MA Modules

Module Leader: Peter Fritz
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: A
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: Problem Set 1 (25%); Problem Set 2 (25%); Problem Set 3 (25%); Problem Set 4 (25%)

Description: The purpose of this module is to present basic methods and results concerning first-order logic. The emphasis is on the practical skill of formulating and proving results in and about logical systems. Students are introduced to basic set theory, enumerability and non-enumerability, cardinality, soundness and completeness, the Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems, and inexpressibility results. As part of this, we discuss and practice informally proving abstract mathematical results, as well as formalizing such results and proofs using first-order logic.

The expected background for this module is propositional and predicate logic as it is covered in a standard introduction to formal logic. This includes familiarity with the languages of propositional and predicate logic, formalization of informal arguments in these languages, evaluating propositional formulas using truth tables, evaluating formulas of predicate logic using models, model-theoretic notions such as validity and consequence, some form of proof system, and corresponding proof-theoretic notions such as provability and consistency. A main component of the module is regular problem sets.

Module Leader: José Zalabardo
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: C
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: The purpose of this module is to present some of the central doctrines of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The module focuses on the account offered in this book of the structure of reality and our ability to represent it in thought and language. We will also study ideas of Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege that are relevant for the development of Wittgenstein’s thought.
The module will enable you to understand these important ideas, overcoming the obscurity of Wittgenstein’s writing. This will contribute to your general understanding of the central philosophical issues that Wittgenstein addresses. It will also develop your ability to interpret difficult philosophical texts.
Topics covered by the module will include:
Russell’s dual-relation theory of judgment
Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment
Russell and Wittgenstein on forms
Wittgenstein’s picture theory
Frege on unity and unsaturatedness
Wittgenstein on the unity of the proposition
Wittgenstein on the unity of facts
Objects and expressions as common structural features
Substance and simplicity
 
Teaching Delivery
The module will be delivered by weekly two-hour lecture/seminars, combining presentation of material by the lecturer and general discussion of the ideas presented. You will be expected to do preparatory reading for each session.

By the end of the module:
You will have gained a deep understanding of some of the central ideas put forward by Wittgenstein in his early period.
You will be able to connect Wittgenstein’s proposals to contemporary debates in metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.
You will have enhanced your interpretative skills regarding difficult philosophical texts.
You will have developed your ability to grasp and discuss highly abstract philosophical issues.

Recommended Reading
In preparation for the module, we advise reading the following core texts. These can be found in the UCL Library:
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears and B. McGuinness. 2nd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Original edition, 1961.
Zalabardo, José L. 2015. Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Module Leader: Mark Kalderon         
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: A
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: C.D. Broad offers a comparative phenomenology of vision, audition, and touch highlighting the important differences between them. We will assess Broad’s comparative phenomenology drawing upon analytic, continental, historical and psychological literature. The aim is to introduce the student to advance themes in philosophy of perception through this assessment of Broad’s comparative phenomenology. The class will be conducted as a seminar with student presentations

For relatively recent analytic discussion of these issues, the student might consult the optional reading Perception and Its Modalities edited by Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Module Leader: Rory Phillips    
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: C
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This historically-focused module will introduce students to a range of thinkers from the European tradition who have made important contributions to the philosophy of religion. Importantly, this course will try to take seriously the importance of many authors’ theological and philosophical commitments, especially when concerning authors for whom these disciplines were inseparable, like authors of late antiquity and the medieval period. Primary texts will be the core readings for every week, supplemented by commentary and engagement from contemporary philosophers. Every week there will be a 45-minute lecture followed by an hour-long seminar. Representative thinkers and topics include: Augustine on sin and grace; Anselm on the ontological argument and the workings of salvation; Aquinas on the argument from contingency; Luther on the separation of theology from philosophy and the nature of free will; Leibniz on the actual world as best of all possible; Hume on miracles and the argument from appearance of design; Kant on the impossibility of traditional arguments for God; Schleiermacher on religion as a feeling of absolute dependence.

Module Leader: Rory Phillips
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: C
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This module focuses on central issues in the writings of the German Idealists – Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel – with special attention to the ways in which they develop and transform Kant's philosophy. The module will be ordered roughly chronologically, beginning with the late work of Kant, moving through Fichte and Schelling and ending with Hegel. Representative topics include the nature of self-consciousness and the different ways (morality, nature, history) that self-consciousness is embedded, the nature of moral authority, the relationship between art, nature, and the self, the importance of history, and so on. Every week there will be selected primary texts available on Moodle, as well as supporting secondary literature. The class will be roughly a 45-minute lecture followed by an hour-long seminar. The aim of the module is to serve as an advanced introduction to the German Idealists and their chief concerns, as well as understanding how they fit into the story of philosophy after Kant. Some background knowledge of Kant is advantageous but not necessary.

Module Leader: To Be Confirmed       
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This module will introduce you to contemporary metaethics, a discipline which asks philosophical questions about ethics. The four questions at the centre of the course are: (i) are there truths about ethics – about what is good, bad, right, wrong, and so on? (ii) are these truths objective? (iii) are these truths part of the natural world, and (iv) how does our ethical thought and language work? You will investigate these questions by learning about the major theories defended in contemporary metaethics, and as part of this you will learn about various specific problems and questions investigated by contemporary philosophers in this area.

The module will cover the following topics, which may be subject to variation depending on developments in academic research and the interests of the class:
The five theories we will discuss are:

• Moral naturalism: the view that there are ethical truths, they are objective, and part of the natural world.
• Moral non-naturalism: the view that there are ethical truths, they are objective, but that they are not part of the natural world.
• Constructivism: the view that there are ethical truths, but that they are not objective.
• Error theory: the view that there are no ethical truths.
• Expressivism: the view that ethical language and thought is not best understood as trying to represent ethical truths.

Some of the problems and questions we will investigate include:
The nature of ethical properties and facts, and their place in the world
The link between ethical judgements and motivational states like desires and intentions
The nature of our knowledge of ethical properties and facts: can we know about such things? How? Is it problematic to learn about ethical truths on the basis of what others tell us?

Teaching Delivery: This module is delivered in weekly two-hour classes, which are a mixture of lecture and discussion. Students are expected to read the compulsory reading set each week and prepare for discussion in the seminars.
This module has historically been popular. If you try to register on this module, we would advise exploring additional options, just in case.

By the end of the module, you should be able to:
Understand and explain the broadest aims and questions of contemporary metaethics.
Understand and explain the most popular contemporary metaethical theories and some prominent problems and questions investigated by contemporary philosophers in this area.
Philosophically evaluate and assess these theories and the answers given to these problems and questions, and understand what kinds of considerations are relevant to this assessment.
Understand and explain how these theories and questions, and their evaluation, connect with one another and with broader philosophical issues.

Recommended Reading: In preparation for the module, we advise reading the following core texts. These can be found in the UCL Library or online through UCL Library Services:
The International Encyclopedia for Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette, is a great resource for short introductory articles to topics. You could start by reading the article on metaethics, written by Jonas Olson. Other good articles include those on moral naturalism, non-naturalism, non-cognitivism, quasi-realism, and error theory.
Copp, David, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press, 2007, chapters 1, 3, 4, 5.

Module Leader: Simona Aimar
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: C
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This course examines central aspects of Aristotle’s Theoretical Philosophy. This year we focus on Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta, where Aristotle accounts for his notion(s) of power (dunamis). We will roughly read one chapter per week, with the exception of weeks involving especially longer chapters. The course aims at reading closely at the texts but also clarifying the philosophical relevance thereof and connections with contemporary debates in metaphysics.    

Module Leader: Giulia Cavaliere
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Feminism and Philosophy focuses on central topics in feminist philosophy, including the object of feminist theory and practice and the role of the concept of “woman” therein; the relationship between women’s biological capacities and gender-based oppression; the role of markets in regulating women’s reproductive labour; the concept of gender justice and the distribution of waged and unwaged labour; feminist perspectives on autonomy, beauty norms and gender-based oppression; sex and consent.

Module Leader: To Be Confirmed    
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: A
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This course focuses on causation and modality. But what are causation and modality? Causation is easy to introduce: it's about what it means to say that something causes something else. Modality might sound more obscure at first: yet it's about familiar notions too, the notions of possibility and necessity. The goal of our seminar is to figure out how these notions connect to one another. In order to find out whether something causes something else, we often tend to consider what could possibly or necessarily happen if a given event were to happen, or not to happen. To many, this suggests that there is a close relation between notions such as possibility, necessity and causation. But what relation exactly? In this course we will explore, formulate and assess several answers to this question.    

Module Leader: John Hyman
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: C
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: In post-war Oxford, between the 1950s and the 1980s, a rebellion took shape against prevailing conceptions of morality, and eventually against morality itself. New methods and new approaches to thinking about morality were developed by philosophers including Anscombe, Austin, Foot, Hart, Murdoch, Strawson, Wiggins, and Williams. The main formative influences on this movement in philosophy, as on philosophy in Oxford generally in this period, were the anthropological philosophy of language developed by Wittgenstein in the 1930s and 1940s and the so-called ‘ordinary language’ approach to philosophy championed by J.L. Austin. But Aristotelian ethics, Thomist moral philosophy, and existentialism also fed into this radical movement. This course will examine key articles and chapters by these philosophers, including several of the following:
Austin, A plea for excuses (1957); Anscombe, Modern moral philosophy (1958); Foot, Moral beliefs (1959); Hart, The Concept of Law, ch. 8 (1961); Strawson, Social morality and individual ideal (1961); Murdoch, The idea of perfection (1964); Williams, Morality and the emotions (1965); Murdoch, The sovereignty of good over other concepts (1967); Foot, Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives (1972); Wiggins, Truth, invention, and the meaning of life (1976); Anscombe: Medallist’s address: Action, Intention, and ‘double effect’ (1982); Foot, Morality, action and, outcome (1985); Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, ch. 10 (1985).
Background reading
Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytical Philosophy, ch. 6
J.L. Austin, ‘A plea for excuses’
G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Modern moral philosophy’

Module Leader: Han van Wietmarschen       
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: In everyday moral and political arguments appeals to equality are ubiquitous. But what do these appeals amount to? In this course we will attempt to gain a deeper understanding of equality in moral and political thought. The first part of the course will focus on the idea of moral equality. What grounds all human beings’ equal moral status? What does it even mean to say that all human beings are morally equal? Is the moral equality of all people consistent with our favourable treatment of our children, family, and friends? Are non-human animals morally equal to humans? In the second part of the course, we will focus on the idea of political equality. Specifically, we will consider what the equal status of all citizens implies about how we should distribute power and make political decisions. Does a commitment to the equality of all citizens commit us to democratic rule? If the political decisions made in Community A significantly affect the members of Community B, should the members of Community B have a (democratic?) say in Community A’s decision? Might this commit us to some form of global democracy?

Module Leader: Robert Simpson   
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: B
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words) 

Description: This module offers an introduction to contemporary legal philosophy. Each instance of the module will be centred around a recent philosophical monograph on a topic in legal philosophy. Topics may include punishment, human rights, constitutionalism / the rule of law, tort law / compensation, free speech, and general jurisprudence. A selection of classic and contemporary essays will be curated, which thematically dovetail with the central monograph, and which contextualise its arguments in the wider legal philosophical landscape. The teaching delivery will primarily involve exposition and critique of the texts, with an emphasis on group discussion. One meta-topic, which each instance of the module will address, is what exactly legal philosophy is. Is it just a sub-branch of moral and / or political philosophy? And if not, what kind of distinctive philosophical questions arise when we’re inquiring into the nature and functions of the law?

Module Leader: Lucy O’Brien
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: B
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words) 

Description: The seminar will be based on a set of key readings in political philosophy: a classic text, an important recent text, or a collection of articles. The texts will vary from year to year. For example one year the module covered the works of Iris Marion Young. Each student taking the module for credit will be expected to make a presentation. All students are expected to read a particular text each week and to contribute to the discussion, as well as complete a written assignment.

Module Leader: TBC
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: N/A
Shared: MA Only
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This module will introduce UCL Philosophy Masters students to graduate study in philosophy and to philosophical discussion. Most of the sessions will involve reading in advance one or two pieces of analytic philosophy. Then in the seminar itself, each paper will be presented by a student for a discussion which is moderated by the convenor.
The topics covered in this module will generally vary from year to year depending on developments in academic research and the interests of the class and module leader. However the main skills covered will remain the same:
• Reading and understanding works of analytic philosophy
• Understanding philosophical argument and common strategies of argument and reasoning
• Understanding how to connect ideas within and between philosophical topics
• Beginning to understand how to pursue philosophical research.
Teaching Delivery
This module is delivered via a two-hour seminar once a week. Students will be expected to read the set reading each week, and each week one or two students will be asked to present one of the set readings for discussion. The schedule and exact format of the presentations will be discussed and arranged during the course itself.
This is a compulsory module for the MA programme in philosophy.
Enrolment on this module is restricted to students on the MA programme in philosophy.
By the end of the module, you should be able to:
• Understand the works read in the seminar and evaluate the ideas and arguments they contain.
• Understand how to read works in philosophy and make sense of the ideas and arguments they contain.
• Understand the style of philosophical arguments and know some common strategies of argument and reasoning
• Recognise connections between argument styles and philosophical topics where appropriate
• Use literature and other resources to embark on philosophical research.

Module Leader: To Be Confirmed
Level: 7 
Term: 1
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Climate change not only raises extremely important practical challenges, but a host of deep ethical and epistemic questions. The ethical questions you will study include the proper scope of moral concern (e.g., human centred versus biocentric views); individual and collective responsibilities to mitigate climate change; what we owe to future generations; and the permissibility of geoengineering.
You will also examine epistemic questions about the nature and status of evidence for climate change, including the epistemic status of climate change models, and which types of climate change scepticism are reasonable. Core skills focused on are those of philosophical reasoning and argumentation.
The module would be suitable for non-philosophy students with an existing interest or expertise in climate change, but such students may find it hard going at times.

Module Leader: José Zalabardo
Level: 7 
Term: 1
Area: A
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: On the standard conception of the place of linguistic meaning and mental content in the world, there are facts about what speakers mean by linguistic expressions and about what people believe and desire. Interpretation is the process by which we gain access to these facts—we use the evidence at our disposal to determine what people mean by what they say and the contents of their mental states. On this standard conception, facts about meaning and content are generated by connections between language and the mind, on the one hand, and the world, on the other. These facts do not depend in any way on the interpretative procedures by which we seek to discover them.
Since the last few decades of the 20th century, several philosophers have challenged this conception, arguing that facts about linguistic meaning and mental content are somehow produced by the procedures that we employ for ascribing meanings and contents. The goal of this module is to provide a general introduction to this approach. We will focus on the work of four of its main advocates: WVO Quine, Donal Davidson, Saul Kripke and Daniel Dennett.

Topics covered by the module will include:
1. Quine on the indeterminacy of translation
2. Davidson on truth, meaning and radical interpretation
3. Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations
4. Dennett on the intentional stance
Teaching Delivery: The module will be delivered by weekly two-hour lecture/seminars, combining presentation of material by the lecturer and general discussion of the ideas presented. You will be expected to do preparatory reading for each session and to be able to take part in seminar discussion.

By the end of the module:
1. You will have gained a deep understanding of the specific ideas put forward by the authors studied in this module.
2. You will be able to assess their proposals as well as their general approach in philosophical semantics, and to compare them to other major approaches to the subject.
3. You will have enhanced your interpretative skills regarding difficult philosophical texts.
4. You will have developed your ability to grasp and discuss highly abstract philosophical issues.

Recommended Reading: In preparation for the module, we advise reading the following core texts. These can be found in the UCL Library:
•    Gibson, Roger F. 1998. Radical translation and radical interpretation. https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/radical-translation-and-radical-interpretation/v-1
•    Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, Chapter 2.
•    Davidson, Donald. 1973. ""Radical Interpretation"". Dialectica 27:313-28.
•    Dennett, Daniel C. 1987. ""True Believers"". In The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
•    Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Blackwell.

Module Leader: To Be Confirmed
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: C
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This module focuses on problems and figures in 17th and 18th century European philosophy. This period was both fertile and influential. The rejection of old Aristotelian ways of thinking, along with dramatic developments in science, resulted in conceptual ferment and creativity. Moreover, the philosophical debates occurring in the period set the stage for many subsequent developments in the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition, as well as in much contemporary analytic philosophy. This module will take a deep dive into a single figure or topic in this period, which will vary from year to year.  Sample figures include traditional figures like René Descartes, Nicolas Malebranche, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, and Thomas Reid, as well as lesser known figures such as Margaret Cavendish, Ann Conway, Henry More, Pierre Bayle, and Mary Shepherd. Sample problems include sensory perception, colour, representation, embodiment, and the passions. 

Module Leader: Pavel Reichl
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: C
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: In 2025/26 this module will focus on how Post-Kantian Continental Philosophy, as it has been received in Latin America.
In this module, we will study 20th century Latin American philosophy, focussing on its historical development in critical dialogue with the European post-Kantian tradition. We will explore how key figures such as Enrique Dussel, Leopoldo Zea, or Santiago Castro-Gómez have appropriated work of philosophers including Hegel, Marx, and Levinas in their attempts to articulate an 'authentically' Latin American philosophical discourse. Our aims will be to develop an understanding of key 20th-century Latin American philosophers and to critically assess their positions on topics such as history, domination and liberation, and modernity.
 

Module Leader: Andreas Ditter    
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: A
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: Problem Set 1 (15%); Problem Set 2 (15%); Essay 3000 words (70%)

Description: This module will be focused on paradoxes. A paradox is a set of jointly inconsistent claims each of which is individually plausible. Paradoxes are not merely entertaining puzzles; they also raise serious philosophical problems. In many cases, they lead us to rethink basic assumptions about some of our most fundamental concepts, including space, time, motion, truth, knowledge, and belief. In this module, we will examine several paradoxes and the philosophical issues they raise. Along the way, students will be introduced to some central conceptual and formal tools that are relevant not only to the paradoxes but also to a wide range of other philosophical debates.

Paradoxes to be discussed may include: Zeno’s paradoxes about space, time and motion; paradoxes of infinity (the Ross-Littlewood paradox, Benardete’s paradox); the Sorites paradox; logical and semantic paradoxes (Russell’s paradox and the Liar paradox); paradoxes of rationality (Newcomb’s problem, Prisoner’s Dilemma); paradoxes of belief and knowledge (the surprise examination paradox, the preface paradox, the lottery paradox); and paradoxes of personal identity, coincidence, time travel, and modal variation.

***Please note that the course combines philosophical and formal elements. A good knowledge of first-order (predicate) logic is presupposed.***

Module Leader: Sam Carter
Level: 7
Term: 1
Area: A
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: We are epistemically imperfect beings. Our access to the world is beset by noise, error, and inexactness. We navigate our lives using unreliable perceptual systems, deteriorating memories and incomplete information. As a result, there are many things we fail to know.
Fallibilists about knowledge advocate (qualified) hope: despite our flaws, there are nevertheless some (and perhaps many) things we can know. This course will explore the implications of our imperfections for our knowledge, within a broadly fallibilist setting. We’ll look at work on a variety of topics, unified by the idea that our epistemic flaws have important lessons for us about what we know (and what we fail to know). A recurring theme will be how our ignorance about the world can give rise to ignorance about what we know.
The authors we will read take a mixture of formal and informal approaches: the aim of the course is, in part, to provide an introduction to some useful technical machinery, while placing an emphasis on its philosophical interpretation.

Module Leaders: Fiona Leigh and Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: C
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: The module focuses on Aristotle's philosophy of mind and moral psychology. After a brief introduction in the first week to the central tenets of his metaphysics and epistemology, the module will cover topics including Aristotle's views human nature and human flourishing, the kinds of cognitive capacities attributable to humans and non-human animals, the emotions, virtue ethics, the doctrine of the mean and learning to be good, weakness of the will, and vice. The central primary text will be the Nicomachean Ethics, although other texts will be consulted, notably de Anima. It is intended that students will learn to read passages from Aristotle’s works in ethics and psychology. They will develop the ability to evaluate the arguments proposed in the sources and to propose and assess different possible interpretations. They will be encouraged to reflect critically on the significance of the material. A sample syllabus, with the relevant primary texts, is as follows (selected secondary reading is also assigned each week):
Week 1
Introduction & metaphysics – overview of life and works, relation to Plato – and Aristotle’s metaphysics: hylomorphism, substance, the four causes, body and soul
Primary Text: Metaphysics, VII.1-4, 6, 10-11, 13, 15, 17; Physics II.1-9; III.1-3, VIII.6; de Anima, book 1.1, 1.4
Week 2
The soul & cognition
Primary Text: de Anima, books I-III, and (optional) de Motu Animalium, 6-11
Week 3
Phantasia & emotion
Primary Text: Rhetoric book II.1-10; de Anima, book III.3
Week 4
Understanding the ‘doctrine’ of the mean
Primary Text: Nicomachean Ethics, books II-III (especially II.1-9, III.5-12)
Week 5
The mean ‘relative to us’
Primary Text: Nicomachean Ethics, books II-III (especially II.1-9, III.5-12)
Week 6
The structure of habituation
Primary Text: Nicomachean Ethics, I.13, II.1-4
Week 7
Habituation & action
Primary Text: (the same as for week 6) Nicomachean Ethics, I.13, II.1-4
Week 8
Virtue and Akrasia (weakness of the will)
Primary Text: Nicomachean Ethics, Nicomachean Ethics, VII.1-10
Week 9
Vice and moral conflict
Primary Text: Nicomachean Ethics, III. 2-5, 10-12, VII.7-8 (already read in week 8), IX.4
Week 10
Vice as a unified psychological state
Primary Text: (mostly the same as for week 9) Nicomachean Ethics, III. 2-5, 10-2, VII.7-8, IX.4

Module Leader: Zoe Walker
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Feminist scholars have long noted that the personal is political. What we do behind closed doors is at once influenced by, and influences, wider power structures and patterns of injustice. But what are the implications of this for sex and relationships? When are they unethical? And when, if ever, should the government intervene to place limits on what we do with our bodies? In this module, we will consider a number of questions concerning the ethics and politics of sex and relationships. 
Topics will include: sexual objectification, the limits of sexual consent, the wrongness of rape, the politics of sexual attraction, sex work, surrogacy, pornography and marriage. 
Some background in Ethics and Political Philosophy will be highly beneficial for this course.

Readings 
The readings for this module will include: 
• Doughtery, Tom (2013). ‘Sex, Lies and Consent.’ Ethics 123 (4): 717-744. 
• John Gardner (2018). ‘The Opposite of Rape.’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 38 (1): 48–70. 
• Srinivasan, Amia (2018). ‘The Right to Sex.’ London Review of Books 40 (6). 
• Nussbaum, Martha (2006). ‘“Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for Bodily Services.’ In Jessica Spector, Prostitution and Pornography: Philosophical Debate About the Sex Industry. Stanford, CA (Stanford University Press): 175-208. 
• Anderson, Elizabeth (1990). ‘The Ethical Limitations of the Market.’ Economics and Philosophy 6 (2):179. 
• Satz, Debra (1992). ‘Markets in Women’s Reproductive Labor.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (2):107-131. 
• Langton, Rae (1993). ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (4):293-330. 
• Brake, Elizabeth (2010). ‘Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law.’ Ethics 120 (2):302-337.

Sample Questions 
Questions that will be covered in this module include: 
• What is sexual objectification? When is it wrong? 
• Under what conditions is consent to sex compromised? 
• Is the wrongness of rape best explained in terms of a lack of consent? 
• What, if anything, is wrong with power imbalanced relationships? 
• Can patterns of sexual attraction be unjust? If so, what, if anything, should we do about them? 
• Is there anything wrong with buying and selling sex? 
• Is women’s reproductive labour different from other kinds of labour? 
• How, if at all, should the use of sex robots be regulated? 
• Does pornography subordinate women? 
• Should the institution of marriage be abolished?

Module Leader: Rob Simpson
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Free speech is a short-hand term for an ethical idea / precept, roughly, that acts of speech should be free (legally, politically, culturally) in a way that’s different from, and in some sense deeper and more robust than, the presumptive freedom that all other kinds of human activity enjoy. All liberal systems of politics presume that we should generally be free to live and act as we please, as long as we’re not significantly impinging on other people’s ability to do the same. The basic idea of free speech is: speech should have some additional degree of freedom, on top of that liberal baseline. 

Individual autonomy is the capacity a person has to govern their own lives and choices. It’s a capacity that very young children ordinarily don’t have, and that adults ordinarily do have. It’s a capacity that can be impinged upon, by other people or by institutions. It’s usually thought to mean something more than mere freedom. Suppose I live in a society where I’m officially free to follow any religion, or choose any career, or socialise with anyone else that wants to socialise with me. But suppose that my ability to actually exercise these freedoms is constrained by a lack of material resources, or because I’m subject to some kind of systematic identity prejudice. Under those conditions I might have freedom, but lack autonomy. Autonomy is something that many of us – and especially political liberals – think of as especially valuable. Having your autonomy taken away is a significant harm, and in many cases a serious injustice. 

This module investigates philosophical questions about free speech and autonomy, and in particular, the relationship between them. Many theorists of free speech have argued that there is a close and important relationship between free speech and autonomy. Roughly, they believe that the political importance of free speech is in some sense grounded in the ethical / personal importance of individual autonomy. By the end of this module you’ll be in a position to explain this idea – both why someone might think it’s true, and what sorts of problems or criticisms this idea faces.
 

What Sorts of Texts Does the Module Include? Most of the readings in the module are works of analytic moral and political philosophy. Some of them have a more formal / technical style, but most of them have a more informal / discursive style. There’s only a few moments across the whole syllabus where the arguments are articulated in logical / symbolic terms. Quite a lot of the readings are by authors who self-consciously identify as “liberals”. In this context, being a liberal means being someone who believes that individual liberty is the most important feature of a just society and legal / political system. John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum are prominent liberal philosophers from the 20th century. John Locke and John Stuart Mill are prominent liberals philosophers from earlier times – the 17th and 19th centuries respectively. People who reject liberalism reject the idea that individual liberty is the most important feature of a just society. You might think, for instance, that there are forms of solidarity, or cohesion, or equality, or overall well-being, that matter more than individual liberty. Different kinds of conservatives and progressives (e.g. socialists) reject liberalism, on these grounds. Most contemporary philosophical work on free speech and autonomy have been produced by authors who identity as liberals in the sense that I’ve described here, which is why they loom large on the syllabus. We also read a number of texts by authors who are critical of liberalism, from some kind of progressive perspective, with a particular emphasis on feminist critiques of liberal individualism, in relation to both free speech and autonomy. Most of the readings are works published in the last 30 years or so, with just a few texts from earlier in the 20th century.

Presumed Background Knowledge The module presumes that students have a basic understanding of key concepts in ethics (e.g. distinctions between major families of ethical theories, consequentialist v. deontological), and some familiarity with basic classifications in political philosophy (e.g. similar to the ones I sketched out in the previous section). Some of the readings in the module intersect with law, but students are not expected to have any prior knowledge of the law, and all of the focus for the syllabus (and assessment) is on philosophical questions, rather than legal facts.

Background readings 
One of the papers we read fairly early in the module is John Christman’s “Autonomy and Personal History” (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21/1 (1991): 1-24, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1991.10717234). If you wanted to do some prereading for the module, this would be a good paper to look at, (a) because it’s one of the papers we examine in depth and return to throughout the module, and (b) because in terms of its style and approach, it’s fairly representative of the type of material that appears across the syllabus. If you want to do some background reading on free speech, I recommend reading Jeff Howard’s entry on the subject in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freedom-speech/).

Module Leader: Clara Bradley    
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: A
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: Problem set 1 (15%) Problem set 2 (15%) Essay, 2500 Words (70%)

Description: In this module, we’ll explore the probabilistic representation of belief and its deep connections to rationality, evidence, and action. Some of the questions we’ll ask include: • What are degrees of belief? • What rules should these degrees of belief follow—and why are they rationally required? • How do beliefs change over time when we learn new information? • How do probabilities shape the way we act and make decisions? • Can probability theory help us solve long-standing philosophical problems in the contexts of induction and scientific confirmation?

The module will roughly follow the structure of the text for the module (see below). We’ll begin with the mathematical foundations of probability theory and see how it can represent—and constrain—our degrees of belief, both at a single moment and as they change over time. From there, we’ll apply probabilistic reasoning to philosophical problems in scientific confirmation, induction, and decision making under uncertainty. We’ll finish by exploring some of the most influential justifications for the probabilistic representation of belief: Dutch book arguments, representation theorems, and accuracy arguments.

The primary texts for this module are:
Titelbaum, Michael (2022), Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology Volumes I and II.

There are also several other books/readings that are complementary to the course:  
• Hacking, Ian, An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic 
• Bradley, Darren, A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology 
• Skyrms, Brian, Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic 
• Easwaran, Kenny, Bayesianism I and II. 
• Weisberg, Jonathan, Odds and Ends

Background Knowledge 
There are no formal prerequisites, but you should be comfortable with introductory logic (e.g., at the level of Introduction to Logic 1 & 2). Chapter 2 of Titelbaum (see above) includes a summary of the relevant first-order logic you’ll need. If you’re unsure about your background, speak to me—I can suggest readings to help you get up to speed. Mathematically, the module will introduce and make use of basic set theory and probability theory, and you will be required to do some mathematical proofs as part of your problem sets (see below). We will go through the concepts from the ground up, and we will do plenty of practice problems in class, but you should be ready to engage with formal definitions, simple proofs, and symbolic reasoning.

Assignments 
The module is 30% take-home problem sets, split over two problem sets each worth 15%, and 70% essay (2500 words). 
The problem sets will mainly be taken from end-of-chapter exercises in Titelbaum. 
Some example essay questions are: 
• Once we recognise that belief and confirmation admit degrees, should we still hold on to the traditional epistemological notion of full belief? 
• Can a satisfactory argument be given that obeying the Principal Principle is a requirement of epistemic rationality? 
• Does the Dutch Book argument succeed at showing that probabilism is a requirement of rationality? Does it succeed at showing that updating by conditionalizaiton is a requirement of rationality? 
• Does a Bayesian approach help to solve the Grue paradox? 
• Does the Newcomb Problem demonstrate that we ought to endorse Causal Decision Theory?

Module Leader: Ulrike Heuer
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: We will explore theories of responsibility, in particular their explanations of its grounds, its scope and its limits. We will also discuss some fundamental skeptical challenges to the practice of holding ourselves and others responsible. In light of these general considerations, we will then examine more specific topics, such as responsibility for attitudes, moral luck, blameworthiness, excuses and collective responsibility.
The aim of the module is to develop an understanding of the nature of responsibility, and the resources and problems of contemporary approaches.
Introductory readings:
• R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 1996.
• Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990.
• Daniel Statman (ed), Moral Luck, SUNY Press 1993  

Module Leader: Ulrike Heuer
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: We will discuss work-in-progress by and with philosophers working on the nature of practical reasons, the explanation of normativity, and related topics in theoretical ethics. We will meet in one week to discuss an author’s work-in-progress among ourselves and then discuss it with the author themself in the following week. The discussion with the author will be based on questions that each student must submit in writing after our preliminary, first discussion of the author’s work.  A list of the invited philosophers will be available in August 2025. 

Module Leader: Pavel Reichl
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: C
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Kant famously imposed strict limits on reason's capacity for knowledge. At the same time, he maintained that human progress depends on individuals' ability to use reason. In this module, we will seek to answer the question: given the critical limits to reason, what role is left for it in philosophical enquiry? Drawing on the first and second Critiques as well as shorter writings, we will look at the following topics: Kant’s conception of theoretical reason in its constitutive vs. its regulative use, the nature of practical reason and its ability to answer the traditional questions of metaphysics, and the relation between the practical and the theoretical, alongside related themes. 

Module Leader: Lucy O’Brien
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: A
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Pervious to Others: The Nature and Control of Social Self-Consciousness

In 2025/26 this module will be taken by Lucy O’Brien. She will present work on her current book project (supported by a BA/Leverhulme Trust Senior Research Fellowship ‘Pains and Pleasures of Interpersonal Self-Consciousness’) 

Humans are social animals. We can make sense of little we do without thinking of ourselves in the context of other humans – our con-specifics. Analytical philosophy of mind has not, however, developed a social philosophy of mind, as a distinct track. This book aims to make a start on doing that. My particular concern is with the nature of social self-consciousness. We say that we ‘feel self-conscious under the eyes of another’. But, what is it to feel that? It is a peculiar duplex phenomenon that is not easy to understand: it seems both to involve us being reflexively conscious of ourselves as ourselves – it is a form of self-consciousness – and at the same time being so through the idea, or awareness, of the other and their perspective on us: it is also other-consciousness of us. A satisfactory account of such social self-consciousness seems to demand both a doubling of standpoints – me and my observer – and an integrated single intersubjective, but reflexive, structure. The book aims to make sense of the nature this form of self-consciousness, how it is occasioned, and how it is controlled by others. It explores how such self-consciousness relates to the self-conscious emotions of shame and pride, and how considers the subject’s own rational and practical relation to her social self-consciousness.

Alongside the presentation of work from the draft of the book, we will explore core related readings.   

Module Leader: Peter Fritz
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: A
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: Problem sets 

Overview This module gives an introduction to some of the formal tools most often used in contemporary philosophy, focusing in particular on modal logic. Modal logic concerns the logic of intensional notions such as necessity and possibility, obligation and permission, knowledge and belief, tense and other temporal constructions. Studying such logics is particularly interesting for philosophers since such intensional notions are central for many philosophical debates, e.g., in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of language. 

The module is based on lecture notes, with references to further literature. To get a better sense of the topic, it may be helpful to consult a standard textbook on modal logic, such as the following: 

Hughes and Cresswell: A New Introduction to Modal Logic (Routledge, 1996) 

A week-by-week overview of a previous instalment of the module is appended at the end of this guide. However, please note that the content of this year’s instalment may deviate somewhat from this. 

Prerequisites The expected background for this module is propositional and predicate logic as it is covered in a standard introduction to formal logic. This includes familiarity with the languages of propositional and predicate logic, formalization of informal arguments in these languages, evaluating propositional formulas using truth tables, evaluating formulas of predicate logic using models, model-theoretic notions such as validity and consequence, some form of proof system, and corresponding proof-theoretic notions such as provability and consistency. 

It is recommended that students have taken, and passed, PHIL0005 Introduction to Logic 1 and PHIL0004 Introduction to Logic 2, or equivalent before selecting PHIL0025 Intermediate Logic. Those who have taken these (or equivalent) modules, but who may have forgotten some of it, are encouraged to review the material in preparation for PHIL0025, e.g., using the (various versions of the) forallx textbook, which is freely available online. 

Assessment The module is assessed using regular sets and an in-person written exam (2 hours). The module grade is calculated as follows: 
• Problem Sets: 45% 
• Exam: 55% 
Problem sets and exam primarily consist of technical exercises in modal logic, but also include some philosophical questions concerning the application of various modal logics to philosophical topics.

Sample Outline 
Unit 1: Basic Theory
Week 1: Introduction and Review 
Lecture 1: Introduction 
Lecture 2: Review of Propositional Logic 

Week 2: Modal Languages and Possible Worlds 
Lecture 1: The Languages of Modal Logic 
Lecture 2: A Logic of Necessity and Possibility 

Week 3: Kripke Semantics 
Lecture 1: Accessibility Relations and Kripke Models 
Lecture 2: Kripke Frames, Validity, and Consequence 

Week 4: Classes of Kripke Frames 
Lecture 1: The Logic of a Class of Kripke Frames 
Lecture 2: Defining Classes of Frames 

Week 5: Normal Modal Logics 
Lecture 1: Hilbert Systems for Modal Logics 
Lecture 2: Soundness and Completeness Unit 2: Extensions 

Week 6: Indexical Operators 
Lecture 1: Double Indexing 
Lecture 2: Pointed Frames 

Week 7: Counterfactuals 
Lecture 1: Selection Functions 
Lecture 2: Systems of Spheres 

Week 8: Propositional Quantifiers 
Lecture 1: Quantifying over Propositions 
Lecture 2: Propositions and Possible Worlds 

Week 9: Modal Predicate Logic with Constant Domains 
Lecture 1: Combining Modal and First-Order Logic 
Lecture 2: The Necessity of Identity 

Week 10: Modal Predicate Logic with Variable Domains 
Lecture 1: Variable Domains 
Lecture 2: Free Logic and Summary

Module Leader: To Be Confirmed
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: A/B/C
Shared: MA Only
Assessment: Essay 4,000 words

Description: This module is a continuation and extension of PHIL0142. This module has two aims: (1) to train you in reading difficult philosophical texts (2) to train you in the skills involved in philosophical discussion.
Indicative Topics
The specific topics covered in the module will vary with the choice of philosophical papers.
Teaching Delivery
Teaching will consist in a weekly two-hour seminar. Discussion of the text will be organized around student presentations.

Module Leader: Clara Bradley 
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: A
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: What is space? What is time? Are they real, physical things—or just ways we describe relationships between objects? And how do we even measure or gain empirical access to spacetime in the first place? In this module, we’ll explore these questions at the intersection of philosophy and physics, tracing how ideas about space and time have evolved from the paradoxes of Ancient Greece to Einstein’s theory of General Relativity. Along the way, we’ll investigate debates about motion, the nature of space and time, and how choices are made between theories of something as abstract as spacetime.
 

The week-by-week schedule is as follows (subject to change): 
1. Zeno’s paradoxes - Mind-bending puzzles about motion and infinity. 
2. The Aristotelian conception - A natural, commonsense view of the cosmos, and how it was overthrown. 
3. Cartesian physics - A ‘relationalist’ picture of space and time. 
4. Newtonian physics - A ‘substantivalist’ picture of space and time. 
5. The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence - A philosophical debate about ‘relationalism’ vs. ‘substantivalism’. 
6. Space-time - A modern way of characterizing the debate between substantivalism and relationalism in terms of the geometric structure of space and time. 
7. The origins of special relativity - What the alternative theories were and why Einstein’s theory became the accepted one. 
8. The philosophy of special relativity - What relativity tells us about reality. 
9. Conventionality of geometry - Whether multiple geometries can describe space.
10. General Relativity - What our best current physics of space-time says and what new philosophical puzzles it raises.

The primary texts for this module are: 
Huggett, Nick (1999), Space From Zeno to Einstein.
Maudlin, Tim (2012), Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time
 
If you would like to get a sense of the level of mathematical detail of the course, I would suggest taking a look at the second reading above (Tim Maudlin’s book). 

There are also several other books that are complementary to the course: 
• Sklar, Larry (1977), Space, Time, and Spacetime 
• Cushing, James (2012), Philosophical Concepts in Physics 
• Disalle, Robert (2006), Understanding Space-Time 
• Geroch, Robert (1978), General Relativity from A to B 
• Earman, John (1989), World Enough and Spacetime 
• Norton, John, Einstein for Everybody 
• Read, James (2023), Special Relativity

Background Knowledge 
There are no formal prerequisites for this module, but we will tackle some challenging physical ideas and their mathematical representations—for example, the concept of four-dimensional spacetime. This means that we’ll sometimes engage with abstract thought experiments and use elements of mathematical geometry. 
A background in physics, mechanics, or geometry will certainly help, but it’s not essential. You can succeed in this course as long as you’re curious about physics (and the maths behind it) and ready to embrace some abstract thinking.

Some example essay questions are:

• Which of Newton’s arguments were directly attacking Descartes’ views? Are they successful? 
• Does Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles succeed at refuting substantival space? 
• Explain Bell’s spaceship scenario. What is the best explanation for the effect? 
• Can empirical evidence alone determine the geometry of physical space?

Module Leader: Mark Kalderon    
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: C
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This seminar is devoted to historical texts that discuss the nature of perception. The texts vary year by year. 
This year we will the seminar will be devoted to Aristotle’s De Anima 3.2 with special attention to the opening aporia about perceptual self-consciousness (though other aspects of that chapter will be discussed, time permitting, especially the closing aporia about apperceptive unity).

Assessment
Assessment is by essay. There will be no assigned titles. Instead, after Reading Week, you are required to meet with me to approve your title and discuss your proposed paper topic.

Reading 
Background 
Plato Charmides 

Editions of Aristotle 
R.D. Hicks, Aristotle’s De Anima, Cambridge University Press, 1907 
W.S. Hett, Aristotle, On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath, Harvard University Press, 1936 
David Ross, Aristotle De Anima, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1961 
D.W. Hamlyn, Aristotle’s De Anima, Books II and III, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1968 
Christopher Shields, Aristotle De Anima, Clarendon Press, 2016 
C.D.C. Reeve, Aristotle De Anima, Hackett, 2017 

The Commentary Tradition 
Themistius, On Aristotle on the Soul, Duckworth, 1996 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestiones 2.16–3.15, Bloomsbury, 1994 (Quaestio 3.7) 
Philoponus, On Aristotle on the Soul 3.1–8, Bloomsbury, 2000 
Simplicius, On Aristotle on the Soul 3.1–5, Bloomsbury, 2000 
Thomas Aquinas, A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Yale University Press, 1999

Secondary Literature 

Victor Caston. Aristotle on consciousness. Mind, 111:751–815, 2002 

Victor Caston. Aristotle on the Appearance of Color and Other Perceptibles. In K. Ierodiakonou and V. Decaix, editors, Theories of Colour from Democritus to Descartes. Routledge, forthcoming 

Victor Caston. More on Aristotle on Consciousness: Reply to Sisko. Mind, 113(451): 523–33, 2004 

Robert Grasso. Perceiving That We See and Hear in Aristotle’s De Anima III 2. Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 13(1): 120–46, 2019 

Pavel Gregoric. Perceiving that We are Not Seeing and Hearing: Reflexive Awareness in Aristotle. In P. Gregoric and J.L. Fink, editors, Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind, 119–37. Routledge, 2020 

Thomas K. Johansen. In Defense of Inner Sense: Aristotle on Perceiving that One Sees. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 21:235–76, 2005 

Aryeh Kosman. Comment on Johansen. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 21:277–85, 2005 

Aryeh Kosman. Perceiving that we perceive: De Anima 3.2. In Virtues of Thought, chapter 3, pages 43–61. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA and London, 2014 

M.M. McCabe. Perceiving that we see and hear: Aristotle and Plato on judgement and reflection. In Mary Margaret McCabe and Mark Textor, editors, Perspectives on Perception, volume 6 of Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical Research, chapter 9, pages 143–77. De Gruyter, 2007 

Catherine Osborne. Aristotle, de Anima 3. 2: How do we perceive that we see and hear? Classical Quarterly, 33(02):401–411, 1983 

Michael Pakaluk. Commentary on Sisko. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy, 16(1):199–206, 2000. 

Mika Perälä. Perceiving that We See and Hear in Aristotle’s De Anima. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 101:317–44, 2019 

John Sisko. Reflexive Awareness Does Not Belong to the Main Function of Perception: Reply to Victor Caston. Mind, 113 (451): 513–21, 2004 

Joshua Trubowitz. Aristotle on perceptual self-consciousness. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, pages 1–22, 2025

Module Leader: José Zalabardo
Level: 7 
Term: 2
Area: A
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

General subject matter of the seminar
In very general terms, the realism/antirealism debate concerns the status of the following thought:
(A) How things stand in the world is, in many respects, independent of us,
and yet
(B) we can gain cognitive access to how things stand in the world;
that is,
(B1) we can represent things in thought and language as being a certain way, which may or may not coincide with how things are
and
(B2) some of these representations can achieve the status of knowledge—we can know that things are as we represent them as being.
The debate arises from a perceived tension between A and B—from arguments to the effect that representation or knowledge are only possible if the independence of the world is abandoned or qualified. Antirealists invoke these arguments to support positions on which reality is somehow dependent on us. Realists maintain that these arguments fail to undermine the independence of the world.
These debates have adopted a wide variety of shapes. The general goal of this seminar is to study specific manifestations of the issue.

The 2025-26 Edition. Realism and Scepticism
This year’s seminar will look at how the problem of scepticism affects the realism/antirealism debate.
Some background reading:
Stroud, Barry. 1994. ""Scepticism, 'Externalism', and the Goal of Epistemology"". Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68:291-307.
Stroud, Barry. 1989. ""Understanding Human Knowledge in General"". In Knowledge and Scepticism, edited by M. Clay and K. Lehrer. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 31-50.
Sosa, Ernest. 1994. ""Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity"". Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68:263-290.
Fumerton, Richard. 2006. ""Epistemic Internalism, Philosophical Assurance and the Skeptical Predicament"". In Knowledge and Reality, edited by T. M. Crisp, M. Davidson and D. Vander Laan. Dordrecht: Springer.

Module Leader: Tim Button
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: A
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: Worksheet 1 (15%); Worksheet 2 (15%); Worksheet 3 (20%); Essay, 2500 Words (50%)

Description: Arithmetic is the branch of mathematics which studies the natural numbers — i.e. the numbers we use to count, i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on — and operations on the numbers — like addition and multiplication. Arithmetic is special. On the face of it, arithmetic is: infinitary; a priori; necessary; universally applicable; indispensable; intersubjectively robust... These features make it especially interesting for philosophers. How is it even possible for there to be a subject with these features? We will start by surveying a few responses to this question. Ultimately, they will push us towards a very tempting philosophical view, advanced by Hilbert. Hilbert's idea was: in higher mathematics, consistency is all that matters. This philosophical view inspired a mathematical research project: Hilbert’s Programme. This aimed to provide arithmetical proofs of the consistency of certain mathematical theories. Famously, though, Hilbert’s Programme runs headlong into Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. The main challenge for philosophers of arithmetic, then, is to make sense of our knowledge of arithmetic, given the phenomenon of incompleteness. In the first five weeks, we will cover the philosophical discussion which led to Hilbert’s Programme. In the second five weeks, we will learn how to prove Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

Background knowledge this course assumes 
Please note that this course is roughly 50% formal logic and 50% philosophy. 

I will presuppose that you have studied introductory logic (at the level of first year Introduction to Logic 1 & 2). Specifically: you’ll need to be comfortable working with first-order logic. (If you aren’t, but are interested in taking the course, that’s OK; you can catch up by reading some introductory material; ask me for recommendations.) 

The course doesn’t require a particular background in mathematics. I will not presuppose any prior knowledge of university-level mathematics; only that you know how to count, and can make sense of things like ‘x 2 + 3x + 2’. That said: whilst I won’t presuppose a lot of mathematical knowledge, I will presuppose ability in and enthusiasm for mathematical logic. We will ultimately prove some substantial results in mathematical logic. This is challenging, but extremely rewarding!

Assessment This course sits at the point where philosophical reflection meets some serious, formal mathematics. The assessment covers both the philosophical and technical aspects. 

In the second half of term, you will also complete three take-home worksheets. These will familiarize you with the formal material that we study in the second half of term. Together, the worksheets will account for 50% of your grade. 

You will write a single coursework essay, due at the start of Term 3. 
The essay will account for 50% of your overall grade. Past essay questions have included things like: 
• Can we know that arithmetic is consistent? If so, how? If not, why not? 
• Is consistency sufficient for truth in mathematics? If not, why not? If so, why is it insufficient for truth in general? 
• What do Gödel’s incompleteness theorems teach us about Hilbert’s programme? You can also apply to choose your own essay title (but I need to approve your choice).

Background readings 
Perhaps you're thinking about doing some background reading before the course starts? Perhaps you're wondering what you've got yourself in for? If so, here are some (totally optional) recommendations!

On the philosophical side, you might also try browsing these books: 
• Stewart Shapiro. 2001. Thinking about mathematics. Oxford University Press. Shapiro's book is a very gentle introduction to philosophy of mathematics. 
• Øystein Linnebo. 2017. Philosophy of mathematics. Princeton University Press. Linnebo's book is a pacier and deeper introduction to philosophy of mathematics. 
• Michael Potter. 2000. Reason's nearest kin. Oxford University Press. Potter's book is not an introduction at all, and it's very dense in places. However, it's a truly fantastic book. 

On the formal side, you could refresh your knowledge of first-order logic (or teach yourself from scratch) with:

• PD Magnus & Tim Button. forallx:Cambridge. This is an open access pdf, which you can obtain here (together with solutions to the questions) And if you want to look ahead, we'll be learning Gödel’s incompleteness theorems from: 
• R Zach. Incompleteness and Computability This is an open access pdf, which you can obtain here.

Module Leader: James Brown
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Many current philosophical discussions, both in practical and theoretical philosophy, centre around the explanation of normativity. This module will introduce you to contemporary debates about the nature of normativity. We will ask questions about the nature of our reasons for performing various kinds of action, for possessing various kinds of feelings and attitudes, and for believing various propositions. We will investigate these questions by learning about contemporary theories and debates concerning each of these areas, covering both classic texts as well as more recent research within this area. 

The module will be structured around three broad areas: 
• Reasons for action. Here, we will examine the nature of reasons for actions, what they are and when we have them. This may include examining views such as internalism, externalism, and constructivism about reasons. 
• Reasons for emotions. Here, we will examine the nature of reasons for emotions in general, as well as philosophical questions arising from specific emotions. This may include examining emotions like grief and anger, as well as issues like the ‘wrongkind of reason’ problem. 
• Other kinds of reasons. Here, we will examine whether there are distinctive kinds of reasons relating to various distinctive normative domains. This may include examining whether there are distinctive reasons relating to domains such as rationality, prudence, and epistemology.

Teaching Delivery This module is delivered in weekly two-hour classes, which are a mixture of lecture and discussion. Students are expected to read the compulsory reading set each week and prepare for discussion in the class. It is expected that all students will contribute to the discussion. 

By the end of the module, you should be able to: 
• Understand and explain the broadest aims and questions of contemporary theorizing about normativity and reasons. 
• Understand and explain the most popular contemporary theories of reasons and normativity and some prominent problems and questions investigated by philosophers in this area relating to action, emotion, and the scope of normativity. 
• Philosophically evaluate and assess the answers given to these problems and questions, and understand what kinds of considerations are relevant to this assessment. 
• Understand and explain how these theories and questions, and their evaluation, connect with one another and with broader philosophical issues.

Recommended Reading 
In preparation for the module, you may wish to read the following introductory texts to get a flavour of some of the topics that may be covered (these will not exhaust the topics covered). These can be found in the UCL Library or online through UCL Library Services. 

On internalism vs externalism about reasons: 
• https://ucl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UCL_INST/18kagqf/cdi_scopus_primar y_2_s2_0_84876381196 
• https://ucl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UCL_INST/18kagqf/cdi_informaworld _taylorfrancisbooks_10_4324_9781315213217_21_version2 
• https://ucl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UCL_INST/18kagqf/cdi_credo_entries_ 23828811 On the ‘wrong kind of reason problem’: • https://ucl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UCL_INST/18kagqf/cdi_credo_entries_ 23828811 
• https://ucl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UCL_INST/18kagqf/cdi_informaworld _taylorfrancisbooks_10_4324_9781315213217_22_version2 
• https://ucl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UCL_INST/18kagqf/cdi_wiley_primary _10_1111_phc3_12412_PHC312412 On the varieties of normativity: 
• https://ucl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UCL_INST/18kagqf/cdi_informaworld _taylorfrancisbooks_10_4324_9780429266768_39_version2 
• https://ucl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UCL_INST/18kagqf/cdi_informaworld _taylorfrancisbooks_10_4324_9781315213217_22_version2 
• https://ucl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UCL_INST/18kagqf/cdi_wiley_primary _10_1111_phc3_12412_PHC312412

Module Leader: Zoe Walker
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Philosophers have always been interested in ethical questions, but in recent years, the spotlight of ethical inquiry has been shone in new and surprising places. We all accept that actions can be the locus of ethical evaluation, but what about mental states like beliefs and attentional dispositions? Can you wrong someone by believing or noticing something about them? We all accept that explicit, sincere utterances could be disrespectful, or do harm, but what about metaphors, jokes and other fictions? And do we all have a fair chance at making a good joke or a beautiful work of fiction, or might injustice have a role to play there as well? In this module, we will explore recent work in practical philosophy that tackles these questions. We’ll start off by looking at work on the ethics of mental states: the ethics of belief and attention. We’ll then move from analysing the mental states themselves to evaluating some of the representations that prompt those mental states: fictions, metaphors and jokes. From here, we’ll transfer our focus to the production of these aesthetic representations: are some people limited in what they can say, and the art they can make, by structural injustice? Finally, we will consider some strategies for resisting these injustices: counter speech, and reshaping our aesthetic tastes. This course will pick up themes from Ethics, Political Philosophy, Aesthetics and, to a lesser extent, Philosophy of Language. Some background in any of these areas – especially Ethics – will be beneficial.
 

Readings 
Provisionally, the core readings for this module will be: 
Week One: Basu, Rima (2021). ‘A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.’ In J. Lackey (ed.) Applied Epistemology: 99-118. 
Week Two: Gardner, Georgi (2022). ‘Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention.’ In M. Alfano, J. De Ridder and C. Klein (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. 
Week Three: Zheng, Robin and Stear, Nils-Hennes (2023). ‘Imagining in Oppressive Contexts, or What’s Wrong with Blackface?’ Ethics 133 (3): 381-414. 
Week Four: Fraser, Rachel (2018). ‘The Ethics of Metaphor.’ Ethics 128 (4): 728-755. 
Week Five: Anderson, Luvell (2015). ‘Racist Humor.’ Philosophy Compass 10 (8): 501-509. 
Week Six: Kukla, Rebecca (2014). ‘Performative Force, Convention and Discursive Injustice.’ Hypatia 29 (2): 440-457. 
Week Seven: Fraser, Rachel (2024). ‘Aesthetic Injustice.’ Ethics 134 (4): 449-478
Week Eight: Clavel-Vázquez, Adriana (2023). ‘Controlling (Mental) Images and the Aesthetic Perception of Racialized Bodies.’ Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10: 25. 
Week Nine: Langton, Rae (2018). ‘Blocking as Counter-Speech.’ In D. Fogal, D.W. Harris and M. Moss (eds.) New Work on Speech Acts: 144-164. 
Week Ten: Irvin, Sherri (2017). ‘Resisting Body Oppression: An Aesthetic Approach.’ Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):1-26.

Sample Questions 
Questions that will be covered in this module include: 
• Can you wrong someone just by believing something about them? 
• When, if ever, are patterns of attention immoral? • Are there any ethical limits on what we imagine? 
• (How) can metaphors entrench injustice? 
• When, if ever, is a joke racist? 
• When I speak, can my audience alter what I do with my words? 
• Can you be wronged in your capacity as an aesthetic agent? 
• What is the relationship between beauty and injustice? 
• How can we resist bad speech? 
• Can we improve our aesthetic tastes?

Module Leader: Florent Dumont
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: C
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This course will focus on Descartes’ metaphysical views in his Meditations on First Philosophy. 
In the Principles, Descartes writes “(…) since God alone is the true cause of everything which is or can be, it is very clear that the best path to follow when we philosophise will be to start from knowledge of God himself and try to deduce an explanation of the things created by him. This is the way to acquire the most perfect scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge of effects through their causes” (CSM, 1/201). 

And yet, the existence of God is not demonstrated until the Third Meditation. This reveals an important feature of the Meditations: the order of reasons does not coincide with the order of things. In order grasp the content of Descartes’ metaphysics, we must therefore interpret the Meditations according to the order of things. This course aims to do just that. 

Here is a provisional outline of the course structure: 
• WEEK 1: THE ORDER OF REASONS &THE ORDER OF THINGS 
• WEEK 2: SUBSTANCE AND INDEPENDENCE 
• WEEK 3: THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 
• WEEK 4:DIVINE SIMPLICITY 
• WEEK 5: EFFICIENT CAUSATION 
• WEEK 6: ANALOGY AND EQUIVOCATION 
• WEEK 7: FREEDOM AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES 
• WEEK 8: THE SIMPLE NATURES 
• WEEK 9: MATTER AND EXTENSION 
• WEEK 10: MIND AND THOUGHT

Background knowledge this course assumes 
Familiarity with Descartes’ work is not required but will be beneficial for engaging with the course material.

Module Leader: James Wilson
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This module provides an in-depth examination of philosophical questions in the epistemology and ontology of social change. Each week will combine the study of one or more key theoretical concepts, with relevant real-world case studies. Precise topics to be studied will change from year to year, but an indicative selection of topics that could be discussed in the module would be:
1. Mechanistic explanations and social change 
2. Structural explanations and individual agency
3. Wicked and super-wicked problems
4. Social norms, and their role in explanations of social change
5. Complex systems approaches to public policy
6. Self-fulfilling prophecies and looping concepts
7. Power, knowledge and social reality I: understanding power
8. Power, knowledge and social reality II: epistemic injustice
9. Agenda setting in democratic decision-making
10. The role of the role of scientific expertise in democratic decision-making 
11. Evidence and public policy I: What should we measure, and how?
12.  Evidence and public policy II: Replication, scaling up and external validity

Module Leader: Shai Agmon
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Come gather 'round people Wherever you roam And admit that the waters Around you have grown And accept it that soon You'll be drenched to the bone If your time to you is worth savin' And you better start swimmin' Or you'll sink like a stone For the times they are a-changin' 

(Bob Dylan.)

This course addresses one of the most fundamental aspirations in politics: changing the world for the better. Social activists, journalists, politicians, policymakers, and social movements all share the desire to make a difference and to drive meaningful change.

However, the question of how change should be pursued is far from obvious. This course examines this normative challenge, inviting students to engage with key questions such as: When acting for change, should we aim for an ideal society or focus on what is feasible in the present? What constitutes political power, and how can we discern which changes are achievable? Should we advocate for revolution or incremental reforms? Should we pursue change through electoral politics, social movements, courts, or by altering social norms and culture? Should we aim for change as a result of intentional collective action or through the spontaneous order arising from individual actions? Should we try to change from within by making our voices heard, or by leaving the group?

Examining these philosophical debates will engage us with some of the most important and enduring problems in contemporary politics. Throughout the course, we will bridge abstract philosophical discussions with a series of concrete, real-world examples.

Pre-requisites: There are no formal prerequisites for this module, but it is a shared course for third-year undergraduates and master's students. Therefore, some background in political philosophy is assumed, such as the content covered in the first-year module, PHIL0007 Introduction to Political Philosophy. Familiarity with key concepts, theories, and debates in political philosophy will be beneficial for engaging with the course material. Teaching delivery: The course consists of 2 hours per week: a 1-hour lecture and a 1-hour seminar. The lecture will cover key concepts, and the seminar will allow for discussion and deeper analysis. You will be expected to do preparatory reading for each session and to be able to take part in seminar discussion.

By the end of the module:

You will explore and evaluate key theories of political and social transformation, engaging with normative debates on power, collective action, spontaneous social order, compromise, revolution, institutional mechanisms for change, and more. You will be able to apply philosophical insights to contemporary political debates such as climate change, housing segregation, abortion, judicial activism, Brexit, and more. You will be able to articulate your views and present them in an analytical, rigorous, and philosophically informed manner. You will have developed your ability to normatively assess arguments presented in texts, case studies, and real-world scenarios, identifying logical fallacies, inconsistencies, and biases in reasoning.

Module Leader: Giulia Cavaliere
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: BA and MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: Love, friendship, parenthood and public policy.
This module explores fundamental questions in moral and political philosophy that shape both private and public life, examining the intersection between the two.
The first half of the module focuses on intimate relationships and the role of law and public policy in regulating them. While we often consider relationships—whether between parents and children, romantic partners, or friends—to be deeply personal matters, the state frequently intervenes through legal and policy frameworks. To what extent should it be allowed to do so? What are the limits of permissible interference in private relationships? While such regulations can promote well-being and social flourishing, they can also come into tension with other important values. Drawing on scholarship in moral and political philosophy, this module provides students with analytical tools to assess these trade-offs and critically evaluate different policy approaches.
The second half of the module turns to the philosophy of love broadly constructed, with an emphasis on moral and political aspects of relationships such as romantic love, sex, friendship, and parenthood. How do love and morality intersect? What obligations, if any, arise from friendships or romantic commitments? What are justified reasons for ending a relationship? Are there ethical objections to polyamory? As contemporary relationship structures evolve—through new parenting models, non-traditional partnerships, and alternative friendship arrangements—this module examines the philosophical implications of these shifts. Students will engage with both conceptual questions about the nature of these relationships and normative discussions concerning the rights, duties, and interests of those involved.
By the end of the module, students will have developed a deeper understanding of the philosophical foundations of private and public life. Through interactive, discussion-based seminars, they will also sharpen their critical thinking, practical reasoning, and argumentative skills, equipping them to engage thoughtfully with pressing ethical and political issues.

Module Leader: John Hyman
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: C
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words) 

Description: This course will consist in a close reading of the main passage in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations devoted to the philosophy of mind: §§243-315. The topics discussed in this passage include the privacy of the mind, the ownership of mental states, our knowledge of our own and others’ mental states, our expression and communication of our mental states, and the impossibility of private language. We may in addition discuss other passages and topics in Wittgenstein’s post-1929 writings relating to action, expression and causation.

Set text: L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

Background reading: Severin Schroeder, Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle; 
P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy, chs.1-5, espec. ch.5.
 

Module Leader: Véronique Munoz-Dardé
Level: 7
Term: 2
Area: B
Shared: MPhil Stud
Assessment: One essay (4,000 words)

Description: This module will introduce grad students to Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Political thought remains focused on questions of injustice and inequality. In the era of civil rights, the key theoretical text on these questions came to be written and published: John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. The purpose of the course is to present and assess Rawls’s seminal book in its entirety, as a single project, placing it in wider historical and ethical context. Students will also familiarise themselves with current philosophical work on equality and inequalities inspired by, or critical of Rawls’s egalitarianism.