Colonizing the Greek Mind? The Reception of Western Psychotherapeutics in Greece

Edited by
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Greeks do not like the idea of having been colonized any more than Americans do. In both cases there has been plenty of intervening time to forget colonialism, unlike countries such as Cyprus where colonization and independence lie within living memory. Although America retained the English language, along with numerous other cultural features, the geographic expansion of the USA and its economic success over the last century have ultimately reduced the British colonial moment to a quaint object of reflection. In an act of ideological prestidigitation, the British period today conjures up images of American independence — the Boston Tea Party, fifes and drums — rather than mournful colonized dependence, or subordination.

The four hundred-year Ottoman period carries more traumatic overtones for Greece not least because it straggled to a close in a series of conflicts lasting into the twentieth century. But these wars of liberation also enshrined autonomy and self-determination as paramount values. During my first lengthy stay in Greece, while waiting out a driving rainstorm lasting several days, a shepherd on Naxos enthused about the heroic Greek values of independence as expressed by Kazantzakis in his passionately written novel Kapetan Mikhalis (Freedom or Death). When the sun finally came out, shouting “freedom or death”, we took a picture of ourselves draped in shotgun cartridge belts, holding a couple of old hunting rifles aloft. I cite this example to highlight the grassroots unthinkability of “colonization” in Greece.

Today there is a fair amount of Greek scholarship on the Ottoman period, but it is not thought of as colonial history. Indeed, the general framework of colonialism/post colonialism has not been much embraced by modern Greek

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historians. To the extent that such a paradigm has been explored it is mostly in relation to a Western colonization of Greece beginning with philhellenism and leading to the war of independence. A Bavarian monarch headed the first government of Greece and there were even some foreign boots on the ground for a while in the 1830s. According to the independence-as-colonization theory, Hellenism, Greece’s core political and aesthetic value, is to be understood as a Western model formulated by European classicists and philhellenes and foisted onto Greece (Leontis 1995: 68, Gourgouris 1996, Calotychos 2003: 49ff). Neoclassical buildings had, for example, already sprouted in Edinburgh and Paris. Their erection in Greece by German-trained architects implemented a foreign-processed Hellenism rather than a diachronically developed Greek aesthetic.

Michael Herzfeld’s (2002: 901) contention that Greece was “crypto-colonized” by the West offers a variation on this analysis. In his view Greece retained political independence at the price of economic dependence on the more powerful states of Europe, which also came to exercise hegemony over Greece in the sphere of ideas and aspirations. More recently, the archaeologist Yannis Hamilakis has offered a perceptive account of how exogenous Hellenism at first squelched local Greek versions of national identity (Romiosyni), but later amalgamated with them to form a hybrid indigenous Hellenism (2007: 119). It is worth noting that these various analyses in terms of colonialism have all been produced outside Greece (even if by Greek scholars), and in English in the first instance. Perhaps the recommendation of colonialism as an analytical tool is itself a further colonization by hegemonic Western academic authority? It remains to be seen if the language of colonization will be developed in domestic Greek scholarly circles and public forums.

This is the background against which to read the essays collected here under the title: “The Colonization of the Greek Mind?”. Not all of the contributors would agree that there is such a thing as the Greek mind, or that it has been colonized. The title is meant as a próklisi – and I use this Greek word because no single English term captures the combined senses of challenge/stimulation/provocation intended in my usage of “colonization”.

One might think that the reception of psychotherapies into Greece presents a set of issues very different from colonization. Clearly there were no psychotherapies of the contemporary post-Freudian sort in Greece before Freud and his successors innovated them. The same was true of every other country, including Austria. These
ideas arose and circulated only beginning in the last century. As people began to embrace these ideas they came to think differently about themselves – as having individualized psychologies, as having an unconscious, as assuming an active role in the quest for self-understanding. The consciousness of everyone who came into extensive contact with psychotherapeutics was, in this way, “colonized”. People came to participate in a world increasingly psychologized in the sense that people were individuated and managed through measurements of aptitude and intelligence. Psychotherapies and self-help therapies extending into the popular sphere of magazine articles and television programmes further radiated what Nikolas Rose (1998: 2) has termed “psy”, the complex of disciplines and ideas orientating people toward self-realization, individualization, autonomy and self-fulfilment (Rose 1998: 2-3). There should, therefore, be no surprise (or stigma) if Greece also received these ideas along with everyone else. In the last fifty years, with increased global marketing and communication, “psy-ification” has been a hard-to-avoid matter of globalization. Change, yes; colonization, perhaps no?

Globalization may not, however, be a neutral alternative to colonization, but rather entirely consistent with it: a form of neo-colonialism. As the journalist Ethan Watters puts it in his book, *Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche* (2010: 3):

> A few mental illnesses identified and popularized in the United States – depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anorexia among them – now appear to be spreading across cultural boundaries all around the world with the speed of contagious diseases.

This standardization is driven by international medical science, with general consensus around ideas disseminated in professional journals. Local illness categories have been demolished and replaced in the process causing the experience of illness to be reconfigured both individually and socially. With the increasing pharmaceuticalization of psychiatry the winners are the big pharmaceutical companies (“Big Pharma”), based predominantly in countries such as the USA, Britain, France and Germany. One must, therefore, seriously consider the realities behind the expression “colonization of the mind”.

Of course, not everything received through globalization is necessarily accepted, or understood and locally consumed in exactly the same manner. Anthropologists have persistently made the case that global products are localized
and endowed with particular cultural meanings. McDonald’s, for example, means different things in each of the major Asian countries: some think of it as a taste of the West (Hong Kong), others as only snack food and not a proper meal (Japan), while still others see it as only for children, or as a tourist destination (China) (Watson 2006). Greece resisted McDonald’s for a long time. Yet in the interim it developed an indigenous alternative: Goody’s. The basic concept of fast food could not be resisted. Yet McDonald’s has also been localized. The menu is by no means the same as at outlets in America. You cannot get a “Greek Mac” in Chicago.

**Was it Greek to Begin With?**

Some have contended that Greece was the first place to develop “therapies of the word” as the Spanish professor Pedro Laín Entralgo (1970) termed them. If one adequately historicizes the Western tradition, then it does appear that Greece first produced and exported some of the ideas it later received back from northern Europe in the form of “psy” therapies. “Colonization” by the West would then be an inaccurate assessment, a matter that Vasileios Thermos raises in his contribution to this volume. Logotherapies began in ancient Greece with Plato’s idea that a skilled philosopher could use rhetoric to talk people out of dismal states of mind. He contended that individuals could be restored to the harmonious condition of *sophrosyne* if they could be persuaded to take a new view of themselves and their situation. This was an early version of cognitive behavioural therapy developed further by the Stoics (Hadot 1995, Sorabji 2000). Aristotle thought that physicians could heal patients by treating emotions via poetry, or through a drama therapy in which emotions were theatrically induced to effect psychotherapeutic healing, the “catharsis of the soul” (Laín Entralgo 1970: 245). Galen recognized that the psyche could cause illness, but the Hippocratic tradition treated the body alone and the therapy of the word never gained hold in the medical tradition.

Christianity contributed to the development of “psy” when it formulated the Trinitarian and Christological doctrines of the “person” leading, as Marcel Mauss (1985: 20) contended, to the formation of the concept of the unified, modern person. Earlier Stoic thought informed Christian ideas and practices of controlling the self. The goal, however, was no longer happiness *per se*, but a freedom from sin that would place one close to God both now and in the afterlife – blessedness. With its emphasis on the choice-making individual as responsible for sin and as the account-
able unit for salvation, Christianity contributed to the formation of the concept of the individual. But the permeability of this individual to forces of God and the devil made it a distinctively Christian anthropology. It was this anthropology that held amongst the populace of the Greek state as the country emerged into European modernity after independence.

It is true, then, that developments in the Greek area from antiquity through Christianity laid some of the foundation for modern psychotherapeutics, but not the whole foundation. After the Greek Church split from the Latin Church, and Constantinople fell to the Ottomans, the Greek-speaking east was increasingly isolated from crucial developments such as Protestantism, the Enlightenment and secularism that would prepare the final way for the establishment of psychotherapeutics.

Protestantism took the unreformed Christian out-worldly orientation of the few (i.e. monks; Weber 2002: 101), and made it into the watered down inworldly project of the many. Self-discipline became a more pronounced feature of life in the world, while the abolition of confession made knowledge of the self yet more private. The depth and interiority of the individual increased. As Webb Keane (2007: 52, 188) has illustrated in his study of Calvinist missionaries, Protestantism placed a high premium on freedom of conscience, and also on the sincere responses of the self. Agency came to rest in the individual’s authentic interpretation of experience, rather than in the actions of spirits or objects, which instructed people what to do. God might have a powerful plan, but this would be realized through individual interpretation, not by surrendering individual decision making to exterior forces.

Beginning with Descartes’ separation of the thinking mind from its external objects of contemplation, enlightened European thought emphasized consciousness as the defining feature of mind. Over the following two centuries, this consciousness was shown to contain an unconscious level comprising unrecognized impulses and emotions. The scanting of the unconscious in Descartes’ original formulation, motivated its triumphant discovery, and by 1870 the notion of the “unconscious mind” was a European commonplace (Whyte 1978: 160).

This delivered the situation up to Freud. An ideology of individualism and self-discipline spurred by Protestantism had taken hold in northern Europe while spirituality and religiosity had gradually drained out of the equation. Secularism reached one of its periodic high tide moments in the late Victorian period. With no
Protestant outlet in confession – except where lay confession known as the “the care of souls” (Seelensorge) was practiced (Ellenberger 1970: 76) – and a rising conviction in the power of the unconscious, the situation was ripe for the creation of psychoanalysis.

**Psychotherapeutics and Greece**

As Cartesian consciousness underwent revision in the West, the psyche (psykhi) in the Greek-speaking world remained a partially divine portion of the person. Priests were ipso facto psychoanalysts and psychotherapeutics was a branch of theology. The northern European, post-Reformation way of being had taken centuries to form. Only after independence were the Greek lands able to begin extricating themselves from Ottoman serfdom where the main civic reference point was the Patriarch of Constantinople. The adaptation of European law codes by the early state, the foundation of institutions such as the university, and the political subordination of the Church to the state were, for Greece, like living the Reformation and the Enlightenment in speeded up time. A northern European way of life could not, however, be adopted so quickly and in any case, the ground was not prepared for it to flourish since the Church was still unreformed. Orthodox stalwarts at the time complained about being Protestantized under the new Bavarian-led state, a position echoed by latter-day exponents of Neo-Orthodoxy (e.g. Yannaras 1971: 139). Northern European modernity could not simply be transferred to Greece. A way of being cannot just be copied; it needs to be lived into. There exists no equivalent to Apple’s “Migration Assistant”¹ for transferring ontology from one society to another.

One of the first articles I read when I embarked on a career as an anthropologist was Adamantia Pollis’s “Political Implications of the Modern Greek Idea of Self” (1965), where she wrote that: “Nothing demonstrates more dramatically the absence of the notion of an autonomous individual than the absence of a word in Greek for privacy. One of the basic rights of an individual in the West, the right to privacy, is lacking as a concept and is not part of the cultural pattern of Greece” (p. 32). In Greece, to be alone is pitiable, or else an ascetic religious choice, not an everyday value.

¹ [For PC users] “Migration Assistant” is used when one wants to transfer all of the contents from one computer to another computer. Migration Assistant performs the feat of preserving and transferring the interdependent, bedded-in relationship between operating system, applications and files that had built up organically over years of use.
Pollis’s observation would not be expressible today in its bold original terms without incurring charges of linguistic determinism and stereotyping. Greek people are too various to classify by such lumbering criteria as individualism and collectivism. Most people are both individualists and group-orientated to varying degrees, in alternation, and according to the situation. Yet Greece undoubtedly has a very different cultural feel than Germany or the Netherlands. Recriminations flying between Greece and Germany during the current financial crisis make this clear. The IMF and other members of the Troika (European Commission and European Central Bank) attempting to stabilize the Greek economy have characterized Greece as beset by corruption, tax evasion, clientelism, and fraud (Hirschon n.d.). The “fear of responsibility” (εφθινοφοβία), which Herzfeld (1992: 90, 143) identified as a besetting problem within Greek bureaucracy, may also be listed here as an indication of difference. The implicit contrast is with American or northern European governmental systems where, in theory at least, the buck stops somewhere. It is no coincidence that Mediterranean societies inspired the analytic terms “honour and shame”. Post-Protestant anthropologists were, I believe, fascinated (at an unacknowledged level) by the different attitude toward guilt in southern Europe, and they zeroed in on this difference as a salient Mediterranean cultural feature.

Greece became a majority urban society only in the early 1960s, a demographic shift made more or less a century earlier in northern Europe. Traditional life began to erode quickly at this time in the face of higher education levels and social mobility, which made the emerging generation less dependent on the family. One sign of this, as identified by Renée Hirschon (2010: 300), is the gradual shift away from the celebration of name days. Approximately 70 per cent of Greek men share twenty names. To celebrate on one’s saint’s day, then, is to celebrate communally the eternal saint. A party would be prepared at home to which no invitation was needed since name days were public knowledge. By contrast, birthday celebrations are private and individualizing, and Hirschon’s interlocutors (n.d.) explicitly recognized birthdays as a “European” practice (έτσι κάνουν sto exoterikó, stin Evrópi) – an example of European hegemony working as a gradual process over the last fifty years. I agree with Hirschon (2010: 306) that these developments point to an ontological shift from the Orthodox anthropology of the person to a Western anthropology of the individual.
A senior academic psychologist in Athens recounted to me how at first, in the 50s, Greek therapists tried to apply American models that focused on promoting individuation in the treatment of teenagers and young adults. They soon realized that this approach was not appropriate to a transitional post-war Greek context where individual psychological health could not be achieved apart from the family. Mental healthcare initiatives, such as Anna Potamianou’s Mental Health Section (MHS) of the Royal National Foundation (1956-64), or George and Vasso Vassiliou’s Athenian Institute of Anthropolos (opened 1963), tried to take account of the new social realities in Greece. The MHS, studied by Despo Kritsotaki (this volume) combined short-term psychotherapy, group therapy, and family therapy. In so doing practitioners performed the difficult task of helping people to become independent from their families, while involving their families in their therapy. Greek transcultural psychiatry later articulated the view that in so-called “sociocentric” settings (where the individual is strongly connected to a surrounding community), therapy was more usefully oriented toward social and family relations, rather than toward individual “self-knowledge” and “self-governance” (Davis, this volume). As a Greek woman told my anthropologist colleague Renée Hirschon (personal communication): “We don’t need counsellors and psychotherapists; we’ve got friends and family”.

Group, family, and drama therapies have had a relatively good uptake in Greece over the last fifty years. Something similar is revealed by Li Zhang’s ethnographic study of Kunming, a city in south-western China where people have settled on a repertoire of preferred therapies that include prominently: Cognitive/Behavioural Therapy (CBT), family therapy, and sand play, a therapy based on Jungian principles where clients make shapes in sand that are interpreted as models of the psyche. According to Zhang (n.d.), “Chinese clients lost patience when asked to spend long periods of time narrating their pasts”. Ultimately, Western psychotherapeutics come in a variety of forms, and these are mixed and matched in the process of localization.

**Traditional Greek Psychotherapeutics**

A panoply of psychotherapeutic practices were available in Greece before the advent of psytherapeutics. The evil eye (to máti) caused illnesses ranging from headache through lethargy and body aches. A family member or a person from the community would diagnose it (by dripping oil into water) and cure it using exorcistic
spells. The Church accepts the evil eye and has its own prayer against it, which a priest must perform. Lay exorcism, which the Church considers a superstitious practice, is far more common. People also entertained a variety of so-called xotiká – spirits such as the neráïdes and lámies, which could “steal people’s minds”, causing them to go mad (Stewart 1991). A variety of dedicated spells and prayers existed to cure xotiká attacks. And finally, closely related to the xotiká, were the attacks of the Orthodox Christian devil, and his accompanying demons, which found openings left by the weakness of human will to cause mental illness or ruinous addictions. The cure in these cases, also valid against the demonic xotiká, was exorcism performed by clerics at a Church or monastery, accompanied by communion and confession if possible. All of these various illnesses placed the person in a social context where their condition could be publicly labelled and treated. Furthermore, if a neráïda (female demon) left a young man insane, or withering gossip (glossofagiá) inflicted the evil eye, it was not entirely the sufferer’s fault. In fact, it was often said that these attacks resulted from the envy of others at the victim’s success or beauty.

In traditional Greek communities the body was the primary vehicle for the expression of distress, giving rise to a profusion of what psychiatrists might term “somatoform disorders”. These are physical symptoms not caused by any underlying medical pathology (e.g., phantom pains, Münchausen syndrome). Well-known Greek examples include névra or, “nerves”, which is felt as headache and internal pressure to the point of boiling over into fits of shouting and throwing things; and stenokhória, debilitating “worry, or anxiety”. To these one might also add being matiasménos, “in the grip of the evil eye”, or daimonisménos, “possessed by a demonic force”. An example would be the “suffering” reported by the Thracian followers of the cult of Saint Constantine studied by Danforth in his book *Firewalking and Religious Healing* (1989). Two main categories of sufferers emerged from his study: 1) those away from the community in the loneliness of diaspora; and 2) recent brides living in their husband’s natal home with their in-laws. People presented with a variety of symptoms, such as mood swings, anxiety, or feelings of suffocation. They attributed their illness to a malevolent possession by the saint, which they understood as a call to revere the saint. Many joined the Anastenarides, an inner circle of devotees, who are custodians of special icons. To regain wellbeing, they venerated the saint intensively throughout the year, culminating in a ritual of fire walking on the saint’s day. The saint is said to empower
them and protect them from burns. As an example of ritual healing, fire walking may be classed with evil eye un-bewitching, funeral lamentation and exorcism. All of these indigenous therapies take sociosomatic illness seriously and treat it performatively, and often publicly.

Bodily symptoms may index painful social relations. As Nadia Seremetakis showed in her study of funeral lamentation (1991, and in this volume), pain, like the lament, is antiphonal; it takes shape as others respond to it. There is a sufferer and a chorus. The complaint is shared, repeated, ratified and dissipated. Similarly, therapists such as coffee cup readers and evil eye un-bewitchers frequently take on the symptoms of the sufferers in yawns and sneezes as they process and expel the ailment. Medical cures such as aspirin are viewed as impersonal; not involving a social relationship and therefore less effective (Seremetakis, this volume).

As Danforth (1989) observed, in the USA people engage with firewalking through straightforward psychologization. They determine that they have inner fears or limitations and decide that this ritual will help them to improve as a person. In the Greek cases of ritual healing it could be said that there is little or no detour through psychologization. This poses a problem for the application of Western psychotherapeutics, first of all because these therapies are geared toward people who present as ill in psychological rather than religious terms. Much as philosophy arose in ancient Greece by replacing animate gods with abstract principles through application of the neuter article to conceptualize elements (to pyr, “fire”; to ýdor, “water”), so Western psychotherapeutics arose in the wake of Weber’s “disenchantment of the world”. Their precondition was the elimination of animate ideas of the emotions such as we find in the accounts of the early Church where lust, envy and despondency (akidía) were not only sins, but demons which attacked individuals. The management of such troubling emotions in traditional Orthodoxy involved a psychic battle against external forces, and the community largely accepted the power of this “external persecutory order” (Crapanzano 1977).

Modern psychotherapeutics reframed these demonic powers as human projections of what deeply belonged to the individual: their history and personality. Learning to submit to this new conceptualization required countenancing a personal ownership of illness, applying a hermeneutics of suspicion to the self, and involvement in the therapeutic process required exercising individual agency to effect healing. These were the new rules of the game of personhood. If the idea of a
“colonization of consciousness” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992) is not an acceptable description of this transformation, then perhaps it can be viewed as analogous to a religious conversion; in this case, a conversion to modernity.²

In Thrace, one of the most rural and underdeveloped areas of Greece, psychiatrists viewed somatic “conversion disorders” as indexes of local culture; ailments brought on by cultural situations and ideas, but which were not true mental illnesses. This view is consistent with the psychiatrists’ diagnostic manual (DSM), which considers “somatoform ailments” not to result from any physical pathology. An example would be the young woman described by Elizabeth Davis (this volume), who was distressed by life in her husband’s extended family household, and suffered bouts that she described as “going wild”. Her structural situation and symptoms resembled those of women who referred themselves to the Anastenaria – also located in Thrace. At the clinic in Alexandroupolis, psychiatrists viewed her as exhibiting “classic hysteria”, such as was common in Europe in the 19th century, but which is rarely encountered in modern societies. Indeed, conversion disorders generally have been receding in the face of modern psychotherapeutics. As Davis remarks (this volume), these cases of hysteria represent the shrinking space of “culture” (read pre-modern culture) as Western modernity claims more and more territory. The ultimate goal of modern psychiatry in Greece is to eliminate these atavistic illnesses altogether. To paraphrase Freud: Where catatonia was, there depression shall be. This situation may fairly be conceived as a colonization of the Greek mind, understanding colonization in this case as the intentional replacement of local beliefs and practices with metropolitan forms.

The goal of the psychiatrists in Thrace was “to coax distress out of the body and into discourse” (Davis, this volume). This did not mean the self-knowing discourse of psychoanalysis, but rather a liberal discourse of individual responsibility. The doctors also introduced therapeutic contracts in which patients agreed to their obligations in order to continue receiving care (Davis 2012: 211). Western psychotherapeutics thus contributed to the advent of a new ontology of the person, which had been arriving for some time now as we saw in the example of name day celebrations. Psychiatry is not engineering change all by itself, but in

² As Jung points out in his Psychology and Religion (1960), the development of modern psychology rests precisely on the transition from religious explanation of mental states in terms of animate, exogenous supernatural forces such as demons and angels to explanation in terms of dynamic endogenous emotional forces described in inanimate analytic terms.
concert with other factors. Urbanization, education in Western universities, and mass tourism in Greece – these are only some of the notable developments stimulating the shift to a more individualistic ideology. To be clear, this is not an either-or situation where one is either wholly Western individualist or non-modern sociocentric Greek, but one of gradations, with plenty of steps forwards and backwards, and contradictions. The situation is non-homogeneous, or “non-synchronous” to use Ernst Bloch’s term (1977). People are orientated in various non-coordinated temporal directions in the present; some cling to the past, while others energetically prepare for the future.

**Dreaming: Indigenous and Exogenous Approaches**

I became interested in these questions of indigenous and exogenous psychotherapeutics in the course of the project on dreaming that I recently completed (Stewart 2012). The majority of dreams that I collected were historical, dating back to the 1830s and the 1930s. These dreams of saints played out mainly in the field of religion. The subject matter did not involve illness or the need for psychotherapy. Yet, I was conducting my ethnographic research in the present and collecting, discussing and presenting my data in the Greek context that I have been describing above. Although dreams of saints were widely accepted in some quarters, others viewed them skeptically. In my own case study from Naxos, people dreamed of holy figures who instructed them to build a huge church. Construction on the church began in the late 1990s and it is almost finished. Those members of the community spearheading the actual building, however, downplayed mystical dreaming. They called themselves “dreamers”, but they pointedly rationalized the term to mean that they were people with ambitions and goals. I wanted to understand how the various ways of understanding dreams sat next to each other and interacted in contemporary society.

Alongside religious dreaming where saints appear and give instructions, the other main indigenous form of interpretation is oneirocriticism, a tradition extending back to antiquity. In this system the dream is raided for certain key symbols, which have particular meaning. If you see snakes, for example, it means that you will encounter enemies; to see fish (psária) foretells sorrows (lakhtára), a formulation held together by assonance and widely remembered. In the oneirocritic view dreams predict the future: if you see a wedding, you will attend a funeral. On a
recent visit to a village on Naxos a young man told me of a dream in which his tooth fell out and then went back in again. Shortly thereafter a friend was involved in a bad car accident and he almost died but the medics revived him. Losing a tooth in a dream signifies death.

When I began my research on dreaming in Greece, many people asked me if I “believed” in dreams. What they were actually asking was: “did I believe that dreams come true – i.e., did they predict the future?” This reflects the pervasiveness of oneiromancy, but it also indicated people’s doubts about it and their awareness of alternatives. Would a “Westerner” like me subscribe to the dream book approach? When I gave a guest lecture at the Panteion University in Athens I discussed this topic with the students. They said that they would prefer to have their dreams interpreted by their grandmother according to the age-old oneirocritic method, rather than by consulting a psychotherapist/analyst. In rejecting psychoanalysis the Panteion students were rejecting an exogenous psychological model, implicitly, not by identifying it as an import, or by criticizing its theory. What they opposed was the commodification and atomization of therapy. With one’s grandmother, dream interpretation is free, and carried out within the home, with perhaps other family members sharing in the process. Professional psychotherapy, they pointed out, is contracted with a “stranger” (xénos, their telling term for a non-kin person) for a fee; it is private and individualistic. Leftism along with family cohesiveness informed their thinking.

Oneirocriticism offers one set of interpretations to fit everyone, but in practice these meanings are adjusted to individuals. By and large oneirocriticism does not specify where dreams come from; they are occult phenomena. Some people offered hesitant views on “instinct” (énstikto) and “premonition” (proaísthisi), to account for how people might know the future. In some conversations people wondered if it was not the “unconscious” (yposyneídito) that gave rise to dreams and they looked to me for confirmation and further discussion.

The oneirocritic approach appears to be at least somewhat psychotherapeutic in the sense that it deals with the mental imagery of individuals and helps them manage emotions such as anxiety. For this reason, oneirocriticism could be considered an indigenous psychological practice. Yet, from the view of western psychotherapeutics, it is non-psychological because it does not consider the dreams to spring from individual biographies. At the very best it could be viewed as
ineffective psychotherapy, capable at most of temporarily halting a symptom, much as hypnosis could be briefly effective in treating hysteria. Traditional therapies – and this can apply to the earlier indigenous forms of healing – work at the level of imitation and illusion, while Western psychotherapies consider themselves to address the truth of the individual subject and therefore to have the potential to effect lasting cures (Pandolfo 2000: 138).

The Orthodox Christian view of dreaming presents a different indigenous psychology within Greek culture. A saint appears to the dreamer and dictates a course of action or a prophecy. Such dreams occur every day throughout Greece where saints appear to people, advise them, and sometimes heal them. Consider the case of the Macedonian woman who began to suffer pathological levels of anxiety after marrying and moving to live with her husband in his natal home with her in-laws. Her situation went unrecognized until her brother had a dream in which he saw his sister standing on the balcony of her in-laws’ house plaintively calling out to St. Raphail to come in and visit her (Handman 1996: 95). Feeling the strikingly powerful quality of the dream, the brother discussed the dream with his sister. By this time his sister had begun to receive psychiatric care. She came to realize that having her own home was crucial to her mental health, and she persuaded her husband to rent a small apartment where they could live alone together. Finally, in the last stage of her cure, she made a pilgrimage to St. Raphail’s church on the island of Mytilíni and returned completely better. Her illness had involved recourse to both western psychotherapy and to the Christian tradition of saintly healing.

The prophetic dreams of the Greek Orthodox tradition share the future orientation of dreaming found in oneirocriticism, yet the Church is opposed to popular dream divination. In a recent booklet on dreams (Karakovoúni 1996) the Church criticizes those engaging in “occult” forms of dream interpretation such as oneirocriticism. The author points out that many practitioners think that oneirokrítes (popular dream interpreting books) form part of Christianity and that accurate predictions indicate the grace of practitioners when in fact they are just “puppets of the devil” (ypokheíria tou diavólou). The author sees it as the Church’s pastoral task to rescue people from their error.

To sum up, then, I have covered two indigenous paradigms of dream interpretation and noted that the one is opposed to the other. The Orthodox Christian population of Greece is steeped in both of these – prophetic dreaming of
saints by virtue of their religion, and the dream book approach, by virtue of their cultural history. The Orthodox Church would ideally eliminate oneiromancy, but it has not been able to do so despite trying over the centuries. So the dream book approach remains an unfortunate “superstition” from the Church’s point of view.

Into this uneasily shared field of dreams psychoanalytic and other psychological perspectives of American or Northern European origin have entered over the last fifty years as part of the general influx of “psy”. One of the initial impediments to the spread of psychotherapies was the fact that the psycho- part of the word comes from the Greek word psykhi, meaning “soul”. This unintentionally and perhaps confusingly references the domain of religion. The Church is critical of psychotherapies for not acknowledging the existence of God, angels or demons. Psychotherapists are thus unable to recognize the spiritual messages sent to humans (Karakovoúni 1996: 25). The psychotherapeutic and Orthodox Christian approaches to dreaming do, however, share the basic premise that dreams reflect an individual’s habitual thoughts and practices; they originate in the self. Even if God or the devil communicates the content of the dream, the dreams actually result from the private life and morality of the individual. This is why the priest and psychiatrist Vasileios Thermos (this volume) considers the Church’s orientation to be “more modern than magic” in its attention to the life of the person.

The Establishment of Professional Psychotherapeutics in Greece

The British actually founded the first mental institution in Greece when they built an asylum on Corfu in the 1830s, which then passed to Greek control when the island was annexed in 1864. The Athens asylum was founded in 1856. The mentally ill had theretofore been treated in general hospitals, cared for in monasteries and churches, or left to wander (Ploumpidis 1993: 241). No doubt they continued to be treated in these traditional ways. A Byzantinist colleague told me that well into the twentieth century mentally disturbed persons were occasionally chained up in the Hosios Loukas church (located between Athens and Delphi) in expectation that the saint’s power could expel the demons causing illness. In 1862 Greece adopted mental health provisions modelled on French laws that emphasized curability, humanism

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3 There are major differences and clashes in perspective between “psy” practices such as CBT, psychoanalysis, and psychiatry. Grouping them together, however, calls attention to certain common denominators that inform all of them: individuation, the importance of individual agency in effecting cures, and the embrace of an idea of self-improvement. These core elements of “psy” contrast with the sociocentrism and sociosomatism addressed by indigenous Greek psychotherapeutics.
and the rights of the individual (Stylianidis and Ploumpidis 1989: 645). In practice, however, families tended to allow the insane to remain in asylums well out of public view to avoid stigma. After joining the EU, Greece adopted new regulations in line with European policy of providing more care in the community with the goal of enabling the mentally ill to reintegrate into society (Blue 1993: 313). Elizabeth Davis’s recent book, Bad Souls (2012), provides an illuminating account of how this initiative is currently working out in Thrace.

Psychoanalysis was brought to Greece by Greeks who had studied in Germany. Many of the early protagonists were pedagogues and they applied psychoanalysis in the counselling of troubled schoolchildren. The educators preferred Adler’s optimistic approach to human potential over Freud’s emphasis on sexuality and guilt. The discussion of sexuality ran up against cultural taboos, and the guilt part did not resonate with Greek people (Atzina 2004: 64). This circle of educationalists was politically left leaning and highly visible, which prompted the dictator Metaxas to shut them down in 1938. Psychoanalysis thereafter was associated with leftism – a major impediment considering the power of the political right in Greece through to the fall of the military Junta in 1974. In general there was very little interaction between psychoanalysis and psychiatry, which was a branch of neurology. Between 1946 and 1950 a psychoanalytic circle emerged in Athens led by four figures including the surrealist writer Andreas Embiricos, and Marie Bonaparte, a great promoter of psychoanalysis who had paid the Nazi ransom to get Freud out of Austria. Although she was the aunt of King Paul of Greece, she could not prevent the group from being chased into exile during the 1950s.

Psychoanalysis only established a secure basis as a profession after the fall of the military dictatorship. Beginning in the late 1970s Greek specialists such as Thanassis Tzavaras (this volume), who had studied abroad, returned. Much like the political parties in the early Greek state – known as the Russian, the French and the British parties depending on the Great Power with which they were aligned – psychoanalysts divided into French, British or American schools depending on their country of training (Tzavaras, this volume). Psychoanalysis still remains an imported mode; professional credentials can only be earned abroad. And owing to the cost of classical psychoanalytic treatment, the urban middle classes are the main clients. The stigma of mental illness (Blue 1993: 305) which previously prevented people from publicizing the fact of being in treatment for mental health has faded and over the
last decade being in analysis has become a badge of distinction in Bourdieu’s sense (1986), like driving an expensive car.

To complete the picture, the first degree-granting Department of Psychology (University of Crete) did not begin admitting undergraduate students till 1987. In 1979 a law for the licensure of practicing “psychologists” was passed, but what a practicing psychologist might do was so vague that no licenses were granted until the 1990s. At that point anyone with a four-year degree could put up a shingle advertising their services as a psychologist (educational testing, social development, counselling). “Psy” had reached Greece, but carrying confusion in its wake. The government is still trying to decide what might be the requirements to be licensed to practice “psychotherapy” (Dafermos et. al.: 2006).

**Dreaming and Hybridization**

I return to the topic of dreaming in order to examine one particular domain where indigenous and exogenous approaches have been adjusting to each other. The introduction of psychoanalytic approaches to dream interpretation has been part of the social transition described above. In order to take up psychoanalytically informed therapies people must adjust their temporal orientation since indigenous therapies such as coffee cup reading and dream interpretation involve a divinatory, future orientation. One thinks about oneself in relation to what is forecast to happen, rather than in relation to past events that have been formative for one’s personality. The American-educated anthropologist Nadia Seremetakis observed that her Freudian-influenced sensibility toward dreams was diametrically opposite to that of women in the remote Mani region of the southern Peloponnese (1991: 57). Seremetakis, whose ancestors originally came from this area, had become alienated from this pre-modern temporality through her urban upbringing, education, and long period of residence in the USA. Anthropological fieldwork provided the opportunity to reconnect with it. In her words: “The initial moment of this process involved my understanding of the total irrelevancy of Freudian logic to my dream symbology, the distance of my dreams [as an integrated member of the Maniat community] from Western and ‘northern’ paradigms of psychologization” (p. 233).

A similar experience of disjuncture between different psychological paradigms may hold for psychotherapeutic practitioners themselves. An American-trained psychotherapist in Athens told me that she had no difficulty analyzing the dreams of
her clients according to Freudian notions of the unconscious. She went on to remark, however, that some dreams, which she labelled “spiritual”, should not be subjected to psychotherapeutic analysis.\(^4\) As an example she related the story of a man who dreamt that rats were chasing him. A car ran him down the following week. Dreams of rats foretell death in the oneirocritic tradition. This analyst asserted that such predictive dreams, when they can be recognized, should be kept apart from psychoanalyze-able dreams. Her distinction made sense within her own socialization into Greek categories, which she shares with her clients.

This rapid determination of which dreams are suitable for psychoanalysis and which belong to another system is worth more reflection. Amira Mittermaier (2010: 186) reported that there have been television talk show programs in Egypt where people phone in their dreams. These were especially popular after the Islamic revival as people wished to explore Islamic modes of dream interpretation. A Sufi Shaykh serving as the master of ceremonies would receive all calls and then decide whether to interpret the caller’s dreams himself or pass them on to a Western-trained psychologist. The Shaykh, however, had the first and last word. A similar show was broadcast from Saudi Arabia in the 1990s hosted solely by a psychologist, who interpreted all of the dreams psychoanalytically. As the show was broadcast from Saudi Arabia, however, he was not free to ignore Islamic overtones in the dreams. Occasionally he had to accept some as religious messages rather than endogenous productions of the individual mind, thus contravening a basic tenet of Western psychotherapy (Mittermaier 2010:187).

In practice today the three major paradigms of dream interpretation in Greece may be combined. Consider a dream recently collected in Thessaloniki by the ethnographer Elisabeth Kirtsoglou (2010). A woman named Niki recounted how she had dated a wealthy fellow student while at university. She could not envisage a life with him, but this remained a vague, unarticulated feeling. She herself came from a poor background. One night she dreamt of a garden and it began to rain while the sun shone at the same time. The popular Greek rhyme “sun and rain – the poor get married” (\(\text{i}l\text{i}o\text{s k}a\text{i} \text{v}r\text{okh}i, \text{p}a\text{n}tr\text{e}v\text{on}tai \text{o}i \text{pht}o\text{k}h\text{oi}\) came into her head, and with it an image of Charis, a fellow student of similarly modest background. She awoke

\(^4\) We spoke in English so I cannot be certain if by “spiritual” she was translating a Greek term based on \(\text{psykh}i\) or \(\text{pn\text{e}v}\text{ma}\), or possibly re-translating the American term “psychic.” In any case, she clearly opposed this type of dream to the dreams of the unconscious that can be dealt with by psychoanalysis or derivative psychotherapies.
knowing that she could marry him. Niki’s comments on the dream indicate that this was not a predictive dream *strictu sensu* – it did not say absolutely that she *would* marry Charis, although she did – but a dream that worked out the intricacy of her personal psychological predicament while imagining the future (Kirtsoglou 2010: 330).

This example suggests that lay approaches to dreaming in Greece may combine assumptions from western individual psychology with attempts to predict the future. Perhaps it should be taken as a current reading on the penetration of “psy” into Greek cultural thought. Theoretically, nothing stops Christian motifs and principles from finding a place in these dreams as well. The problem resembles that encountered in cases of syncretism or creolization where elements from exogenous traditions are combined.

Once upon a time the Christian view of dreams was an exogenous imposition onto the oneirocritic landscape of the ancients. And friction remains between these two long-standing approaches that two millennia have not been able to erase. It is not, thus, surprising to see discontinuities between recently introduced western psychotherapeutics and both of the longer standing approaches to dream interpretation. The various therapeutic systems recognize that they are different from each other, as my examples have shown.

These alternatives have not so far been resolved by the formation of stable mixtures and compromises, although the dream of Niki considered above might encourage one to begin to make that argument. Instead, I think that the three possibilities continue to co-exist in a situation of plurality. This is the condition of the average Greek person’s life as they move from workplace or university, to home, to religious occasions; or from Athens to an ancestral village, or to visit a grandmother in the course of an average month. Different temporalities and different subjectivities are activated in these contexts as we saw in Nadia Seremetakis’s acclimatization to life in Mani.

Perhaps we could go so far as to speak of alternative ontologies within the space of Greek society, serially inhabited through subtle transitions. Western psychotherapeutics have been in the ascendant since the 1950s; they seem to have the upper hand, but we can not be sure how matters will work out. Egypt went from a fascination with strictly psychological approaches, to an alternation between Islamic
and psychological TV programs, and Mittermaier’s ethnography (2011) reveals the current vitality of indigenous Egyptian approaches to dreaming.

Ultimately the situation in Greece, as in Egypt, is unstable, with the tide flowing now in one direction and now in the other. In both places the contact with Western systems, through actual colonization or virtual colonialism (hegemony), has been proceeding for such a long time that it is now no longer a situation of modernity vs. tradition. The arrangement of psychotherapeutics in Greece is the state of Greek modernity, and it comprises hybrids and countervailing purifications, as in Latour’s (1993) general assessment of Western modernity. Priests now train in psychotherapeutics as part of their pastoral training, and people amalgamate their futurological oneirocriticism with speculations on the role of the unconscious. It is a non-synchronous modernity marked by a pluralism that allows people to make serial recourse to various forms of therapy (Peglidou 2010: 44). In this space, Modern Greek subjectivity takes shape. And I have not even begun to address the New Age.

**Epilogue**

So was the Greek mind colonized or not? It depends on what one means by “colonized”. I have used “colonization” heuristically, as a stalking horse to provoke critical thinking and to organize the investigation. It appears in my title followed by a question mark, and the matter remains difficult if not impossible to decide. Below I offer a summary overview and a final reflection.

In the most anodyne metaphorical sense colonization can mean simply taking over a place (e.g., “my son has colonized the living room with his toys”). Western psychotherapeutics have certainly made major inroads into Greece in areas spanning from psychiatry to family therapy, and by this token it could be said that they have colonized the Greek mind...to a certain extent. Yet these developments could also be understood to result from ambient “social change” or “globalization” rather than through the power of “psy-therapeutics” by themselves.

The definition of “colonization” given above may, however, be too weak. For many, the prime characteristics of colonization are that it involves coercion and some profit or other benefit that is extracted from the place colonized. In the Greek case this is complicated since at independence the Greek people accepted a Bavarian king and his advisors, and again during the early 1980s the country willingly entered the EU. There was no coercion and the terms were not evidently exploitative, although
Greece did take out loans and has done so throughout its history. The current economic crisis reveals that it has been in the interest of the more industrialized northern European countries to loan Greece money so that Greece may buy goods from them, advantageously increasing their market while expanding Greek debt. Perhaps this fits better into the category of economic domination rather than colonization.

In entering the EU Greece also agreed to implement European standards in many domains, including psychiatric care. The standard assumptions of individualizing “psy” thus came to Greece as part of a willing Europeanization. This situation can be called “colonization” only in the weak metaphorical sense; it was not imposed by force and there was no evident and transparent exploitative extraction of wealth from Greece accompanying the advent of Western psychotherapeutics.

The severity and duration of the current financial crisis has exposed the differences between northern European Protestant notions of the self and those found in the unreformed Christianity of Greece. If only the Greeks were more fiscally responsible, less corrupt, lazy and deceitful – northern European voices assert – then this crisis would not have happened. Protestantism stresses personal responsibility, which gives rise to internal guilt, which leads to compunction and corresponding action governed by an ideology of sincerity (Keane 2007: 209). It is often assumed that the unreformed Christianities place more emphasis on guilt because sin is acknowledged publicly by confession. In my view, guilt may fester and grow more powerful in the Protestant situation where it cannot easily be expiated in ritual. In his recent study of social life in a suburb of Rome, Herzfeld (2009: 53) points out that corruption in the form of tax evasion and the circumvention of building restrictions is informed by the system of “indulgences” within the Catholic Church. The indulgence system allowed the negotiability of sin, and the possibility of “buying off” sin through donations. The Greek Orthodox Church has developed a different ethics among the Greek population, and more research needs to be done on how Orthodox practices have contributed to the formation of ideas about guilt in Greece.

The Roman example nonetheless indicates a different sensibility in the unreformed south of Europe. When Germans express frustration that Greece is not honoring its debt the operative word in German is schuld, which means “guilt” as well as “debt”.

As the debt situation has progressed and the expectations of the northern countries have become clearer, one major reaction in Greece has been to say that if
this kind of debt management and fiscal stringency characterize Germany, then we do not want to be Germany. What is the point of having a Greece that is exactly like Germany? It defeats the point of Greece. What people are implicitly recognizing in such statements is the unreformed Christian history of Greece, which did not evolve the Protestant ethic described by Weber. The Germans and their fellow EU supporters may wish that “psy” had colonized Greece to a greater degree as it would have inculcated a deeper cultural embrace of individual responsibility and compunction. But the conditions for the growth of psychotherapeutics in Greece have not been ideal on account of the long conditioning and ongoing influence of the Orthodox Church. The Greek resistance to the EU insistence on responsibility to debt and disciplinarian austerity that we are now seeing, might, in fact, indicate a barrier to the further progression of psychotherapeutics in Greece. Even if the general public does not begin to reject Western psychotherapeutics as complicit in engineering unwanted changes in the Greek ethos, the current crisis might motivate a new resort to less professionalized and less expensive indigenous therapies or other therapies such as New Age practices (Roussou 2010).

As we have seen, the power of Western psychotherapeutics to colonize the Greek mind did not arise strictly from the effectiveness of the ideas and therapies proposed. Western therapies made advances in changing economic situations where more and more people were migrating within and beyond Greece to take up work in cities. Isolated, without readily available family support, their living situations disposed them to individualizing psychotherapies. In the 1950s and 60s it was difficult and expensive to communicate by telephone with family in one’s native village. This has all changed in the last decades with mobile phones, Skype, the internet and other communications technologies. As Nadia Seremetakis (this volume; 2009: 347) has contended, the technologies of modernity in Greece have not necessarily contributed to the overall project of modernity, which would have ushered in yet more individualism and more “psy”. Instead, there has been a significant “remediation” of the Greek social condition. Available modern technologies have renewed the sociocentric orientation of traditional Greece, and revitalized practices such as evil eye un-bewitching, which can now be done by telephone (Roussou 2011: 95), or Skype. This leads to the conclusion that the Greek mind is not about to be fully colonized anytime soon.
Works Cited


