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From false dawns to new beginnings: A tale of urban revolutions past, present and future

Tim Wickson

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Development Planning Unit | The Bartlett | University College London
34 Tavistock Square - London - WC1H 9EZ
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 1111 - Fax: +44 (0)20 7679 1112 - www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/dpu

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Tim Wickson
timwickson@gmail.com

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Abstract

First drafted in 2012, this DPU working paper concerns the past, present and future potential of urban revolutions. Writing from the privileged position of a "prophet who looks back" (Galeano, 1973/2009, p.8) this paper first assesses the contemporary urban condition through the eyes of the 1960s idealists; establishing the 1968 revolutions, and Sartre's death knell of colonial dependency structures as a false dawn in the quest for the socially just city. Thereafter the paper concerns itself with unpacking neo-liberal ideology as a pervasive counter revolution committed to fragmenting opposing voices, yet systemically incapable of wrecking total distraction on the potential to revolt; before turning to the future potential of urban based revolution movements.

Riding on the bandwagon of global Occupy movements and early Arab Spring optimism, this paper puts forward a case for reconnecting the disciplines of history and development in order to further the cause of progressive urban change. The work champions an awareness of past betrayals, together with a commitment to "agonist in pluralism" (Mouffe, 2000) as a route forward for those interested in connecting the ninety-nine per cent.

Frequently drawing on sources from popular culture, and ending with a word from Gotham City, the paper ranges broadly across space and time, offering snippets of case material from historic and contemporary cities in both the global North and South.

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1. Introduction

"Are we obliged to kneel before one of these two altars?" (Galeano, 1998, p.318).

This rhetorical question, posed by Galeano in his book Upside Down: A Primer for the Looking Glass World, describes an artificial binary that shields neo-liberalism from critical reappraisal. In the post-Cold-War political landscape, to oppose neo-liberal, capitalist policy is to declare allegiance to a radical, and thus potentially dangerous, other. This conjuring trick, arguably sharpened further still by the events of 9/11, has underpinned the spontaneous consensus necessary to support neo-liberalism's ongoing dispossession project (Palma, 2009).

In order for a more socially just[1] future to emerge (Harvey, 1988; Young, 1990; Fainstein, 2010), such binaries must be unsettled (Varley, 2002). Today, to quote Sassen (2012b), inequality is reaching excesses "beyond exclusion", creating the frightening prospect, indeed reality, of "social expulsion"; and thus, more than ever before, there is a need to consider a third altar. Whether one sees this as the pursuit of just socialism without the sacrifice of freedom or free capitalism without the sacrifice of justice (Galeano, 1998, p.318) is a matter of some debate; but it is to this possible emergence that this paper turns.

Considering today's tomorrow through the eyes of yesterday, 2012 represents a stran-ge juncture in World History. It is a world in which the face of Karl Marx, a man famed for prophesising capitalisms inevitable demise.

'What the bourgeoisie…produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.' (Marx & Engels, 1848/2004).

– and for implicating debt as the bedfellow to capital accumulation (Marx, 2008), now adorns a German issue of MasterCard (Jeffries, 2012). If the collapse of the Berlin Wall marked the death of the Communist ideal then surely this represents capitalism dancing on its grave! Although perhaps such imagery is misleading, falling as it does dangerously inline with Fukuyama's (1989) End of History rhetoric at a time that thinkers such as Badiou (2012) have dubbed The Rebirth of History[2].

The present social, political and economic climate is one of intense global turmoil. Mention only the Arab Spring; the London Riots; the Euro Zone Crisis; and Occupy movements and the subconscious constructs the canvas of today. Indeed, it is this tumult that inspired this paper to return to the unrest of the 1960s when theorists, similarly captivated by endemic social movements, last projected such a tipping-point. Then, voices heralded the death of both communism and capitalism, and, for Malraux[3] at least, of God (Steinfels, 2008). Idealist eyes looked forward to a future of unbounded potential and *"Imagination in Power"* (in Jones, 2006, pp.523-524). Indeed, emerging at the tail-end of a decade in which Sartre (1961/2001), in his controversial, reductionist preface to Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, had already announced the inevitable demise of colonialism's exploitative dependency dynamics:

"Fanon speaks out loud…our [colonial nations'] methods are out-of-date; they can sometimes delay emancipation, but not stop it" (Sartre, 1961/2001, pp.10-11).

– the idealists of 1968 saw themselves as architects of a new future liberated from the *"society of the spectacle"* (Jones, 2006, pp.523-524).

However, looking back from the tomorrow of Marx-MasterCards, a Muscovite Macdonalds and Hello-Kitty-everything, in the face of ever-multiplying chains and cages of exploitation (Galeano, 1973/2009), such enthusiasm appears misplaced, naïve even, and the 1960s lost to history as a decade of false prophets and false dawns. Yet, that these revolutionary moments failed to turn does not render them unimportant. On the contrary, this paper positions itself in defence of history, re-examining such moments and establishing the position that the revolution towards a more socially just city (Harvey, 1988; Young, 1990; Fainstein, 2010), free from colonial-esque dependency dynamics, remains alive but, in its attempt to progress beyond intellectual/theoretical realms and to become socially, politically and spatially real, under siege and unrealised.

From this position, the paper focuses on questioning how the assailing forces of capital interest were able to reassert themselves, considering those new and improved structures of control/domination that have underpinned a neo-liberal project of unparalleled inequality and rampant capital-extraction (Palma, 2009; Sassen, 2012a, 2012b). Here it is argued that neo-liberalism is best conceptualised as a "counter-revolution" (Palma, 2009, p.838) against welfarism; a re-adaptation of old-tricks, and a conjuring of new ones, that reclaimed power by

extending many of the excesses and methods associated with colonialism into an intra-city environment. Today, the success of this project can be measured by the fact that the chains and cages of exploitation have reached such ubiquity that their absence has become symptomatic not of freedom but of disconnection. As Hirst (in Fiori, 2011) notes wryly, today sub-Saharan Africa cannot even afford the "luxury" of exploitation in the global economy. Indeed, could not the same be said of America's surplus tent-city populations, increasingly foreclosed from the system? In 2012 an individual with no debts is no longer considered virtuous, they are thought extraterrestrial: "Whoever does not owe, does not exist" (Galeano, 1998, p.247). This section, influenced by the work of Palma (2009; 2011) and Harvey (2003; 2005), draws attention to the impact of fear-controlled fragmentation (economic, spatial and socio-political as all exist in a relationship of mutual reinforcement) in maintaining the constructed neo-liberal hegemony (Body-Gendrot, 2007; Salecl, 2011).

Finally this paper will look forward to the potential for new dawns to emerge from today's crises (both utopian and dystopian), constructing a case concerning the importance of expanding the scope of urban social movements beyond narrow, sectional class signifiers. This is argued as a fundamental precondition for the creation of a collective urban consciousness, reflective of urban diversity and powerful enough to reconnect the fragmented ninety-nine per cent and rekindle the potential for change lost in the post-1968 malaise. The capitalist model has long rested on extracting capital, and thus power, from the backs of a disposable majority; this connection, if it is to be delinked, will only be challenged by the politics of numbers (Harvey, 2012b).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. A notion understood as possessing both distributive and institutional dimensions (Young, 1990).
2. A title itself problematic by the tacit admission that history died in the first place.
3. French Minister for Cultural Affairs, 1959-69.

2. On the question of why the city?

"Cities have become strategic spaces for the implementation of neoliberal logic"

(Fezer, 2010)

Before continuing it is first important to address the question, Why the City?

Taking Lefebvre's (1970/2003) conceptualisation, the late twentieth-century witnessed an erosion of distinct rural identities as transport and communication revolutions contracted and reimagined spatial connections and disconnections. Although neither entirely new as a phenomenon, nor one precluding to the possibility of exceptions, the fact remains that, as the twenty-first-century unfurls, Roy (2011) and others are fully vindicated in announcing this the "*urban century*". Thus, as our condition becomes increasingly defined by our urbanity, it is interesting to consider the existence of intra-urban-dependencies, questioning how uneven-geographies of development, too often misconstrued as a solely urban-rural or international phenomenon, are spatially manifested within cities themselves.

However, the importance of the urban to this paper runs deeper, when one considers the interplay between the City's long-standing relationship with both capital and democracy. Of the former, Harvey (2008, p.24) describes urbanisation as "a class phenomenon"; since the process "depends on the mobilisation of a surplus product" and capitalism depends on the production and reinvestment of *"a surplus product in order to produce surplus value".* Of the latter, Borja (2010, p.30) is equally categorical:

"The city is…the soil in which democracy lives, progresses and responds to new challenges. Without the city, the place that maximizes exchanges between people, democracy loses its strength to create…futures and promote…actions."

Demonstrating a certain irony, cities exist as both the spatial manifestation of capital's triumph, and also as bastions of democracy and cradles of resistance. For Castells (1985, p.2), if the key question ant stake is who creates societal rules, then the game being played is unquestionably an urban one. In a world in which "capitalist leaders treat daily [urban] life as they once treated the colonised territories" – exploiting "the dominated [dually] in their capacity as producers and consumers" (Lefebvre in Miller, 2008), privatising space and as a result foreclosing opportunities for democratic exchange – Lefebvre was right to insist that the revolution *"has to be urban, in the broadest sense of that term, or nothing at all"* (paraphrased in Harvey, 2008, p.40). It is in city-spaces that the gauntlet is most visibly thrown-down, and it is there that it must be universally picked up.

Though consciously urban, this paper has not restricted itself to the consideration of evidence from a pre-given category of city. Instead it roams freely across the conventional North/South divide. This decision was influenced by a growing trend within the literature towards destabilising, problematizing, and contesting reductionist binary definitions (Varley, 2002). For contextualisation, one only has to consider Roy's (2003, p.474) criticism of how American academics, and indeed politicians, transplant their specific brand of propertied citizenship onto diverse global stages. This decision, she argues, is based on misconception, and engenders an irrational fear of Southern cities, confusing visually variable manifestations for alien processes.

"American cities [may be relatively]…free of the populist volatility of squatting[4] *and other forms of informality, but they are fraught with the humiliation of homelessness."*

Whilst it has long been a popular parlour-game for development writers to present ghastly descriptions of life, consciously stripped of geographic and temporal indicators, in order to trick the reader into second guessing the location as Kinshasa, or Dhaka, before unveiling the source as Risorgimento Naples (in Davis, 2007) or turn-of-the-century New York (in Roy, 2004), notionally blurring the north/south divide, there is an inherent danger to this approach. That being, it has the potential to feed a logic which explains immiseration away by simply placing developing nations a few decades back along a linear, teleological timeline, and consequently still "on course to win eventually" (Glennie, 2012).

Moreover this approach neglects direct, current parallels that might be drawn between societies irrespective of geography. Is Fernando Meirelles' City of God (2002) not a Brazilian equivalent of David Simon's The Wire (2002-2008)? Perhaps a flippant example, and certainly both are problematic for identifying subject communities

extensively *“with their worst configurations”* (Caldeira, 2011, p.174), but both are also grounded in a material reality of unequal intra-urban development and social injustice, featuring criminalised informality, dependencies, and racial segregation.

Similarly, Ward’s (2004, pp.265-66) study of informal housing production at the urban-rural interface between Texas and Mexico also supports this point. Illustrating how, for those earning less than twenty-thousand dollars per year, in a nation of increasingly low-incomes and systemic inequality, Colonias (“quasi-formal homestead subdivisions”) are becoming more and more prevalent in the US – very much “urban informality in the era of liberalisation”.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

4. Written before the explosion of Tent-Cities.

3. False dawns

> "History is a prophet who looks back: because of what was, and against what was, it announces what will be."
>
> (Galeano, 1973/2009, p.8).

Through adding the caveat – and against what was – Galeano liberates history from being considered as a mere story of teleological progress and introduces the potential to reconfigure the discipline as a pluralist tale of "shattered expectations" (Habermas in Quarles van Ufford, Giri & Mosse, 2003, p.21). Indeed, such a conceptualisation of history, considered in combination with the Foucauldian understanding of history as the attempt to "cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning" (in ibid.), allows the discipline to evade its Whiggish prison and unleash creative "less absolutist ways of overcoming the limitations of a particular situatedness" (ibid. p.22). So inspired, this section concerns the history of two false dawns occurring in the 1960s, events which bookended a decade of such moments, and is justified on the grounds that only through understanding the hopes and dreams of such periods can one truly understand the fearful reality of the present. The two moments in question are Jean Paul Sartre's (1961/2001) premature announcement of colonialism's, and neo-colonialism's inevitable demise; and the 1968 urban revolution that failed to turn.

Looking to the first, Sartre's (ibid. pp.10-11) influential preface not only depicted Fanon as the herald of colonialism's undoing but went so far as to dismiss neo-colonialism as a mere "idle dream of mother countries", irrelevant in a world "wide-awake" to colonial "falsehoods". His words drew a line in the sand. Here, in 1961, colonialism was on its knees. His conviction was tangible, and yet, a little more than fifty-years on, the hand of Europe – which might now be read as the hand of capitalism given the emergence of new, extra-European, neo-imperialist players and Marx's understanding of colonialism as a key phase of capitalist accumulation[5] – remains locked to the throat of the marginalised.

Evidence presented by Sassen (2012a) in her work on "social expulsion" (a new stage beyond exclusion) contains frightening echoes of colonial excess. Between 2005 and 2010 over seventy-million hectares of land were bought by foreign governments and transnational-firms in developing countries triggering rampant exploitation and expulsions. '"W]hen China buys 2.8 million hectares of land in Zambia to grow palm for bio-fuels, it evicts whole villages and smallholder agricultural systems" (ibid.). Similarly, in post-earthquake Port Au Prince, where "tarp-covered structures" continue to remind all of the nation's crawling recovery (Ferreira, 2012), the acquisition of land (conspicuously absent for recovery and resettlement efforts) by companies such as Sae-A (South-Korea) mirrors colonial land grabs in all but name. Such companies now profit from "duty-free access to the US market, a captive labour force of 70% unemployment and labour costs competitive with China" (Doucet, 2012). Indeed, media outlets around the world are busy announcing the Scramble for Africa 2.0 with the traditional European protagonists now joined, and in fact often led by the USA, China and, in an example of tragic systemic replication, even India. The example of the USA, who "succeeded so well" in catching-up Europe as to become "a monster, in which the taints, the sickness and the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions" (Fanon, 1961/2001, p.252), has many disciples.

Moreover, the out-dated methods Sartre (1961/2001) previously dismissed as redundant, have been reinvigorated, facilitating an increasing delocalisation of dependency dynamics, and the encroachment of oppressive/exploitative master-servant (Hegel, 1807/1979) relations into the relationship between the wealthy and the poor[6] and the formal and the informal[7] at all scales; from global, through national, and into urban. As Monsiváis (in Galeano, 1998, p.29) writes:

"The world carries on: the injustice that rules between countries is reproduced within each country… year after year the gap between those who have everything and those who have nothing widens."

The image of Sao Paulo depicting "swimming pools that overlook streets with no sewers" (Caldeira, 2011, pp.172-173), now somewhat clichéd, finds its equivalent in almost all global cities. Some of which one might expect, Mumbai for instance is an oft-used example, Cape Town another, but others, like Las Vegas, that one might not. Indeed, of the latter, O'Brien's (2007) Beneath the Neon depicts a literal underworld beneath Sin City, recounting a tale

of endemic homelessness, inequality, addiction and violence, worthy of Frank Millar (1993) himself, played out in storm-drains below the Strip. Contrary to Sartre's assertion (1961/2001, pp.10-11) it appears that "our Machiavellianism" retains much "purchase" and the "tin-pot bourgeoisie that colonialism placed in the saddle" continue to fiddle whilst inequality burns on.

Dependency theory – long considered a dirty-word within a mainstream development discourse committed to promulgating a worldview in which "we are all on course to win eventually" (Glennie, 2012) – may have rebranded, trading in its embarrassment of slave-ships for more discrete fleets of informal sub-contracting chains, but the fundamental dynamics remain unchanged, and the extraction of wealth from the marginalised for the betterment of a minority elite continues apace.

Between nations – as can be seen in Davis' (2007, p.178) investigation into Wal-Mart's penetration, via informal sub-contracting networks, "deep into the misery of the colonias and chawls" of Latin America, illustrating the continued spatial-disconnect between areas of production and areas of profit collection – within nations – in Chile, Galeano (1998, p.250) notes that the "hundred richest Chileans earn more in a year than the entire state budget for social services"; whilst in the US Sassen (2012a) documents the current rash of foreclosures (amounting 9.3million between 2005 and 2010, of which 7.2million have resulted in eviction) as announcing a transition beyond exclusion and into the realm of systemic expulsion – and within cities – today, New York's top one per cent accumulate on average US$3.7 million per-annum whilst fifty per cent of the population, all of them contributing in varying degrees of directness, to said accumulation, live on less than US$20,000 (Harvey, 2012c) – dependency dynamics retain healthy vital-statistics.
These dynamics – perhaps best described by Galeano (1973/2009, p.2)

"For those who see history as a competition…backwardness and poverty are merely the result of…failure. We lost, others won. But the winners happen to have won thanks to our losing…Underdevelopment is…an integral part of the history of world capitalism's development."

– not only remain the history of most developing nations but, reading the global economy through Harvey's (2003; 2005) theoretical lens of "accumulation by dispossession", are the present and future of today's foreclosure generation worldwide.

This paper now turns to the dampened fires of 1968 and the urban revolution that failed to turn.
"Power is weak – it's up to us to change it" (in Kugelberg & Vermés, 2011, p.240).

Read alongside accounts of camaraderie that traversed "economical, social and racial lines" (ibid. p.15), such phrases, daubed boldly across a "rebels' drawing board" of posters and graffitied walls (Jones, 2006, pp.523-524), seem at first to reinforce Sartre's prophecy that conventional power was indeed coming to a close. For a short time, ideas "with the potency to last a lifetime and change it forevermore" (Kugelberg, 2011, p.15) were on; the television – "government in the living-room" (Jones, 2006, pp.523-524) – was off. Imagination, it seemed, had a chance to enter the corridors of Power.

Indeed such optimism was fired by the spread of solidarity movements. From Paris, playing to its historic role as an infectious revolutionary epicentre – *"When Paris sneezes, Europe catches cold"* (Austrian Chancellor Metternich, in Davis, 1997) – the 1968 spirit decamped to cities across the globe from Berkeley to Berlin to Tokyo (Fink, Gassert and Junker, 1998) forcing diverse societies into a rare moment of cross-class introspection of capitalist societal values. A window of opportunity, through which a vision of alternative futures and a *"sense that it might really be possible to escape the ruts of history and create something…new"* (Steinfels, 2008), glimmered.

In Paris, 1968 was the 1871 Commune of its time. First initiated by student demands for increased decision-making powers in a bureaucratised, quasi-authoritarian society, the movement combined explosively with police brutality, and spread like wildfire through French society, ultimately triggering a General Strike of Solidarity. Here, Parisians had made a stand. They had claimed back the city that they had built and, in so doing, reclaimed their right to revision themselves and their world[8]. For Lefebvre, the great theoretician of 1968, urbanisation should have meant "valorising social reproduction and everyday life over technocratic and normalizing measures" (in Boudreau, 2007), and in May of that year these ideas abounded. The "Fault in Reality", read one slogan, cannot be adjusted on your television set (in Miller, 2008), for many it seemed that the society of the spectacle had been exposed and the age of Métro, boulot, dodo (Metro, Office, Bed) was nearing its curtain call.

However, forty-four years on, the ideals of 1968 seem to have left little more than a residue on the urban environment. This is not to say that 1968 achieved nothing. Such a reading fundamentally misinterprets the role played by those hot months in eventually felling De Gaulle's administration, but rather that, from a revolutionary perspective, "the unions and the left-wing political parties sold their own brothers and sisters down the river, requesting bigger cages and longer chains instead of seizing [the] power" (Kugelberg, 2011, p.15) necessary to reshape the city (spatially and politically) in the interest of social justice. This, for Kugelberg (ibid.), represents "the grand cop-out of the

May 1968 heritage". Alliances of commonality were paid-off, and fragmented through manipulation.

Consider the Parisian riots of 2005 in Clichy-sous-Bois, and of 2007 in Val-d'Oise and ask, what has changed? The disempowered remain outside of the City's light – excluded socially, economically and, courtesy of a Haussmannised class segregation structure, spatially, to the ghettoised limits of Paris. The police remain under a cloud of accused brutality; and the powers-at-be remain unwilling to broach questions of social deprivation, indeed crisis. Instead they prefer to invent compound words such as "thugocracy" (former President Sarkozy in Moore, 2007) and paper-tigers to explain away unrest without delivering costly reforms. Yesterday's Communists are today's Islamic Fundamentalists. Even if Jones (2006, pp.524-525) is right to interpret the narrowness of Giscard d'Estaing's 1974 electoral victory over the socialist Mitterrand as evidence of a 1968 "mood for change" legacy, this mood was nonetheless left unrealised. More revealingly, 2002 witnessed a far-right candidate nominated as "second choice in the first round of the presidential elections" (Body-Gendrot, 2007, pp.354-355), and today the Front National membership grows ominously.

Moreover, globally, the society of the spectacle remains entrenched – justifying Jones' (2006, pp.523-524) final analysis that the "unclassifiable" 1968 represented confirmation of a societal commitment to "consumerist materialism" (with striking-workers bought-off with wage increases) rather than its overthrow. "Pacification by cappuccino" as Zukin (in Harvey, 2008, pp.31-32) would call it. Writing about Chile, Moulian (in Galeano, 1998, p.249) warns that "everyday culture has come to revolve around symbols of consumption: appearance as the essence of personality, artifice as the way of life". A point illustrated by Cooper's (ibid. p.250) description of "imposters in the paradise of consumption". These include those individuals who stroll Chilean supermarket aisles parading carts stacked with expensive products before abandoning them "without buying so much as a stick of gum" (ibid.). Similarly, suburban-sprawl – that "soulless" consumption-orientated mode of living, vehemently opposed by the American 1968 contingent (Harvey, 2012a, p.10) – has rolled on reaching the exurbian nightmares lyricised by Arcade Fire in their third Album The Suburbs:

'I feel like I've been living in
A city with no children in it
A garden left for ruin by a millionaire inside of a private prison' (City With No Children, 2010, Track_6).

Even the memory of those days – although still plundered for political currency – has faded from revolution to movement and is now dismissed by the right as a mere event (Erlanger, 2008). Silenced are the calls for utopian urban, social reform, drowned by a milieu of voices writing the happenings off as a hormonally induced, Freudian rebellion against parental control. An explanation with worrying echoes of Missoffe's, the then Minister of Youth and Sport, advice to student-leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit that his protest was born of sexual-deviance and that he should cool-off in the pool (Seidman, 2004).

Whilst chapter three will position neo-liberalism as the chief assailant of the urban revolution, it is worth remembering that the decline of the 1960s' urban social revolutions was arguably hastened by inherent internal contradictions. Movement leaders, often left-wing-militants convinced by notions of the Party, failed to comprehend the destructive force exerted by the programmatic/political dimension, triggering fragmentation. For Castells (1985, p.12) such social movements are best understood as "reactive utopias" able to pose necessary questions but unable to answer them; transformational in civil society but often neutralised by entry into the political dimension. Neo-liberalism in contrast consciously asks fewer questions whilst offering tantalising solutions to existing powers, albeit that these have recently exposed as a house-of-cards.

In combination, these moments position this paper. Empire, in its territorial expression, may be a "failed nineteenth-century project" – born of "Great Powers… in competition' seeking to 'maximise… acquisitions, often without economic logic" (Hirst, 2005, pp.46-47) – but the dialectical master-servant (Hegel, 1807/1979) relationships of dependency at the heart of colonial endeavours have survived, adopting new faces and embedding themselves within the urban fabric. Such social relationships, for this is ultimately what dependency is (Castells, 1983), can be traced between modern investment bankers and their informal domestic-helpers, and between Wal-Mart and their informal, Latin-American subcontractors (Davis, 2007).

The existence of modern dependent cities – understood in the Castellian (1983, p.212) sense as: "a city where most workers must themselves take care of a substantial proportion of the reproduction of their labour power; where to do so, the state must disregard its own institutional rules; [and] where to obtain such a tolerance squatters must find powerful protectors on whom to depend" – poses a number of interesting questions.

Why is urban space produced by its dwellers "as if they were not the producers of such a space, but the temporary builders of their master's hacienda" (ibid.)? Why is "social segregation" more powerful "than legal integration" (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p.145)? Why, even after Lefebvre

(ibid. p.21) spoke against the "colonisation of the urban space" by "the spectacle of objects", are billionaires such as Bloomburg and Simm colonising planning offices and public purses, and bending cities to the whim of capital? And, the question that preoccupies Palma (2009, p.842), how is it possible that the American Dream has been "hi-jacked by a tiny minority" who now only lease it out on credit? It is to such questions that this paper now turns.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

5. "The colonial system ripened trade and navigation...The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement and murder flowed back to the mother country and were turned into capital there" (Marx in O'Hara, 1999, p.114)
6. Categories which, although often connected, are not synonymous.
7. Defining informality is not easy. Labels such as 'shadow cities' (Neuwirth,2006), "hidden economies" (Tiwari, 2007:348) and the infamous black market paint a problematic image of lawlessness/illegality, which Sassen and Läpple (both in Burdett and Sudjic, 2007:487-488) dismiss as reductive and non-equivalent. Instead, Läpple (in ibid.) claims that urban informality is better conceptualised as a specific mechanism of development: "metropolitan urbanism under the condition of globalisation". In understanding informality as a process, rather than a condition, Läpple builds upon the work of Castells & Portes (1989, p.12) who conceptualise informality as "not [just] a set of survival activities performed by destitute people on the margins of society", nor "an individual condition" or "euphemism for poverty", and instead present a process based definition: '"informality is] a process of income-generation characterized by one central feature: it is unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated". At this point it is noteworthy that Fiori & Brandão (2010) see such a definition as similarly applicable to informal housing.

8. Following a logic expounded by Park (in Harvey, 2012a, pp.3-4) – "in making the city man has remade himself [sic]".

4. Conjuring up a counter-revolution

"'The human race has come a long way', he said casually, 'but most of us are throw-backs'" (Fitzgerald, 1920/2009, p.67).

This chapter concerns the mechanisms of domination, extraction and control that constitute the neo-liberal political and economic system. Read through a Marxian analysis, these systemic mechanisms, originating in the 1970s, represent a reassertion of class power on behalf of the "angry-right" (Palma, 2009, p.839). Emerging from elite frustration with the relative economic stagflation associated with welfarist liberal-Keynesianism, and facilitated by national leaders such as Reagan, Thatcher and Pinochet, this period saw a radical shift towards the neo-liberal position. This discourse, although premised with the prefix neo-, represented a "counter-revolution" par excellence (Palma, 2009, p.838). A fact demonstrated both by its return of the whip-hand to the forces of capital, and consequential regression of the social advances achieved under Keynesianism (near full-employment, rising real-wages, improved income distribution, and welfare provision etc.); and also, if one considers that liberalism originally emerged from the Age of Enlightenment /Aufklärung , by the way it betrayed its progressive roots to establish neo-liberal capital as a "de facto new King", and its ideology as a "new Church", re-shackling both people and the state (Palma, 2009, p.849). Here, it will be argued that neo-liberalism renewed those dependencies and urban inequalities contested in the 1960s through a concerted programme of spatial, economic and socio-political fragmentation.

Neo-liberalism can thus be conceptualised as an ideological throw-back. A political project aimed at re-establishing "the conditions for capital accumulation"; restoring "the power of economic elites"; and affecting a return to entrenched social inequality and injustice (Harvey, 2005, p.19). It is a sad truth that having already established the 1960s as a decade of false dawns in the journey towards Fainstein's (2010) Just City, the proceeding decades (up to and including today's crisis) have, for their part, witnessed a further entrenchment of capital power. In this time, to quote Palma (2009, p.863), the rentiers have attempted to rid themselves of "all fetters on their greed" whilst at the same time transferring associated risks.

This move, although neither entirely surprising nor exactly unique, gains importance when one considers its unprecedented success within the protective auspices of a democratic tradition. To quote Palma (ibid. p.842), "the neo-liberal ideology… is just shorthand for the art of getting away with such a remarkably asymmetric distributional outcome within a democracy!" Indeed, as Sassen (1998, p.xxiv) states: "although unequal profit-making capabilities among different economic sectors and firms have long been a basic feature of market economies… what we see today takes place on another order of magnitude". However, before assessing the systemic supports behind this process, one often explained away in a functionalist fashion (i.e. because it is of benefit to capital), it is necessary to unpack neo-liberalism as a theoretical concept.

Rooted in a nineteenth-century liberal tradition, neo-liberalism, like its forbear, posits that harmony between social and private spheres occurs as the result of Adam Smith's supposedly class-blind "invisible hand" (in Palma, 2009, pp.837-838); and that a socially optimal equilibrium will occur inevitably as long as "rational (i.e. utility-maximising) and selfish economic agents are allowed to interact freely in… competitive markets" with "defined and properly enforced" property rights (Palma, 2009, p.830). This foundation translates into a convenient excuse for neo-liberal inequality:

"Not everybody will be happy in capitalism, but whenever individuals are not happy it is because they have just had bad luck, or have lacked useful skills, have operated in an institutional setting that has hindered competitive free-markets, or have themselves… [resisted] the harmonising magic of the invisible hand." (Ibid. pp.837-838).

As such, active exploitation is ushered off-stage, and winning or losing defaults back to a purely Darwinian conceptualisation. Indeed the emphasis on notional free choice places the burden of loss and discontent with failure squarely on the shoulders of the individual, exonerating the system.

In similar vein, Harvey (2005, p.3) describes neo-liberalism, citing Treanor for support, as a process valuing "market exchange as: 'an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs', it emphasises the significance of contractual relations in the marketplace. It holds that the social good will be maximised by maximising the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market." Moreover it is a process that converts freedom from a universalistic tradition into an individualistic, indeed elite privilege.

"The freedoms it embodies reflect the interests of private

property owners, businesses, multinational corporations and financial capital." (Ibid. p.7).

Indeed, one might go so far as to interpret neo-liberal economics as being defined against post-WWII embedded welfarist liberalisms; constituting a class revolution from above; and leading to the eventual erosion of political democracy. Restricting the "freedom of the masses… in favour of the freedoms of the few" (ibid. p.70). To evidence this fear, earlier voiced by Polanyi (1944/2002), Harvey (2005; 2012a) points to Pinochet's coup d'etat against Allende, and the neo-liberalisation of Chile.

Sadder still, Harvey (2003; 2005) exposes a sinister trend within neo-liberal capital's endless quest for accumulation opportunities. Expansion, he argues, has begun to hinge increasingly upon "accumulation by dispossession". This process is defined as:

"The continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices which Marx had treated of as 'primitive' or 'original' during the rise of capitalism. These include the… privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations…; conversion of various forms of property rights… into exclusive private property…; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labor [sic] power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slave trade (which continues particularly in the sex industry);…usury, the national debt and, most devastating of all the use of the credit system as a radical means of accumulation by dispossession." (Harvey, 2003, p.159).

Additionally, Harvey (2005) is keen to stress that this footloose phenomenon has little respect for national borders, roaming freely across and between the Global North and the Global South. In the North, for example, dispossession is occurring through socially expulsive foreclosures (Sassen, 2012a), as well as the continued "diminution or erasure of various forms of common property rights (such as state pensions, paid vacations, and access to education and health care)" (Harvey, 2003, p.160).

However, although persuasive, the Marxian analysis, presented by the likes of Budd (in Cohen, 2003), and Harvey (2005), is not the only perspective on neo-liberalism. Notably, Foucault (2004, p.120) prefers to conceive neo-liberalism as a new form of governmentality, placing the "state under the surveillance of the market, rather than a market under the surveillance of the state". Folding this analysis into the Marxian conception, Palma (2009) responds to the inequality associated with neo-liberalism and presents a compelling synthesis of this phenomenon as a dispossessing technology of power. In doing so Palma draws on 2006 data from the USA showing how the national income share (excluding capital gains) of America's top one per cent has rocketed from eight to eighteen per cent (Palma, 2009, p.836).

Returning to the materiality of that which Palma (2009, p.847) interprets as the most remarkable "dispossession feat" ever achieved within democracy, it is important to situate neo-liberalism's emergence, and arguably the origin of today's sub-prime economic crisis, in the context of late-Keynesian welfarism and a frustration with the associated stagflation. This frustration, combining potently with a blend of binary Cold War politics and, more often than not, xenophobia/racism , ushered in leaders such as Reagan and Thatcher, and opened a window for unbridled neo-liberalism to exploit. Today "US military hegemony undergirds" neo-liberal globalisation (Hirst, 2005, p.41), just as the World Bank/International Monetary Fund conveys it southwards.

The 1970s presented capitalist classes with the problem of excessive labour-power in relation to capital (Harvey, 2010). Governments were faced with managing "conflicting demands from workers and capital in a world of declining growth rates", without stimulating social unrest (Streeck, 2011, p.11). Against this problem, neo-liberalism presented itself as a magic bullet, offering "*systems so perfect that no one will need to be good"* (T.S.Eliot in Palma, 2009, p.830). Several books have been written on the technicalities involved in turning mortgages into asset-backed-securities (ABSs), and ABSs into collateralised-debt-obligations (CDOs). However, for the purpose of this working paper it is sufficient to focus on the social results of such processes, and to take the primary conjuring trick of neo-liberalism as being the systematic reintroduction of fear through a concerted programme of risk driven destabilisation.

For Budd (in Cohen, 2003), neo-liberal regimes consciously pursued monetarist policies in order to raise unemployment, seeing the latter as an "extremely desirable way of reducing the strength of the working classes". In one fell swoop, this engineered a recreation of Marx's (2008) "reserve army of labour", a phenomenon conspicuously absent from the Keynesian-era of near full-employment , and one held as a contributing factor to the fleeting success of general-strike action in 1968. This step, facilitated by the potential for coordinated action between two neo-liberal superpowers (Reagan's USA and Thatcher's UK), engendered labour discipline through wage-repression, whilst at the same time reducing the likelihood of strike activity by returning the threat of dismissal or, latterly, outsourcing. Fear of unemployment was used instrumentally to fracture traditional working class solidarity, justifying decreased real-wages and leading to what might be called a "double-exploitation" (Burgess in Jenkins, Smith & Ping-Wang, 2007, p.164) as the workers themselves created a surplus demand for a finite employment supply, and consequentially drive down their own remuneration.

For countries housing a large informal sector (both economic and social), this double-exploitation is even more pronounced. Often, although not definitively, emerging as a

pseudo survival strategy providing affordable service, shelter and additional income , informality sustains wage repression by artificially lowering the cost of maintaining/reproducing individual capacity for labour, increasing labour market competitiveness and bottom-line profit margins. Moreover, the increase of informal subcontracting under neo-liberal globalisation imbues many workers with a legal invisibility, rupturing the "traditional dynamic whereby membership in leading economic sectors enables the formation of strong organised labour movements" (Sassen, 2007, p.287). This invisibility denies such urban workers even "the meaning of a proletarian work relationship" (Birkbeck in Castells & Portes, 1989, p.13), preying upon their artificially maintained vulnerability. For many this is the great paradox of informality. It is a two-sided coin, functioning dually as both a survival mechanism for the exploited and also a key driver of said exploitation.

However, whilst wage repression is doubtless fundamental to extending capital accumulation opportunities, left unmitigated, it would eventually dampen aggregate demand. Against this threat the smoke and mirrors of neo-liberalism devised a method to grow aggregate demand (and thus capital accumulation), through a process of "part-pay/part-lend" real wages (Palma, 2009, p.858) and the fostering of ever increasing credit-economies. A solution also predicated on the logic of control through fear. This experience, albeit to varying levels of maturity, is a global phenomenon. Debt, as Galeano (1998, pp.247-248) states, is "something even those with nothing have". Thus, whilst writers like Harvey (2012a, 2012b), Palma (2009) and Sassen (2012a, 2012b) commonly speak of the US it is important to remember that they stand united that such examples are symptomatic of broader globalised processes.

The cornerstone of this second conjuring trick is, that which Palma (2009, p.860) has dubbed, the "mirage of an ever-increasing households' net worth". Artificial housing-bubbles were created wherein financial institutions regulated both supply and demand, lending to real-estate developers as well as buyers from ever-widening income groups (Harvey, 2012b). Indeed, as the process accelerated, mortgage lending reached the point that financial institutions would lend in full knowledge that their sub-prime borrowers would eventually prove unable to pay escalating interest-rates, but confident in the belief that increasing housing-bubbles would undergird a re-sale market capable of restoring their initial investment (Palma, 2011). That this process ultimately led to the accumulation of "more risk than is privately efficient, let alone socially" (ibid.), and precipitated the current crisis when the market took revenge by calling the rentiers' bluff (Palma, 2009), illustrates the short-sightedness of this policy. However, one cannot deny that in the short-term it underpinned an unprecedented dispossession process; neutralising and fragmenting urban populations at the same time as building a credit empire on the back of largely imagined household value. "Consumer credit of the household sector jumped from 25% to over 40% of wages and salaries between the early 1980s and 2007" mirroring an increase in home-mortgage-debt from sixty-five per cent to one-hundred-and-sixty-six per cent (US figures in Palma, 2009, p.859).

For Harvey (2010) mortgage-financed homeownership, and its most common incarnation suburbanisation, must be considered as a socio-political project as much as an economic one. The theory is simple: "debt-encumbered homeowners do not go on strike" (ibid.). Even those with little, fear loss, indeed often more so than those with plenty (Salecl, 2011). Moreover, this fear of loss manifests itself politically by promoting an ideological shift towards private-property and capitalism, expanding the American Republican and Right-Wing-Democratic electorates (Harvey, 2012b). In a very real sense, private homeownership exists as the "material foundations" of neo-liberalism's "spontaneous consensus", fostering an "ever increasing tolerance for inequality" (Palma, 2009, p.860), and driving the wheels of counter revolution.

Just as colonial "ideologues of divide and rule" (Davis, 2007, p.51) adopted spatial fragmentation in reaction to concerns that city living would "detribalise" colonial subjects and promote a unifying anti-colonial solidarity (Myers, 2003, pp.338-339), so the neo-liberal project deployed spatial fragmentation to curtail the possibility of emergent class/social solidarities. This logic, Davis (2007) argues, underpins modern tendencies for relocating central poor communities to scattered locations on the urban periphery. In the Dominican Republic, for example, President Balaguer, returning to office in 1986, aimed to *"Haussmannize the traditional hearths of urban resistance*" in Santo Domingo by "shunting them to the outskirts" (Morle & Mejía in Davis, 2007, p.105); he was far from unique in this intention. Independence, for cities such as Santo Domingo and Nairobi, often simply exchanged a 'citizen-subject racial dichotomy' for a class-based division – a phenomenon increasingly bound up with constructed questions of ethnicity (Katumanga, 2010, p.350).

Similarly, although perhaps more guarded of its intention, the race bias in US home ownership, particularly during the 1960s and 70s, supports this argument. As white-flight took hold, the working class were increasingly fragmented along race-lines. Manifesting itself spatially, cities like Cleveland saw overall urban-decline paralleled with a growing proportion African-Americans living in the decaying inner-city as both middle-class, and the so-called elite poor, were co-opted into homeownership and decamped to the suburbs. During the 1960s the proportion of Afro-Americans living in inner-city Cleveland jumped from sixteen to forty-four per cent (Krumholz, 1982, p.164). Just as the fear of loss turned those in employment against the unemployed, it also turned homeowners against those unable to access even a leased form of the American Dream (Palma, 2009). As Hirst (2005, pp.17-18) writes "alarm about crime and racist fear for property values" ensured that central business districts were soon surrounded by rings of poor, decaying housing. Tax bases

putrefied, services declined and crime spiked triggering an inequality driven self-fulfilling prophecy. Across the USA, social segregation, once again, proved itself "*more powerful than legal integration*" (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p.145).

Having identified fear as a key tenet of neo-liberal accumulation/fragmentation, and having connected neo-liberalism with increased inequality, one has only to connect this inequality with an increase in fear (both perceived and real) to begin to picture how this accumulation model was able to weave a closed loop.

This final connection is evidenced in the parallel growth of crime / crime perception in ever multiplying societies of the spectacle. Muggers, in a world that constantly informs us "of our obligation to look at ourselves in a single mirror", seize those "fetishes [cars, phones, money] that make people real, in order to become what their victims are" (Galeano, 1998, pp.26-27). Thus such criminal acts ultimately reaffirming the victory of consumerism. Writing of Johannesburg, Bremner (2007, p.210) cites an interview conducted by the Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation as evidence of this condition:

"If I steal a car and drive to a party with my girlfriend…every girl will wish to be in love with me."

Crime, or the perception of crime, in turn feeds erratic forms of urbanism. Strangled behind gates, glass/wire-topped walls, personal-security and CCTV cameras , the city and its inhabitants become increasingly disconnected. Moreover, although such fragmentation is perhaps most readily identified with Blade Runner-esque (Scott, 1982) 'off-worlds' such as Cairo's Beverly Hills Suburb, Beijing's Orange County complex, and Johannesburg's Melrose Arch development (Davis, 2007, pp.114-115; Bremner, 2007, p.210) it would be an 'aestheticisation of poverty' (Roy, 2004) to assume that this system was not replicated in US housing projects, Brazilian favelas us Indian slums. Such urbanism represents an attack on the street and, concurrently, the potential for social movements:

"*Revolutionary events generally take place in the street. Doesn't this show that the disorder of the street engenders another kind of order? The urban space of the street is a place for talk, given over as much to the exchange of words and signs as it is the exchange of things. A place where speech becomes writing. A place where speech can become 'savage' and, by escaping rules and institutions, inscribe itself on walls.*" (Lefebvre, 1970/2003, p.19)

In the prophetic words of Caldeira (2005, p.335), "Cities of walls do not strengthen citizenship but rather contribute to its corrosion".

Once co-opted into the system, individuals, motivated by fear of exile, are more likely to replicate systemic inequalities than aid the transition towards urban social justice. This is a phenomenon encapsulated by Holston's (2007) observation of favela formalisation in Brazil. To his eyes, newly formalised settlements serve as an additional policing band against newer informal/illegal settlements, offering compelling evidence of the psychological conditioning of private-property. This process bares all the hallmarks of the oppressive relations discussed by Fanon (1961/2001) and Freire (1970/1996). It becomes apparent that "[t]he very structure of their [the oppressed] thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped. Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors [sic]" (Freire, 1970/1996, p.27). Use the term oppressor, consumer or homeowner interchangeably and one begins to grasp the compulsion of the neo-liberal system. Today to be a "man" is to be a homeowner, a car-driver… a capitalist. As before "the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to identification with its opposite pole" (ibid.).

If such relations of dependency, exploitation and marginalisation were once the calling card of colonial overlords, it is clear that the apple of neo-liberalism's oligopolistic capital has not fallen far from this tree. Indeed, facing such evidence it could be argued that we are confronted with an Orwellian situation in which all hope for change relies on a consciousness that can only be awakened by such change:

"*Until they become conscious they will never rebel, and until after they have rebelled they cannot become conscious*." (Orwell, 1948/2000, pp.80-81).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

9. A time marked by thinkers, such as Smith, Kant and Rousseau, intent on freeing humanity from the chains and cages of monarchical/religious power.
10. The US Republican Party Southerner Strategy involved the slogan "government is the problem because it takes your money and gives it to Those People" (in Palma, 2009, p.840-841).
11. Broadly a feature associated with the Northern experience.
12. Formal workers often supplement earnings with informal employment, challenging the binary formal/informal divide (Castells & Portes, 1989, p.12)
13. All contracted out lucratively to multinational firms such as Blackwater, Fluor, Bechtel and CH2m Hill (Klein, 2008, p.410).

5. The dreams and nightmares of new beginnings

Faced with a concentration of power beyond even Orwellian (1948/2000, p.80) proportions one could be forgiven for abandoning hope in the democratic process. In 1984's dystopian Oceania, the "swarming disregarded masses" of 1984's dystopian Oceania numbered a mere eighty-five per cent, fourteen less than the figure emblazoned on the banners of Occupy. Even Josué de Castro, awarded the International Peace Prize in 1954, would later resign himself, albeit "unhappily", to the existence of "no other solution than violence"[14] (in Galeano, 1973/2009, p.4). However, bringing together the theories of Fanon, Sartre (both 1961/2001) and Foucault (1979/2000), it is possible to unsettle this fatalism.

Sartre (1961/2001, p.14), although perhaps a little hasty in his proclamation of colonialism's inevitable fall, was apt in his summary of the naked contradiction inherent to the coloniser's position:

"He ought to kill those he plunders, as they say djinns do. Now, this is not possible, because he must exploit them as well…he loses control, the machine goes into reverse.'"

Similarly, whilst we have seen neo-liberalism's remarkable aptitude for reinvention fight this logic, it remains unable to command absolute power and, therefore, cannot create a situation in which it is truly "*useless to revolt*" (Foucault, 1979/2000, pp.449-450). Thus, in reality, revolution – wherein "a single individual, a group, a minority, or an entire people says, 'I will no longer obey', and throws the risk of their life in the face of an authority they consider unjust" – escapes to a realm "outside of history" (ibid.). Those who rebel, preferring the "risk of death to the certainty of having to obey", are "*inexplicable" and thus interrupt the "flow of history, and its long chains of reasons*" (ibid.). Therefore, at a time when Sartre's words – *"newcomers have life to fear rather more than death"* (1961/2001, p.17) – take on renewed meaning; the opportunity for revolutionary change (the Arab Spring for example) cannot be discounted. Moreover, as Harvey (2012a) and Palma (2009) acknowledge, there is compelling evidence to suggest that this moment is different. Capitalism faces a crisis "without an enemy" from within or without (ibid. p.865), and the conventional survival model of "*building houses and filling them with things*" (Harvey (2012c) paraphrasing the US Federal Reserve's conventional crisis response) faces a housing stock surplus.
Such a conceptualisation doubtless influences the optimistic tone housed within works such as Harvey's (2012a) Rebel Cities; and Badiou's (2012) The Rebirth of History. Both hope that the Right to the City can finally move beyond existence as an "*empty signifier*", and become filled with socially just meaning (Harvey, 2012a, p.136). However, although it is true that today's crisis of capitalism represents a moment capable of catalysing transformative change, the direction of said change is far from assured. Possibilities may be "imminent", but they are not "transcendent" (ibid.). Here, again, Foucault (1979/2000, p.452) can add value to the debate. That people revolt; that a "convict risks his life to protest unjust punishments"; that a "madman can no longer bear being confined and humiliated"; and that a "*people refuses the regime that oppresses* [them]" is a fact, and one that introduces subjectivity into history. However this fact does not ensure innocence for the first, sanity for the second, nor indeed the promised tomorrow for the third (ibid.). Consequently, Palma (2009, p.866) is right to warn us that the main cost of today's crisis may not be "the many trillion dollars worth of asset deflation" but rather that the crisis advances the possibility of a "right-wing, xenophobic, fascist backlash". One can well imagine Galeano's (1973/2009) prophet looking back through closed fingers at the role Black Tuesday (the Great Wall Street Crash of 1929) played in Fascism's nightmarish ascent to power in Europe. Whilst today's global economic crisis maybe unlikely to precipitate WWIII it is already manifesting itself in increased xenophobia against migrant minorities wrongly accused of undermining fragile, if not indeed entirely mythic, economic recoveries, proving another example of divide and rule politics as a tool to drive fragmentation through fear.

Looking for recent signs of hope, Harvey (2012a) champions the case of El Alto, Boliva as evidence of the potential of urban revolution. In acity earlier hailed by Don Baulio Rocha[15] (in Lazar, 2008, p.55) as Bolivia's "sentinel [of democracy]", the period 2000 to 2005 represented a "genuinely revolutionary epoch in a situation of deep cleavage between elite and popular classes" (Webber in Harvey, 2012a, pp.141-142). During this time a popular rejection of neo-liberal policies (particularly those concerning natural resources), and their foreign-backed traditional elites combined potently with a history of racial repression[16] to trigger urban uprisings that felled two regimes and propelled the socialist Morales to power (ibid.). Similarly, in 2001 Argentinean street protestors, convened spontaneously in response to the national government's decision to freeze bank accounts in response to economic crisis, amassed under the banner of "*!Que se vayan todos! !Que no quede ni uno solo!*'" (They all must go! Not one should remain!), and achieved their demand. The country cycled through five governments in a fortnight (Sitrin, 2011, p.10).

Both instances serve as testimony of the potential strength of urban protest – particularly when facilitated by synergies between active neighbourhood associations and the more conventional work-place hearths of resistance (Harvey, 2012c). However, it is important to lay out the particularities of urban social movements such as that which occurred in El Alto. Indeed, such a critical evaluation is crucial to unpacking the potential replicability of any historical example. For Lazar (2008) the successes of El Alto's urban social movements revolve around a potent combination of geographical location, cultural solidarity and collective memory. Of the former, strategic location at the head of a primary supply chain to La Paz, allowed victory to be achieved through cutting the nails of the national elite:

"During the strikes, rich people will have all their money in vain, they'll die of hunger the same as us, and the president will have to listen." (Dona Josefa, urban insurgent, in Lazar, 2008, p.1).

Of the latter two, Gill (in Harvey, 2012a, p.144), describes El Alto as a city "where many victims of Bolivia's experiment with free-market reform teeter on the edge of survival". There, the nation's low-income refugees[17] gathered, united in their contempt for neo-liberalism. This collective threat combined potently with a healthy tradition of neighbourhood association based street level democracy and relative ethnic homogeneity to support the emergence of broad-based, cross-sectoral resistance capable of transcending the tendency of unionised action to descend into sectionalism.

However, the appreciation of contingent factors does not diminish the potential to learn from precedents. On the contrary, this case focuses the attention on several issues facing emergent social movements – of which Occupy is a prime example. In particular El Alto illuminates the need to tackle sectionalism in the quest for critical mass.

Arguably the tendency of the left towards self-implosion can be traced back to the divergent views of alternative socialist modernities that competed for the nineteenth-century Paris Commune. For Harvey (2012a, p.8) these competing worldviews, pitting centralist Jacobinism against the Proudhonist model for anarchic control by the people, midwifed, through the fires of recrimination over loss, an enduring split between Marxists and Anarchists. Similarly, more recent examples of such divisions can be seen within the lack of cooperation between conventional unionised American organisations and their less traditional peers, such as the Excluded Workers Congress (a divide which only recently lessened) (Harvey, 2012b, 2012c); and the enduring homeless question that confronts Occupy movements globally.

Turning to the first, it is clear that to draw artificial divisions between formal and informal, illegal or immigrant workers undermines the potential for broad-based action. Considering the success of protest events such as the 2006 May Day movement by the Immigrant Workers of Los Angeles, when the declaration of a rights-based protest forced the city shut down; or, in the case of New York, when a Domestic Workers Movement achieved a Bill of Rights in 2010; it is a tragedy that alliances of commonality have not been extended. Analysis of such divisions necessarily wander from fear of employment competition into discussions of racism and xenophobia, two factors commonly manipulated by the politics-of-fear phenomenon discussed earlier, and going someway towards justifying Palma's (2009) concern that the new dawn of tomorrow could break yet darker still. Such a politics preys on a common misconception of the informal as systemically opposed to the formal rather than, to cite Roy (2005), as a component actively created by formality and fundamentally constitutive of today's urban condition. This misconception facilitates continued fragmentation upon falsely constructed rivalries in the "*daily fight for survival"* (Harvey, 2012a, p.15). This process has strangely familiar echoes of Sartre's (1961/2001, p.16) concern for the potential of fury without outlet to "*devastate the oppressed creatures themselves… since they cannot face the real enemy*".

Of the second, a similar tendency to divide and exclude – both evidence of systemic replication – can be traced into debates over Occupy's so-called homeless question across the globe.

"If you are not contributing to the movement, then why are you here? If you do not go on marches, why are you here? This is not a place for free food or…cigarettes. If you live in New York, go home. If you are homeless in New York, there are plenty of places…Go there. Feel free to visit, maybe even eat some free food, occasionally. But don't stay here. Don't cause trouble. This society gives us enough trouble." (A proposal to Occupy Wall Street's General Assembly in Herring & Glück, 2011, p.165).

This statement, evokes memories of antiquated debates concerning the deserving- and undeserving-poor, presenting a modern dichotomy of "contributing and freeloading" (Herring & Glück, 2011, p.166), and playing into Meyer's argument (in Tarrow, 2011, p.269) that a class-biased "participation gap" has emerged within social movements with short-protests giving way to "extended campaigns" requiring "disposable income and free-time". For Herring & Glück (2011, pp.165-167), the homeless question is often a reaction to the sensibilities of middle-class campers. Such exclusion is not uniform, with many movements championing the cause of the homeless: operating soup kitchens in Oakland; campaigning against shelter closures in Atlanta; and pushing for the legalisation of tent-cities in Austin (ibid.). However, that the question exists at all is symptomatic of a tendency that must be countered.

Indeed, for Harvey (2012a) and Lazar (2008) the key component to the success enjoyed by Rebel Cities, such as El Alto, is the ability to construct lasting alliances of commonality – not simply between formal and informal workers, or

the homed and homeless, but also between workplace and neighbourhood associations, and across classes. Indeed, although aware that such alliances have existed before, as in 1968, without delivering enduring change, broad-based oppositional programmes remain fundamental to those attempting to unmask neo-liberal inequality. Too often the leaders of social movements remain committed to a narrow, exclusionary definition of the working-class, resulting from a distorted Marxist interpretation of history.

Far from being the sole work of those homogeneous industrial societies so privileged by Marx, the majority of key revolutionary moments in global history were broad, collaborative, cross-class projects:

"Far from representing a single social class, the Parisian sansculottes who were responsible for some of the most electrifying journées of the Revolution were a coalition of middle-class intellectuals, artisans and journeymen, with few representatives from poorer strata." (Lefebvre in Tarrow, 2011, p.74)

For those committed to these narrow, quasi-mythic conceptualisations, many of whom even refuse to accept non-factory workers into the proletarian fold, true social revolution, it follows, would now only be possible for industrial nations such as China (Harvey, 2012c). Thus, for others interested in reconnecting the fragmented post-industrial ninety-nine per cent, a new theory is needed upon which to base collective identity formation.

To this aim Harvey's (2003; 2005) theory of "*accumulation by dispossession*" again offers an interesting perspective. Combined with more conventional extraction via wage-labour, the notion that accumulation has increasingly come to involve active dispossession – whether in the sense of unemployment, or foreclosure – facilitates a broadened conceptualisation of the value creating demographic. Moreover, given that Marx (in Harvey, 2012b) was willing to accept those involved in the "maintenance and repair of capital" as direct contributors to value production, it is possible to justify the inclusion of non-factory based domestic-workers, delivery-operators, and shop-assistants etc. Moreover, this logic, when combined with the rationale put forward in chapter three and the conceptualisation of informality as a key-factor driving down the cost of labour reproduction (and thus allowing profit to be gleamed from wage repression), also provides an intellectual foundation upon which to build formal/informal alliances. Whether this can be achieved is to be seen, but its failure should not result from a perceived incompatibility with leftist theory.

At this point, it is necessary to pre-empt a possible criticism from those interpreting the use of El Alto, unquestionably an exceptional model of urban ethno/economic homogeneity, as an attempt to construct a blueprint from an anomaly. This was not the intention, nor, should this paper be read as an advocacy piece for urban homogeneity.

Global Cities, as Hirst (2005, pp.18-21) writes, have changed radically since the 1960s due to the combination of "post-colonial migration"; emergent "lifestyle communities"; and the decline of "community-based associations in the face of greater individuation". Indeed, such an interpretation might read as the epitaph of cities as consensus producing melting pots – "in the sense of assimilating incomers and acculturating the majority of them by the second generation" (ibid.). However, whilst to some extent accurate, this interpretation does not justify the abandonment of hope for urban social movements. Indeed, perhaps the opposite is true. As Young (1990, p.300) argues, homogeneous communitarianism is ultimately unable to provide a sustainable base for a politics of diversity to emerge:

"Community is an understandable dream, expressing desires for selves that are transparent to one another, relationships of mutual identification, social closeness and comfort. The dream is understandable, but politically problematic…those motivated by it will tend to suppress differences among themselves or implicitly to exclude from the political groups persons with whom they do not identify."

Following this line it is possible to conceptualise the modern city as capable of traversing a path between fractious neo-liberal individualisation and exclusionary communitarianism. For Young (ibid. p.319) hope lies in the utopian "unoppressive city" – a configuration defined by "openness to unassimilated others". The achievement of this requires a third path; one that Mouffe (2000) has termed "*agonistic pluralism*".

Mouffe (ibid. p.16) considered "agonistic pluralism" in opposition to the consensus based propositions of thinkers such as Rawls and Habermas. She posits that, far from placing democracy in peril, agonistic confrontation is the "very condition of its existence":

"Modern democracy's specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order." (ibid.)

Consensus behind certain unifying values is important but this should always be "conflictual consensus", allowing space for individual interpretation (ibid.), and can only ever be "periodic" (Levy, 2007, p.3). Returning to the urban social movements of El Alto, it is possible to view the city's elevation to rebel status as being assisted by an active tradition of agonistic street-level politics. This position was supported, although without explicit reference to Mouffe's (2000) theory, by Harvey's (2012b) explanation that El Alto's "*Unions and neighbourhood associations were well attended as if you didn't attend you were likely to get shafted [sic]*!" Thus, Mouffe's (2000) "agonistic conflict" can be conceptualised as a key dynamic connecting the Altenos (residents of El Alto) and underpinning their capacity for collective action in the face of a common enemy/threat.

In a very real sense the quest for consensus would be ill conceived. More than just incompatible with the modern city experience (Hirst, 2005) it has the potential to undermine social movements, stimulate exclusion (Young, 1990), and, in effect, lead to the death of the city as a cradle for democracy (Mouffe, 1993/2005). Reconnecting the ninety-nine per cent is not about flattening out differences, but rather it is about drawing strength from diversity.

Put another way:

"A healthy city can embrace and make productive use of the differences of class, ethnicity, and lifestyles it contains, while a sick city cannot; the sick city isolates and segregates difference, drawing no collective strength from its mixture of different people."

(Sennet, 2011)

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

14. The argument in support of violence as a tool of revolution was famously discussed by Sartre (1961, pp.18-19) who wrote: *"violence…is man recreating himself…to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses: there remains a dead man, and a free man; the survivor for the first time, feels a national soil under his feet."* However, this view is strongly criticized by thinkers such as Arendt (1969) who posited that violence is wholly incapable of creating power. This theoretical legacy was picked up by Solnit (2011, p.154) who argued that "the master's tool won't dismantle the master's house. And they sure won't build a better house". For her violence, as a tool of the left, failed in the 1970s – evidenced by the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany; and the Weather Underground's Days of Rage in Chicago. It is presented as a form of cooptation drawing social movements closer to their oppressors and justifying incarceration, brutalisation and marginalisation (ibid. p.148). Left to the right, violence, such as the infamous Wall Street pepper-spray incident, can instead signify weakness and evidences the failure of coercive powers (Schnell, 2004).

15. Executive Secretary of El Alto's Federation of Street Traders.

16. According to Lazar (2008, p.2) seventy-four per cent of the city's residents self identified as indigenous Aymaran.

17. Displaced miners from rationalised tin-mines, banished agricultural workers from commercialised farms and those forced out of La Paz by prohibitive land values

6. Conclusion

Moving towards a conclusion, this paper has put forward a case for conceptualising neo-liberalism as a pervasive counter-revolution responsible for turning the hopeful dreams of 1968 into the nightmarish fears of 2012. In so doing it has championed the cause for conceptualising oligopolistic capital as a pseudo-colonial oppressor every bit as committed to divide and rule, fear-based exploitation as its colonial forbears. Moreover, this paper has presented neo-liberalism, as a poor master to its own self-destructive greed. Showing how, like all power that is based on continued exploitation, it has proven systemically unable to wreak total destruction on the potential for future revolution – a phenomenon housed outside of history (Foucault, 1979/2000) – and has subsequently careered back into crisis. Looking forward towards a possible dawning tomorrow, it ends by counselling caution to those imagining today's crisis of capitalism as an inevitable precursor to the translation of exploited workers into those grave-digging scourges of capitalism prophesised by Marx and Engels (1848/2004). In short a case has been made for the need to broaden inclusion under the auspices of 'agonistic pluralism' (Mouffe, 2000) if urban social movements are ever to truly de-link and contest the elusive duo – money and power.

Certainly, few would interpret these words as revolutionising the field of urban social movements, indeed this was never an achievable intention given the scope of words and experience at my disposal. However, in moving to liberate history from its restrictive Whiggish tradition, and unpacking the Foucauldian "details and accidents" behind Habermas' "shattered expectations" (both in Quarles van Ufford, Giri & Mosse, 2003, p.21), this paper contributes to a growing interest in reconnecting the disciplines of development and history. Paying testimony to the potential value to be derived from such an endeavour.

Equally, if Harvey (2012b) is right to read the remarkable cohesion achieved by the latest Chilean student occupation movement[18], which has already forced through corporation tax amendments, as contingent on an acute awareness of past betrayals (an awareness somewhat absent for the 1968 cohort) then it follows that any effort to revive memories of betrayed past optimisms can be seen as a progressive step towards shaping the consciousness necessary to pursue systemic reinvention. To his eyes it is no coincidence that said university students are the same cohort who staged a 2006 high school strike and were "betrayed and bought off with false promises" (ibid.). Moreover, the importance of "agonistic pluralism" (Mouffe, 2000) cannot be overstated. History has shown that past attempts in the 1960s/70s to discipline social movements to programmatic, political party lines neutered their cross-sectorial, cross-class appeal (Castells, 1985), and extinguished their flame before they reached conflagration.

The lament, but-this-is-different-now, has often been rightly scorned as a much-parroted, hollow emblem of youthful exuberance, or indeed arrogance. However, the opposing seen-it-all-before resignation is equally problematic. That the future of 2012 might be conjured away by further capitalist reinvention is a distinct possibility, indeed, there is a chance that, paradoxically, the dawn might break darker than the night before. However, such an occurrence should not again result from old tricks, false promises, and an ignorance of history. After all, to borrow a final line from Gotham City:

"'Why do we fall?'

[if not]

'So we can learn to pick ourselves up'"

(Nolan, 2012)

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

18. The Chilean student movement claims a legitimacy backed by seventy per cent national agreement; fifty per cent more than President Pinera. (Harvey, 2012b)

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