|
Gottfried Seebass: The Significance of Free Will -- The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website -- Prof. Dr.
Seebass, of the Philosophy Department of the University of
Konstanz, begins by putting aside the discussion of determinism and
freedom in
terms of the doctrines of compatibilism and incompatibilism. He
supposes, no
doubt rightly, if for his own reasons, that we need to start again.
This he
does by beginning with what it is to will something -- to have a
conscious
optative attitude. The freedom of our willing is a matter of two
dimensions,
one of these being what is natural or essential to a person. This
naturalness is the
central concern of the paper. Certainly the paper is outside of the
circle of
stuff that is readily understood by students of philosophy in the
English
langage. That is not a reason for not working at it. What is needed
with
determinism and freedom is an escape from the declining industry of
compatibilism, incompatibilism and the compromises and variants. Here
is one. ------------------------
The
Significance of “Freewill“ is one of
the great, old and possibly “eternal“ enigmas of mankind. In 1437 the
Renaissance philosopher Lorenzo Valla diagnosed that there is “scarcely
a
question more in need of being answered and less close to an answer at
the same
time”. Since then, I suspect, things have not changed essentially. Yet many
people think otherwise. Some are unconvinced of the topic's oldness.
Some
scholars have claimed that “freewill” is an invention of Judaeo-Christian
theology unknown to the Greek
tradition. This claim, however, proves false on both counts. Others
believe it
to have been solved long ago or antiquated. Schlick in 1930 and
Schopenhauer
almost a century earlier expressed anger at all those “ignorants” who
“still
spill much ink” on a subject they believed had been long since settled.
And
more recently Davidson dismissed it bluntly by citing a number of
philosophical
predecessors who had done “what can be done, or ought ever to have been
needed,
to remove the confusions that can make determinism seem to frustrate
freedom”. Now, the
history of philosophy is full of examples of alleged “definite
solutions” that
turned out to be over-hasty. “Freewill” is a case in point. The
widespread
tendency to dismiss it stems from a double error. On the one hand, its
significance tends to be underrated due for the most part to a
misconception
of, or resigned disengagement from, what it really means to be active.
On the
other hand it is badly overrated in that it is assumed, explicitly or
implicitly, that “willing freely” means ipso facto “being entirely
indetermined
in what one wills” or (in the words of Kant) being independent “of the
mechanism of nature in its entirety”. The
latter misconception is mirrored vividly by the established division
into
“compatibilism” and “incompatibilism”. This distinction suggests that
it is one
and the same thesis that is affirmed by the one party and denied by the
other.
But this is misleading. First, the question of determination is only
one of a
number of different aspects of “willing freely” and is not in itself a
question
of “all or nothing”. Second and most important, what is at stake among
the two
parties is not whether one should accept or reject the thesis that
“freedom and
determinism are compatible”. The real issue is how the concept of
“freedom”
relevant to understanding ourselves as active beings, or as beings that
are
responsible for what they do, should be analyzed or explicated.
Consequently,
the thesis affirmed by the so-called “compatibilists” is not the same
thesis
that is denied by the “incompatibilists”. Also what kind of
determination the
latter want to deny and for what reasons is an open question allowing
for
various answers. So let us
forget from now on this unhappy categorization and go to work afresh.
As
elsewhere in philosophy, this work is mainly conceptual. We need to
know what
we are talking about in discussing “freedom of will”. Of course we do
not want
to know what philosopher X or scientist Y have said these words mean.
There
would be no end to listing different definitions and declarations. We
want to
know what we ordinarily mean when talking of the “free will” of active
and
responsible persons. And to know this we have to clarify the
constitutive notions,
beginning with “will”, “volition” and “willing”. II Let us
state first what willing is not. Obviously it is not a brain state or
brain
process. I know that I want to finish my talk, and you may want to
raise some
objections in the discussion. But neither I nor you know what
corresponds to
this in our brains. That there is something going on up there, most
probably
something very complex, is not in doubt. But for the purpose of
identifying our
volitions these facts are irrelevant. Still, to
acknowledge this conceptual truism does not prejudge the questions of
further
explanation and possible ontological reduction. Couldn’t it be the case
that
willing to finish a talk is wholly dependent on, or even identical
with, a
complex brain pattern? Maybe, but to show this two essential steps must
be
taken. First we would need to establish general, stable and specific
correlations between conscious volitions and brain events, hopefully
one-to-one
correlations or else one-to-many, yielding some kind of
“supervenience”. Some
people believe we are pretty close to this already. Now, I am not a
neurologist
and do not know the vast amount of relevant empirical findings.
However, due to
my earlier work on language and thought and my recent cooperation with
neuro-psychologists I am not totally unexperienced in reading
neurological
studies and have looked at some of them more closely. So I have every
reason to
be sceptical about enthusiastic, far-reaching claims. The permanent,
all over
activity and interconnectedness of the brain make it difficult to
single out
and interpret relevant patterns even if these are localized fairly
well. So it
is unlikely from the start that specific neurological correlates of
intentional
states like “wanting” or “willing that p” can be identified by the
present
experimental methods. And to my knowledge there is no concrete proposal
up to
now. This
holds true also and most specifically of the readiness-potential
measured by
Libet and his followers. Setting aside the well-known conceptual and
methodological
difficulties of these experiments there are two principal obstacles.
The
findings are much too unspecific to represent concrete volitional
states.
Moreover, they cannot be the relevant neurological correlates, if (as
is
reported) they are prior to conscious volition. At the very most they
can be
causes of other (unknown) brain patterns that really correspond to
intentional
will. So we would not be better off anyway. The only rational stance
towards
ongoing neurological research on human volition is: wait and see! Even more
problematic and futuristic is the second step. Given all the
correlations we
need, how are they to be interpreted? If the relation is irreducibly
that of
event causality involving a time-difference, dualism is inevitable,
although some
philosophers will insist (denying the necessity of some “loss of
energy”) that
the efficiency here runs only from the physical to the mental. Shunning
dualism
other philosophers claim that what we have here is identity: token
identity at
least or even type identity after the manner of chemical reductions
like “water
is H2O” (or some variant weakened by “supervenience”).
Although
advocates of these positions assure us that they know what they are
talking
about, I doubt it. The idea is strange indeed. How physical objects,
like
neurons or an entire neuronal network, might be the direct bearers not
only of
relevant physical properties, but also of mental properties like
“willing” or
“wanting that p”, is an ontological mystery that needs mystics to be
believed.
I am unsuited for this task. To my mind, the only ontologically
respectable
alternative to dualism is neutral monism as advocated by Spinoza,
Fechner and
Mach. This is a metaphysical position, too. But it is consistent and no
conceptual mongrel. The main
problem for the volitional “naturalist” is epiphenomenalism. This
covers more
than the classical causal accounts given by Huxley and Nietzsche.
Mental events
are in danger of becoming epiphenomenal, too, if they are taken to be
mere
correlates (as in classical psycho-physical parallelism) or secondary
qualitive
aspects conjoined factually (for whatever reasons) to something
accounted for
completely in physical terms. Thus epiphenomenalism is likely to follow
from
neutral monism (recognized firmly by Mach) and from all sorts of
alleged
“identity theories”. This is a
threat, of course. For the idea that our conscious volitions, beliefs
and
deliberations are just accidental performances on an “inner stage”
caused by,
or conjoined to, hidden neural processes getting along on their own is
the
epitome of irrationalism. Nietzsche and his postmodern adherents are
quite
happy with this. Others shamefully try to overlook this result or to
avoid it
by inconsistence. But irrationalism is the price one has to pay for
unbounded
physiological “naturalism”. If this were our natural human condition,
the idea
of being active and responsible would be an accident of our “inner
theatre”,
too, as Nietzsche and his followers have claimed all along.
Fortunately, all of
this is “science or philosophical fiction” up to now, despite all
pseudo-scientific rumour. Lacking further evidence it is wise to keep
one's
head and to remember (varying Hamlet) that ”there are more things in
heaven and
earth than are dreamt of in your physiology”. III If
willing is not a brain state or process what is it? Behaviorists such
as Hull
or Berlyne proposed a dispositional analysis of intentional states like
believing or willing, referring to interconnected internal states that
are
ascribed to human beings as “hypothetical constructs” (in the sense of
Meehl
and MacCorquodale), viz. states or events thought to be realized
physiologically. In a modified form this conception still survives
under the
name of “functionalism”. Now, though it is true that willing, in
contrast to
idle wishing, is qualified dispositionally, the idea of its complete
dispositional explication is hopeless. My detailed reasons for this are
given
in a book to which I must refer those of you who are inclined to think
that
this still is a plausible option. Surely willing, believing and other
intentional states can not be defined by the various “causal roles”
they play
in connecting relevant inner states or mediating between external
stimuli and
responses. The core
of willing, stripped of its motivational and possible further
qualifications,
is a conscious optative attitude related reciprocally to an assertoric
attitude
as its conceptual counterpart. Both states are elucidated in a
preliminary way
by the metaphor of “directions of fit” (in the vein of Frege, Anscombe,
Searle,
and Tugendhat). Much more can be said, however, about what this means
and in
what ways wanting, willing, deciding or intending differ from the mere
optative. Still, as is the case with every basic notion, there are
irreducible
elements in it that cannot be analyzed further, but must be grasped by
the
individual learning the relevant terms of language. Talk of unconscious
or
preconscious volition is derivative from its conscious form. Thus in
the
discussion of “freewill” we are referred to the conscious, intentional
and
motivationally qualified state of willing. IV Turning
next to the concept of “freedom” I will take a shortcut. In the most
general
sense, being “free” means being “unhindered”. Hobbes and Schopenhauer
have argued
for this, and their diagnosis is confirmed by ordinary language. More
specific
senses of “freedom” are subsumed easily. This refers in particular to
the
classical notions of “freedom of action” and “freedom from constraint”
developed by Greek philosophy. Most forms of social, political and
economic
freedom are covered by these. Freedom of action means: being in a
position to
act as one wants or wills to act. Freedom from constraint is more
complex,
meaning in a broad sense almost the same as being unhindered but having
several
narrower meanings that overlap partly (already hinted at by Aristotle)
with
what we would call “freedom of will”. Freedom of will is another
special case
branching again into various subcases. First, however, let us look more
closely
at the concept of “hindrance” itself. Clearly
this is very general notion to be specified best by the questions what
is
hindered in what and by what. A river that is not hindered in its flow
by dams
or embankments is said to “flow freely”. A paralyzed or tied man is
“unfree”
because he is hindered by abnormal (internal or external) impediments
to move
as he wants. The hindrance need not extend to every part or aspect and
need not
be absolute. Still it must be significant. Common to all subcases is
the idea
that something is restrained severely from evolving, living or existing
in ways
which are “natural” or “essential” to it and therefore should not be
precluded.
Hence whether, in what respects and to what degree something is free or
unfree
has to be judged from two dimensions: the relevant standard of
“naturalness”
and the relevant realm of theoretical possibilities actually closed or
open.
Roughly, the greater the number of possibilities open, the lesser the
hindrance
and the greater the freedom. However, possibilities that do not touch
on the
relevant “nature” can be ruled out as inessential. Most of the infinite
number
of actions I might envisage but actually cannot do are irrelevant to my
freedom
as I do not and will never care about them in the least. In the
limiting case
even a maximum of open possibilities can mean no freedom at all if they
are
totally “inessential”. Conversely, freedom may not be diminished if the
only
possibility open is just the only “essential” one. V Concerning
freedom of action it is tempting to think that the question of
“naturalness” or
“essentialness” is settled by what one wills. Let us be content with
this for
the moment and see what determinism would mean for “acting freely”. As has
been worked out lucidly by Aristotle, determinism is not confined to
causal or
nomological types. Rather, determinism is the thesis that every event
is fixed
without alternative (“determinatum ad unum”) and therefore necessary in
some
sense, depending on the specific reasons for this fixation. More
precisely, for
every pair of (elementary or complex) propositions “p”/“¬p” and
corresponding
states of affairs, the realm of possibilities open is reduced to one,
the
relevant alternatives being excluded definitely. Determinism is an
ontological
thesis, not an epistemic one and thus independent of predictability.
Also it is
a general thesis covering mental as well as physical events. This was
recognized by the early Stoics and Epicureans. Later on Christian
theology came
to realize that universal determinism is implied by the belief in an
omniscient
and almighty god. Nevertheless some theologians thought, as did the
later
Stoics, that volition could be exempted. Both types of thought are
still
virulent today. VI Suppose
first that mental events can be undetermined while the physical world
is fixed.
Then in what sense can we say that “unhindered” physical actions are
“free”?
Clearly, the possibilities criterion fails. Measured by this standard
freedom
has a zero degree. So we are left with the second criterion,
“naturalness” or
“essentialness”. Assuming that volition defines what is “essential” we
could
say that we are free if the will and the physical world (say: the
movements of
our lips in speaking or the motionlessness of our arms when voting)
coincide.
Otherwise we are unfree. If volition is unfixed and flexible we may
increase
freedom by adjusting it to the world. This is what the later Stoics and
their
followers recommend. The advice is not easily complied with in some
cases (e.g.
speaking and voting). But anyhow: Isn’t a reactively adapted will
unfree, too,
as its formation is constrained by physical reality? And doesn’t the
fact that
we will have to do what is fixed anyway, independent of our will, rule
out
freedom of action at least in the physical world, even if our volition
is
undetermined and merely happens to conform to what is fixed? Most
people will accept these conclusions. Some, however, try to evade them.
Thus
theologians such as Origen and Molina contrived an argument, revived
more
recently by Harry Frankfurt, which is intended to show that the
inexistence of
open alternatives is not detrimental to freedom. The argument is
flawed,
though, and not difficult to refute. It seems convincing because a
volition
free of adaptive constraint and coinciding with what is fixed seems to
be
realized without hindrance. Recall, however, that this depends on the
premiss
that this will is the only “essential” one at the relevant instant. How
is this
to be safeguarded? Well, people believing in a benevolent fate or a god
who
knows best and takes care of their “real persons” at every instant are
on the
safe side. But do we believe in this or some secular substitute of it?
If a
fire breaks out and I find the doors locked, would I really think that
my
freely and successfully not having wanted to check them earlier is part
of my
“nature” and that my present constrained will to escape is but a
fleeting
misunderstanding giving way readily (fate permitting) to my considered
insight
that it is “essential” to me to be burned within a few minutes?
Certainly not. Accordingly,
Locke stated long ago, following common opinion, that a man locked in a
room is
not free to leave it even if he does not care about leaving at present.
Being
able to leave or stay according as to what one wants surely is
“natural” for a
human being. And the deeper reason for Locke’s important point had
already been
uncovered by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Plotinus and Augustine. Modified
slightly and reformulated in my terms it is this: Even if it is not
denied that
human volition is a necessary, or even decisive, criterion of
“naturalness”,
one cannot confine it to actual states but must take into account
others that
could be formed under certain conditions, viz. conditions that cannot
be ruled
out as “inessential”. The
lesson is clear. Leaving aside strong metaphysical presuppositions (or
very
special cases where there really is only a single volitional state that
proves
to be “essential”), we would not ordinarily call any action “free” that
is
voluntary but does not depend on the will. And if we would, or rather
would
have it that way for philosophical reasons, it is quite clear that this
notion
of “freedom” is not relevant to the claim that we are active beings and
responsible for the outcome of our reactions. VII Now let
us drop any reservations concerning the mental and turn to an
uncompromising,
universal determinism in the vein of the early Stoics and the
mainstream of
Christian theology. According to such a conception, all of what we
think,
believe and will, all of our practical and theoretical reasonings are
fixed
without alternative. Whether this is due to the order of fate or god,
to
natural laws, or due simply to ontological reduction is immaterial. All
that
counts is the fact of fixation and its implication for freedom of will
and
action. Now, it
is certainly a mistake to define “freewill” in an indeterminist
manner. The
adequate definition is: “freedom to form one's will”. This covers many
different processes most of which include deterministic parts and
elements,
though they are not normally thought to be fixed throughout. Forming
the will
may consist in a spontaneous single act but need not. It may imply
extended
weighing of reasons and calculating means, ends and consequences. But
it may also
be confined to a quick decision. A more extensively reflecting person
may try
to stir up (time permitting) unconscious attitudes in the endeavour to
find out
what she “really wants” or “wants inmost” or to arrive at some
“volitional
equilibrium”. Also reflection may or may not extend to volitions of a
higher
order, as has been countenanced by Augustine, Abelard and more recently
Frankfurt. All of these processes may be carried out under restraint,
external
as well as internal, and with a significant lack of knowledge. If so,
they are
considered traditionally (beginning with Plato and Aristotle) as being
hindered
and unfree since the resulting will is precluded more or less from
relevant
alternatives. Otherwise they are presumed to be free (lacking further
hindrances). Suppose,
however, that all alternatives are ruled out and the entire process is
fixed.
Could we still call it “free”? Obviously there are problems here
(noticed at
the latest by Aristotle, Epicurus and the Stoics). Accepting
determinism for causal
and theological reasons Augustine attempted to solve them. To save the
ordinary
assumption that freedom of action implies alternative options he
invented the
conditional analysis of the concept of practical possibility which
allegedly
ensures this formally. And to ensure the freedom of the conditioning
will, he
contrived a formal argument to the effect that volition is free ipso
facto.
Both of these theoretical devices have been adopted by myriads of
theologians
and philosophers up to now, at least in part and in a modified form.
Ignorant
of their theological origin many of the so-called “compatibilists” rely
on them
in the belief that they are achievements of modern philosophers such as
Hobbes,
Hume and Moore. However,
despite the respectable authority of St. Augustine and all of his
followers,
both moves are flawed. The argument for intrinsic volitional freedom is
invalid. And the conditional analysis is no analysis of practical
possibility
at all as it does not extend to its relevant modal sense and merely
shifts
problems back to volition, albeit perhaps to volitions of a higher
order. The
crucial questions are still the same: Having dismissed the
possibilities
criterion radically, we are left with the criterion of the
“naturalness” or
“essentialness” of volition as a last resort. But, leaving aside
Augustine’s
argument or metaphysical premises, how could this be provided? VIII Basically two
solutions have been
suggested. First it is said that the will is free if its formation
satisfies
certain general patterns which can be regarded as “natural”. Some
philosophers
have been content even with the unspecific condition of being “amenable
to
reasons”. Others, along with jurists, have tried to specify lists of
characteristic epistemic defects and restraints the absence of which
defines,
allegedly, what “willing freely” means. This may be tolerable for
practical
purposes, say in the courts. But it is surely inadequate theoretically.
On the
one hand, it is indifferent to the optative attitudes entering into an
informed
and unrestrained formation process. Also it is confined to the average,
ignoring what is “essential” for a particular person at a particular
time. On
the other hand, granting the definition as a mere stipulation, we still
get no
answer to the most central point: Why should we say of someone
determined (by
god, fate or natural causes) to satisfy the relevant patterns that he
is active
and responsible in this case any more than in another case where he
happens to
be determined not to fulfil them? Clearly, this notion of freedom,
contrived
for practical reasons at best, is squarely beside the point. IX The
second solution, proposed independently or in
support of the first, looks even more Augustinian: Couldn’t we simply
say that
volitional states and processes are “essential” for some person ipso
facto if
they are taken to be defining? This would be a nice solution indeed.
However,
what volitions will qualify? Arguing in a sweeping manner (which
actually is
but a secular variant of the belief in a universally caring god) Kant
and
Schopenhauer proposed that the entire set of our volitions and actions
defines
the “empirical character”, indicating successively (to ourselves and to
others
as well) who we are as a person. But apart from the transcendental
metaphysics
backing this generous form of “personal essentialism”, the idea is
strange.
Obviously the multifarious trivialities and contingencies of our lives
are not
constitutive for us as persons. Also we do not register passively only
what
volitions might crop up in our minds.
Yet
the same passivity is characteristic of the idea
that there might be some stable, limited set of attitudes to be
discovered (by
reflection or progressive self-experience) to be constitutive of what
we are.
This form of “personal essentialism” is not as strange as the other
one. But it
is still peculiar. If it were true, we should be able to list at least
some of
the most basic attitudes supposed to be definitional. But are you able
to do
this? And on what grounds could the defining attitudes be selected?
Merely
because of their factual (genetic, educational or habitual)
entrenchment?
Hardly. Such attitudes can be taken as well, and are taken frequently,
to be
mere conditions under which we live or even hindrances to our living
and acting
as we would want. To make them part of our personality, we have to
accept them,
i.e. decisively
to “appropriate” them or
to “identify ourselves” with them.
Hobbes
thought that preserving biological life is the
only unchanging object of our guiding will. Bentham, Freud and many
others
thought that it is gain and preservation of pleasure. But a short look
at human
history makes clear that even these very general and unspecific goals,
unfit to
single out individuals anyway, do not qualify as defining personal
characteristics. An Al Quaida suicide terrorist surely does not care
very much
for his physical life and pleasure. Personal life is an ongoing dynamic
process
made up not only of passive experiences and receptions but also of
instances of
actively forming our attitudes towards facts and possibilities. This is
the
central element in setting the standards of what is “essential” for us
and
therewith of relevant hindrances. Accordingly, they are subject to
change. A
volition we firmly “identify with” at present may well be dissociated
later on.
And even if some basic volitions were to be stable and definitive of
what we
are, it would certainly be absurd to claim that all of our concrete
willings
and doings are free and unhindered only to the extent they can safely
be
referred to those. All of this concurs to the conclusion that the
second
solution, when considered more closely, proves to be badly inadequate,
too.
X Suppose,
however, the ordinary conviction that we can have an active part in the
development of volition is false (say: for epiphenomenalistic reasons)
no less
than is, supposedly, our common belief in the existence of objective
alternatives. If so, the ordinary notion of “freedom” would not apply
to us,
provided that what is hindered is still an individual person and not
some
volitional or other state declared independent of her activity (e.g. by
a
better-knowing god) to be “essential”. Moreover, if what we want and
do, as
well as the ways by which we come to it, are fixed in advance and in
every
detail, we cannot be responsible actors. And as this condition is
implied by
the traditional system of normative social control, different from
merely
manipulatory forms of shaping behaviour, this system will become
inapplicable,
too. In fact
the consequences are even more radical. They lead to a fatalist view of
life.
Of course this does not refer to the so-called fatalism of “lazy
reason”,
better called “foolish reason”, as it rests on the denial of obvious
causal
dependencies. This idea is ill-conceived and not consequently
deterministic.
Fatalism, rightly conceived, includes the mental realm and amounts to
the
thesis that the course of the world, being fixed throughout, cannot be
altered
(theoretically) and therefore cannot be influenced actively (in the
relevant
practical sense of “can”). Within philosophy this should have been
settled ever
since Aristotle. More recently Richard Taylor has renewed the same
argument
provoking dozens of articles which in vain have tried to refute it.
Clearly, a
consistent determinist must be a fatalist − provided he is determined
happily
to be consistent. XI In view
of this, philosophers having a temper similar to that of Schlick and
Schopenhauer might grow angry about the fact that there are still so
many
“ignorants” “spilling ink” in the hopeless endeavour to get around what
is
obvious by contriving, following the lead of St. Augustine, some
substitute
notion of “freedom” that fits a fixed universe and still preserves
understanding ourselves as active and responsible persons. In fact,
these hopeless endeavours are motivated by a double belief: (1) that
determinism is true, or might well be true, as the universe is confined
to what
can be accounted for in strictly “naturalistic” terms and therefore
must be
seen as “causally” or “nomologically closed”, and (2) that the only way
to deny
determination is to affirm “blind chance”. Now, I am not in a position
to prove
or refute either determinism or naturalism. But I think that it is
possible to
deny both of these and that to do so is (at the very least) not as
desperate as
are the continuing illusions or self-deceptions about the consequences
that
would result from their truth for rationality, activity,
responsibility, and
personal freedom. Whether microphysical indeterminism, taken to be
implied
(pace David Bohm) by standard quantum theory, could be of any use to
freewill
is unclear to me. Some of the relevant proposals (e.g. that of Kane or
Hameroff/Penrose) are certainly subject to the objection of “blind
chance”.
Others might well be better off. But I know of none which is
satisfying. So I
must leave it with this. Before ending my talk however, I would like to
draw
your attention to one further important point. Even
confining ourselves to the physical world and natural science, it is
amazing to
see how many people still believe that determinism, though unproven,
must be
true. It is not just the existence of quantum physics. Any experimental
physicist knows the insuperable dispersions in measurement. Most
theories rely
on probabilistic rather, than deterministic laws, if they formulate
general
laws at all and do not confine themselves to regularities and
correlations. All
of this holds all the more strongly if we move up to psychological,
social and
cultural phenomena. Mankind has always lived in a world full of
probabilities
and contingencies not amenable to deterministic calculation. To believe
that
this is merely the result of epistemic defects that could be overcome
is (at
the very best) a useful methodological maxim and apart from that, as a
general
ontological thesis, simply an ideology. To me the
only understandable reason for this is fear of “blind chance”. Surely
our world
is not full of this, though chance, apparently, cannot be excluded. But
anyhow,
to deny that something is determined is not in the least equivalent to
affirming that it happens “by mere chance”. The false belief to the
contrary is
one of the big blunders made repeatedly ever since the early critics of
Epicurus. The existence of statistically constant marriage and suicide
rates,
e.g., proves neither that individual marriages and suicides are matters
of mere
chance, nor that some people are determined somehow to marry or to kill
themselves (as believed by some of the early 19th century
interpreters of “moral statistics”). Both kinds of events may well
result from
undetermined free decisions of individual persons. Indeterministic
freedom may
not exist in reality, but it is surely not inconceivable or conceivable
only at
the expense of being “chancy”. This argument against those who are
still
interested in making sense of understanding ourselves as free, active
and
responsible persons, this bad old ploy at least should disappear
completely
from the discussion. HOME to Det & Free website front page |