, the exclusion of minority groups from decision-making, and social control by those in command of social capital (Portes in Pelling, 2002).

²⁰ The social vulnerability approach argues that access to physical safety is shaped by individual and collective access to assets. Assets that directly influence vulnerability to environmental hazard include secure land and housing, basic physical infrastructure and social services, and institutional arrangements and information flows that provide for disaster preparedness, mitigation, responses and recover (Blaikie et al in Pelling, 2002). These assets are underlain by people's access to economic resources, social claims and political rights (Moser in Pelling, 2002).

²¹ The purpose of the research project was to explore how the poor have responded to changes in economic circumstances and labour market conditions. The background to the research was a longitudinal community panel study, which compared households in a low-income community in Guayaquil between 1978 and 1992. That study's methodology included both sociological surveys and anthropological participant observation to highlight comparative issues at intra-household and community levels experiencing economic stress (Moser, 1997).

²² Though, the population of Guayaquil registered during the last census of 1990 was 1 508 440 inhabitants (Argudo, 2000; Swyngedouw, 1995). In 1992, 58 percent of Ecuador's 10 million inhabitants lived in urban areas. The high level of urbanization, which is due to rural-urban migration, is among the highest in Latin America (World Bank, 1995).

²³ Despite an average daily production capacity of 220 litres of water per inhabitant, the citizens in the *suburbios* who are unconnected to the water distribution system live on an average of 20 litres of insalubrious water a day (Swyngedouw, 1995). Compared with the internationally accepted standard of 150 litres per person per day, Guayaquil is in the position to provide every citizen with a sufficient supply of potable water (Hardoy et al, 2001). The problem is thus clearly one of distribution.

²⁴ Historically, Guayaquil's economy has been controlled by a small number of elite families, the agricultural land developers (Swyngedouw, 1997).

²⁵ *El Niño*, or *El Niño* Southern Oscillation (ENSO), is an anomalous oceanographic and atmospheric event in the equatorial Pacific Ocean that usually occurs every three to seven years and is characterized by an increase in the sea-surface temperature in the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean. ENSO is thought to be responsible for anomalous climatic conditions spanning most of the globe. Many of the resulting impacts of *El Niño* are negative, causing drought, famine, and floods.

El Niño events (1982-83 and 1997-98) had a strong impact on the population of the *Costa*. The flooded cities had problem with water supply, sewage, and damage to their infrastructures (Cornejo-Grunauer, 2000).

²⁶ Ecuador is a country with great ethnic and cultural heterogeneity (Roos & van Renterghem, 1997). About half of Ecuador's eleven million people are *mestizos* (descendants of Indians and Spaniards). They mostly live in the towns and small villages of the *Sierra*. About a quarter of all Ecuadorians belong to one of eleven different indigenous peoples, mainly living in de *Sierra* and the *Oriente*, and to a lesser extent in the *Costa*. A recent wave of mobilization has taken politicians by surprise and reasserted indigenous identity (Ecuadorian Confederation of Indigenous Peoples in Roos & van Renterghem, 1997). Yet, their struggles for land and resistance to environmental grievances of the oil industry have little relevance to the study of urban citizens in Guayaquil. Black Ecuadorians make up a significant part of the population (~10%) in the *Costa* (Roos & van Renterghem, 1997). Yet, recent poverty research has revealed that the impoverished areas are to a greater extent inhabited by indigenous and black population (Flores, 1999; World Bank, 1995).

²⁷ Underemployment, estimated at 50 percent for Guayaquil, reflects the major feature of the IMF deflationary stabilization measures designed to reduce employment in the public sector, to freeze wages through a stringent wage control policy, as well as a high inflation rate especially for food and drink (UNICEF in Moser, 1992).

²⁸ In households with less educated members and/or less adult labour, mothers with young children, as well as school-aged children, often have had little option but to enter the labour force in jobs that are largely informal and poorly paid (Moser, 1997). Men suffered as well, especially construction workers and older informal artisans such as tailors; however, many young men were able to develop lucrative informal enterprises as long as they had access to capital and skills training (ibid). Further, Moser argued that SAPs often have a differential impact within households on men and women, and boys and girls because of gender bias in macro-economic policy formulated to reallocate resources (Moser, 1992).

²⁹ The different roles of the women are typically the productive, reproductive and community management ones (Moser, 1987, 1992).

³⁰ Extended household: a single adult or couple living with their own children and other related adults or children. Nuclear household: a couple living with their own children

³¹ Only very recently, the DPLAN-G started to update its institutional capacity in order to improve land tenure (see Medina, 2001 and discussion in last criterion).

³² Nesting: an invisible intergenerational densification strategy facilitated by home ownership, in which young households without their own assets form separate households on their parents' land.

³³ Within the social sector, the most dramatic decline in spending was in education, going from 34.7 percent of total government expenditure in 1980 to 18.2 percent in 1992 (World Bank, 1995). Furthermore, access to health care remains a problem, with only 20 percent of the population able to benefit from basic health services (Moser, 1997).

³⁴ Background research for the World Development Report 2000/01 has been executed in *Is/a Trinitaria* in the southern *suburbios* of Guayaquil (amongst other places). It concerns a multi-ethnic group of informal and wage workers, situated along the Guayas river basin, and surrounded by three tidelands contaminated with liquid, solid and toxic waste (Flores, 1999).

³⁵ As a result of the importance of community mobilization and the prominent role of NGOs and multilateral agencies in settlement consolidation and basic infrastructure provision in Cisne Dos, significant numbers of people participated in community activities in 1992. Nearly one out of five urban citizens in Cisne Dos participated in the *barrio* committees. The church had the highest participation rate – above 40 percent. People also extensively participated in the NGO projects at

community level. Political parties, trade unions, and youth groups had low participation rates (Moser, 1997).

³⁶ This includes the allocation of resources in return for political support (Moser, 1982, 1987; Swyngedouw, 1997).

³⁷ This involved working directly with the different *barrio* committees, negotiating with them to identify their needs, providing 50 percent funding – to promote sustainability – and requiring the community itself to organize, administer, and implement projects (Moser, 1997).

³⁸ The lack of police stations in peripheral areas such as Cisne Dos means that the most important function of the *barrio* committee within the community is to try maintaining social order (Moser, 1987).

³⁹ The *Red Comunitaria de Desarrollo Infantil*, was introduced in 1988 by the national government. This program expanded and extended the existing community services originally introduced as UNICEF program in 1978. It provided three home-based day care centres for preschool children, two larger urban day centres in which children received care, and jobs for local woman. In 1992, *Red Comunitaria's* free feeding program and primary health program targeted specifically at preschool children reached 90 percent of the children. The withdrawal of government support in 1993, with one month's notice, adversely affected the children, household income for the women who lost their jobs, and community morale (Moser, 1997).

⁴⁰ Corruption of the politicians is useful since they know that only during electoral campaigns they show an interest for their problems (Flores, 1999).

⁴¹ As in most urban poor communities, one of women's multiple responsibilities has been community managing, voluntary work undertaken to ensure the provision and maintenance of basic services such as water, health, and nutrition through CBOs. Men, by contrast, tend to have a community politics role, organizing at the formal political level, generally within the framework of national politics (Moser, 1987, 1992).

⁴² Indeed, the Latin society places great emphasis on the submissive, dependent, and mothering role of women (*hembrismo*) as against the dominant, aggressive, and fearless role of men (*machismo*) (Moser, 1987). Gender roles: (1) Reproductive role: Childbearing and child rearing responsibilities and domestic tasks carried out mainly by women to guarantee the maintenance and reproduction of the labour force. (2)

Productive role: Work done by both men and women for cash or kind including both market and home or subsistence production (3) Community managing role: Work undertaken primarily by women at the community level to ensure the provision and maintenance of such collective goods as water, health care, and education. But community politics role: Formal political organizing undertaken primarily by men at the community level.

⁴³ Furthermore, consultations with the urban citizens in the *suburbios* at the end of the century reveal that they conceptualise inequalities no wider than at the *barrio*-level (Flores, 1999).

⁴⁴ The earthquake on 13th of May 1942 particularly affected Guayaquil, where there was an amplification of the vibrations of the soft soil of Guayaquil. There were 40 people who died, the main cause being crushing, because of the total collapse of buildings. What is particular to the earthquake of 18th August 1980, is that it occurred during working hours of the city. The 10 people who died and the one who got injured was mainly the result of falling debris from brick wall from the so-called mixed houses in the *tugurios* (Argudo, 2000).

⁴⁵ Argudo (2000) means that the buildings of the *suburbios* are safe light post and beam constructions of bamboo and timber on stilts. However, the analysis of the first two criteria shows that ongoing consolidation continuously alters these construction methods, meanwhile lacking the seismic provisions. Furthermore, figure 2 reveals that the density in parts of the *suburbios* are similarly to that of the city centre.

⁴⁶ Argudo (2000) refers to little coverage of emergency services, the non-existence of contingency plans for earthquakes in the health sector neither for post-disaster social assistance and a range of aged but essential infrastructure that are vulnerable to earthquakes, e.g. schools, hospitals, services like water and electricity etc.

⁴⁷ This stems from the early 1970s, when municipal autonomy was severely circumscribed by the rapid expansion of central government programs at the municipal level, which were financed by the oil boom. Municipalities were henceforth obliged to coordinate their activities with a wide

range of central government agencies. By the early 1990s, local government activities were very limited; involvement in education and primary health care was marginal (Nickson, 1995).

⁴⁸ “The response of government to the widespread apathy towards planning and planners has generally been a form of anti-planning, the concession of special assistance to particular interest groups, whether or not these concessions corresponded to planned targets” (Bromley, 1977, p. 71).

⁴⁹ Achievements included: a manual of recommendations for seismic-protected building techniques developed together with the Catholic University; housing improvement solutions implemented yearly by MIMG in close cooperation with affected communities, along with tenure regularization processes; several legal instruments on land use, building standards and taxation parameters which were thoroughly discussed with the private sector and other partners in civil society until they were officially approved by the City Council; and the development of an urban cadastre database which led to the formulation of a GIS-oriented municipal information system. The Municipal Department of Planning also prepared a series of urban indicators to periodically monitor the city’s growth and life conditions (Medina, 2001).