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**SQUATTERS, BUREAUCRATS, AND POLITICIANS:
CONFLICT BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
IN ÖMERLI WATERSHED, ISTANBUL**

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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INCOME INEQUALITY: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Abstract

After World War II, large numbers of Turkey's rural dwellers migrated to the cities in search of employment. Industrialisation, and the progressive liberalisation of the economy has, to date, continued to draw large numbers of migrants to the big cities. Istanbul is the largest metropolitan centre of Turkey and accounts for 20 percent of the total urban population. The municipal authorities have been unable to cope with the demand of these mostly poor migrants, for land, housing and services, and the migrants have responded by invading empty tracts of state land and illegally erecting homes. Around 60 percent of Istanbul's population live in these illegal dwellings known as *gecekondu*. These settlements continue to grow and have expanded into environmentally sensitive areas. One such area is the watershed catchment of Ömerli reservoir located about 30km from central Istanbul. The population living within Istanbul's metropolitan water reservoir areas increased from 190,000 in 1985 to 466,600 in 1990 – a rate much faster than the city average (Uysal, quoted in Yonder, 1999). Substantial numbers of small industries, some up-market housing developments, and mainly informal settlements have all proliferated around Ömerli, and have resulted in deforestation, and pollution of the city's freshwater supply.

The problems associated with settlement around Ömerli are multi-factorial – economic, social, cultural, environmental. But the Turkish authorities' approach can be typically categorised as that of "administrative rationalism", where each symptom arising from these inter-related problems is treated as the problem itself. The Turkish context is one featuring Islamic and secular ideologies pitted against one another, and political exploitation of these differences. Corruption is also pervasive in politics and society. Each of these contextual flaws contributes to the undermining of the administrative rationalist approach to governance, and is a key determinant of policy outcomes. Planning laws exist, as do those pertaining to environmental protection, but the on-the-ground realities, as illustrated at Ömerli, are no reflection of these.

1.2 Aims and Method

This paper traces the conflicts between environment and development in Turkey, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The aim is to show how the administrative rationalist approach in the Turkish context

has resulted in failure for environmentally responsible urban planning. The research methods included document searches for a literature review, the use of primary and secondary sources for both theoretical and contextual substance, as well as empirical data. Some unpublished papers were obtained by electronic mail communications with Turkish academics. The David Thomas Award field trip provided the basis for contextual observations, including images of squatter settlements recorded in photographs. Interviews were also conducted as part of the field trip, and many of the comments from key informants have been used to support analysis within the case study.

Chapter 1 of this paper will present the underlying features of the "administrative rationalist" approach, and expose the flawed assumptions within this approach that prevent it from dealing effectively with environmental problems. Chapter 2 will provide a contextual picture, offering a historical overview of the tensions set up by conflicting ideologies within Turkish society, and between the central and local bureaucracies. It will make use of the analytical framework set out in chapter 1 to illustrate that the Turkish approach to environmental problems is typical of the administrative rationalist discourse. By tracing economic developments and the problems associated with illegal settlement over a period of time, starting with the 1940s, but focussing in greater detail on events since the mid-1980s, this chapter will also illustrate how multiple contextual issues affect urban development and the environment. Drawing on both the theoretical and contextual chapters, chapter 4 will use the Ömerli watershed case study to illustrate how administrative rationalism in its rigidity fails to respond to change, or to recognise the importance of political, social, and cultural context in determining the environmental consequences of policy. The picture is one of polarisation: Ömerli illustrates the differences between the way "things ought to be" according to the administrative rationalist, and the way "things really are". In conclusion, whilst this thesis seeks to expose the inherent flaws of the administrative rationalist approach in the context of urban environmental development, it should also convey that perhaps the most important factor affecting policy outcomes is the context in which this discourse operates.

2 ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALISM

2.1 What Is Administrative Rationalism ?

2.1.1 The State

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, an intellectual movement began to emerge in western Europe whose fundamental tenets of philosophical individualism and human reason were largely directed against the irrational powers of the Absolutist state and organised religion which were dominant at the time. Thinkers of this time, which became known as the period of "Enlightenment", placed great emphasis on the importance of science in banishing religious dogma: there was a need to separate facts from values, science should replace the irrationalities of metaphysics and speculation in order to attain "objectivity". Social institutions, it was argued, should accord with principles of reason. (Swingewood, 2000). In summary, Enlightenment embodied "the individual as autonomous of religious and governing structures, with capacities for self-reflection, and with rights which should be defended against the power of states" (Healey, 1997: 39). This project of "modernism" paved the way for technological invention and economic organisation which led to the Industrial Revolution, and later saw the emergence of democratic nation states. The scientific knowledge and empirical inquiry so crucial to the project of modernity was to be central to the "administrative rationalist" discourse which came to dominate, and formed the basis upon which modern states ordered their affairs.

According to the rational administrator, states function to impose order where, if left to pursue their own individual interests, humans would come into conflict with one another and the resulting outcomes would be detrimental to society as a whole. The underlying assumptions are that i) people are rational individuals, motivated by self-interest; ii) a common or public interest is at stake, and would be compromised by the irrational outcomes of the sum of actions of these self-interested individuals; iii) only the state is capable of keeping order and maintaining sight of the common or public interests. The British philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, was one of the earliest to draw such a picture of the human condition in his major work of 1651, *Leviathan*, describing man as,

continually in competition for honour and dignity...and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war

Without the state to order affairs, nature would dominate man and the world would revert to a wild place where there would be,

no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (quoted in Minogue, 1966)

Although the theoretical basis for the state has been elaborated since Hobbes's time, the underlying assumption that individual action in the absence of a state can lead only to chaos has remained largely unchanged in the administrative rationalist tradition (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). How a state orders this chaos is a function of how it interprets the factors which motivate human behaviour. This, in turn, will be influenced by the state's historical context - in most western European countries the Industrial Revolution and the birth of capitalism have made their contextual mark. The system in the United States has very much been determined by a belief in the rights of the individual. Under this system, people are perceived to act not in the communal interests but according to economic self-interest. The state's function has been to prevent interference with individual rights, so that each is able to compete for resources or private property within the free market. In many European countries there has been a tendency for the state to play a greater role, not simply as a guarantor for the functioning of the free market, but as provider of public goods. In France, for example, the role of the state has traditionally been strong, and the bureaucratic apparatus accordingly developed to plan and order affairs. In the UK, the system has been a mixture of free markets and the welfare state.

By contrast, in many African countries one can see evidence of the traditional African systems sitting side by side in an uneasy chimera with the imported colonial systems: African affairs were traditionally ordered by the community at the village level, and village elders were the ultimate arbiters where disputes arose. Hierarchies existed, but the well-being of the community as a whole was paramount: for example, land and natural resources were for use of the whole community, and the concept of "private property" was unknown. Colonial rule in the nineteenth century brought with it western value systems. Tracts of land were fenced off, and natural resources were extracted for private profit; colonial bureaucracies were created to administer affairs. In their struggle against imperial domination, many African countries turned to Marxism, adapting the village structures to create Marxist "cells" which would feed into the central dominant state. Today both communal lands, state-owned enterprises, and private lands exist; parliaments have been created to accommodate both elected Members of Parliament and traditional chiefs from rural areas, and both bureaucracies and community representatives have a hand in ordering local affairs.

In all of these cases, to varying degrees, a bureaucracy has had to play its role; its ability to do so has hinged upon an assumption that its workforce, comprising technical experts, is able to make rational and objective choices, based on scientific fact or economic cost-benefit calculations. This is administrative rationalism.

2.1.2 Rational Administrators and the Problems Bureaucracies Have in Dealing With the Environment *Conflicting Rationalities.*

Administrative rationality operates as a problem-solving discourse and is a means of delivering particular ends. How the ends are determined very much depends upon the context in which a state operates, and upon which individuals or groups have secured the power to define the problems which need solving and the power to determine the means of solving them. If we recall Hobbes' graphic description of a world in which humans would behave as animals do in the wild, were it not for the state's intervention, we already have the beginnings of an explanation about how nature might be viewed in rational terms: as both a well of resources over which people may be prepared to compete and fight, and, being the intrinsic essence of humankind itself, as a potential threat to order. The Industrial Revolution put to work newly developed technologies which were designed to dominate the environment, both in terms of their physical presence on the landscape, as well as in their ability to extract the earth's natural resources for use in the project of "progress" at an unprecedented rate. Nature was made subordinate to man. Administrative rationalism is a product of modernism, and how administrative rationalism defines environmental problems is very much associated with this fact. Into the Twenty First Century economic development remains the priority for the vast majority of nations, but to varying degrees in relation to the environment.

In a country such as the United States where the chosen path is that of liberal capitalism, the rational administration or bureaucracy does not exist to question this path, but to make choices within this context that will deliver outcomes required to maintain the liberal capitalist status quo. This usually means operating in a way that secures investor confidence (Dryzek, 1997). In other words, rationality itself has no content, but its application makes decisions predictable (Doyle and McEachern, 1998). When the status quo is set in the context that favours economic growth over environmental concern, then bureaucrats will judge their decision-making priorities accordingly. But in order to deliver predictable outcomes, the bureaucracy is supposed to have a neutrality associated with modernism: technical expertise, scientific analysis and judgement. The French philosopher, Michel Foucault (1926-1984), took issue with this modernist concept of rationality, rejecting it in total, and instead recognising it as intrinsic to certain discourses:

I think that the word rationalisation is dangerous. What we have to do is to analyse specific rationalities rather than always invoking the progress of rationalisation in general (Foucault quoted in Swingewood, 2000).

Another critic of modernism was the German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, who argued that there exist 3 modes of reasoning: instrumental-technical reasoning; moral reasoning; and emotive-aesthetic reasoning, but that administrative rationalism takes account of only the first type (Healey, 1997). Ultimately the type of "objective" scientific order associated with bureaucratic logic may conflict with the type of logic associated with other forms of rationality:

the logic of public administration does not rest on the same set of assumptions as that of entrepreneurial, competitive economic activity. Attitudes to risk and innovation can be quite different, and the whole spirit of pursuing ordered administration, detail and documentation could well act as a brake on the rationality of the marketplace. There could be antagonism between administrative and economic rationality (Doyle and McEachern, 1998: 151).

Equally, the bureaucracy could find itself in conflict with ecological rationality: how, for example, could technical experts scientifically measure the values that many ecologists would ascribe to the preservation of a species purely for the sake of species preservation? Dryzek has argued optimistically that it is possible for bureaucracies to make the appropriate adjustments in order to pursue newly defined social goals, but that the first obstacle to overcome is the establishment of these new goals on the political agenda (*ibid*). Conceding this scenario, however depends upon an acceptance that the "irrationalities" of politics, including the cultural and social influences, have a part to play in shaping the administrative mind; and this acceptance is lacking because of the implications this would have for predictable planning. In fact, one of the things that administrative rationalism fails to recognise from the outset is that states do not operate in a vacuum but in politicised environments, where values and alliances are often shifting, and where those who have secured the power to define problems may be influenced or even displaced by other interest groups over time. This is one of the reasons why the administrative rationalist approach is not always able to deliver the predictable outcomes that its proponents profess it to be capable of.

Generation of Unforeseen Consequences.

One of the premises upon which post-industrial capitalism has been built, is that the state should play a minimal role in commerce. One of the paradoxes of capitalism has been that, in order to ensure that the market can operate unfettered, the administration has had to make a wholesale effort to engineer the division of social life into distinct public and private sectors, and to provide the building blocks of industrialisation, the social and physical infrastructure (eg roads and education) in order to facilitate the accumulation of capital. In other

words, rather than playing a diminishing role, the state's bureaucratic machinery has played an increasingly interventionist role. Since capitalism is about competition, the survival of the fittest, those too weak to compete would, in the Hobbesian nature-dominated nightmare, be left to perish; the role of the state has therefore been to intervene in this natural selection, for example by providing welfare to the weakest members of society. The problem this poses for the "problem-solving" administration is that in implementing policy, it generates consequences that it cannot control, and which often themselves generate further "problems" requiring yet more policy for administrative action. In environmental terms, the implementation of policy to achieve industrialisation has led to pollution, the consequences of which, for human health and the environment were not necessarily foreseen.

Lack of Imagination.

In order to tackle these often unforeseen consequences, the administration must respond "by reflex to its emerging problems" and this exposes yet another problem with bureaucracy,

..... perhaps, [this] is its most pressing problem. The celebrated lack of imagination characteristic of the bureaucratic mentality is no doubt part of the difficulty. Indeed, schooled in routines, their attention fixed by rules and conventions, administrative officials are, we have been told, at best predictable.....little innovation is to be encouraged or expected in the solution or definition of problems (Torgersen, 1990: 130).

Even as the negative impacts of the Industrial Revolution became apparent in terms of pollution and ill health, the rational administration did not have much to say or do about it: after all, their "problem" as defined by the dominant political voices at the time, was to facilitate the process of industrialisation. It was not the task of a bureaucrat to imagine new problems or solutions to them. Moreover, the experts trained within specialised sectors of the bureaucracy found it difficult to think or act in ways which reach beyond the narrow remit of their expertise. Max Weber himself recognised the potential for bureaucracies to engulf human creativity and trap the mind within an "iron cage". However, only in more recent times, largely as a consequence of pressing environmental crisis, and the increasing power of environmental pressure groups, have problems associated with the environment been defined as such. The administrative rationalist's response has been to create yet another division or compartment within the bureaucracy to deal with environmental matters.

Poor Horizontal Communication.

At the heart of the creation of this problematic "iron cage" is rationality itself: the rational way to administer the complex task of providing public goods and services, is for bureaucracies to divide the tasks so that, as far as

possible, each is reduced to the smallest possible technical compartment for precision management. Thus problems are managed in "sectors", eg transport, finance, employment etc, which are each further broken down into more specialised manageable packages. This compartmentalisation tends to lead to the inadequate definition of environmental problems which are also based on single discipline perceptions and solutions, eg a water pollution problem, a deforestation problem, or a sanitation problem. This compartmentalisation results in different sectors of the bureaucracy pursuing divergent and often competing objectives (Carley & Christie, 1994; Dryzek, 1997; Bryant & Bailey, 1997). It follows that there is then a failure in co-ordination and integration of policies, the phenomenon being referred to by Randall Baker as the "administrative trap":

The administrative structures of the Less Developed Countries were generally inherited intact from former colonial powers, and are typically organised vertically into sectoral, or functional, ministries and departments (Agriculture, Education, Health, etc). This works reasonably well until the system encounters a problem of a very broad and highly integrated nature – such as desertification. Then it tackles on the parts which are identifiable to each ministry and then each ministry tackles the symptom as a problem in, and of, itself (Randall Baker quoted in Carley and Christie, 1994)

Poor horizontal communication may result in symptoms being cured by one specialist arm of the bureaucracy, only to reappear as a different symptom for treatment by another specialist arm of the bureaucracy. Thus, for example, if a department responsible for preventing air pollution issues a regulation prohibiting the burning of waste, some companies may resort to dumping waste into watercourses, thereby displacing the environmental problem into the domain of the department responsible for water pollution prevention.

Poor Vertical Communication.

The vertically organised sectoral or functional compartments of the bureaucracy do not only generate horizontal conflicts and communication problems between these sectors. Communication can also be restricted vertically within each specialist department as a result of the hierarchies which exist within them. Thus, for example, the head of department, say in the forestry ministry, may decide that a national afforestation programme is required. But he may be unaware of the potential obstacles encountered by fieldworkers employed to implement this policy on the ground. In addition, those groups or individuals outside the bureaucratic machinery who are not considered to be "experts" possessing the requisite "rational" judgements have no way of communicating their concerns or needs vertically upwards into the policy-making machinery. The

bureaucracy, depending as it does on rational expertise, has no reason to seek communication vertically downwards with these groups.

Poor vertical integration, defined as “a result of the common failure of understanding and information flows between the policy levels of government and small scale production units or individual resource users, who may generate substantial, cumulative environmental impacts” (Carley and Christie, 1994: 159) also leads to inadequate environmental problem definition. This lack of mutual understanding is aggravated by the “large economic and cultural gap between the policy making level and the reality of life at farm or village level, a reality which is often characterised by the drive for basic survival” (*Ibid*). The failure to produce a mutually understood definition of the problem leads to “small producers” or the poorer groups within a population distancing themselves further and becoming independent of government control systems; they muddle through or design their own set of rules and regulations to order their affairs. The sheer number of these small producers operating outside the formal rules leads to the inadequacy of the formal system to deliver sustainable outcomes.

Nepotism and Corruption.

In theory, the growth of the bureaucratic state should proceed in close connection with the advance of political democratisation, because the demands made by democrats for political representation and for equality before the law necessitate complex administrative and juridical provisions to prevent the exercise of privilege (Giddens, 1971 on Weber). In carrying out their varied tasks, bureaucrats are motivated by a sense of duty to provide these public goods¹. However, there are many examples of bloated bureaucracies in states whose democratic credentials are questionable, and where the administrators are political appointees as opposed to experts selected on an impersonal basis according to educational qualifications. Thus, whilst democratisation can generally be said to create the need for larger bureaucracies, it does not necessarily follow that big bureaucracies are an indication of democratic rule.

‘In this respect, one has to remember that bureaucracy as such is a precision instrument which can put itself at the disposal of quite varied interests, purely political as well as purely economic ones, or any other sort. Therefore, the measure of its parallelism with democratisation must not be exaggerated, however typical it may be’ (Weber quoted in Giddens, 1971: 181)

Intrusion of Culture and Values.

In part, it is the political leadership that determines the interests served by the bureaucracy. But bureaucracies themselves may pursue alliances and policies in their own interests, thus exposing the flawed assumption underlying the administrative rationalist approach, that bureaucracies are neutral instruments. In

reality the administrative sphere does not escape the human condition; after all, civil servants are people each with their own set of cultural values and judgements, each the outcome of the subjective communications with other people and the natural world. “What is excluded from this notion [of the neutral administrative mind] is the concept of mental activity being dependent upon interaction” (Torgersen, 1990: 121). Thus, “public policy and planning are social processes through which ways of thinking, ways of valuing, and ways of acting are actively constructed by participants” (Healey, 1997: 29). It is therefore logical to presume that rather than simply being neutral implementers of policies which aim to solve ready-defined problems, bureaucrats may themselves determine *how* they manage the process of implementing policy, and therefore contribute to the ways of *defining* a problem and of *making* policy. Bureaucracies may themselves become so powerful as to set the agenda on problem definition to the exclusion of others, or may enter into bargaining partnerships with other powerful groups in order to serve their interests.

2.2 Administrative Rationalist Tools To Deal With Environmental Problems

Administrative rationalism is a problem solving discourse. Problem solving follows a linear and rational path:

1. A problem that requires action is identified
2. Goals and objectives are formulated
3. All possible ways of solving the problem or achieving the goal are listed. These are alternative strategies or courses of action.
4. The important consequences which would follow from each alternative strategy are predicted and the probability of those consequences occurring is estimated.
5. The consequences of each strategy are then compared to the goals and objectives identified under 2.
6. Finally, a policy or strategy is selected in which consequences most closely match the goals and objectives. (Bulmer, 1986)

Since the administrative rationalist analyses problems in a compartmentalised way, the above process could be employed, say, to look at the problem of water pollution. The goal might be to render polluted reservoir water potable. Legislation would be introduced to specify what must be achieved in environmental terms, eg clean drinking water, but it would often be left to the bureaucrat or technician to formulate the appropriate means of meeting the legal requirements. A local industry emitting effluent might be the culprit of the pollution. Water specialists would be employed to propose solutions to the problem which could include removal of pollutants from the water or imposing limits on the amount of effluent permissible. Either solution would involve the water experts deciding upon what the acceptable limits of pollution are, and these limits would be specified in

regulations. Companies exceeding the limits specified within the regulation would be punished, for example, by means of a fine. Regulations could be drawn up not only for pollution control, but for land-use zoning and the creation of physical master-plans. In order to determine which companies or individuals were in breach of the regulations, however, monitoring and enforcement agencies would be required.

The problems associated with these particular administrative rationalist tools are related to the problems of the administrative rationalist approach in general, as outlined in section 2.1.2 above. The water experts, lacking communication with other sectors of the bureaucracy, eg land-use planners, economists etc, may be incapable of taking a holistic approach to the problem. It could be that economic factors, such as the high price of urban land, have forced a polluting factory to locate to cheaper land which may be close to the reservoir, and recognition of this fact could help formulate a solution to the problem. Moreover, regulatory agencies have to operate within political environments accommodating different political constituencies:

These constituencies are a reflection of ideological differences and represent opposing positions on the fundamental political dilemma of regulation: the extent to which economic restraint by the imposition of legal rules is justifiable (Hawkins, 1993).

In the UK, regulations are developed through consultation between government and officials, and the polluters themselves, so that more flexible agreements are reached. This, however, opens the way for bargaining to take place and powerful companies have often been able to negotiate for more time to comply with standards, or to agree to voluntary commitments with degrees of self-policing (Dryzek, 1997).² In many developing countries, limited government funds render

monitoring ineffective. The incidence of corruption within some monitoring or government agencies can mean that companies are able to pay bribes to officials in lieu of a costlier fine.³ Thus, the regulatory approach is not always as neutral or scientifically objective as it is supposed to be, and outcomes are not always predictable. Other problems associated with the regulatory approach include the fact that monitoring is time consuming and expensive; punishment *after* regulation breach is not as effective as *prevention*, so fines need to be set at levels appropriate for deterrence, and enforcement needs to be rigorous (Hawkins, 1993; Connely & Smith, 1999; Dryzek, 1997).

Another tool used by the administrative rationalist is the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The EIA specifies that government departments or private developers must prepare a systematic assessment of the environmental damage likely to be caused by any proposed project. The EIA will be taken into consideration by the planners and officials before permission to proceed is granted for the project in question. Thus EIA is seen as a rational and systematic way of aiding decision-making (Dryzek, 1997; Weston, 2000). Within European Union Member States there is a requirement for project plans, along with the EIA, to be made available to the public, and for the public to be given the opportunity to express their views before any project is initiated. The final decision on approval is, however, made by government, and this can mean political or financial interests are given more weight than environmental considerations. It is a legal requirement in some developing countries for proposed projects to be subject to EIA. However, where the spirit of public participation is culturally absent or politically discouraged, this can mean that EIAs are merely a rubber stamp for a project to go ahead if it serves the interests of the decision-makers. Like regulations, therefore, EIA is also subject to political forces.

3 THE TURKISH CONTEXT

3.1 Introduction

The extent to which bureaucracies are controlled by the political leaders of a state varies according to the democratic character of the state. Even if a state is deemed to be democratic, the *type* of democracy it exercises is an important determinant of which individuals or groups define the problems in need of policy solutions. If “democracy” can be defined simply as “a political system in which the opportunity to participate in decisions is widely shared among all adult citizens” (Dahl, 1991, quoted in Mason, 1999) it is easy to see how degrees of democracy may exist. A state’s constitution is the blueprint underpinning the type of democratic path that state will pursue, and this will be reflected in the type of governance processes and governance structures employed by the state. Although context is all-important, as a general observation, states that follow the administrative rationalist path are most likely to see governance as the management of common affairs of the state, public and private, through formal institutions of the government and experts. This is in contrast to states employing more participative or “communicative” forms of governance in which the management of common affairs of political communities involves more than formal institutions of government, eg home, work, economy, community-based organisations (Healey, 1997). This chapter aims to: examine some of the contextual issues, offering insights into the governance processes and structures; review the legal and institutional framework to illustrate the dominance of the administrative rationalist approach within this context; introduce the problem of the *gecekondu* as a product of both the Turkish context and the administrative rationalist approach to planning.

Turkey’s case is complex: it is a country with a long history of a strong state, but one which has also a long, if troubled, experience of democracy. The Ottoman governance structure was based on a centralised empire with a decentralised system of administration which allowed many different ethnic and religious communities to maintain their community interests. But such a structure did not imply any self government in the modern sense, and was designed to ensure “unity in diversity”, in order to ensure the maintenance of the empire’s centralised power (Özcan, 2000).⁴

The revolution in Turkey, and subsequent establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, could easily be compared to the period of “Enlightenment” in western society, during which the value of scientific knowledge and enquiry was seen as key to progress and emancipation from religious dogma which had reinforced, by divine right, the power of absolutist monarchies. In western Europe, “Enlightenment” paved the way for western conceptions of democracy, based on the individual franchise, the rights of individuals to pursue their lives and livelihoods, and the primacy of profit seeking and self-interest. The Industrial Revolution followed. When Kemal Atatürk founded the Turkish

Republic in 1923, he also sought to bring about an Enlightenment-type transformation: he wished to emancipate Turkey from the shackles of religious dogma by banishing Islam from politics, importing more liberal western values to Turkish society, and establishing a democratic secular state. Industrialisation was to be key to Turkey’s modernisation and the attainment of standards in line with “contemporary civilisation”.⁵

The modernity that Atatürk sought to import into Turkish society was enshrined in the constitution, and has remained in successive amended constitutions as “irrevocable” provisions. Article 1 states, “The Turkish state is a Republic”; Article 2 states, “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyalty to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble”. Article 3 sets provisions relating to the integrity of the state, official language, flag, national anthem, and national capital (Turkish Constitution, 1982, available from Turkish Foreign Ministry).

Constitutional reform was not left at these expressions of principle and national identity, significant though they were. Atatürk also took the sorts of pragmatic measures necessary to allow him to consolidate political power. For example, the 1924 Constitution provided for a majoritarian form of democracy, which allowed for effective one-party control by Atatürk’s ruling Republican People’s Party until the introduction of multi-party democracy in the late 1940’s. Nor was reform limited to the Constitution. In pursuit of modernity, Atatürk sought to import legal best practice from other European states. In 1926, Turkish legal experts were appointed to translate both the Swiss and French Civil Codes, and extract from them the most desirable elements for a new Turkish Civil Code. Administrative law was based on the French system, commercial and maritime law on the German system, and criminal law on the Italian system. The main purpose of these “receptions” of foreign systems was to tear up the foundations of the old legal systems and :

To regulate and legislate the ... relationships of the people according to what was thought these relationships ought to be, and not according to existing customs, usages, and religious mores. This...was revolutionary and radically reformist, and can be summed up as a prime example of “social engineering through law” (Oruncu, 2000).

Economic transformation was also part and parcel of Atatürk’s drive for reform. Turkey was primarily an agricultural economy, and the prime objective of the Planned Economy, subscribed to and supported by the Constitution,⁶ was to transfer agricultural capital to

industrialisation. Independent economic development began through the nationalisation of capital, industrialisation, and the creation of a middle class. During the 1940s there was some degree of economic liberalisation. The mechanisation of agriculture, an influx of rural to urban migrants, and rapid urban development accelerated the growth of small indigenous businesses in the cities.

Throughout this drive to modernity, there remained some elements of continuity with the old Ottoman order; in particular, the tradition of state centralisation remained in place as the accepted model of state-society relations. In order to put into practice such radical transformation, it was believed, a strong centralised state was necessary. To summarise, therefore, the period between the establishment of the Republic and the Second World War was characterised by *etatism*, one party rule, constitutional and legal reform, and economic upheaval.

An early gesture towards decentralisation was the 1930 Municipality Law. It gave local municipalities the power to regulate local commercial life and to provide local municipal services, but in their capacities as extended parts of central government. Local revenues were collected by central government and used towards the industrial effort in large metropolitan areas. Municipal authorities were excluded from any active political or economic decision-making, and their powers were weak. The real power lay with central government who appointed provincial governors to oversee the functioning of various ministries at provincial level (Ozcan, 2000).

In 1963 local elections for municipal mayors were introduced, and a proportional representation system was employed. By the 1970s the rising power of social democrat politics began to express itself at the municipal and national levels. Social democrat municipalities in major metropolitan cities introduced new concepts of local governance, emphasising democratisation and public participation. During this period, clashes with the right wing central government were frequent. The interim military regime of 1980-1983 tried to centralise the municipalities and weaken the left wing municipal administrations. However, a real re-structuring of municipal government took place after the Motherland Party introduced the Greater City Municipalities Act in 1984 which unified the various levels of local administration, giving the metropolitan municipalities extensive powers over the district municipalities (*Ibid*).

The introduction in the late 1940s of multi-party democracy facilitated the election in 1950 of the traditionalist, Islamic-leaning Democrat Party. By 1960, a combination of economic crisis and fear of counter-revolution by traditionalists was followed by military intervention. In 1963 local elections for municipal mayors were introduced, and a proportional

representation system was employed. By the 1970s the rising power of social democrat politics began to express itself at the municipal and national levels. Social democrat municipalities in major metropolitan cities introduced new concepts of local governance, emphasising democratisation and public participation. During this period, clashes with the right wing central government were frequent. The 1970s oil crisis brought the decade to a close with hyper inflation, political instability, and street terror. The result was another military coup in 1980. The interim military regime of 1980-1983 tried to centralise the municipalities and weaken the left wing municipal administrations. The 1983 elections brought the Motherland Party (ANAP) to power, and mainstream political parties were tolerated in elections that followed. A real re-structuring of municipal government took place after the Motherland Party introduced the Greater City Municipalities Act in 1984 which unified the various levels of local administration, giving the metropolitan municipalities extensive powers over the district municipalities (*Ibid*; Alada, 1996). But in 1995 the Islamist Welfare Party came to power with an unprecedented 21.4% share of the vote.⁷ The military stepped in again, this time to protect the secular ideology of the state and the Welfare Party was banned on the grounds that its attempted introduction of Islam into politics undermined fundamental state ideology. Each military intervention was followed by a change to the Constitution: the 1995 amendment to its Preamble included the following:

...no protection shall be accorded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests...Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics...(Turkish Constitution, 1982, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Today Turkey has 80 provinces, and within these provinces there are a total of 849 districts. Provincial governors remain in charge of coordinating and assisting service provision, and with the investment projects of various central government institutions within the province. Directorates of different ministries in each province function under the control of the governor. The bulk of the revenues of provincial local administration comes from its shares in general taxes and grants provided by the central government. There are 3215 municipal authorities, and 15 greater city municipalities, which are mainly metropolitan areas of large cities. The municipalities are the only institutions open to local democratic participation. Their revenues come mainly from taxation of property.

3.2 Dealing With the Environment: Turkey's Legal and Institutional Framework

3.2.1 The National Level

The contextual picture so far illustrates that one of the most remarkable features of the modern Turkish state is that its ideological and legal foundations rest largely upon the efforts of one man and an elite group of bureaucrats dedicated to the wholesale re-structuring of Turkish society. The very essence of Turkish society, its social relations, were prescribed by the experts and regulated in law. The economy too was subject to central planning and controls. In keeping with the Weberian ideal, the planning tasks were carried out by experts within specialised departments of the Turkish civil service. Since the 1960s, central planning of the economy, infrastructure and land-use has been set out in the Five Year Development Plans, the main focus of which was initially to accelerate the industrialisation process. One of the unforeseen consequences generated by planning for industrialisation, as is typical within the administrative rationalist model, was environmental degradation. Consequently, the Five Year Development Plans began to make reference to environmental management policies during the 1970s, but it was not until the 1980s that environmental issues started receiving attention in Turkey (Sonmez, 1995). Concern about the environment, including its social dimensions was reflected in the new 1982 *National Constitution*, under section VIII entitled "Health, the Environment and Housing", where Article 56 states that:

Everyone has the right to live in a healthy, balanced environment. It is the duty of the state and citizens to improve the natural environment, and to prevent environmental pollution....

And Article 57 under a sub-heading entitled "Right to Housing" states that

The state shall take measures to meet the need for housing within the framework of a plan which takes into account the characteristics of cities and environmental conditions and supports community housing projects.

Great importance is attached to stewardship of forests, and the substantial constitutional provisions relating to this are worth quoting at length. Under a section entitled, "Protection and Development of forests" Article 169 states:

The state shall enact the necessary legislation and take the measures necessary for the protection of forests and the extension of their areas. Forest areas destroyed by fire shall be reforested; other

agricultural and stock-breeding activities shall not be allowed in such areas. All forests shall be under the care and supervision of the state.

The ownership of state forests shall not be transferred to others.....Ownership of these forests cannot be acquired through prescription, nor shall servitude other than that in the public interest be imposed in respect of such forests.

Acts and actions which might damage forests shall not be permitted

Under a further section entitled "Protection of the Inhabitants of Forest Villages", provision is made for cooperation between the state and forest inhabitants for forest stewardship.

Finally, Article 90 of the Constitution recognised international treaties ratified by parliament as legislative acts valid as domestic law.

Legislation.

The first Environmental Law was adopted in 1983, and it defines the framework for environmental legislation on the basis of the Polluter Pays Principle. In keeping with the administrative rationalist approach, where problems are compartmentalised into single disciplines, and where regulations are the chosen instrument for dealing with each of the compartmentalised problems, the Environmental Law provides for regulations on air, water and noise pollution. These specify a range of emission and discharge standards, as well as requiring polluting industries to obtain discharge permits. The 1988 Regulation on Water Pollution Control also defines water quality, and prescribes protection zones and land use strategies in regard to reservoirs and lakes used for drinking water. The 1991 Regulation on Solid Waste Control covers transport, storage and disposal of all types of waste. Mandatory EIA was introduced in 1993. International treaties ratified include the Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats in 1984, the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1996, and the Ramsar Convention on wetland preservation in 1994 (Sonmez, 1995; OECD, 1999; UN, 1997).

Nature conservation is referred to in general terms in the 1983 Environment Law. More specific legislation includes the 1983 Law on Conservation of Cultural and Natural Assets, the 1983 Law on National Parks, the 1989 Decree on the Establishment of the Authority for the Management of Specially Protected Areas, and the Forestry Law, the most recent amendment of which was proposed in 2001 and is still awaiting approval. The 1995 Law on Reforestation and Soil Erosion Control provides for the restoration of forest ecosystems. Physical planning regulations are based on the 1985 Construction Law, which identifies three levels of planning: regional, territorial and urban.

Each of these laws, sector-specific as they are, illustrate how the administrative rationalist state has compartmentalised environmental problems, and drawn up sector-specific regulations without necessarily seeing how each relates to the other. It is significant that the first Environment Law, indicating as it did the emergence of an environmental discourse, establishes economic rationality as dominant over any sort of ecological rationality: Article 1 of the law states that any environmental measures taken “must be in harmony with the targets of economic and social development” (Sonmez, 1995).

Institutions.

As with the legal framework, the institutions designed to formulate policy are also compartmentalised into sectoral areas of expertise.

The first Ministry of Environment was established only as late as 1991. It is the lead department responsible for negotiation of international environmental agreements, but also works on planning, environmental protection, pollution prevention and control, and environmental assessment. A number of Specially Protected Areas (SPAs) have been established under the Ministry, and these comprise particularly ecologically sensitive sites: prior agreement of the Authority for the SPAs is required before any activity can be carried out in these areas. The Ministry of Forests is responsible for national parks and nature reserve areas. Around 99% of Turkey's forests are State-owned and managed by the Ministry. The State Hydraulic Works (DSI) is part of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, and its main duties are to design and construct major water projects. After completion by DSI, water supply projects become the responsibility of the relevant municipalities. DSI, however, continues to monitor water quality, as does the Ministry of Health.

An exception to the administrative rationalist's “compartmentalisation” rule, is the State Planning Organisation (SPO). The SPO is an organ under the authority of the Prime Minister which develops economic, social and environmental policies, and prepares annual programmes and public investment programmes within the “Five Year Development plans”. Its approach, in theory, is therefore multi-disciplinary.

3.2.2 Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Framework

A contention made in Chapter 1 is that states which follow the administrative rationalist path are generally those most likely to see governance as the management of common affairs of the state, public and private, through formal institutions of the government and experts. This is in contrast to states employing more participative or “communicative” forms of governance in which the management of common affairs of political communities involves more than formal institutions of government, eg home, work, economy, community-based organisations (Healey, 1997). In Turkey, we have seen so far how the experts within the formal institutions of central government have legislated and regulated to

manage the affairs of state. A move away from the administrative rationalists' reliance on technicians and experts would be to seek wider participation in governance, and one way of achieving this could be by decentralising power, for example to municipal bodies. Legislation over the years, particularly the 1984 Greater Municipalities Act, has paved the way for such a move, but the centrist tradition has made it difficult for Turkey to abandon the administrative rationalist's methods. Thus, there exists a duality between centralisation at the provincial level and decentralisation at the municipal level.

The duties of the greater city municipalities as set out in the Greater City Municipalities Act of 1984 are as follows:

1. to make investment plans and programmes for the city
2. to make and implement the master zoning plan
3. to approve and control the implementation of the urban development plans
4. to execute water, public transport and sewerage services
5. to coordinate affairs between district and township municipalities and to mediate in disagreements between municipalities

Metropolitan municipal councils are headed by the municipal mayor, and comprise each of the district mayors and members of the district municipal councils. The 1984 Act aimed to bring about a more decentralised form of governance which was participative by virtue of the fact that mayors are elected by popular vote. However, some of the district municipal mayors, accustomed as they were to initiating local projects to attract votes, resented the interference of the bureaucrats from the metropolitan authority (Ozcan, 2000), and today there continues to exist some tension between the mayors (who are politicians) and the technocrats who work within the local bureaucracies. Turkey's moves towards decentralisation have exposed the failure within the administrative rationalist approach to consider that rationality itself is exposed to external forces: bureaucrats are subject to power struggles with politicians – in this case municipal mayors – and the outcomes of these power struggles are far from predictable.

With reference to point 4 regarding water and sewerage services, the State Hydraulic Works division (DSI) of the Governor's office had been the responsible body prior to 1981. However, the successive waves of migration to Istanbul from rural areas put tremendous pressure upon the DSI which by the early 1980s was unable to cope with the new demands for services. The *gecekondu* migrants in particular were recognised as the major strain on services:

The population of Istanbul has increased very rapidly due to the migration movement especially originated from the South-

Eastern provinces of Turkey.....Plundered areas all around the city made the performance of the services more difficult as they have no infrastructure...[the DSI] was no longer sufficient to meet the water and sewerage needs of increasing population (ISKI, 1999: 16).

As a result, a new law (number 2560) was passed to provide for the creation of the Istanbul Water and Sewerage Administration (ISKI) which would be responsible for services within the Metropolitan boundaries. The creation of a compartmentalised agency specifically to deal with the single issue of water is in keeping with the administrative rationalist's sectoral approach – albeit in this case at the local level. After the passing of the Greater City Municipalities Act in 1984, ISKI became an organ of the Metropolitan Municipality. The Board of Directors, comprising technical, financial and legal experts, as well as the Chairman who is also the Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, is responsible for ISKI policy. Such an arrangement has again set up tensions between the technocrats and politicians – fallout not envisaged in the administrative rationalist approach

3.3 Consequences of Economic Policies on Settlement in Istanbul

3.3.1 Istanbul's Changing Morphology: Rural-Urban Migration

Turkey has followed four different models of economic development since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. The first was a state-dominated model, implemented in 1923 to ensure rapid industrialisation, and remained in place until 1950. The second model, liberalisation, was adopted in 1950. In 1960 Turkey entered a period of economic planning in which an import substitution model prevailed, and cities developed by expanding their internal markets. In the 1980s the privatisation model was introduced in the context of globalisation (Uzun, 2001).

Istanbul is the largest metropolitan centre in Turkey. "Until after World War II, under state-led industrialisation policies, public investments were targeted away from Istanbul, the old capital and symbol of the Islamic Ottoman legacy, to build up the new capital city, Ankara, and develop new centres throughout Anatolia" (Yonder, 1998). Following economic liberalisation policies in the late 1940s, Istanbul regained its centrality, attracting private and public investments, and becoming the industrial, financial and cultural centre. At the same time, the introduction of mechanisation in agriculture meant many small-scale farmers lost their

land, and large numbers of rural dwellers migrated to Istanbul in search of a living. During the years of import-substituting industrialisation (lasting up to the 1980s), many Anatolian merchants located to Istanbul and transformed themselves into an industrial bourgeoisie (Tokatli and Boyaci, 1999). By 1973, 44% of all private manufacturing establishments employing more than ten workers were located in Istanbul, accounting for 51% of total employment in Turkish private industry (Keyder and Oncu, cited in *Ibid*). The opening of the Bosphorus Bridge between the Anatolian and European sides further increased accessibility to the city, drawing more businesses and migrant workers into the urban areas.

Having succeeded in building up an industrial base, by the 1980s "a new model of development with an outward-oriented strategy emerged which aimed to develop the export potential of the country by recognising and coming to terms with global competitive conditions" (Tokatli and Boyaci, 1999). The government began to promote Turkey as a prospective bridge between the capitalist world and the former Soviet republics. Liberal policies and privatisation of state industries started to take place in order for Turkey to compete in the increasingly global economy. Business relationships with Europe were strengthened through both direct foreign investments and the formation of European-Turkish alliances – both responses to the perceived threat of the Single European Market.

These economic changes brought both demographic and structural changes to Istanbul's morphology. Service industries which relied on face-to-face relations with customers remained in the city centre, but large-scale industries moved to the periphery, particularly on the Anatolian side (Uzun, 2001). The population increased from fewer than 1 million people in 1950 to 3 million in 1970, and 4.7 million in 1980. It is estimated that over 10 million people now live in the Istanbul metropolitan area. Historically, settled areas in Istanbul were confined to a narrow strip along the coast of the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus. Forest areas protecting the city's water reservoirs and a lack of roads restricted growth further inland. Until the late 1970s, Istanbul grew through two distinct types of development: density increases and middle-to high-income settlements along the coast, and low-income settlements further inland, near the industrial areas located along the E-5 highway.⁸ Construction of the first Bosphorus Bridge in 1973 facilitated a similar pattern of growth on the Asian side of the city, so that the urbanised area currently extends some 80km along the E5 axis (Yonder, 1999; Noe, 1991). The pattern is again repeated with the construction in 1988 of the second Bosphorus Bridge and Anatolian Expressway to the north of the E5 (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Map of Istanbul showing E-5 highway and Anatolian Expressway

3.3.2 The Effects of Law and Government Policy on Authorised Housing Supply

Industrialisation and urbanisation created a housing boom between 1950 and 1980. In accordance with the import substitution strategy, interest rates for deposits and credits were kept at artificially low levels, and money markets were prohibited. Commercial banks were prohibited by law from using their own resources for home mortgages in order to encourage resource allocation to industry. Although the State was producing houses for rent during the first years of the Republic, this approach was abandoned for fear of damaging the private housing market. Thus, urban land and housing became a unique investment avenue for private savings amongst the middle classes (Baharoglu, 1996; Bugra, 1998). The growth in demand for urban land and housing was met by an inelastic supply. Speculation became rife. The oligopolistic structure of the construction material industry meant the costs of materials could be raised without checks. Together these factors created a sharp rise in land and housing prices.⁹ The urban middle classes purchased houses not only for their own use, but to secure regular incomes by renting them out.¹⁰

In 1963 the rent control system established pre-war, was abolished following a decision by the Constitutional Court which found rent control unconstitutional on the grounds that individual rights could not be suspended or abolished. During the second half of the 1970s, the rates of increase in rents overtook inflation, and this further increased the demand to invest savings in housing (Baharoglu, 1996; Uzun, 2001).

State policy had clearly encouraged the creation and development of such a housing market, and this system which provided the means for capital accumulation of the middle classes was unlikely to be challenged by the State in future. The oil shock in the 1970s sparked recession causing the housing market to collapse, but it picked up again in the early 1980s and the same cost patterns were established. This time, however, one of the effects of the economic liberalisation policies of the 1980s was to pull down wages, so now even the middle-income groups found it hard to buy/pay rent within the authorised housing stock. Some of these people resorted to seeking accommodation within unauthorised housing settlements.

3.3.3 Unauthorised Housing Settlements: The *Gecekondu*

Neither the formal private sector, nor national and municipal authorities were able to cope with the demand of Istanbul's mostly poor population for residential land, housing and services. Large numbers of rural-urban migrants, possessing few resources, resorted to invasions of large unused tracts of State land and created their own settlements, erecting dwellings within very short periods of time. The word "*gecekondu*" in Turkish literally means "built overnight". These dwellings are deemed illegal because they are either: a) built on public land usually belonging to the Treasury; b) constructed on private property not belonging to the homeowner; c) built on shared-title land; and/or d) constructed without occupancy or construction permits (Baharoglu and Leitman, 1998). According to figures supplied by the Ministry of Reconstruction and

Settlement, in the first half of the 1960s 45% of Istanbul's population lived in irregular settlements, but by the 1980s this figure had increased to 70% (Bugra, 1998). Such a spectacular development could not have occurred without the state's complicity, nor in the absence of public sympathy for the plight of the migrants.

3.3.4 Law and Government Policy Towards Informal Settlement

In 1949, law no. 5431 was passed to allow the government to demolish *gecekondu* as a violation of property rights and the modern city image (Yonder, 1998). Whenever demolition was attempted, however, "it was regarded as an act of cruelty against helpless individuals and represented as such by the media" (Bugra, 1998: 307). Law no. 6188 passed in 1953 was a reflection of this, and provided for existing *gecekondu* to be consolidated, only new construction to be demolished, and for State lands to be made available on easy terms of payment for new housing construction. As a complementary measure, the Turkish Real Estate and Credit Bank, as well as the Social Insurance Fund would make available credit for low-income housing. In reality, however, it was mainly civil servants and other middle-income groups who eventually benefited (Keyder and Oncu, 1993, quoted in Uzun, 2001; Baharoglu, 1996; Bugra, 1998).¹¹

Legislation issued after 1948 gave municipalities the primary responsibility for dealing with *gecekondu* and encouraging new housing construction. But municipal administrations were restricted by limited revenues and strong central government controls which directed development towards "beautification" programmes, further dislocating large numbers of people from the city centre and into *gecekondu* settlements (Yonder, 1998).

By the 1960s, *gecekondu*s began to be perceived as an inevitable consequence of rapid urbanisation and economic development. They were providing a source of cheap labour, thereby serving the state's economic interests, and were also a solution for the housing needs of the urban poor. Moreover, by offering support to these settlements, politicians could capture the *gecekondu* vote at election time. Election campaigns during the mid-1960s began to feature *gecekondu* amnesties that legalised large areas of informal settlements.¹² A conference held by the Ministry

of Reconstruction and Settlement in November 1965 featured Prime Minister Demirel stating that the demolition of *gecekondu* without providing alternative shelter was totally out of the question: a wave of land invasions in Istanbul followed.

The first two "Five Year Development Plans" (1963-72) recognised the need to increase mass housing construction, as well as the upgrading of existing settlements; the *gecekondu* law no.775 of 1966, and amended in 1976, facilitated the latter. Legalisation schemes were also instituted. All these developments provided increased security of tenure to the settlers, as well as the extension of infrastructure and service delivery to these areas by government.¹³ As a result, *gecekondu* land and housing, like the authorised housing stocks, became a subject of speculation, and new *gecekondu*s started to be built for profit rather than as shelter for those who could not afford formal housing. A new *gecekondu* Law no. 2981 passed in 1984 amnestied all *gecekondu* built up to that time, and more importantly it specified that they would be re-developed in line with the authorised housing stock; this generally allowed for their re-construction as multi-storey units (Erman, 1997; Bugra, 1998; Baharoğlu, 1996; Baharoğlu & Leitman, 1998; Erkip, 2000). Existing *gecekondu* owners used the opportunity to build multi-storey buildings on their existing plots, keeping some accommodation for their own use, and either selling or renting out the remainder. Today, this commercialisation of *gecekondu* is illustrated by the fact that most owners did not enclose the land themselves, but purchased it either from the person who initially appropriated it (56.22% in Istanbul) or from a relative or a real estate agent (19.2% in Istanbul) (Bugra, 1998). The commercialisation process has gained a moral legitimacy: Turkey's moves towards a market economy since the 1980s has meant that the state has been unable or unwilling to intervene and make provision for human needs, including adequate shelter (*Ibid*). Instead, the state's approach towards urbanisation and the urban poor has been described as,

financing the whole urbanisation process through the massive ground rents generated by rapid urban development and fuelling and then manipulating these ground rents as an income redistribution mechanism (Pinarcioglu and Isik, 2000: 5).

4 CASE STUDY

4.1 Ömerli Water Basin Case Study

4.1.1 Introduction

Developments around the Ömerli water basin area offer a comprehensive illustration of how Turkey's rational policy implementation has yielded unforeseen and multi-faceted problems. The government has attempted to address these problems in a sector-specific way, using regulations and zoning plans. Efforts have been made to draw up more comprehensive development plans. But poor horizontal communication and coordination between the various responsible authorities, as well as poor vertical communication from the apex of the administration to the grassroots level has undermined these efforts. Political manipulation and corruption have been a powerful undermining force, and today the local environment is in a state of rapid decline.

4.1.2 Background

When the Bosphorus bridges were built in 1973 and 1988 respectively, they were approved by the SPO. But at this time there was no strategic planning, nor EIA requirements to take into consideration the impacts on industry location, consequent migration to surrounding areas of the workforce, and the potential environmental consequences for Ömerli.

The *gecekondu* Law no. 2981 passed in 1984 (see section 3.3.4) which encouraged *gecekondu* owners to build up their own properties for rent or for sale had an

impact on developments around Ömerli. The population in the basin has dramatically increased since 1985 when the population stood at 36,860 compared to 257,204 in 1997¹⁴. Between 1985 and 1990, the rate of population increase for Istanbul was around 5.3%, whilst the rate of increase around the Ömerli basin was 26.76% during the same period (Göksel & Turkoğlu, 2000). Industries have not been segregated from the residential zones, and around 340 of them are scattered within the basin. The most densely populated area of the water basin is a town called Sultanbeyli which has been built on what was once forest and wetlands. Sultanbeyli is an entirely *gecekondu* settlement which did not exist over a decade ago, but which now houses a population of between an estimated 170,000 and 350,000 (Pinarcioğlu & Isik, 2000; *Turkish Daily News*, November 1997; CNN, 1997).¹⁵ During a field visit to Sultanbeyli,¹⁶ building construction appeared to be underway in every street on new plots, and as additions to almost every one of the existing buildings: more than 50% of the half-constructed apartments had the word "Satılık" ("for sale" in Turkish) painted on the bricks (see plate 1). A Sultanbeyli resident, who was also an estate agent, told me that the economy of Sultanbeyli relied on the construction industry. Residents were mainly migrants from eastern Turkey, many attracted by stories told by their friends already settled in Sultanbeyli about how easy it was to obtain and sell land in the area. Sultanbeyli acts as a magnet, attracting migrants to the town and other parts of the water basin area.¹⁷



Plate 1: "This place is for sale" – Sultanbeyli (photograph taken on 02/08/2001)

4.1.3 Ömerli Watershed: Physical Characteristics

Ömerli Dam Water Basin is one of Istanbul's major water dams, with a capacity of 270 000 000 m³ and supplying 40% of the drinking water of the city. It is located on the Anatolian side of Istanbul and covers an approximate area of 620 square kilometres. It is surrounded by mostly state land comprising areas of forest and wetland, both of which are legally protected areas. The forest area covers 320 square kilometres

and comprises pine trees (18%) and deciduous trees (generally oak trees) (82%). The existing forest area does not contain many other plant materials and the soil is therefore open to erosion (Göksel & Turkoğlu, 2000).

A GIS study of the Ömerli water basin carried out by academics at the Istanbul Technical University revealed the extent of illegal settlement growth in the area between 1992 and 1997 (see Figures 2 & 3 and Table 1 overleaf).

Figure 2: GIS picture showing settlement and land characteristics around Omerli, 1992




Figure 3: Same GIS picture for 1997




Table 1: Land Categories - Changes within the Ömerli Water Basin Area Between 1992 and 1997 (figures and table taken from Goksel & Turkoglu, 2000)

Description	1992 (Ha)	1997 (Ha)
Water	1785.33	1825.29
Forest	39169.17	35140.23
Road	360.99	439.86
Industry	164.43	351.63
Settlement	6009.21	6391.26
Wetland	2143.89	1103.13
Bare Soil	11817.99	16198.96
Total	61451.02	61451.02

4.1.4 Environmental Problems

The environmental problems associated with Ömerli are manifold: they involve densely populated urban enclaves situated in environmentally sensitive areas, and therefore encompass both “green” and “brown” issues.

Firstly, municipalities have been negligent in the enforcement of design regulations and *gecekondu* dwellings generally do not conform to earthquake building standards (Sengul, 1999; Parker, 1995). Hazard mapping has shown the Ömerli region to be within the first to second degree zones (maximum intensity) of potential earthquake severity (Coburn, 1995). The *gecekondu* in this area are therefore extremely vulnerable to all of the hazards associated with earthquakes, including homelessness, collapse of infrastructure such as sewerage pipes, infectious disease, and death.

Secondly, building on land which constitutes part of the natural drainage system prevents water seepage into the soil and increases the incidence of flooding during rainy periods; this has happened in Istanbul (*Turkish Daily News*, August 1997).

Thirdly, although many of the *gecekondu* homes in the Ömerli region appear to be provided with water and sewerage services, a higher proportion than those living within the formal cities do not receive such services¹⁸. Although official figures are not available, the higher incidence of infectious and parasitic diseases within cities whose facilities are inadequate are well documented elsewhere (see for example, Serageldin et al., 1994; World Health Organisation, 1996; Satterthwaite, 1997). Those houses not connected to the sewerage system dispose of their waste in unsanitary ways, and eventually wastewater ends up in the reservoir. During my field trip the Ömerli reservoir,¹⁹ it was difficult to discern whether any of the houses constructed close to the water's edge were actually connected to sewerage systems or septic tanks. There were, however, some outdoor latrines with small open trenches leading directly into the reservoir. Within the Sultanbeyli municipality I was told by a local resident that most houses were connected to the sewerage system, but those which were unconnected disposed of their waste-water in the streets²⁰. During an interview²¹ conducted with ISKI, I was told that 75% of waste-water was treated and the reservoir water quality was generally good: both the ISKI

annual report for 1999, and the OECD Environmental Performance Review for 1999 show the Ömerli reservoir water quality to be well within WHO standards. However, during an interview with an official at the Ministry of Environment I was told that people who drank water from the reservoir had suffered from disease, and that the true picture had been concealed from the OECD experts who had come to do their performance review:

We just told them [the OECD] the water was alright and they wrote it down. Why do you think everybody in Istanbul buys water? [instead of using tap water]

Settlement around Ömerli is a “green” issue by virtue of the fact that building is taking place on wetlands and forest lands, both of which are essential natural drainage features, and act as a collection basin for the reservoir. Both of these are also home to a variety of flora and fauna, many of which are rare and unique to the area.²²

4.2 Problems with Administrative Rationalist Approach to Planning:

4.2.1 Poor Horizontal Communication

The rational solution to Ömerli's problems would involve the following: since the area is largely forest and wetlands, the Ministries of Forestry and the Environment have some competence; the Ministries of Finance and of Public Housing all have interests about investment for industry and/or housing in the area; the Ministry for Health should have views about development of informal settlements and any implications for health, particularly in relation to the fresh water supply; and ISKI should have competence and expertise about how to manage the reservoir. In the ideal Weberian model, each sector would be able to solve the problems within its relevant area of expertise. However, The State Planning Organisation as the national body responsible for developing economic, social and environmental policies has the mandate to seek views from the various sectors or ministries whose competence is relevant to the Ömerli case, and this constitutes a digression from the rigid sector specificity of the administrative rationalist model. Although the SPO, in theory, plays a coordinating role to facilitate horizontal communication between the sectors,

by its own admission, economic development takes precedence over other matters. Moreover, even when the SPO produces its national development plans, planning at the local level has generally taken the form of "masterplans" which concentrate on physical zoning regulations, and fail to take account of the cross-sectoral issues.

As illustration, one 1991 study of the planning process cited the lack of horizontal communication as a major problem for Turkey: the example given was the approval by the Istanbul metropolitan authorities of a land-use plan in one of its eastern municipalities, which did not acknowledge in any way a major highway that the metropolitan authority had begun building, and which would pass through the municipality in question (Noe, 1991). The same study noted that the Turkish master-planning process raised concerns about "the divorce of physical development projects...from the indirect policies required for their implementation". It concluded that:

local development planning has been institutionalised as the preparation of static physical master plans. The plan documents may include recommendations for infrastructure and transportation development, urban design characteristics and other features. But the elements which carry the force of law when approved are parcel-by-parcel designations and accompanying building density limits. The elements omitted from this traditional and narrowly focused approach pose even more serious problems than the fragmentation described above. The most crucial concern here is an absence of systematic integration of policy formulation and detailed planning.

The uncoordinated approach to planning has also created additional structures and processes which, in a sort of self-perpetuating way further hamper the possibilities for a coordinated approach. These structures are a disparate array of municipal authorities in the watershed area that have sprung up as a result of unplanned population increases, and each of these municipalities has its own planning process. The Turkish Municipalities Act number 1580 states that a Municipality can be created once the total population of a town reaches 2,000. The Metropolitan Municipalities Act number 3030 passed in 1984 further defines a Metropolitan Municipality as "cities which comprise more than one district within their own boundaries".²³ Thus, within the watershed area there are several administration zones: several independent municipalities (Sarigazi, Yenidogan, Alemdag, Sultan Ciftligi and Samandra), the Istanbul Greater Metropolitan Municipality, and two anomalous sub-municipalities of the Istanbul Greater Metropolitan Municipality called Sultanbeyli and Ömerli. The latter two were created in 1992 and 1994 respectively by virtue of the rapid but unplanned population growth in these areas.

At this stage it would be useful to recall the functions bestowed upon municipalities by the 1984 Greater City Metropolitan Municipalities Act:

1. to make investment plans and programmes for the city
2. to make and implement the master zoning plan
3. to approve and control the implementation of the urban development plans
4. to execute water, public transport and sewerage services
5. to coordinate affairs between district and township municipalities and to mediate in disagreements between municipalities

Each of the Municipality duties listed 1-4 above overlaps to varying extents with functions of other government departments and the categories of planning for which they are responsible. For example:

In relation to functions 1, 2, and 3 above exists the *National Five Year Development Plan* which is drawn up by the State Planning Organisation. The SPO approves all public investment projects, each of which is subject to EIA procedures, including those proposed by municipalities. Although one of the objectives of the current 5 year plan is for Turkey to "realise sustainable development", the SPO acknowledges that environmental concerns are not prioritised because economic development is the government's major concern.²⁴ The *Regional Plan*, also drawn up by the SPO, details zoning and development plans on a regional basis. The *National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP)* is drawn up by the Ministry of Environment. It identifies Turkey's main environmental issues and proposes new measures to develop a nationwide environmental management system. The *Metropolitan Masterplan* is drawn up by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and details local investment plans as well as physical planning, and is approved by the SPO. ISKI is responsible for drawing up its own *ISKI Master Plans* for projected water and sewerage needs of the city and the investments required for infrastructure and treatment plants. Presumably, the Ministry of Forestry has drawn up its own plans for protection of the forest areas²⁵. However, none of the informants interviewed during the field study made any reference to the Ministry of Forestry, although they were quick to make reference to other departments with responsibilities in the Ömerli area: a fair conclusion would therefore be that the role of the Ministry of Forestry is minimal in this context.

The SPO is supposed to take account of the NEAP when drawing up its 5 Year Development Plan, but the reality is different. A planning expert at the SPO admitted that although the 5 Year Development Plan tried to incorporate "some environmental considerations here and there" implementation was a problem not only because economic growth was a priority over the environment, but because "the institutional arrangements were weak". She explained that there was a lack of communication between all the institutions involved in

drawing up the various levels of planning, and a failure to link macro-plans with micro-plans. Some problems were technical, with the data for micro-plans being compiled too slowly to keep pace with the rate of migration and illegal settlement construction. At the same time, she explained, the Municipalities often acted without consulting the other institutions because they were only interested in pleasing the local electorate.²⁶ A senior planner at the Ministry of Environment agreed that communication between the responsible administrations was poor, and blamed the failure of politically motivated Municipal Mayors to grasp the importance of technical planning requirements.²⁷ A Deputy Director General (DDG) at ISKI also agreed that horizontal communication was poor:


we have no real organic relations with central government, and as we said, sometimes what we wish to do regarding water is the opposite of what the Metropolitan Planning department wish to do.²⁸

The 1994 version of Istanbul's Metropolitan Masterplan recognised the need for conservation within the Ömerli

water basin; where settlement was allowed, the plan provided for small farmhouses with adjacent large tracts of land. However, the 1995 mayoral elections were looming and the plan was never implemented because, according to key informants at the Metropolitan Municipality and the independent professional association of the Istanbul Chamber of Architects, its low-density zoning provisions would have discouraged *gecekondu* settlement and this would have been politically unpopular with the *gecekondu* electorate.²⁹

In the elections, the Islamic Welfare Party was successful in the Sultanbeyli and Ömerli municipalities, as well as the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. According to the same informants at the Metropolitan Municipality and Chamber of Architects, the Islamic representatives acted in contravention of the 1994 Metropolitan Masterplan, and set about encouraging *gecekondu* settlement in the area. This was achieved by the introduction in 1995 of new ISKI zoning regulations for the Ömerli watershed area which was divided into protection zones as follows: Absolute (0-300m), Short (300-1000m) Medium (1000-2000m) and Long Range Protection zones (2000m-Borders of water basin area). These are shown in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: ISKI Protection zones of Ömerli Water Basin Area



Prior to 1995, a similar zoning regulation existed to protect the water and lands around Ömerli: it provided only for low-density planning in the area. But the new post-1995 regulation allows for higher density settlement within the zones. According to the Chamber of Architects,

Instead of specifying the desirable limits of habitation and minimal pollution, the new regulations specify the maximum limits of habitation, and the maximum levels of pollution allowed in the water.....So ISKI is no longer fulfilling its legal function, which is to protect the water reservoir, but it's changed its focus to protect the housing.³⁰

The Istanbul Chamber of Architects filed a law suit against the ISKI on the grounds that its new regulation was in contravention of the Constitution and won. But ISKI have re-submitted a new regulation which is the same in substance but worded differently. The Chamber of Architects is again challenging ISKI in court, but worries that because of the lengthy court procedure, ISKI will continue to allow development in the area in the interim.

What the ISKI zoning regulation clearly reveals is the rivalries and conflicting interests generated by the administrative rationalist's sectorial approach to problem solving, and debunks the myth that technical divisions of bureaucracies are neutral implementers of policy. Clearly, the planners within the Municipality are at odds with those drawing up the zoning regulations within ISKI because both sectors are pursuing different interests and have different ideas about how to define the problem around Ömerli. The planners at the Metropolitan Municipality believe that the problem around Ömerli is environmental degradation resulting out of a permissive attitude towards settlement in the area; ISKI acknowledges that there is a need to protect the water quality in the reservoir and that this can be achieved by a combination of technical clean-up plants, a total conservation zone within the 300 metre zone, and some planned settlement in the remaining zones (according to the Chamber of Architects, ISKI's intention is to accommodate luxury apartments). ISKI may thus have another agenda, which is to raise revenue for the Metropolitan and district Municipalities in the area by allowing luxury developments in the area, and this revenue will be at the disposal of the politicians who head the municipalities (in this case, they happen to be Islamic). The power struggle between the planners and the water technicians is one that has been realised in the courts by the Chamber of Architects whose interests match those of the planners. Although the court has ruled in favour of the latter, ISKI still has the political upper hand. The outcome remains to be seen, and in

any case will not be as predictable as administrative rationalists would have us believe.

Those at ISKI would dispute claims by the Metropolitan Municipality planners and the Chamber of Architects that they were encouraging settlement around the reservoir. According to the DDG at ISKI, it was the Municipality that was encouraging settlement around the reservoir³¹:

Part of Istanbul's environmental problem is the fact that ISKI has been given responsibility to supply clean water, but not the power to ensure that water pollution is prevented. For example, the Metropolitan Planning department is responsible for planning housing settlements and infrastructure development, and it often does so for squatters: ISKI does not have the power to stop this activity.³²

Despite claims by ISKI that they had no power to prevent settlement, they simultaneously claimed to have demolished all the buildings that were within the 300 metre zone. A field visit to Ömerli³³ revealed that, contrary to what ISKI had said, there was some low-density housing around the reservoir within the 300m zone of remarkably contrasting quality: some constructions were nothing more than corrugated shacks, but the majority could be described as luxury villas. Some of the houses had obviously been there for some time, and others were in the process of being built. At the same time, there were some properties that had been demolished, and the local inhabitants told me that ISKI had been responsible (see plates 2 & 3).

Whether or not settlement is being encouraged is not in dispute: the data and evidence shows that this is happening. What does appear to be in dispute amongst all the government agents involved is "who" is responsible. It is clear that the problem does not necessarily lie with any one particular agency, but with the institutional structures, processes, and tools all in disparate play at the same time. Ministry involvement appears to be restricted to some consultations with the SPO who then draw up their own master plans, but action on the ground appears to be dominated by the municipalities and ISKI. Each of the municipalities with its expert planners have drawn up physical master plans without consulting each other, and without looking at the wider strategic issues at stake, eg local culture, the environment, the economy etc. ISKI have drawn up regulations without consulting the municipalities, and these are as narrowly conceived as the master plans, lacking as they do any strategy for dealing with related issues, and relying on enforcement which, evidently, has not succeeded in preventing building construction.



Plate 2: Luxury villa within 300m zone – building demolished by ISKI in foreground (29/07/01)



Plate 3: Buildings within Ömerli watershed demolished by ISKI (29/07/01)

4.2.2 Poor Vertical Communication

The master plan approach described above not only illustrates the poor horizontal communication between the various departments, but the poor vertical communication, for example, between the SPO and the municipal planners, and between each of the official institutions and the general population. The outcomes for local residents have been split between two opposing extremes: sanctioning of building in the watershed with material rewards, such as title deeds and service delivery, for those breaking the law; and punishment for breaking the law with demolition of illegal buildings. On balance, however, it would seem that the rewards for breaking the law are greater than the potential punishments (Leitman & Baharoglu, 1999).

During an interview with the DDG at ISKI, I was told that water and sewerage services were not supplied to the *gecekondu* because they were illegal residents. Yet a visit to the ISKI web-site gives official confirmation that services are indeed supplied to the *gecekondu* town of Sultanbeyli, though the per capita provision appears markedly lower than for "legal" settlements.³⁴ Both the SPO and Ministry of Environment confirmed during interview that the *gecekondu* received services, and a Sultanbeyli resident

talked about how easy it was to get the municipality to provide services (see Annex 7 for interviews).

During interviews carried out in a separate study (Baharoğlu & Leitman, 1998), a metropolitan mayor explained: "the law clearly says that municipalities can provide services only to buildings with permits. But it does not say what happens if one provides services to illegal housing. No particular fines are defined in the laws". Another mayor stated that "the legal framework is based on human beings. We have to provide services to places where people are living. You can do some illegal things in this regard everyday within the existing laws. For example, I use my own initiative". Yet another mayor said that he felt bound to provide services because to not do so would invite health problems. "Refusing to supply water and other infrastructure is like killing (*gecekondu* dwellers) in the long term". Sometimes utilities companies will provide services directly in order both to create business, and to prevent losses resulting from illegal connections. Thus the Director of an electricity company in a large metropolitan area explained: "it is not my job or responsibility to prevent illegal houses, it is the prime responsibility of municipalities....My job is to buy and sell energy". Figure 5 below illustrates the forces at play which result in service provision for the *gecekondu*.




Figure 5: Forces at play which result in service delivery to the *gecekondu* (from Baharoğlu & Leitman, 1998)

These mixed signals can only create confusion within the community about what constitutes problematic behaviour, what the rules and regulations are, and whether they are relevant anyway.

If we define poor vertical communication as "a common failure of understanding and information flows" both within levels of government, and between the government and *gecekondu* dwellers, it is easy to see how this has led to inadequate environmental problem definition in the Ömerli area. Moreover, this lack of mutual understanding is aggravated by the "large economic and cultural gap between the policy making level and the reality of life" for the *gecekondu* whose behaviour is motivated in part by a drive for basic survival. Whilst figures for employment and income levels specifically within the *gecekondu* population are not available³⁵, the gap between rich and poor (which includes many *gecekondu*) is wide: between 1987 and 1994, the share of total incomes going to the richest fifth of Turks rose from 50% to 55%, whilst the share of the poorest fifth shrank from 5.2% to 4.9% (*The Economist*, June 2000). Exploitation of the real estate market has formed part of a survival strategy for the *gecekondu* (Pinarcioglu & Isik, 2000), but has also led to upward mobility within these groups and the marginalisation of the poorer newcomers who have not established themselves so well into the clientelist *gecekondu* networks.

Further, the gap between the policy-makers in central government, policy-makers in municipalities, and the local residents is like a tiered system of cultural difference. Whilst the central state is committed to secularism, and this is reflected in policy-making, most of the residents within the Ömerli basin are Islamists, and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Sultanbeyli and Ömerli municipalities are, accordingly, run by Islamic officials. That *gecekondu* residents exercise a choice in remaining culturally "different" from the secular state by joining the ranks of inhabitants in places like Sultanbeyli is illustrated in interviews carried out in one recent study (Erman, 1997). These revealed that, given the choice, rural-urban migrants would still prefer to live in *gecekondu* settlements because of the close-knit social relations within them, and because of the traditional Islamic culture which exists therein. Male rural-urban migrants said that a major reason for their preference for *gecekondu* settlement was that they did not feel they had to worry about the honour of their women when they (the men) went to work each day, because Islamic tradition within the *gecekondu* would control women's and men's behaviour. When entering the town of Sultanbeyli, the Islamic influence is in strong evidence: most notable is the prevalence of hejab-clad women and bearded men, which sharply contrasts with the westernised appearance of residents in central Istanbul.³⁶ An official at the SPO conceded that the cultural rift between the *gecekondu* and secular society was problematic:

In the cities we now have a situation where there exist two distinct types of culture. Migrants from the rural areas like to live in traditional communities. They tend to be religious, and want to live in their own ghettos – like replicating their rural existence in the urban areas. That's what the problem is – large numbers of people from a totally different culture who don't want to follow the way things are done in the cities. This causes cultural clashes.³⁷

Informal networks based on kinship, local origins, and religion play a central role in facilitating integration into city life for newly arrived migrants (Erder, 1999). In squatter settlements like Sultanbeyli Islam plays a central role in everyday life, where those heading the Municipality facilitate land appropriation, creating *de facto* rights to title deeds and services. Thus, a Sultanbeyli real estate agent commented:

Our community representatives are the mosques. They have been very active in helping residents.....The municipality (Sultanbeyli) actually sells land-renting rights to people – it costs 10 million Turkish Lira per year for a plot. Building on the land is a different matter and we don't have permission to do that. But people build on the land illegally anyway, and the municipality provides the services anyway – a rubbish collection service comes round every week. People build here because they know that at election time they'll be given title to the land. It always happens, there's always an amnesty. People get to hear about it from their friends who are already living here, and they come to Sultanbeyli.³⁸

Meanwhile, those who have *de jure* title deeds cannot claim their rights *de facto*, and they are forced to accept very limited prices in exchange of their land in the formal market by the formal Municipality. Thus, Sultanbeyli is a success story for the Islamic networks which offer "fraternity and solidarity which could provide material gains", but an example of the "total failure of the state and law and the formal life conditions, which have been strongly desired by the Republic since its inception" (Pinarcioglu & Isik, 2000).

The common failure of understanding and information flows between the policy levels of government and *gecekondu* dwellers is not easy to breach when both sides are entrenched within their own cultures, and when the structures and processes for mutual understanding do not exist. The administrative structures, as they are, are either dominated by

technicians at the national level, who are subject to the secular and increasingly neo-liberal politics of the state, or they employ technocrats at the municipal level who are dominated by local politicians and their parochial (often religious) interests. Thus, the administrative structures in place are not the perfectly rational and neutral instruments envisaged by the administrative rationalist; instead they are mired in conflict and contradiction.

Information flows could be enhanced by a more communicative or participative approach to policy formulation. But the following comments are an illustration of the deeply entrenched administrative rationalist approach on the part of bureaucrats, and therefore of the obstacles this approach poses to better vertical communication: when I enquired about the possibilities for “participation” within the formal planning process at the national level, I was told by the SPO that,

People don't always know about the consequences of their preferences, or they want things which aren't necessarily good, for example, for the environment.³⁹

Although tools which have the potential to invite participation, such as the EIA, exist, the manner in which they are employed in the decision-making process is an illustration of the way in which policy-makers dismiss the irrationalities of non-experts. Thus, a Director at the DSI commented on NGO involvement in the EIA process:

There are hundreds of NGOs in Turkey. Anyone these days can call themselves an NGO, it's like a fashionable business. We invite them along and they make a lot of noise. They always make lots of noise. So we let them say what they like, but we don't really take any notice of them. If we and the Ministry of Environment think it's alright for a project to proceed, then the project proceeds.⁴⁰

According to the OECD, Turkey's NEAP was initiated “to ensure wide participation of public and private stakeholders as a guarantee of these stakeholders' commitment to the objectives agreed in the NEAP..... It emphasises the need to enhance environmental information and awareness” (OECD, 1999: 112). But a planning official at the Ministry of Environment explained that the concept of participation was relatively new in Turkey, and that when it did occur, it was only to cater to powerful interest groups. In addition, there was very little environmental education because it was not a budgetary priority.⁴¹

4.2.3 Political Manipulation and Corruption

For administrative rationalism to achieve predictable outcomes, the vagaries of politics, including voter manipulation and corruption have to be ruled out of the

rational equation. In Turkey, as elsewhere, politics distorts the supposedly linear route of rational decision-making, and the outcomes do not conform to the technocrat's plans.

The vote-buying potential of *gecekondu* amnesties granted since the 1960s has already been alluded to in Chapter 3, and was a result of policy formulated by central government. When the Metropolitan Municipalities Act was passed in 1984, greater powers were transferred to the municipalities. From the rational administrator's point of view, one could hail such a development as a victory for the Weberian ideal: technocrats within the local administration would now be able to specialise at the micro-level, for example, drawing up land-use plans for small geographic areas, areas which would become their compartmentalised area of expertise. However, what the 1984 Act achieved was greater politicisation of the planning processes, with local mayors manipulating their new powers to grant favours in return for votes. This often meant the granting of construction contracts to favoured private companies for the development of residential complexes on unsettled land which would previously have been potential sites for *gecekondu* (Bugra, 1998; Yonder, 1999). Courting the votes of the business sector in this way did not necessarily harm the *gecekondu*, simply because they too had begun to engage in *gecekondu* property speculation; outside competition simply fuelled speculation and offered the prospect of improved rental revenues (Oncu, 1999, cited in Uzun, 2001).

In Ömerli this sort of bargaining between the business sector and local politicians is evident. One of the issues at the heart of the court case brought by the Chamber of Architects against ISKI, is the former's charge that ISKI's proposed regulation is designed to facilitate the selling of state land to private contractors who wish to build luxury apartments in the area. A number of construction companies are indeed building and selling luxury apartments in the Ömerli watershed area,⁴² and presumably these companies are paying the municipalities for this land.

The 1984 Metropolitan Municipalities Act also invited party-political struggles and an ensuing deliberate lack of coordination if for example the district and metropolitan mayors were at odds with central government or indeed with one another owing to their membership of different parties (Baharoğlu and Leitman, 1998). Sometimes this has manifested as explicit tension between the state ideology and political Islam (Özcan, 2000; *Turkish Daily News*, 1998), and this is evident in the squatter settlement of Sultanbeyli.

The politicians have been able to exploit the cultural differences between *gecekondu* migrants and the cosmopolitan Istanbulites by granting favours, such as facilitating illegal construction and service provision, on the basis of ethnic and religious networks. For the majority of the *gecekondu* whose involvement in the housing market has been initially a basic survival strategy, the granting of such favours is seen as a morally legitimate activity. They are aware of the huge

income disparities between themselves and the rich Istanbulites, and of corruption scandals which have plagued Turkey's national and local politicians⁴³. The financial crisis which hit Turkey at the end of 2000, for example, was a result of investigations into 10 failed banks that were under government administration. *The Economist* magazine's summing up of the situation was that, "massive corruption permeates just about every state institution" (*The Economist*, December 2000). A recent "corruption perception" survey carried out by Transparency International, an international NGO involved in exposing corrupt practices around the world, gave Turkey 3.6 points out of a possible 10 (10 being the "cleanest" score possible) alongside Egypt and El Salvador (Transparency International, 2001). In short, the Turkish population is regularly exposed to evidence of the rich getting richer at the whole country's expense. Why then should the provision of basic amenities to a poor population be seen as wrong? When the Islamist Welfare Party came to power in the 1995 elections, its success was ascribed to voter dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties and the fact that the Welfare Party gave off an "air of probity and competence" (Ozler, 2000; *The Economist*, June 2000).

So pervasive are the forces of clientelism that most of the officials interviewed during my field study acknowledged it as a major reason for the failure of the rational planning process (see Annex 1 for interview transcripts). An official at the Ministry of Environment observed:

The problem is that it's become a situation where the only thing that matters is politics and corruption....People just want to have whatever they can get. Detailed acts exist for planning and protecting the environment, but nobody respects these plans. That's it, nobody respects the laws anymore. Neither central government nor municipalities can claim to have good relations with the local people....Their idea of good relations and participation is to have good connections

with strong interest groups so that they can buy votes.

With specific reference to the planning process within the Ömerli watershed area, the same official named the *gecekondü* as the strong interest group to whom the politicians were catering. The squatters are now themselves being perceived as party to the "free for all" in which the seeking of quick profits at the expense of the common good (in this case, the environment) is the norm. Some have pointed to the formation of local "mafia" groups who now dominate the *gecekondü* market (Bugra, 1998; Uzun, 2001; see also my interview with the Chamber of Architects, Annex1: 6.4) as an example of the undesirable culture of "maximisation of the unearned increment" now dominant in Turkish society (Bugra, 1998). Thus, a member of the Chamber of Architects commented:

No one in Turkey is interested in productive work any more. They all just want to get money coming in without having to do any work.....It's the government's fault. They have not planned or intervened to create opportunities for productive jobs. They've encouraged property speculation themselves until it's become the major way of saving or making money. It's unsustainable. When poor people see the government being corrupt and making money without having to do productive work for it, they think to themselves, why shouldn't we do it too⁴⁴

Corruption among the politicians and non-poor of Turkish society has had a major negative impact on the rational planning process. Whether or not provision for the poor in return for votes is deemed corrupt, it is also a reality which has undermined the laws and regulations and affected the rational planning process. Thus, the way things "ought to be" according to the administrative rationalist have been distorted by these forces into a "way things really are"; the reality bears no resemblance to the rational outcome predicted by the bureaucrats.

5 CONCLUSION

This paper sets out to establish that administrative rationalism is the dominant discourse in Turkey. The critique of the administrative rationalist approach to environmental problems in Chapter 2 formed the basis against which to test the case study, and demonstrate that the theoretical problems associated with the administrative rationalist approach materialise in practice here. This study has aimed to show that the inherent flaws and weaknesses of the administrative rationalist approach are apparent in the way that the Turkish state has dealt with the problems associated with *gecekondu* settlements within the Ömerli watershed, and that it is these intrinsic weaknesses that render administrative rationalism incapable of environmental protection.

Administration rationality is a problem solving discourse. It carries out the task of implementing policy determined by the state's ideology and priority interests. So what are the state's priorities according to its ideology? Chapter 3 likened the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 to an "Enlightenment"-type transformation in which industrialisation was to be key to modernisation, and economic imperatives took precedence over the environment. In the early years of the Republic, therefore, there was little room for conflict between administrative rationality and ecological rationality, simply because the latter was not a dominant discourse. During the 1980s, when Turkey began adopting neo-liberal policies in order to join the global economy, environmental concerns also started to appear on the policy agenda. But ecological rationality remained subordinate, and this was reinforced within the legal terms of the first Environment Law.

Part of Turkey's "Enlightenment" involved banishing Islam from politics: at its inception, therefore, the Republic had set up potential for considerable conflict between religion, arguably the elemental components of the moral and emotive sort of rationalism referred to by Habermas, and the instrumental-technical reasoning of administrative rationalism. Evidence of these tensions exist today at the national level where the rational, secular values embodied in the Constitution have invited military intervention as a method of suppressing Islamic parties which have come to power in general elections. These tensions, however, have not gone away: Islam has not been banished from politics at all. Instead, the municipalities appear to have become the arena in which secular and Islamic politics continue to exercise their tug of war.

The neo-liberal economic model being pursued by Turkey since the 1980s has sharpened the focus of these struggles, and the environment serves as an exemplary case study for analysing the conflicts. The mechanisation of agriculture, and subsequent slashing of agricultural subsidies has caused successive waves of rural-urban migration. Many rural migrants come from traditional Islamic communities, and seek out communities with shared values, usually within *gecekondu* settlements, on arrival in Istanbul. In

accordance with neo-liberal policies, the role of the state in welfare provision has been diminishing, yet welfare needs, such as housing have been increasing as a result of these policies. An example of both one of the paradoxes of capitalism, and of an unintended outcome of the rational policy process. Failure of the state to provide sufficient housing has created the opportunity for "moral rationality" to make inroads: *gecekondu* dwellers have been able to construct sub-standard homes illegally on unsuitable land, and infrastructure has been provided by the municipal authorities, particularly those administered by Islamic officials catering to their Islamic constituencies. The neo-liberal influences on the housing sector have continued to fuel the moral economy: the state, recognising its inability to provide welfare housing, has encouraged private investment not only in the formal sector, but also in *gecekondu* housing stock as a means of redistributing wealth to the poor. That much of the construction is now being carried out in environmentally sensitive areas is of secondary concern to the politicians who wish either to encourage the growth of the liberal economy through the private construction industry, or to solve the mass housing problems by granting permission for *gecekondu*. In both cases, the authorities stand to make political capital by granting favours to different sectors of the electorate. The picture which emerges is one where economic and moral rationality have intruded upon the administrative rationalist ideal, and where political influences have played a large part in shaping events. The denial inherent in the administrative rationalist discourse discounts such influences because they are not "the way things ought to be". This results in a failure to see "the way things really are", which is unpredictable under such circumstances.

Turkey's legal and institutional framework for dealing with environmental problems is typical of the administrative rationalist model: individual ministries are responsible for specific environmental sectors, and laws prescribing regulations within these sectors, for example in land-use planning, forest management, and in dealing with water and air pollution, soil erosion etc. Within the Ömerli watershed a number of these sectoral interests are at stake: construction of sub-standard buildings on unsuitable land continues apace, deforestation and soil erosion is occurring, there is a progressive loss of unique habitats and biodiversity, and groundwater is being polluted and making its way to the freshwater reservoir which supplies Istanbul's drinking water. Yet none of the ministries responsible for their particular areas of competence appear to communicate with one another, or to have any coordinated strategy for preventing the environmental deterioration.

The problems that have materialised around Ömerli are multi-faceted, not the domain of any one particular sector, and therefore not solely "environmental" problems, although the negative impacts appear to be greatest within this sector. The situation at Ömerli is a result of changes in the economy, poverty, cultural rifts and competing rationalities, poor integration

of environmental considerations into economic and land-use plans – in short one that could best be dealt with using a holistic approach. The State Planning Organisation is an advisory body with the capacity to take into consideration each of the contributing factors and draw up coordinated strategies in the form of Master Plans. But by the SPO's own admission, environmental considerations are secondary, and in addition to the competing sectoral interests, there are also problems with vertical coordination. For example, the municipalities responsible for micro-plans fail to consult the macro-plans for development planning within their boundaries.

One development that could have facilitated better vertical and horizontal communication was the passing of the Metropolitan Municipalities Act in 1983. It provided the basis for closer cooperation between the "expert" technicians deployed to municipal offices, as well as closer communication between council officials and the local residents who, by virtue of local elections, could have a say in the direction of local developments. But "economic rationality" and "moral rationality" have supplanted any administrative rationality that municipalities were supposed to employ in their decision-making. Politicisation of the local planning process has enabled local politicians to exploit both forms of rationality. They have sought to justify their complicity in flouting laws and regulations conceived by the rational administrative process using a number of excuses: they are contributing to local economies by encouraging the private construction companies; they are making economically rational decisions to provide services in order to prevent illegal utility connections and therefore financial loss; or they are morally obliged to provide services to the poor. Within the Ömerli watershed, Islamic local politicians have been able to exploit the fact that there is poor vertical communication between the secular central government and Islamic local

constituents. They have been able to bridge the cultural gap and fill this communication void by building up Islamic clientelistic networks. Underlying each of these forms of political exploitation is the increasingly prevalent tendency within Turkish society for vote-buying and corruption. Local mayors stand to benefit in elections if municipalities under their direction cater to the interests of construction firms and *gecekondü* constituents. The mayors and their municipal offices also stand to accrue considerable incomes from the sale of land to property speculators. The rational, scientific instruments such as regulation and EIA, have not been used in a "neutral" way to solve the problems they were designed to solve, as the ISKI zoning regulations, which may be a way for ISKI to gain money and favour, demonstrate. The attitude of the DSI towards NGO participation in planning and decision-making also illustrates how bureaucrats favour the use of planning tools according to their own interests and preferences.

Administrative rationalism is a discourse featuring in both developed and developing countries, and its effectiveness in dealing with development problems varies from country to country, according to the complex factors affecting the application of its rules. What this case study has attempted to show is that the inherent flaws of the administrative rationalist approach, such as narrow problem definitions, rigid prescriptions, and poor levels of communication, make predictable and rational outcomes less likely than they "ought" to be. But the Turkish case study is typical of the picture in many developing countries, and what is perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from Ömerli is that it is the context in which administrative rationalism operates that affects outcomes the most. Only by understanding economic, political, social and cultural change is it possible to have some idea about why this particular discourse may be failing to achieve the intended results.

6 ANNEX 1: INTERVIEWS

Some of those interviewed did not wish to be named, and in those cases I have simply referred to those speaking as officials or representatives. Notes from the interviews were taken in long-hand, and sometimes, when the speaking was in Turkish, I had to make use of a translator: some of the details that follow, therefore, are summarised and/or translated accounts of what people said.

6.1 Interview with Mustafa Eldemir, ISKI Deputy Director General (DDG), Istanbul, 24 July, 2001

Me: What is ISKI's status, when and why was it established? What are its functions?

DDG: ISKI was established by law in 1981 in response to growing population pressures and the increased demand for domestic water supplies. ISKI's functions are to supply, store and transport water, as well as to treat waste-water and sewerage. ISKI has a Board of Directors, the head of which is from the Istanbul Municipality.

Me: I understand that there are large squatter settlements around the Ömerli reservoir, and that they have contributed to water contamination with sewerage. How does ISKI make sure that the water in Ömerli reservoir does not become polluted?

DDG: ISKI is only responsible for the above functions, not for environmental protection. Part of Istanbul's environmental problem is the fact that ISKI has been given responsibility to supply clean water, but not the power to ensure that water pollution is prevented. For example, the Metropolitan Planning department is responsible for planning housing settlements and infrastructure development, and it often does so for squatters: ISKI does not have the power to stop this activity.

Me: How much consultation and coordination of policy does ISKI have with other government departments, such as the Metropolitan Planning department and Ministry of Environment?

DDG: In theory there is some cooperation, but in practice we have no real organic relations with central government, and as we said, sometimes what we wish to do regarding water is the opposite of what the Metropolitan Planning department wish to do.

Me: So do you feel that all the relevant departments should perhaps engage in more cooperation?

DDG: There is currently a new law under consideration which will oblige ISKI to increase its coordination of functions with other government departments. ISKI is against this law because it also seeks to pass responsibility for solid waste management to ISKI, and to "blame" ISKI for solid waste related problems. Because this law is only in draft, we do not wish to discuss it further.

Me: Alright, but would you say that some of the current environmental problems relating to Ömerli

have something to do with the lack of coordination between departments?

DDG: Yes.

Me: Does ISKI provide services to the gecekondu?

DDG: No.

Me: Why not?

DDG: These settlements are illegal. Anyway, we find that if we don't supply them with water, then they can't produce so much waste-water. The average daily water consumption per household within the legal settlements is 200 litres. If we refuse to supply water to the gecekondu, we find that their consumption goes down to 15 litres per household, because they have to buy their water from more expensive water sellers, and this makes them use water more carefully.

Me: What about providing sewerage connections to the gecekondu?

DDG: No, we don't service those areas.

Me: But if you don't service these areas, then surely wastewater simply gets thrown into the streets and causes both a threat to health, and infiltration into groundwater and ultimately the reservoir?

DDG: Well, we did have a problem with contamination, but now we've improved our treatment plant at Ömerli, and all wastewater is now around 75% treated.

Me: So this must mean that you do provide sewerage connections to around about 75% of settlements, legal and illegal?

DDG: No, not to the gecekondu.

Me: Are there any houses or settlements close to the reservoir, I mean closer than Sultanbeyli?

DDG: No. There used to be, but we've demolished them all. We have a zoning system where building in the first zone, which is 300 metres from the reservoir outwards, is forbidden. There are no houses there at all. ISKI plans to buy up all this land within the 300 metre zone and build a wall around it so no one can build there.

Me: What is your main source of income? Do you have difficulty collecting revenues?

DDG: ISKI is funded from the revenues collected for water supply and sewerage connection, though around about 3-4% of their revenue comes from central government. Revenue collection is almost 100%, and those who do not pay their bills have their supply cut off.

So we are quite comfortable financially.

6.2 Interview with the Planning Experts (SP1 & SP2) at State Planning Organisation, Ankara, 27 July 2001

Me: What is the status of the SPO?

SP1: The SPO is an advisory board responsible to the Prime Minister.

Me: I'm looking at the Ömerli reservoir as a case study which shows the environmental impacts of illegal settlement in an ecologically sensitive area. How do you see the "problem" of the gecekondu? Migrants

come to cities looking for work as a result of government economic plans, so how do you plan for this – for example, how do your 5 Year Development Plans take into account the National Environmental Action Plans?

SP1: The 5 Year Development plan is modelled by sectoral areas. We look at the NEAP and try to incorporate environmental considerations here and there, but implementation is very poor. For example, industries don't want to use environmentally clean technologies, even if they've installed them, because they think it increases their costs.

Services are provided legally to illegal areas: no law specifically prohibits service delivery to these areas. This costs three times more than if settlements, and the accompanying service provision, had been planned. The gecekondu also drill wells, for which permission is required, but nobody bothers to seek permission.

Me: But I visited ISKI last week and asked them whether they provided services to the gecekondu, and they said they didn't.

SP1: That's not true, ISKI do provide services to the gecekondu.

The current climate is one which encourages the gecekondu to break the law. Instead of being encouraged to comply with the law, they are rewarded with houses and title to land for free. This means there's a lack of respect for the law. What the government should be doing is planning for mass housing projects, where construction takes place in suitable locations, and housing is affordable. But it's difficult when such large numbers of migrants choose to migrate to areas that are not suitable for construction. They should be moved to more suitable areas.

The reason for the non-implementation of the Development Plans are: i) the economy is viewed as a priority over the environment, and measures aimed at protecting the environment are perceived as too costly; ii) politicians are only interested in vote-buying; iii) there are planning process problems: information is not up-to-date; institutions are not communicating, they're not linking macro-plans to micro-plans, and there is no coordination. The law provides that the SPO has policy-making responsibility and the Municipalities have planning responsibility, and they often act autonomously.

Me: How could the planning procedure be made more effective: what needs to be done to ensure sectors communicate and coordinate better with each other?

SP1: What is needed is a framework law for urban issues to see where all the responsibilities overlap. We need to see what the relational issues are. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement is currently producing this "map" of relational issues, compiling all the legal responsibilities of each sector so that we can see where each of them overlaps. We need a clearer idea, in law, about who's responsible for what.

Me: And even if you did have better inter-departmental coordination, how would this affect the behaviour of the gecekondu? You talk about having to

move them away from the unsuitable locations, but won't they just object to this and return to the same locations?

SP1: Yes, past experience has shown that they don't like being moved.

Me: So what scope is there for a more participative planning process in Turkey?

At this stage we were joined by another senior planner in the SPO, and there were differences in opinion between the planners about how to deal with the gecekondu.

SP2: The problem with your question is what is it that you mean by participation? I mean, I was once an academic so I know what it's like; suddenly there's a new concept, a trendy buzz-word like "participation" and everyone wants to think it's the solution to all the problems. But planners have always taken into consideration people's behaviour and preferences, that's what planners are trained to do.

Me: But what about including people in the actual process of planning, actually asking them what their preferences are?

SP2: People don't always know about the consequences of their preferences, or they want things which aren't necessarily good, for example, for the environment. We do take into consideration what people want, but if we did everything they wanted, we couldn't guarantee the right outcome. And many people are uneducated. We have this problem especially with the gecekondu. In the cities we now have a situation where there exist two distinct types of culture. Migrants from the rural areas like to live in traditional communities. They tend to be religious, and want to live in their own ghettos – like replicating their rural existence in the urban areas. That's what the problem is – large numbers of people from a totally different culture who don't want to follow the way things are done in the cities. This causes cultural clashes.

Me: But still, if the majority of the urban population now constitutes rural migrants, then surely their culture has to be taken into account?

SP2: Yes, but they don't want to be open to taking others' culture into account because they're an inward looking traditional community, and this causes problems.

SP1: It is true that we planners are against the sanctioning of gecekondu settlement. People should not be rewarded for breaking the law. And it is no good to say that it's OK for people to build in unsuitable areas, because then what's the point of planning? We have had some experiments with "participation": there's a mass housing project in a place called Batikent. Cheap housing and infrastructure was provided, and the potential residents were asked about their needs and whether they would be happy to live in this area. It was a pretty successful project. These types of project need to be replicated. But what can you do in places like Istanbul, where the numbers of migrants coming daily is so great, and they want to live in areas where gecekondu already exist, and where the land is unsuitable? This is a big problem for Turkey.

6.3 Interview with Planning Official (PO), Ministry of Environment, Ankara, 27 July 2001

Me: Tell me about the planning process, and what role the Ministry of Environment plays in it.

PO: There are really four main planning categories: Regional Planning which is drawn up by the SPO, then there's the National Environmental Action Plan which we draw up. The micro-planning, carried out on scales of 1:1000 and 1:5000 are done by the Municipalities.

Me: When the SPO and Municipalities are drawing up their plans, do they consult with you?

PO: Well, yes, in theory they're supposed to. But we don't have meetings really. They send us their plans and we look at them, but it doesn't mean they take any notice of us.

Me: What implications does this have for planning and the environment?

PO: The problem is that before 1983, physical planning was the responsibility of the Ministry. After the change in the law, municipalities were given all the powers to implement planning. We at the Ministry are technical people who draw up plans according to the laws and regulations. Municipalities are political organisations, and implementation of plans depends on the Mayor's will. They will do what they want to get votes, even if it's not good planning.

Me: But isn't "good planning" not only a consideration of technical requirements, but also of what's politically acceptable, and therefore likely to work? What scope is there, for example, for participatory planning?

PO: The problem is that it's become a situation where the only thing that matters is politics and corruption. The idea of participation is not embedded in Turkish society. People just want to have whatever they can get. Detailed acts exist for planning and protecting the environment, but nobody respects these plans. That's it, nobody respects the laws anymore. Neither central government nor municipalities can claim to have good relations with the local people, or to have participatory opportunities. Their idea of good relations and participation is to have good connections with strong interest groups so that they can buy votes.

Me: And in the case of the Ömerli area, who are these interest groups – who's interests are represented?

PO: The religious groups and gecekondu are a powerful interest group. They break the laws and they are rewarded. Let me give you an example. My brother built his house on land he bought. He did everything the legal way. He applied for connections to the water supply company, but he still hasn't been connected. It's been two years! Most of the gecekondu in Istanbul are connected – all they have to do is ask and it's done. They don't buy their plots, they're just rewarded with free titles and land, for nothing, for breaking the law. This isn't a fair system.

Me: I have spoken to ISKI, and they say they don't provide services to the gecekondu.

PO: This is not true. They do provide services. In Sultanbeyli most people have services. There is a problem with some of those which don't get services – for example, they just dispose of their sewage in the streets and this is bad for health, and it pollutes the water.

Me: ISKI said they are dealing with the problem, and their publications show that the water in the reservoir complies with international standards.

PO: The water is not as clean as they claim. I know that people who drink that water have suffered from diseases. A couple of years ago, there was a group from the OECD doing an environmental performance report for Turkey. They asked for figures and data about drinking water standards. We didn't give them these figures because we wanted to hide the fact that we weren't up to the proper standards. We just told them the water was alright and they wrote it down. Why do you think everybody in Istanbul buys water? At the place where you're staying now, you have running water in the house don't you?

Me: Yes.

PO: But you don't drink it do you? And when you go out, nobody in a restaurant would offer you tap water to drink do they?

Me: No.

PO: Well most of Istanbul's water comes from Ömerli reservoir. People bathe in it and use it for other things, but nobody drinks it.

Me: Are there any education programmes carried out by the Ministry of Environment within gecekondu areas for environmental protection?

PO: Not really. There's not enough money for that. One of the NGOs, called DHKD, have a small programme in the Ömerli area. It's a good one as far as I know, but it's not enough. There are just too many people and they don't really care about the environment. Let me be honest, the biggest problem this country faces is corruption. Everyone in government is just trying to make money and win votes for their own selfish reasons. Then there's the fundamentalists who want to gain power, and they'll give the people whatever they want to get their votes.

6.4 Interview with Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Official (MO) And Istanbul Chamber of Architects Representative (CA), Istanbul, 31 July 2001

Me: Who is responsible for planning around the Ömerli watershed area?

MO: The answer to that question is one of the keys to the problem. So many contradictions exist. The boundaries are all mixed up: we've got the Metropolitan boundary, but within this there is also the Sultanbeyli municipality and Ömerli municipality, and other independent municipalities in the area. Then there's some land there that's private, and other land that's owned by the state and administered by the Ministry of

Public Works. It's a mess. The Metropolitan Municipality has a master plan, but ISKI also has its own master plan which contradicts the municipality plan.

The 1994 Metropolitan Plan was geared towards conservation of the Ömerli basin. It allowed for small farm houses with big lands attached. The plan was shelved because there was an election coming up in 1995, and the plan would not have appealed to the *gecekondu* voters. After the election, the Islamic Welfare Party were successful. Most of the *gecekondu* are Islamic fundamentalists. They pressurised the mayors to stop implementation of the Metropolitan Plan. Then in 1995, ISKI introduced a new regulation. Before 1986 there was no regulation to protect the water or lands around Ömerli. So ISKI introduced a regulation for preservation of the watershed and low-density planning in the area. But after 1995, ISKI changed the regulation to allow for higher density settlement in the area. Instead of specifying the desirable limits of habitation and minimal pollution, the new regulations specify the maximum limits of habitation, and the maximum levels of pollution allowed in the water.

CA: The ISKI regulation specifies about 4 zones around the Ömerli reservoir. In the past, the second and third bands were highly protected areas where only low-density settlement was allowed. Let's face it, even in the 1980s the situation was getting bad, and *gecekondu* were building in these zones, but the 1995 regulation actually encourages building in the zones which are supposed to be preserved. So ISKI is no longer fulfilling its legal function, which is to protect the water reservoir, but it's changed its focus to protect the housing. When the Welfare Party came into power, ISKI employed its own environmental consultants who said it would be alright to build settlements in the protection zones. They did this with a view to making settlements for their Islamic supporters. They say environmentally friendly settlement in the water-basin is possible. But this just isn't true.

We brought a case against ISKI for introducing this regulation, and the court ruled in our favour. But now ISKI have re-proposed the same regulation dressed up in different language, and we're challenging it again in court. The problem is that whilst the cases go through the court, ISKI carries on doing what it wants to do and the *gecekondu* carry on building. The court takes so long to decide, and by the time it does, it's too late because the activity has already taken place.

MO: Legally, the Metropolitan Masterplan has more authority than the ISKI regulations; the latter should comply with the former. But they don't.

Me: Is there any cooperation or intervention from other authorities. For example, the SPO or the Ministry of Environment?

MO: No, not really any at all.

Me: Well then, at a more local level, aren't there incentives for the different municipalities to cooperate and plan together to protect the environment. For example, I've heard that some of the uncontrolled sewerage discharges from Sultanbeyli *gecekondu*

settlement seep into the water table and pollute the reservoir. Surely, this costs ISKI money because they have to then clean the water, and surely this affects the residents in surrounding municipalities?

CA: (laughter) There's no real incentive at all. Yes it costs some money to do a clean up. But there's more money to be had in continuing to build settlements. There's even a building mafia. Everything's run by some sort of corrupt mafia in Turkey. Mayors and politicians give building contracts to their friends, and they collect votes and money. It's more lucrative than protecting the environment.

Me: But what about the inhabitants themselves – is there no scope for getting them to realise the environmental impacts, eg on water quality?

CA: Water quality is of far less importance to them than making money. The *gecekondu* themselves make money out of building and selling apartments. If you go to Sultanbeyli there are thousands of empty buildings for sale. The *gecekondu* have built them for sale or for rent. There's a problem of property speculation and they've contributed to it. I have a cleaner who comes to me once a week. She's from a *gecekondu*. She tells me that her ambition is to build another property on her land and rent it out so that she doesn't have to work at cleaning anymore. No one in Turkey is interested in productive work any more. They all just want to get money coming in without having to do any work.

Me: But if they're poor people, how else are they supposed to earn a living?

CA: It's the government's fault. They have not planned or intervened to create opportunities for productive jobs. They've encourage property speculation themselves until it's become the major way of saving or making money. It's unsustainable. When poor people see the government being corrupt and making money without having to do productive work for it, they think to themselves, why shouldn't we do it to. A government should show leadership, and this government only sets the example of corruption.

Me: What scope is there for pressure groups, like the Chamber of Architects, gaining ground and increasing awareness, or effecting change?

CA: We've succeeded in court, but it's costly, and we're not a rich organisation. Many of us volunteer our time and effort. Going to court is expensive too, and the process is so long. We've protested so much about this particular issue that the Metropolitan Municipality now wants to draw up a new Metropolitan Plan, and they've invited us to participate along with other interest groups. The municipalities are not obliged in law to invite us or anyone to participate, so that's good. But I don't have confidence that they'll really listen to us. It's just to show that they can say they're listening. Democracy is more than just talking and listening: it's about transparency. The leaders have a responsibility to set an example in transparency, but they're only setting an example in how to be corrupt. Even the media doesn't investigate or challenge the government because

they're owned by the politicians. Did you know that 80% of the media is owned by two main groups? These people have big business interests, and to keep the government sweet, they'll write whatever will please government. Turkish society has become one that only knows how to take, not give.

6.5 Conversation with Ali Aydin (AA), Director Of State Hydraulics Works (DSI), Ankara, 27 July 2001

Me: What sort of planning input does the DSI have around Omeli?

AA: None. We did the initial planning and engineering for the reservoir, but once this was completed it was handed over to ISKI.

Me: During the initial planning, what environmental considerations were taken into account?

AA: At the time there was no EIA requirement. The Ömerli dam was built in 1972, and EIA was only made a requirement in 1993.

Me: So now that EIA is a requirement, how is it carried out – I mean, are there provisions relating to public participation?

AA: Yes, we consult a variety of stakeholders when we carry out the EIAs, including NGOs.

Me: Are there many NGOs in Turkey, and are they vocal within the EIA framework?

AA: There are hundreds of NGOs in Turkey. Anyone these days can call themselves an NGO, it's like a fashionable business. We invite them along and they make a lot of noise. They always make lots of noise. So we let them say what they like, but we don't really take any notice of them. If we and the Ministry of Environment think it's alright for a project to proceed, then the project proceeds.

Me: Who carries out the EIA?

AA: We do, or the companies proposing the projects.

Me: What sort of cooperation do you have with municipalities?

AA: We are civil servants and they are politicians with different interests.

Me: I understand that the DSI carries out water pollution testing – does it do so for water in the Ömerli reservoir?

AA: Yes.

Me: And what are the results of these tests – is the water clean?

AA: the water is fine, there are no pollution problems there. We keep a database on these computers with all the figures, and the results are all OK.

Me: Would it be possible for you to print out the Ömerli data for me?

AA: No, that would be too difficult for me to access.

6.6 Conversation with Irfan Aker (IA), Director of Private Water Engineering Company, Ankara, 27 July 2001

Me: Do you know anything about the environmental situation around the Ömerli reservoir?

AA: Not really. I know there are lots of gecekondu settlements there, but I've not had business dealings in that area. My company does engineering and construction works elsewhere.

Me: Does the government make you comply with any environmental standards before you build dams?

AA: We are obliged to carry out an EIA.

Me: And how much room is there within this process for the general public to participate and have their needs recognised?

AA: EIA is supposed to be about the environment. All the time, particularly from the international community, there is a pressure to move the goal posts. Now they're asking for "social assessments", for example when it comes to the building of the Ilisu Dam. It's all about politics and who suddenly gets a powerful voice. The international community have an agenda with the people living near Ilisu, so they decide to take up their cause. Now it's not an environmental issue, but they call it a human rights issue. There will always be people displaced when dams are built: other countries do it, including in Europe. But when Turkey does it, they put new demands on us.

As for the gecekondu problem that you're investigating, it's a problem with Turkey as a whole. People in Turkey don't want to work hard – they're used to subsidies and they just want handouts. Politicians are corrupt and will give them anything to get their votes. The gecekondu have a big voice because the politicians are on their side. So many politicians these days are uneducated, and officials are appointed not on the basis of knowledge or merit, but because they are put there by their friends: they represent the interests of the uneducated masses.

6.7 Interview with Oktay Ekinci (OE), Environmental Editor at Cumhuriyet Newspaper, Istanbul, 30 July 2001

Me: How do you perceive the problem of illegal settlement in relation to the environment around Ömerli reservoir?

OE: The gecekondu have been encouraged to settle illegally from the outset. Let me illustrate this with an example: in 1960 Suleyman Demirel was not yet a politician, he was an engineer. He wrote an article at that time in this well known engineering journal (*pulls out a photocopied article with Suleyman Demirel's name beside it and shows me*)...it says here that "these people are entrepreneurs and we have to back them". Of course, when Demirel came into power, he favoured the arrival of the gecekondu. You know the Turkish constitution says that everyone has the right to housing too.

The trouble is that there is no space left in the city for settlement, so the gecekondu are forced to go to water and forest areas. The official population of old Istanbul is 11 million, but it's really at least 15 million.

In the 1950s all the factories were in Anatolia, but this changed and now they're all in Istanbul or the

Marmara region. The real invasion of gecekondus came in 1985. Gecekondu literally means “landing over night”, but these are birds that land and never fly again! It was the 1984 gecekondu law which allowed for multi-storey gecekondu buildings. They built these multi-storeys with companies that are owned by the government. Some politicians own gecekondus. Now the gecekondus and rich people live in the same areas. It's not just the gecekondu, it's the rich people who are also building in the forest areas.

This year there's been another change in the law, and the government is selling title deeds to the gecekondu. ISKI is trying to sell the land around Ömerli to make it private property where people can build. But these areas should be the responsibility of the state. And foreign firms are allowed to set up factories wherever they want – the government allows them to get away with it. Take the Ford car plant in Izmit: it was right on the earthquake zone, and in forest land. But they must have paid the government to let them get away with building there.

The Ömerli case is not just about one issue, it's about the environmental, social and political factors. Turkey needs to take all of these things into account. There are some NGOs who are aware of this, and their voices are beginning to be heard.

6.8 Interview with Sultanbeyli Estate Agent (EA) (also a gecekondu resident), Sultanbeyli, 29 July 2001

The estate agent's office was a corrugated shipping container with windows. In the windows were Sultanbeyli properties advertised from between 200 – 500 million Turkish Lira (£100 - £250)

Me: What is service provision like in Sultanbeyli?

EA: Most of the properties here are serviced: they have electricity, water, telephones. Sometimes people don't have enough money to pay for the electricity bills and they get cut off. But it's easy to reapply and get connected when a household saves money to pay the bill.

Me: Where do most of Sultanbeyli's inhabitants come from, and what work are they engaged in?

EA: Most people here are from eastern Turkey, and they're mainly involved in the construction industry one way or another. That's what I did when I came here, and now I'm an estate agent.

Me: What's the population here?

EA: Official government figures say Sultanbeyli only has about 160,000 people, but the truth is there are about 350,000 people living here now.

Me: How can you sell houses here if they're illegal?

EA: It's easy. The municipality (Sultanbeyli) actually sells land renting rights to people – it costs 10 million Turkish Lira per year for a plot. Building on the land is a different matter and we don't have permission to do that. But people build on the land illegally anyway,

and the municipality provides the services anyway – a rubbish collection service comes round every week. People build here because they know that at election time they'll be given title to the land. It always happens, there's always an amnesty. People get to hear about it from their friends who are already living here, and they come to Sultanbeyli.

Me: Why doesn't the community plan for its needs in advance? For example, why doesn't the municipality lay the infrastructure before people build houses?

EA: Because people can't always pay initially. They save some money and wait, and once they have enough they apply for connections.

Me: Are there some houses which are not connected to the sewerage system?

EA: Yes there are some, and the sewage just gets thrown into the streets. I think this used to be a problem at the dam in Ömerli, but they've got a new cleaning plant and the problem is supposed to be reduced – over 70 percent of the water is clean now.

Me: How do the people voice their needs – are there community representatives who push the government to provide services?

EA: Yes. Our community representatives are the mosques. They have been very active in helping residents. But the government didn't like this and they recently closed down the mosques for two weeks. The Refah party (Islamic Welfare Party) is very popular here.

6.9 Interview with Leyla Suri (LS), Academic at Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, 1 August 2001

Me: What are the institutional issues that need to be addressed at Ömerli?

LS: The areas of responsibility are too dispersed between different agencies. There is nothing to take account of the scientific facts. The water basin is ecologically sensitive and not suitable for settlement. There needs to be an institution that takes account of this fact. Currently there is only a planning department that tries to draw up guidelines for settlement. But there needs to be a watershed council that takes into account the environmental, social, economic and legal facts. There also needs to be a mechanism for community consultation so that people are more likely to understand why building in these areas is unsuitable. We need more education on this subject. There should also be “watershed policemen” who enforce watershed planning rules.

Me: The SPO tries to take account of the environment within its Regional Planning system?

LS: The SPO don't have any legal powers – they can recommend but not enforce. And ISKI do whatever they please – they don't ask city planners or environmental experts for advice. I even offered them my PhD thesis which details the planning problems around Ömerli, but they didn't want to know.

The government encourages illegal settlement. There's been a recently proposed Forest law just last

month. It was proposed that the state should be able to sell forest land to private buyers in order to raise money for the treasury, because of Turkey's current financial crisis. This will be disastrous if it's allowed to go through.

The government needs to sort out the economy. It needs to have a plan for the whole country so that not everybody has to migrate to Istanbul.

7 ANNEX 2: EXTRACTS FROM “A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONALLY-IMPORTANT HEATHLANDS OF THE ÖMERLI RESERVOIR WATER CATCHMENT, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THEIR CONSERVATION”, 1999, BY TURKISH NGO, DOĞAL HAYATI KORUMA DENEGI (DHKD)

The province (Istanbul) covers just 511,000 hectares (5110 sq km), yet supports an amazing approximately 2000 species of plants – more than the total floras of the Netherlands or United Kingdom.

over 270 species are regarded as nationally rare, listed in the national Red List. Of these some 43 species are more abundant here than anywhere else on earth.

17 species listed on Appendix I of the Bern Convention, which places an obligation of Contracting Parties (such as Turkey) to take adequate and necessary measures to protect both the endangered species themselves, plus the habitats in which they live, and upon which they are reliant.

Conservation at Ömerli: a window of opportunities

Virtually all of the Ömerli Reservoir water catchment is of exceptional importance to nature conservation: only in the southern parts of the catchment has urban spread damaged this exceptional area.


However, the area in question is large: the area identified by DHKD as being of exceptional importance covers ***** hectares. The rationalise conservation action here, DHKD has identified four areas that merit particular conservation attention: these include (i) the wet peatland areas in the upper Bıçkıdere Valley (above the village the Bıçkıdere); (ii) the Pine-heaths of the elevated hill tops in the northern half of the site, and (iii) two large blocks of heathland in the southern half of

the water catchments. It is the latter areas that are the subject of this report.

DHKD believes that they should be formally protected as a matter of considerable urgency. A study on İstanbul's heathlands has indicated that between 85 and 90 % of the heaths have now been destroyed, largely within the past 30 years. Furthermore many of the surviving fragments are now so small or isolated, that it seems unlikely that they will maintain their full interests into the future.

It is all the more important that the two large areas of heathland south of Ömerli are protected. DHKD sees many advantages to the protection of these areas, over and above the direct nature conservation benefits. These include:

- protection of the water quality within Ömerli Reservoir
[Ömerli represents the largest water supply reservoir in Asian İstanbul, and is critical to the supply of water to the citizens of the city. It is essential that no further housing is permitted within the water catchment. Maintenance of the natural vegetation within the catchment represents the best way of limiting soil erosion and pollution into the lake.
- the high landscape values of the reservoir, lying in its natural setting of heathland, means that it is of considerable value as a potential green area for İstanbul's citizens, if their activities could be regulated to ensure the maintenance of water quality within the lake.
- the area has much to offer in terms of environmental education. Education centres, combined with nature trails would provide enormous benefits to the city's school children
- PR: in setting up a nature reserve here, İSKİ could become the first to declare a private (ie non-statutory) nature reserve in Turkey. Such an opening would generate considerable media interest.



8 Annex 3: Some Indicators of Segregation in Istanbul Districts

Districts ^a	Population (1997)	Rate of Pop Increase (1990 –1997), %	Development Index ^b	Education Level of Incoming Pop, % ^c	Results of the last election (1999), % ^d		
					Central Left	Central	Right
Central Districts							
Besiktas	202 783	0.765	2.384	43.1	40.7	25.6	9.5
Bakirkoy +	1 523 310	1.957	2.194	32.0	37.6	29.8	10.4
Kadikoy	699 379	1.084	2.070	42.9	39.4	22.1	15.1
Sisli	257 049	0.370	1.737	33.6	36.6	21.2	15.9
Eminonu	65 246	-3.514	1.727	17.1	18.1	15.8	24.3
Beyoglu	231 826	0.175	1.546	20.4	28.3	15.1	26.3
Fatih	432 590	-0.954	1.483	23.5	27.1	19.3	27.3
Peripheral Districts							
Beykoz	193 067	2.350	1.570	12.9	27.0	21.1	28.2
Kartal +	842 646	4.579	1.538	18.1	34.2	13.2	27.1
Umraniye	498 952	7.208	1.388	19.2	27.7	12.8	31.2
Pendik +	433 734	5.475	1.273	12.9	30.8	12.4	32.3
Gaziosmanpasa	649 648	7.156	1.182	7.9	31.0	14.6	33.0
Kagithane	317 238	2.354	1.122	12.2	28.2	14.8	30.0
Zeytinburnu	228 786	4.610	1.000	13.3	28.6	17.4	25.8

^a Districts indicated with + were divided into new districts at 1990 census. 1990 district borders were used as basis for 1997 calculations for population and rate of population increase.

^b Index calculated by State Institute of Statistics in 1995, and is based on weighted average of household income distribution – 1 is lowest and 3 highest level of development.

^c % of population with high school and higher education.

^d Groups of political parties that collected the majority of votes and are influential in national and city politics.

Table 2: Some indicators of segregation in Istanbul districts (table taken from Erkip, 2000)

9 Annex 4: Plates



Plate 4: Sultanbeyli – a sprawling gecekondu in the Omerli waterbasin (29/07/01)



Plate 5: Sultanbeyli CBD (02/08/01)



Plate 6: Property speculation in Sultanbeyli; newly constructed houses empty and for sale (02/08/01)



Plate 7: Sultanbeyli: settlement on edge of forest, with evidence of infrastructure provision (02/08/01)

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The Aybay Foundation has useful background on all aspects of Turkish law online at: [www.aybay.org.tr/index_e.html]

ENDNOTES

¹ "If furniture movers regularly advertise at the time many leases expire, this uniformity is determined by self-interest. If a salesman visits certain customers on particular days of the month or the week, it is either a case of customary behaviour or a product of self-interested orientation. However, when a civil servant appears in his office daily at a fixed time, he does not act only on the basis of custom or self-interest which he could disregard if he wanted to; as a rule, his action is also determined by the validity of an order (*viz* the civil service rules), which he fulfils partly because disobedience would be disadvantageous to him but also because its violation would be abhorrent to his sense of duty (of course, in varying degrees)" (Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, quoted in Giddens, 1971)

² More recently in the UK, however, public consultation is the norm. See for example, consultation documents produced prior to the introduction of the UK Climate Change Levy by the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions: www.hmce.gov.uk/notices/cc-levy.htm

³ see for example Braadbaart, 1995

⁴ Today there exists a duality between centralisation and decentralisation in the two-tiered local government structure: provincial governors and district heads are appointed by central government, whilst local mayors and the municipal councils are elected.

⁵ Terminology used in the Preamble to the Turkish Constitution.

⁶ Turkish Constitution: Chapter Two: Economic Provisions:

I. Planning

ARTICLE 166. The planning of economic, social and cultural development, in particular the speedy, balanced and harmonious development of industry and agriculture throughout the country, and the efficient use of national resources on the basis of detailed analysis and assessment and the establishment of the necessary organisation for this purpose are the duties of the state.

Measures to increase national efficiency and production, to ensure stability in prices and balance in foreign trade transactions, to promote investment and employment, shall be included in the plan; investments, public benefit and requirements shall be taken into account; the efficient use of resources shall be aimed at. Development activities shall be realised according to this plan.

The procedure and principles governing the preparation of development plans, their approval by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, their implementation and their revision, and the prevention of amendments liable to affect the unity of the plan shall be regulated by law.

⁷ For analysis of recent Turkish party politics, see Carkoğlu (1998)

⁸ Research has shown that industrial labourers choose to live close to the industries which employ them, in order to avoid high transportation and housing costs: A 1997 survey carried out by ICI in Istanbul showed that 51.5% of labourers working in medium and large scale manufacturing industries lived within 5km of the workplace, 26.7% lived within 6-10km, 11.3% within 11-15km and 6.7% within 16-20km (Ocakci, 2000).

⁹ Eg some plots around Istanbul that sold for 50 Turkish Liras per square metre in 1949 had risen to 50,000 Turkish Liras in 1965 (Baharoğlu, 1996). These figures do not, however, give an indication of the inflation rate at the time.

¹⁰ By 1980, the tenancy ratio was estimated at around 50% (*Ibid*)

¹¹ According to one author (Keles & Geray, 1995) the state's attempts to create inexpensive accommodation 'could not compete with free (invaded) land, given the squatters' belief that they would not be dislodged'.

¹² The first amnesty law legalising irregular settlements was enacted in 1949. Others followed in 1953, 1963, 1966, 1976, 1983, 1984, and 1990 (Bugra, 1998).

¹³ Most *gecekondu* owners hold some sort of property title to land: 45.3% have a regular property title, 25.8% hold shared title deeds, and 8.6% have acquired a government certificate that will eventually entitle them to formal legal ownership of their house; 20.3% have no titles (Bugra, 1998)

¹⁴ The possible underestimation of these figures must be borne in mind, given the estimated population of between 170,000 and 350,000 for Sultanbeyli alone

¹⁵ Figures for the 1997 census showed Sultanbeyli's population to be 144,932 (see ISKI web-site at: www.iski.gov.tr/faaliyet/fr_eng/111.htm); however, the UNDP in 1995 put the figure at 169,999 (see UNDP web-site at: www.un.org/Depts/unsd/demog/792.htm); it is believed that both of these are underestimates and that the real figure is somewhere closer to 350,000.

¹⁶ Author visit to Sultanbeyli, 29 July and 2 August 2001

¹⁷ See Annex 1:7.8 for interview carried out on 29 July 2001

¹⁸ For comparative service provision figures see ISKI web-site at [www.iski.gov.tr/faaliyet/fr_eng/111.htm]

¹⁹ I visited Ömerli reservoir on 29 July 2001

²⁰ Interview conducted during field visit to Sultanbeyli on 29 July 2001. See Annex 1: 7.8 for interview.

²¹ conducted on 24 July 2001: see Annex 1:7.1

²² see Annex 2 for some details of native species present in Ömerli heathlands, provided by Turkish NGO, Dogal Hayati Koruma Denegi (DHKD), 1999.

²³ cited from the Turkish Municipalities web-site at: [www.ibb.gov.tr/]

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- ²⁴ The 1999 OECD Environmental Performance Review states that “evaluation of sectoral investments by the SPO is not in full compliance with environmental priorities”
- ²⁵ Lack of information on this subject constitutes a gap in the research: my own searches failed to yield any documentation or references pertaining to the ministry’s activities in the Ömerli region, and failure to secure an interview with this ministry left this gap unfilled.
- ²⁶ Interview with SPO conducted on 27 July 2001: see Annex 1: 7.2
- ²⁷ Interview with Ministry of Environment conducted on 27 July 2001: see Annex 1: 7.3
- ²⁸ Interview with ISKI conducted on 24 July 2001: see Annex 1: 7.1
- ²⁹ Interview with an official from the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and a member of the Istanbul Chamber of Architects conducted on 31 July 2001: See Annex 1: 7.4
- ³⁰ see Annex 1: 7.4
- ³¹ ISKI are not the only authority to blame the municipality for allowing illegal construction: major flooding which occurred in Istanbul in 1997 led to the DSI complaining that “when the municipalities draw up their building plans, they don’t listen to our views on these matters. As a result they do whatever they want, and it’s a risk” (*Turkish Daily News*, November 1997).
- ³² ISKI interview, 24 July 2001: see Annex 1:7.1
- ³³ author visit to Ömerli reservoir, 29 July 2001
- ³⁴ see [www.iski.gov.tr/faaliyet/fr_eng/111.htm]
- ³⁵ some figures have, however, been compiled by the State Institute for Statistics showing development disparities between those living in Istanbul’s central districts and those living in the periphery, many of which will be *gecekondular*. See Annex 3 for details.
- ³⁶ on the Islamic influence in Sultanbeyli, see for example [www.cnn.com/WORLD/9707/10/turkey.Islamic.culture]
- ³⁷ interview with the SPO, 27 July 2001: see Annex 1: 7.2
- ³⁸ Interview with Sultanbeyli estate agent, 29 July 2001: see Annex 1: 7.8
- ³⁹ Interview with SPO, 27 July 2001: see Annex 1: 7.2
- ⁴⁰ Interview with DSI, 27 July 2001: see Annex 1: 7.5
- ⁴¹ Interview with Ministry of Environment, 27 July 2001: see Annex 1: 7.3
- ⁴² see, for example, [www.cemalmutlu.com/english/projects/ayvali_gral.htm] or [www.akfen.com/tr/akfen/en/gnl/istirak.htm], or [www.projeyonetim.com/ing-yw/references/urban.asp]
- ⁴³ In January 1997, for example, thousands of Turks took to the streets in protest at a major corruption scandal that had hit the country: a fatal car crash in the city revealed a trunk full of weapons, and the dead passengers were a prominent politician, a hit man, and a criminal involved in money laundering. See [www.Hartford.hwp.com/archives/51/021.html]
- ⁴⁴ Interview with Istanbul Chamber of Architects, 31 July 2001: see Annex 1: 7.4