These are a philosopher's pages. Writings by him are in them, many on consciousness, many on right and wrong in politics. Also papers by him and by others on determinism and freedom.
One commitment in all this, to which there is an index, is to mainstream philosophy, which is not ownership but greater concentration than that of science on the logic of ordinary intelligence -- (i) clarity, usually analysis, (ii) consistency and validity, (iii) completeness, (iv) generalness. In short, thinking about facts rather than getting to them? Another commitment of these pages, about what is right, is to the Principle of Humanity.   

The Philosophy of Ted Honderich
Macmillan Hall, Senate Hse, University of London, Malet Street, 9 Feb, 2-6.30 pm
Consciousness -- The Actualism Theory
Determinism/Explanationism and Freedom
Right and Wrong and Humanity and Terrorism and Terrorist War

The Royal Institute of Philosophy is pleased to announce a day celebrating the three interdependent parts of the philosophy of Ted Honderich, Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College London -- on Consciousness and the Mind, Determinism and Freedom, and Right and Wrong Including Terrorism. Among his many books are Actual Consciousness and the forthcoming Your Being Conscious Is What? Where?; A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience and Life-Hopes and How Free Are You?; After the Terror and Humanity, Terrorism, Terrorist War. He is also the author of many articles and the editor of The Oxford Companion to Philosophy and Philosophers of Our Times.

Five speakers will take one or more of the three  topics and he will make responses.  

Prof. Noam Chomsky. MIT, (via Skype), ‘Unconscious Mentality: Some Speculations’

Prof. Gregg D. Caruso, SUNY, ‘Origination, Moral Responsibility, Punishment, and Life-Hopes: Ted Honderich on Determinism and Freedom’

Prof. Tim Crane, Cambridge, ‘What is Actually in Consciousness? Comment on Ted Honderich’s Actual Consciousness

Prof. Paul Gilbert, Hull, ‘Ted Honderich and Terrorism’

Prof. Paul Snowdon, University College London, ‘Ted Honderich on Consciousness’

Prof. Anthony O’Hear will preside.

This event is free and open to everyone, but places are limited and no reservations can be taken.  You are advised to arrive in good time to be sure of a seat.

Ted's Audience-Handout/PowerPoint presentation or defence for Tuesday 9 February, Macmillan Hall, University of London

Three Sides of Philosophy of Ted:   Consciousness -- The Actualism Theory; Determinism/Explanationism and Our Freedom; Right and Wrong, Humanity, and Terrorism and Terrorist War

Consciousness -- the Actualism Theory   This, if it is a workplace rather than a final theory, is indubitably a long way from those two big fairy tales still told or remembered.  (1) Consciousness is just objectively or scientifically physical stuff in your head, soggy grey matter as some say, anyway only neural networks. (2) Consciousness is ghostly stuff, as in the old, old theory of mind-brain dualism, there being two entirely different things, and also as in the abstract functionalism of very much cognitive science.

There is a rich figurative database on consciousness in the primary ordinary sense, derivable from the language of philosophers, scientists and others. About 30 items, including their taking being conscious in this sense as being the having of something, its not being deduced, its being given, its being right there, its somehow existing, its being present or presented, and so on. The database can be summed up as initially adequately identifying primary ordinary consciousness as actual consciousness, being something's being actual.

This with some significant help, including the assembling of certain criteria, leads as in many different cases in the history of science to an entirely literal theory -- in this case Actualism. The theory consists in answers as to (i) what is actual in the three different sides of consciousness -- perceptual, cognitive, affective -- and (ii) what being actual is.

In perceptual consciouness, what is actual is subjective physical worlds out there. Their being actual is their being subjectively physical. In cognitive and affective consciousness, what is actual is representations-with-attitude, in here. Their being actual is their being differently subjectively physical.  

So, without any leap or hurry to generality about any of the physical, but pedestrianly -- here is a comparative table of summation.  The genus of all physicality, consisting of two  species and two sub-species of the second species.  Samenesses and differences between the three things



                                                                  /                                  \

                                                                /                                       \

                       SUBJECTIVE  PHYSICALITY                                                                                                               

                                                       /                                                                 /                                                  \

                                                    /                                                                 /                                                        \                                        



SUBJECTIVE  PHYSICAL WORLDS: Perceptual Consciousness

SUBJECTIVE  PHYSICAL  REPRESENTATIONS: Cognitive and Affective Consciousness










in the inventory of science

in the inventory of science

in the inventory of science


open to the scientific method

open to the scientific method

open to the scientific method


within space and time

within space and time

within space and time


in particular lawful connections

in particular lawful connections

in particular lawful connections


in categorial lawful connections

in categorial lawful connections, including those dependency-relations with (a) the objective physical world and (b) the conscious thing as neural.

in categorial lawful connections, including those dependency-relations with (a) the objective physical world and (b) the conscious thing as neural.


a matter of macroworld perception, microworld deduction

dependent subjective physical worlds constitutive of macroworld perception

not perceived, but dependent on macroworld perception


more than one point of view with macroworld

more than one point of view with perception

no point of view


different from different points of view

different from different points of view

no differences from points of view


primary and secondary properties

primary and secondary properties despite (5b) above?

no primary and secondary properties










separate from consciousness

not separate from consciousness

not separate from consciousness






common access

some privileged access

some privileged access


truth and logic, more subject to?

truth and logic, less subject to?

truth and logic, less subject to?


open to the scientific method

open to the scientific method despite doubt

open to the scientific method, despite doubt


includes no self or unity or other such inner fact of subjectivity inconsistent with the above properties of the  objective physical world

each subjective physical world is an element in an individuality that is a unique and large unity of lawful and conceptual dependencies including the above dependency-relations of subjective physicality

each representation is an element in an individuality that is a unique and large unity of lawful and conceptual dependencies including the above dependency relations of subective physicality


hesitation about whether objective physicality includes consciousness

no significant hesitation about taking the above subjective physicality as being that of actual perceptual consciousness

no significant hesitation about taking this subjective physicality as being the nature of actual cognitive and affective consciousness

In short, perceptual consciousness does indeed consist in certain dependent worlds out there, not representations of any kind whatever, whatever registration-without-representation there may be of the objective physical world on a perceiver. Cognitive and affective consciousness, however, are representations-with-attitude -- the attitudes having to do respectively with truth or good.

None of ancient or contemporary ghostly stuff  in this story -- or, say, a funny inner theatre of the mind, or something discernible but transparent, or physical functionalism with knobs on, or any representtions not here in consciousness but elsewhere in the wider category of the mental, or special entities of the better but blanket externalisms of all of perceptual, cognitive and affective consciousness of Putnam, Burge, Clark, and Noe.

Of course there are questions about Actualism. Say Chomsky's implied one about whether we can have an adequate conception of the physical despite science having provided one more or less since Newton. Is ordinary conscousness, consciousness in the primary ordinary sense, actual consciousness, the right subject of consciousness? There isn't one right subject. But this is the necessary one.

Determinism/Explanationism and Freedom An old and doubted and condescended-to story is true. All events or happenings of whatever duration, without exception, as distinct from anything else, are effects or lawful correlates -- each has a fundamental explanation. I.e. each is such that given a particular causal or other lawful circumstance or set of conditions, whatever else were also happening, the event would still have occurred. This is at least a reasonable assumption, in fact the gravamen of naturalism and empiricism. Despite our supposed revealing personal 'could-have-done-otherwise' experiences of deciding and acting. Also despite wonderful  interpretations of the mathematics of Quantum Theory, about as hopeless as Schodinger's cat, which according to that thought-experiment is both alive and dead until it is observed. Also, in the absence of levitating spoons at breakfast or any such wonders etc, it is necessary, if we turn to the brain or whatever, to suppose either that there isn't indeterminism down below in or around it, or that if there is, it doesn't translate upward to where it would count.

The historical doctrines of traditional Compatibilism and Incompatibilism about determinism and freedom have been falsified, demonstrably so. Hume was wrong in taking our freedom as we understand it to be consistent with causation. Kant was wrong in taking our freedom as we understand it to be inconsistent with causation. This is the case simply since in our conceiving, as distinct from fact, there is both incompatible freedom (origination, free will, lawless and unexplainable control) and also compatible freedom (voluntariness -- choice and action according to desire, embraced desires). There is not one idea that of course is either inconsistent or not.

There is a related but alternative true-enough story called Attitudinism.

The real problem of determinism has been  that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes -- at bottom certain desires, stuff of Affective Consciousness. We run up against a conviction owed to reflecting on our own past lives. That conviction is that an attitude akin to the one tied to Indeterminism, that way of holding yourself lawlessly morally responsible, has some or other basis despite the truth of determinism. We need to look for a radical escape here, a solution as radical here as Actualism is with the problem of perceptual consciousness. An escape from dismay and intransigence about our lives into affirmation. 

More particularly, such astute students as Bob Kane of free will or origination or inexplicable responsibility have in fact allowed that in wanting it, we are in fact wanting a certain human standing. We are wanting to be above nature or at least above the rest of nature. The Actualism theory of consciousness provides this uniquely, as well as truth to our irrepressibe conviction of subjectivity. Each of us has the stages of a subjective physical world dependent on us as well as dependent on the objective physical world. To be rhetorical, each of us is a god, however petty. Still more seriously, really and absolutely seriously, each of us is lawful unity of perceptual, cognitive and affective consciousness that is also an individuality and a personal identity. That and no inner entity, no such self, is the referent of your 'I', your use of the first-person pronoun.

Right and Wrong, Humanity, and Terrorism and Terrorist War  There is a morality to which we are all committed, by two things. The first is its accord with the fact of our Affective Consciousness, more particularly with the great goods of our lives, the objects of our six great desires -- which great goods issue in each of us making and being certain of moral judgements about each of us as distinct from anyone else, a seeming moral personal necessity. I must have them. The second thing, which must cut against this self-interest, is our minimal rationality, just the fact of our having reasons, including moral reasons necessarily as general as any other reasons. So we are committed despite our disregarding it to a certain morality of good consequences for all by our individual human nature. This is a kind of moral truth, the fundamental moral truth.         

More fully, we all desire (1) the great good of going on existing, including a personal world going on longer. (2) We want a kind of existence that has to do with our bodies -- not to be in pain, etc. (3) We want particular freedoms and powers. We do not want to be coerced by various personal circumstances arranged by others, subjected to compulsion, bullied, unable to run our own lives, weakened. (4) We want goods of relationship to those around us. (5)  Also respect and self-respect. (6) The goods of culture, starting with being able to read.. All of us want at least some of the latter cutural goods. Many of us want the practice and reassurance of a religion, or the custom of a people, or a homeland. A bad life is to be defined in terms of the deprivation of the six great goods.            

The Principle of Humanity then is that the right or justified thing as distinct from others -- the right action, practice, punishment, struggle, institution, government, society, or possible world -- is the one that according to the best judgement and information is the rational means in the sense of being effective and not self-defeating with respect to the end of getting and keeping people in general out of the bad lives, in well-being. Of course a consequentialism: of course not the end justifies the means but the end and the means justify the means. To the principle are attached certain policies, several fundamental ones having to do with redistribution of the means to well-being, another having to do with escape from restraining conventionality in expression, socieatally based constraint against moral truth.

The Principle of Humanity preceded but is consonant with and takes some support from recent humanitarian causes including armed interventions and pretences of them. The principle is superior to a slurry of attitudes in politics, international relations and conflict. E.g. talk, cant, ideology etc of deserts, equality, legality, our oligarchic democracy, moniedness in our societies, spurious sectional freedoms, 'our values', political traditions such as conservatism, liberalism, economism, etc. All that is a mess, our own lower form of life. It raises the question of what to do.

With respect to terrorism as tolerably defined, the Principle of Humanity, that moral law, issues explicitly and arguably, for just one example, in a moral right for the Palestinians in what is known as their terrorism against neo-Zionism as distinct from Zionism -- of course issues in such a right as is also unfailingly claimed inexplicitly but in effect by neo-Zionism itself, of course wrongly, in its terrorism against the Palestinians, in its taking of the last one fifth of the land or liberty of the indigenous people of Palestine. The Principle of Humanity also condemns terrorist war, including our war on Iraq, and certainly the war criminals Blair and Bush. Eschewing the pretence of fact, even by courts, the principle condemns the attack on and invasion of Gaza in 2015 by the army of neo-Zionism, arguably terrorist war at least more to be condemned than any concerted action of Palestinians at any time.

With respect to Islamic State, in Syria and Iraq, what is necessary is not only to act against barbarism and primitivism but to keep in mind our own civilized recent killing of a million or so more people than the barbarians. Such a proper orientation, rational moral insecurity, denial of self-sanctification, must issue in real negotiation -- negotiation mindful of our Sykes-Picot drawing of lines of in the sand after World War 1 and our subsequent exploitation and toleration of exploitation of peoples, and our ideology and our realpolitik and our terrorist air war in destruction of the society of Libya. Only an inane political class, not the few exceptions to it in politics, could pretend otherwise.

All of it, consciousness to determinism and freedom to right and wrong and humanity, on Tuesday 9 February, Senate House, University of London.

Philosophers of Our Times -- An introductory lecture, Edinburgh Book Festival, by Ted Honderich. Not as worthwhile as the lectures by others in the book of that title. Accessible though.

Recollection of a Hay-on-Wye philosophy and music festival event: Humanity, Conservatism, David Aaronovitch, Edwina Currie.   Ted Honderich
-- Wrongly not deferential to fellow panellists? No, about right.


Oxford University Press

Actual Conciousness

From the jacket of paperback edition:

‘I admire Honderich’s insightful self-reflective re-examination of the facts of consciousness
as he perceives them. That Honderich’s discussion of actual consciousness opens so many
avenues for philosophical exploration is the measure of its success and likely long-lasting
contribution to the study and understanding of consciousness. The book is highly
recommended for its topic, approach and new perspectives on the challenging problem
of adequately understanding consciousness in a scientific philosophy of mind. For those
with minimal objection to countenancing as many actualities as there are perceiving minds,
then the subjective actuality of consciousness may have found an ideal situation in
Honderich’s theory of actual consciousness.’
Dale Jacquette, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

‘Honderich’s thought in Actual Consciousness is as always entirely accessible . . . For its genre
this is an unusual book, not least, though engagingly, for the virtually “actual” presence of
its author on every page. Honderich’s checklists and their interrelations should provide
themes for many seminars to come.’ Alastair Hannay, Philosophy

‘This audacious venture should certainly be praised . . . good philosophy presses readers to
think for themselves, and Actual Consciousness gives us much food for thought.’
Roberta Locatelli, Times Higher Education

‘Oddly engaging . . . a good start for a theory of consciousness, and his approach makes
sense of what most people assume when they take the reality of their experience
for granted.’ Janna Thompson, Australian Book Review

‘Meticulously researched and extensively cited.’ The Guardian

Ted Honderich is Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at
University College London and visiting professor at Yale and the CUNY Graduate Centre.
He has lived in London for most of his life, and lectured in much of Europe and the East.

Cover image: The Woman in Blue, 1874, by Jean Baptiste Camille Corot.
Louvre, Paris, France/Giraudon/The Bridgeman Art Library

Author's sketch/very brief recollection of Actual Consciousness:

To understand what it is to be conscious, don’t start with any of five leading philosophical ideas -- qualia, what it’s like to be something, traditional subjectivity, intentionality, phenomenality, or any bundle of them. Start with a large figurative database. It leads to ordinary consciousness in the primary or core sense being initially adequately clarified, which kind of clarification is essential to inquiry and real agreement and disagreement. This consciousness, speaking as figuratively, is something's being actual.  

The resulting wholly literal and explicit theory of consciousness, Actualism, first is that with consciousness in perceiving, what is actual is a spatio-temporal piece or stage out there of a physical world, usually a room, certainly not a room in a head. Not sense data, any other representations, a self, functional or cognitive-science relations, some constitution or structure of consciousness, or whatever else from the histories of philosophy and science. No matter what roles such things or related ones play in the associated unconscious mentality. 

With thinking and with wanting as against perceiving, what is actual, to be briefer than brief, is only representations-with-attitudes.

Being actual, in all cases, is being subjectively physical, differently so with perceptual consciousness as against each of cognitive and affective consciousness. No representationism by itself, and not the representationism in Actualism, is a sufficient account of cognitive and affective consciousness. Representations being actual have to be in a sufficient account.

The subjectively physical as a whole, its parts being open to full and explicit characterization, no gesturing, is one great category of all physicality, the other being objective physicality. 

Actualism, right or wrong, is therefore a wholly different  physicalism from predecessors. It is different too in being partly an externalism and partly an internalism or cranialism. 

It deals exclusively with the prime subject with respect to the philosophy and science of mind, the necessary subject. It is argued to satisfy assembled criteria better than any competing theory. It denies absolutely any really unique mystery about mind. It claims to explain the fact of subjectivity fully, which is essential to any theory of consciousness, only partly by having a real physical world dependent not only on the objective physical world but also on you neurally. 

Despite being persistently worked out, is it also a programme? It may be philosophically as well as scientifically fertile. Certainly it is wholly consistent with, and respects, and registers the past progress of the science of consciousness. It is a full partner to science, as science is to it.

First Reviews

Long review by Alastair Hannay, in Philosophy

Long Review by Dale Jacquette, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Review by Roberta Locatelli, in Times Higher Education

Review by Janna Thompson, in Australian Book Review

More Stuff

Another author summary of Actual Consciousness

Author talk, launch party

On Why Actual Consciousness is Wholly a Subject for More Science -- and on Some Other Relations Between Philosophy and Science With Respect to Actual Consciousness

Lecture -- Actual Consciousness: Database, Physicalities, Theory, Criteria, No Unique Mystery

Lecture audience handout

Lecture UCL undergraduate Philosophy Society handout / Powerpoint

Actual Consciousness on Twitter

Oxford University Press Catalogue

Author's comments on 2006 papers by others on his earlier stuff that issued in Actual Consciousness --- papers by Harold Brown, Tim Crane, James Garvey, Stephen Law, E.J. Lowe, Derek Matravers, Paul Noordhof, Ingmar Persson, Stephen Priest, Barry Smith, Paul Snowdon. In Radical Externalism: Honderich's Theory of Consciousness Discussed, edited by Anthony Freeman, and also Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2006.


Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lectures
Oxford University Press


The 17 lectures in this volume are in five groups, as listed just below, about (i) the philosophy of mind, (ii) value, (iii) the mixed bag of free will, personal identity and religion, (iv) political and social philosophy, and (v) philosophy itself. They are preceded by brief introductory summaries by the chairman of all the lectures, Prof. Honderich.

Turn if you wish to the general introduction to the volume. Turn too if you wish to the introductory summaries of the lectures.


Thomas Nagel, Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem
Ted Honderich introductory summary

Peter Strawson, Perception and Its Objects
introductory summary

Tyler Burge, Perception: Where Mind Begins?
introductory summary

Jerry Fodor, The Revenge of the Given: Mental Representation Without Conceptualization

introductory summary

Ned Block, Attention and Mental Paint

introductory summary

John McDowell, Intention in Action  
introductory summary

Christine Korsgaard, On Having a Good  
introductory summary

Tim Scanlon, Reasons Fundamentalis
introductory summary

Simon Blackburn, The Sovereignty of Reason
introductory summary

Mary Warnock, What Is Natural and Should We Care About It?

introductory summary

John Searle, Freedom of the Will as a Problem in Neurobiology  
introductory summary

Derek Parfit, We Are Not Human Beings  

introductory summary

Anthony Kenny, Knowledge, Belief and Faith: Is Religion Really the Root of All Evil
introductory summary


Noam Chomsky, Simple Truths, Hard Choices: Some Thoughts on Terror, Justice, and Self-Defence  
introductory summary

Alasdair MacIntyre, Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral Agency  
introductory summary

Jurgen Habermas, Religious Tolerance: The Pacemaker for Cultural Right
introductory summary


Bernard Williams, Philosophy as a Humanist Disciplin
introductory summary

David Chalmers, On the Limits of Philosophical Progress
introductory summary

First newspaper review of Philosophers of Our Times:

of the larger and smaller categories of papers, chapters, lectures, reviews, a speech or two, some television and other media and so on on.

1. Consciousness, its sides, the mind, functionalism and cognitive science, Davidson's Anomalous Monism, mental causation,
mind-brain dualism, traditional physicalism, Roland Penrose's inner tubes, David Papineau's physicalism, that left-behind Union Theory of consciousness and brain now succeeded by Actualism.

2. Politics and hence right and wrong, consequentialism about rightness, equality and its obvious problem, the Principle of Humanity, maybe its holiness, conservatism and liberalism, hierarchic democracy,  civil disobedience, Marx and Mill, Anti-Semitism and also Semitic Inhumanity, a respectable instance of neo-Zionist philosophy, terrorisms, the moral right of the Palestinians to their terrorism, war and the terrorist-war criminal Blair.

3. Determinism's truth and its relation to freedom and responsibility, the absurdity of both the ideas that determinism is compatible and that determinism is incompatible with freedom, philosophical autobiography, philosophical attacks and defences and rows, and more.

4 General and miscellaneous. Russell's great Theory of Descriptions and Strawson's objection, two views of the Logical Positivist A. J. Ayer, against the idea of effects as merely high probabilities, interviews and broadcasts, several fusses.

And here, from each of these four categories, a few quick selections.

1. Consciousness and mind

John Searle and Property Dualism

Actual Consciousness, the 1st review, Times Higher Education

Actual Consciousness: Why it makes consciousness a subject for still more science

Actual Consciousness: An author's oversight already, the tyranny of the present, grandiosity

Descartes, dualism, objective physicalism, the true physicalism -- another summary of a book of 213,000 words

Hay-on-Wye videos -- consciousness lecture

Davidson's Anomalous Monism and the Champion of Mauve

Roger Penrose and Ted Honderich on consciousness

Excerpts from 11 papers by others and from Honderich's replies in a book on his now outlived thinking about consciousness and radical externalism

From that past book, seeing things & intentionality in seeing

2. politics and right and wrong

Thoughts after the book After The Terror on our culpable omissions in a loss of 20 million years of living time in Africa

Jurgen Habermas on After the Terror

A book interview with Ted Honderich on American state terrorism

Occupy London talks to the occupiers at St. Paul's Cathedral

A tv interview & transcript about Palestine

Full lectures (Chomsky, Honderich etc) in a series on terror

Hay-on-Wye videos -- debate on terrorism -- & the talk Terrorisms, Wars, The New Teletubbies

The Neo-Zionist libel of anti-semitism and the fall and rise of a book in Germany

On Understanding, Endorsing or Inciting Terrorism

A Greek interview -- Mass Civil Disobedience Today

Chomsky on simple truths about terrorism etc

Postscript to the German book-banning having to do with purported anti-semitism: The Absent Prof. Brumlik

Our air war on Libya

Reviews by the politicians Michael Foot and Enoch Powell of After the Terror

3. determinism, freedom, responsibility

Dan Dennett, a review of Honderich A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life Hopes

A. J. Ayer review of Honderich determinism book above

A recent and different idea on determinism and our human standing owed to thinking about consciousness

Doyle on Honderich on determinism and freedom

On the curious idea that effects are only high probabilities

Galen Strawson on free will

Ch.1 of the book How Free Are You? in French

The general paper Effects, Determinism, Neither Compatibilism Nor Incompatibilism, Consciousness

Maybe true if traditional articles on determinism & freedom by McCall & McCann

More on determinism and freedom by Manuel Vargas & Ted Honderich

4. general, miscellaneous

Thinking about the nature of  time -- the relations of (a) before and after as against (b) past and present

A letter to the editor against a distinguished scientist about philosophy as dead, time, etc.

A tiff in a Moral Maze on the BBC, and what would have been said if....

On Bernard Williams on moral luck, and other philosophers on other items, thoughts on them

Terrorist-war criminals such as Blair

Danish interview, gratifying to the subject

English interview at the Garrick Club

Is the mind ahead of the brain or behind it? Superior thoughts on the neuroscientist Libet.

You gotta read it -- a review of Searle on mind, language and society

Honderich, McGinn, Strohminger -- academic rows and insults about two reviewed books, one being Honderich's On Consciousness

One Oxford Union speech, this one about money and politics etc

Catherine Wilson review of Honderich, Philosopher: A Kind of Life



9 February, talks in Macmillan Hall, Senate House, University of London, to do with Ted Honderich's work on consciousness, determinism and freedom, right and wrong, by Noam Chomsky (by Skype), Gregg Caruso, CUNY, Tim Crane, Cambridge, Paul Gilbert, Hull, and Paul Snowdon, University College London. Responses by T.H. Details from Royal Institute of Philosophy.

9 March, 5 pm, lecture. 'Your Consciousness Is What? Where?'  Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, Senate House, University of London.

9 May, Oxford, Wycliffe Hall


2015 Kings College London, 24 Jan

Royal Institute of Philosophy, 28 Feb

St. Andrews, Apr 1

Hay on Wye, lecture on consciousness, 27 May

Hay on Wye, panel discussion with Thomas Pogge on world poverty, also 27 May

New York University, consciousness, Sept 29

Graduate Centre, CUNY, consciousness, Oct 1

Muswell Hill Bookshop, Oct 17

Magdeburg, Germany, Nov 25

Berlin School of Brain and Mind, Humboldt University, Nov 27, 2015

University College London, Philosophy Dept, Feb 12

Oxford Brookes, Feb 16

Birkbeck College, Mar 27

Oxford, Rewley House,  May 16-17, 2015

Hay on Wye, May 25, talk on consciousness, panel with David Abramovitch, Edwina Currie

Edinburgh Book Festival, August

University of Bern, Nov 26

Curriculum Vitae



Invitation to an open philosophical website:   Submissions are welcome on consciousness and mind, determinism, free will, political moralities, Palestine, Zionism, neo-Zionism, other related subjects, maybe general and miscellaneous.