

***The Socio-Economic Integration of Migrants***

**Final Report**

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## Executive Summary

### Education:

Based on the age at which individuals leave full time education, we compute the native-immigrant education gap for all immigrants, and we break down immigrants by countries of origin. We do this at three points in time (1993-94, 2000-01, and 2008-09). For all these three periods, and for all immigrant groups, immigrants in the UK leave full-time education *significantly later* than natives. Further, over time the overall educational gap between immigrants and natives (measured as the age at which individuals leave full time education) appears to increase slightly: In 1993-94 the average immigrant left full time education 1.2 years later than the average native, while the gap increases to 1.5 years in 2000-2001 and to 1.8 years in 2008-09. Controlling for differences in the age structure of the immigrant population does not significantly affect these findings.

- There is substantial heterogeneity in education gaps between immigrants from different origins. For instance, in 2008-09 the most highly educated immigrant group, relative to natives, were Eastern European immigrants, who left full time education on average 2.6 years later than UK natives. The smallest gap in school-leaving age is between immigrants from the Indian Sub-Continent, who left school about 1 year later.
- The gap in years of education between immigrants and natives is higher for immigrant men than for immigrant women, but the gap for women increases faster over the last three decades, suggesting that immigrant women tend to become relatively more educated.
- When distinguishing immigrants by ethnic origin, Black African immigrants are the

most highly educated, relative to white natives, and for all years. On the other hand Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have the lowest relative education levels. This is mainly driven by women, who are less educated than white British born women for any year we consider.

- There is considerable heterogeneity in immigrant-native education gaps across UK regions. In 2008-09, Scotland and the North East are the regions with the highest education differentials: immigrants in these regions have left full time education on average 2.4 and 2.7 years later than natives, respectively, while the West Midlands experience the lowest differences.

### **Employment**

- Immigrants have - despite their higher educational achievements - a lower employment rate than natives: in both 1993-94 and 2000-01 immigrants' employment rate is 10.5 percentage points lower than that of natives. In 2008-09 this gap has reduced to 2.7 percentage points. The most disadvantaged groups are immigrants from the Indian Sub-Continent and the Middle East, while the employment rate of immigrants from Oceania is higher than natives' for all years. Eastern European immigrants' employment rate is 10.6 percentage points higher than natives' in 2008-09.
- The immigrant-native employment gap is larger for women than for men. White immigrants have the lowest employment gap relative to natives, while Pakistani and Bangladeshi women exhibit the largest gaps, in the order of 50 percentage points, which remains stable over time. Immigrants of Black-Caribbean ethnicity are unique in that they are the only group for which the employment gap (in favour of natives) is

larger for men.

### Wages

- The raw wages of immigrants were 8.5 percent higher than those of natives' in 1993-94, 10 percent higher in 2000-01, but not significantly different from those of natives' in 2008-09.
- If we compare immigrants with natives who live in the same areas, the average wage advantage of immigrants in the two earlier periods *disappears*, and the immigrant-native wage gap in 2008-09 turns to a *wage disadvantage* of about 10 percent. This suggests that immigrants are more concentrated than natives in regions with a higher wage level (like London).
- If we compare immigrants to natives who live in the same area and have the same levels of education and the same age structure, immigrants' wage differentials turn negative for all years.
- For all years, immigrant women earn on average higher wages than native women, including in 2008-09. When we keep the regional allocation and age- and education structure constant, the wage differentials turn negative, but the wage disadvantage of immigrant women is lower than the wage disadvantage of immigrant men.
- Distinguishing immigrants by ethnic background shows that in all years white immigrants earn on average higher wages than white natives. In 2008-09, the foreign-born ethnic minorities with the higher positive raw wage differential relative to white natives are Indians and Chinese, with average wages being almost 8 percent higher than natives'. Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants, on the other hand, are those with the highest wage disadvantage.

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- The wage disadvantages of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis relative to white natives are higher among men than among women, which is probably an indication of more selective labour market participation among women.

### Differences by Entry Cohorts

- Breaking the data down by entry cohorts shows that at any point in time, the more recent immigrant cohorts are more educated than earlier cohorts. Further, the education gap with natives (which is positive from the perspective of immigrants) decreases with time in the UK, which could be explained by the more educated immigrants of each cohort re-emigrating after some years spent in the UK.
- The immigrant-native employment gap (which is negative from the perspective of immigrants) tends to close with time in the UK for all cohorts, both when observable characteristics are not controlled for, and when they are. Yet, the conditional employment gaps are negative for all cohorts, even after many years since migration.
- No clear patterns emerge for wages. The raw differentials for the 1980/83 cohorts decrease over time, while for other cohorts this is not the case. As of 2008-09, the earliest cohorts have positive wage differentials that tend to decrease for more recent cohorts, and become negative for the 2004/07 cohort.

### Language

- On average immigrants are 18 percentage points less likely than natives to be proficient in reading in the English language, and 19.5 percentage points less likely to be proficient in writing in the English language.

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- Comparing immigrants and natives with the same level of education, this gap diminishes only slightly to, respectively, 15 and 17 percentage points.
- Large differences exist between different areas of origin. Immigrants from most English-speaking countries, like Jamaica, Oceania and Canada have the same level of writing and reading fluency than British natives. Among the remaining groups, those with the highest conditional and unconditional gap relative to natives are Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants. For both groups the gap is above 20 percentage points in reading as well as writing.

### **Social Indicators: Belonging**

- The proportion of individuals who express a very strong feeling to belong to Britain is 14 percentage points *higher* among natives than among immigrants.
- Part of this difference is explained by differences in composition: after conditioning on age and education, this gap reduces to 11 percentage points.
- Women have on average lower feelings to belong to Britain than men. Interestingly, after conditioning on age and education, there are no significant immigrant-native differences in belonging for men, while there remain considerable differences for women.
- Immigrants from Ireland, India, Jamaica, and the Rest of New Commonwealth are *not different* from natives in their feelings of belonging to Britain, irrespective of gender. This holds for comparisons conditional, and unconditional on background characteristics (like age and education).
- Immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Eastern African New Commonwealth have *stronger* feelings of belonging to Britain than native –born British. For Pakistani

and especially Bangladeshi immigrants this is due to stronger feelings of belonging of men, while no significant differences exist for women.

- White and Chinese immigrants are those with the lowest sense of belonging. For instance, the difference in the share of those who feel they belong “very strongly” to Britain is 47.5 percentage points between Chinese immigrants and white natives. Observable characteristics account for only about 5 percentage points.
- While in the North East, the North West, and London, immigrants have lower sense of belonging than natives, no significant differences exist in other regions

### **Social Indicators: Civic Participation**

- Immigrants are on average less likely than natives to engage in any form of civic participation, although the difference is small (around 2 percentage points).

### **Dynastic Aspects**

- In all years and for all ethnic groups, the educational achievement of British-born minorities is higher than of white natives. This is only partially due to the differences in the age structure between white and non-white natives. Chinese are the ethnic group with the highest educational achievement in all years. The gap with white natives has increased over time. In 2008-09 the average British-born individual of Chinese ethnicity left full time education more than three years *later* than her white counterpart. Individuals of Black-African and Indian descent had on average about 2.4 more years of education than whites in 2008-09.
- For the British-born Black Caribbean the educational advantage of women relative to

men is substantial for all years, while for most other ethnic groups men are relatively more educated than women.

- In 2008-09 British-born Bangladeshis are the group with the highest employment disadvantage relative to whites. This overall disadvantage is due to the low employment probabilities of women. In contrast, the employment probability of ethnic Bangladeshi men is not significantly different from whites.
- British-born Pakistani women of Pakistani ethnicity have also a much higher employment disadvantage than co-ethnic men.
- The raw wage gap in gross hourly wages between UK born minorities and whites is statistically not significantly different from zero for most groups (the exceptions are a wage gap for Pakistanis in 1993-94 and 2008-09 and a wage advantage for Indians in 2000-01 and 2008-09 and for African Blacks in 2008-09).
- Controlling for regional distribution leads to a negative wage gap for British-born ethnic minorities, despite their higher levels of educational achievements. This shows that the positive unconditional wage gap is due to ethnic minority individuals living predominantly in high-wage metropolitan areas, foremost London.
- Both the unconditional and the conditional indicators show that the wage gap of women is smaller than the wage gap of men for all ethnic groups and in all years. This is possibly due to more selective labour market participation of ethnic minority women.

### **Intergenerational Aspects**

- The offspring of immigrants from all minority groups are more highly educated than their parents.

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- UK-born minorities have on average a higher educational level than their white peers.
- The children of ethnic minorities have on average a higher employment rate than the parent generation.
- Breaking these numbers down by ethnic groups shows that while the employment rate of Caribbean immigrants born between 1933 and 1964 (and observed in 1979-1988) was higher than that of white natives of the same cohort, the employment probability of their UK-born descendants (observed in 2000-10) is lower than that of comparable white native peers, but still higher than that of native born individuals of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin.
- Pakistanis and Bangladeshis of both the first and second generation have the lowest employment rates, but this is largely due to the low labour market participation of women from these communities.

### **Marriage, UK born minorities**

- There is substantial heterogeneity between ethnic groups, and between genders within the same ethnic group, in terms of marriage (or co-habiting) behaviour. Men and women of Chinese background are those with the lowest share of intra-ethnic marriages: 61% of UK-born Chinese men are married to (or co-habit with) a non-ethnically Chinese partner, and the rate is even higher for women at 72%. Native born Black Caribbean men have also low rates of endogamy, with 63% of them having a non-Caribbean partner.
- Pakistani and Bangladeshi are by far the ethnic group with the highest endogamy rate, which is particularly high among women of Bangladeshi background. Over 85% of ethnic Pakistani men and women have a partner of the same ethnicity, while among

the Bangladeshi minority this share is 74% among men and 93% among women.

- A substantial fraction of ethnically Pakistani or Bangladeshi UK natives have a partner that is a first generation immigrant from that country: 58% of British born ethnically Pakistani men and 56% of British born ethnically Bangladeshi men have a partner that is born in, respectively, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Among second and higher generation Pakistani women, 66% have a Pakistani-born partner, while among second and higher generation Bangladeshi women, this share rises to 83%.

### **Language, UK born minorities**

- There is no overall difference in (self-assessed) reading and writing proficiency between second generation immigrants and natives, conditional or unconditional on age and education.
- Individuals of Indian and Pakistani descent have *a higher likelihood* than natives to classify themselves as having a very good reading proficiency, and the difference survives age and education controls. For writing, it is only individuals of Indian descent who on average have a statistically significant higher (self-reported) proficiency than natives.

### **Belonging and Civic Participation, UK born minorities**

- There is no overall difference in responses to the question of how strongly individuals feel to belong to Britain between second generation immigrants and natives.
- There is substantial heterogeneity among different ethnicities. While second generation Black Caribbean are significantly less likely than white natives to feel they

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belong to Britain, second generation Pakistanis are more likely than white natives to feel strongly to belong to Britain. The analysis by gender shows that, in both cases, it is women who drive the results, while no significant differences exist among second generation men.

- There are no significant differences in civic participation between British born minorities and White British born, neither overall nor by gender.

### **International Comparison: Employment**

- In terms of its share of immigrants in the population, the UK ranges on rank 6 in the group of 15 EU countries (old EU, excluding Luxembourg and including Norway).
- The employment disadvantage of immigrants in the UK is smaller than in most other Central and Northern European countries.
- In almost all countries the *conditional* employment gap is larger than the *unconditional* gap, which indicates that immigrants tend to be younger and with a more favourable education structure than natives, and to settle in regions with higher average employment rates.
- Immigrants and natives in the UK are less segregated across occupations than in most other countries (except Finland, Portugal and Ireland). According to our estimates, in the UK 10 percent of immigrants would have to change jobs to equalize the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives. In comparison, in Germany this share is 19 percent, and in France 12.2 percent.

### **International Comparison: Education of the Children of Immigrants**

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- Comparing PISA test score for 2006, in all countries, except for Australia, children of immigrants born abroad (1.5 generation) at age 15 have lower reading scores than their native peers. In the UK the gap is about 2.5 times larger than in Canada, but smaller than in all other countries, and in particular lower than in all other European countries.
- Once we control for the language spoken at home, test score disadvantage disappears in the UK, Canada, Germany and the US, while it is substantially reduced in all other countries, except for Spain.
- Controlling, in addition, for parental educational and occupational background, and for family wealth, further reduces the gap for all countries.
- Those who are born in the host country (“Second generation”), on the other hand, are less disadvantaged in all countries. Only in Germany and France the reading achievement gap between second generation and native kids is significantly negative, while it is positive in Australia.
- Controlling for language spoken at home and for family background, the gap disappears in all countries. Moreover, in the UK (as well as in Australia and Canada) second generation immigrants outperform the children of native-born parents after controlling for differences in backgrounds.

## 1. Introduction and Background

Integration is a multi-facet concept, and the extent to which minority and immigrant groups are integrated into a country, and perform in its economy, can be measured along different dimensions (economic and non-economic) and according to different metrics (distance from the native population or the majority group conditional/unconditional on education and other observable characteristics)<sup>1</sup>. Each of these dimensions answers different questions. In the following, we will discuss the various concepts that exist. We will then discuss how we will operationalise these in our research, given the available data sources. In what follows we refer to “immigrants” as individuals who are born in a country outside the UK.

*The static perspective:* Performance and integration of immigrants, benchmarked against the native born population, can be measured at a particular point in time, e.g. in a particular year. Such a “snapshot” compares indicators of economic performance in e.g. a particular year, for respective resident populations. It would for instance compare the employment rate of Britain’s different foreign born populations with the employment rate of the native born population. Such comparisons are informative and, give appropriate answers to many policy questions. For instance, for the question “How does Britain’s foreign born population compare with the native born population in terms of average wages, wage dispersion, and employment, for the years after 1990”, such analysis provides the answer. Technically, and denoting the particular outcome of interest by  $y$ , the group of interest by the index  $j$ , and the reference group (e.g. natives) by the index  $k$ , this amounts to computing  $E(y_j) - E(y_k)$ , where  $E$  is an expectations operator.

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<sup>1</sup> See e.g. Home Office (2004).

*The conditional perspective:* Performance of individuals and populations differs according to their demographic and socio-economic characteristics. For instance, a particular immigrant population may differ from the native-born population (and from other immigrant populations) in terms of age- and education composition. We can then compute the difference between two groups if they had the same demographic composition, or we can keep a subset of characteristics constant. This answers questions like “What is the difference in wages between immigrant group  $j$  and natives if immigrants had the same observable characteristics than natives”. To answer that question requires construction of a “counterfactual”, as the population means of outcomes of group  $j$  are typically not observed for the same set of characteristics. Construction of this counterfactual is usually done by regression analysis. In our notation above, and denoting the vector of demographic characteristics by  $X$ , this “conditional” difference amounts to  $E(y_j|X_k) - E(y_k|X_k)$ <sup>2</sup>.

*The dynamic perspective:* Performance of immigrant groups changes over their life cycle. It depends importantly on their initial skills, the way these skills are applicable to the host country labour market, the pace at which these skills are transformed into host country specific skills, and additional skills are acquired. It also depends on the “quality” and “ability” of immigrant populations. While for instance immigrant populations tend to underperform upon entry, due to initial difficulties to make optimal use of their skills (which may for instance be due to language difficulties), immigrants usually overcome this initial disadvantage. The speed of this “adjustment” process (again taking native individuals as a reference group) may differ across immigrant populations, due to different incentives to

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<sup>2</sup> Studies like Blackaby et al. (2002), Heath et al. (2000), Heath and Cheung (2006), Heath and Yu (2005), and Wadsworth (2003) address this with a focus on ethnic minorities rather than on immigrants.

acquire skills, or due to differences in the initial “ability” pool. Thus, the “dynamic” view allows comparisons of immigrants with natives at different stages of their migration cycle. It allows answering questions like “How do immigrants of group  $j$  compare with natives with the same set of observable characteristics over their migration cycle”.<sup>3</sup>

Again, the computation of the life cycle performance of immigrant groups is typically not directly attainable from the data (as this would require information on complete migration cycles of immigrant groups), and is thus based on construction of life cycle profiles, where estimates are obtained by regression analysis. However, to answer questions about life cycle comparisons in the absence of detailed life cycle information is more demanding and requires (sometimes strong) assumptions. Most important is here the view one takes about return migration. For instance, Dustmann and Weiss (2007) show that at least 30% of UK immigrants leave the UK within the first 5 years after arrival. If this process of “return migration” is selective, then this has serious consequences for the computation of life cycle profiles of immigrants that are based on repeated cross-sectional data (like the British Labour Force Survey). This may lead to serious miss-measurement in the construction of life cycle profiles. Almost the entire literature ignores this problem.<sup>4</sup>

*The dynastic perspective:* Performance (and integration) of immigrant populations is a long-term process that spans multiple generations. For instance, due to intergenerational immobility, it is unlikely that the children of a particular immigrant group perform equally well to native born peers if the particular immigrant group is lower educated, and low

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<sup>3</sup> A large literature in Economics is computing life cycle profiles of immigrant earnings. See, for instance, Chiswick (1978), Borjas (1985, 1995), Friedberg (1992), Hu (2000), Lofstrom (2002), Long (1980), Lubotsky (2007).

<sup>4</sup> An early paper that discusses this problem, and shows (for the case of Germany) its relevance for estimation, is Dustmann (1993). See the Appendix in Dustmann (2000) for details.

achieving in the labour market. The question is then whether, the children of immigrants improve relative to their native born peers with the *same* parental background. Although there has been some important progress in the literature on the dynastic aspects of immigrant performance and integration, there are still many open questions.<sup>5</sup> Even less is known about intergenerational aspects of social integration, like the intergenerational transmission of identity with home- and host country.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See for instance Card *et al.* (2000) who find that children of immigrants tend to have higher education and wages than children of natives. Borjas (2006) finds that on average the second generation of immigrants earns 5 to 10% more than their ancestors. Other studies on intergenerational mobility in immigrant communities include, Chiswick (1977), Carliner (1980), Borjas (1992, 1993, 1994), Trejo (2003) and Smith (2003, 2006) for the US, Chiswick and Miller (1988), Sweetman and Dicks (1999), Aydemir *et al.* (2009) for Canada, Chiswick *et al.* (2005) for Australia, Cohen and Haberfeld (1998) and Deutsch *et al.* (2006) for Israel. Work for Europe includes Gang and Zimmermann (2000), Riphahn (2003, 2005) for Germany, Husted *et al.* (2001) for Denmark, Ours and Veenman (2003), Veenman and Ours (2004) for the Netherlands, and Rooth and Ekberg (2003), Hammarstedt and Palme (2006) for Sweden, and Blackaby *et al.* (2005), Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010), Dustmann, Frattini and Theodoropoulos (2011), Platt (2005, 2007) for the UK. Heath and McMahon (2005) study social mobility of ethnic minorities in the UK. Algan *et al.* (2010) perform a comparative study for France, Germany, and the UK.

<sup>6</sup> We are only aware of one study, Casey and Dustmann (2010)

## **2. Data Sources**

For the analysis in this report, we will be using different micro-data sources, which we briefly describe in this section. There are four main data sources we use in this analysis: the UK Labour Forces Survey, the Citizenship Survey, the EU Labour Force Survey, and PISA.

### **2.1 The UK Labour Force Survey**

The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a sample survey of households living at private addresses in Great Britain/UK. Its purpose is to provide information on the UK labour market that can then be used to develop, manage, evaluate and report on labour market policies. It is conducted by the Office for National Statistics. Other than the Census, the LFS is the only comprehensive source of information about all aspects of the labour market. As from 1992 the LFS data are collected and published quarterly. Between 1984 and 1991 the survey was carried out yearly. Between 1973 and 1983 it was carried out biannually. The 1973 data are not publicly available. Also, the 1975 and 1977 waves did not collect data on ethnicity, and are therefore not suitable for the current project. The current quarterly LFS has been running in Northern Ireland since December 1994. From 1984 to 1994 the Northern Ireland LFS was carried out annually and from 1973 to 1983 bi-annually. The ethnicity question was introduced in the Northern Ireland LFS in 1997. Since 1992 the sample size is about 60,000 household in GB in every quarter, representing about 0.2% of the population. The LFS collects information on respondents' personal circumstances (including ethnicity, nationality, country of birth, and year of arrival in the UK if applicable) and their labour market status during a reference period of one to four weeks immediately prior to the interview. As of the first quarter 2010 the LFS should also include an “immigration route” question, which would allow us to differentiate immigrants according also to their entry route (e.g. asylum seekers, work, study, family reunification).

## **2.2 The Citizenship Survey**

The Citizenship Survey is a household survey of adults (aged 16 and over) in England and Wales. It asks for views on a range of topics, including participation in voluntary activity and charitable giving. It was originally called the Home Office Citizenship Survey, and carried out biannually in 2001, 2003 and 2005. Since 2007, the survey has moved to a continuous design, and changed its name to Citizenship Survey. Each wave surveys 10,000 adults, with an additional boost sample of 5,000 people from minority ethnic groups. The latest survey year currently available is 2007.

The Citizenship Survey provides information about identity and social networks, views about the local area, participation in local decision-making, feelings of trust and influence, participation in volunteering and civic activities, perceptions of racial and religious prejudice. It also has demographic (including country of birth or both parents and ethnicity) and employment information.

## **2.3 The European Union Labour Force Survey (EULFS)**

The European Union Labour Force Survey (EULFS) is conducted in the 27 Member States of the European Union and 2 countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). It is a large quarterly household sample survey of people aged 15 and over as well as on persons outside the labour force. In all of the countries providing quarterly data the quarterly sample is spread uniformly over all weeks of the quarter. The national statistical institutes are responsible for selecting the sample, preparing the questionnaires, conducting the direct interviews among households, and forwarding the results to Eurostat in accordance with the common coding scheme.

The data collection covers in total the years 1983 to 2008 (to be released in December 2009), though not all countries are included in all years. The Labour Force Surveys are conducted by the National Statistical Institutes across Europe and are centrally processed by Eurostat.

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In spring 2002, the LFS sample size across the EU was about 1.500 thousands of individuals. Every year since 1999 the EULFS is augmented with an annually changing “ad-hoc module”. In 2008, the ad-hoc module was on “Labour market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants”, providing information on - among other things - parents’ country of birth and reasons for entering the host country. Unfortunately, the current release of the EU LFS does not contain the 2008 ad-hoc module yet, and neither has information on wages.

### **2.4 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) database**

PISA is an internationally standardised assessment that was jointly developed by participating economies and administered to 15-year-olds in schools. Four assessments have so far been carried out (in 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009). Data for the 4th assessment (2009) were not yet available when this report was written. Tests are typically administered to between 4,500 and 10,000 students in each country. In 2006, 57 countries participated in the assessment. Beside test scores in reading, mathematics, and science, the PISA data have also information on parents’ and children’s country of birth, as well as on a number of household and school variables. In our analysis, we use 2006 PISA scores.

### **3. Background: Immigrants in the UK**

Throughout this report we define “immigrants” as “foreign born”, unless otherwise specified. Immigrants constitute a sizable fraction of the total working age population in the UK, and their share has been growing over the last twenty years.

Table 3.1 shows, in row 1, that in 1993-94 immigrants represented 6.9% of the total working age population, while their share has increased to 7.9% in 2000-01, and to 11.4% in 2008-09. The composition of the foreign born population in the UK has also changed considerably over time, as reported in rows 2-10. While in 1993-94 immigrants from Western Europe made up over one third of the total immigrant population, their share has decreased over time, and reached 22% in 2008-09. At the same time, the share of Eastern European immigrants has dramatically increased, from 3% in 1993-94, to 3.6% in 2000-01, and 13.1% in 2008-09, after the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004. As regards other areas of origin, the share of immigrants from the Americas has slightly declined (from 11.7% in the early years to 9% in 2008-09), while the share of African immigrants has increased, from 14.8% in 1993-94 to 18.9% of the immigrant population in 2008-09. Similarly, the share of immigrants from the Indian Sub-Continent has been decreasing, from 20.7% in 1993-94 to 18.6% in 2008-09, while the share of East Asian immigrants has at the same time gone from 8.7% to 10.9%.

Immigrants and natives have, over the entire period, markedly different regional distributions, as we show in Table 3.2. The most striking difference between immigrants and natives is the share residing in London: while the share of natives living in London was just above 10% in 1993-94 and 2000-01, and just below 10% in 2008-09, 40% of working age immigrants were living in London in 1993-94, 43.3% in 2000-01, and 38.7% in 2008-09. Although immigrants are always disproportionately more concentrated in London than natives, there is some evidence of an increased dispersion in more recent years.

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In this report we do not only analyse immigrants, but also their British born descendants. In particular, we analyse in detail the economic and non-economic integration of individuals of non-white ethnicity born in the UK, and who are therefore the offspring of non-white immigrants. Table 3.3 shows that the ethnic diversity of the British-born population has increased over the last twenty years. In 1993-94 over 97% of the British born working age population was white, while in 2000-01 whites constitute 96.1% of all natives, and in 2008-09, their share has reduced to 94.2%. Most of the non-white natives are (averaged over all years), of Black-Caribbean, Indian, or Pakistani descent. In recent years, Indian and Pakistani British born represent each over 1% of the British-born working age population.

The regional distribution of native minorities, which we report in Table 3.4, is similar to that of immigrants: in 2008-09, 9.2% of white natives, but 42.2% of non-white natives was living in London. As in the case of immigrants, there is some evidence of an increased dispersion of ethnic minorities across UK regions over time: While in 1993-94, 46.3% of non-white natives lived in London, this number increased to 49.1 % in 2000/01, but decreased to 42.2 % in 2008/09.

## 4. Integration and Performance of First Generation Immigrants in the UK

We now describe and analyse the economic and non-economic integration and performance of first generation immigrants in the UK.

We will use regression analysis to develop *static* and *conditional* indicators of immigrant performance in the UK. We will look at both economic and non-economic outcomes, at different points in time. All our analyses use as a benchmark the performance of natives. Our indicators can therefore be interpreted as the gap between immigrants and natives for that specific outcome.

### 4.1 Economic integration

To analyse the economic performance of immigrants, we consider the following outcomes:

- Educational attainment
- Employment<sup>7</sup>
- Wages

For each of these outcomes we construct overall indicators, as well as indicators broken down by gender, countries of origin, region of residence in the UK. We analyse three points in time, 1993-1994, 2000-2001 and 2008-09.

#### 4.1.1 Education

Comparing the education of immigrants and natives is not always straightforward because of differences in education systems across countries. The UK LFS classifies all educational

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<sup>7</sup> We have also analysed unemployment and labour market participation. As these two outcomes draw a very similar picture to that emerging from analysis of employment, we do not report them here for the sake of brevity.

qualifications obtained abroad as “other qualifications”, so that the highest qualifications achieved cannot be exactly compared between immigrants and natives, in particular when immigrants come from countries with different education systems (see the Appendix of Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2011) for a discussion).

In order to assess the immigrant-native gap in educational attainments, we therefore use the LFS information on the age at which individuals left full time education. One possible problem is that individuals in different countries may start education at slightly different ages, so that the age at which full time education is concluded may give slightly different indications for different populations about the total number of years of education obtained. We ignore that problem here. Based on this information, Figure 4.1.1 summarises the native immigrant-gap for the age at which individuals left full time education, for all immigrants (leftmost columns), and when we break down immigrants by countries of origin, at three points in time: 1993-94, 2000-01, and 2008-09. For all the three periods we consider, immigrants in the UK are significantly better educated than natives. Further, over time the educational gap between immigrants and natives appears to increase slightly. The largest differences are for immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Middle East, while the smallest differences are for individuals from the Indian sub-continent. This finding is quite remarkable, as immigrants in many other European countries are lower educated than natives – see our analysis in Section 6.

Some of the differences in education could be explained by immigrants and natives having a different age composition. Thus, if overall educational attainment increases over time, one reason for the high level of education in the immigrant population may simply be that immigrants are younger on average. In Table 4.1.1 we report in even columns the data on which Figure 4.1.1 is based (the *unconditional* education gap), and in odd columns the *conditional* indicator whereby we keep the age composition of the immigrant and the native

population constant (we use regression analysis to compute these). We report the standard errors in parenthesis, and we star the coefficients according to their significance level, where the null hypothesis is that the respective coefficient equals zero. One, two or three stars mean that this hypothesis can be rejected at the 5, 1 or 0.1 percent level.

In 1993-94 the average immigrant left full time education 1.2 years later than the average native, while the gap increases to 1.5 in 2000-2001 and to 1.8 in 2008-09. Controlling for the age structure of the immigrant population does not affect the results, except in 2008-09. In this latter period, accounting for differences in the age structure between immigrants and natives reduces the gap to 1.6 years.

There is also substantial heterogeneity in education gaps across immigrants from different origins, as rows 2 to 10 demonstrate. In 2008-09 the most highly educated immigrant group, relative to natives, were Eastern European immigrants: they left full time education on average 2.6 years later than UK natives, or 2.2 years later when we control for the age structure. Remarkably, the smallest gap in school-leaving age is between immigrants from the Indian Sub-continent and UK natives: 1 year in 2008-09, up from 0.09 years in 1993-94 and 0.3 years in 2000-01. The gap in age at which individuals left full time education tends to close over time for Eastern European and Middle Eastern immigrants, which may reflect changes in the composition of these immigrant groups. Important to note is however that the age at which individuals left full time education is *for no immigrant group smaller* than for the white native born. Thus, we can conclude from these numbers that immigrants to the UK are, and have been over the last two decades, well educated, and possibly have higher educational attainments than natives in the same age groups.

Table 4.1.2 shows that the gap in years of education is higher for immigrant men than for immigrant women, but that the gap for women has increased faster over the last three decades. This suggests that immigrant women tend to become relatively more educated.

Considering again different countries of origin reveals that Western European women in the initial periods, and Eastern European women in all periods have a higher educational advantage relative to natives than men. Conversely, the educational gap between women from the Indian Sub-Continent and native women is negative in the initial years, although it closes over time: while in 1993-94 the average woman from the Indian Sub-Continent has 0.9 less years of education than native women, in 2008-09 the gap turns positive, at 0.3 years.

In Table 4.1.3 we use a different classification. Instead of country origin groups, we distinguish immigrants by ethnic origin and report the educational gap between (first-generation) immigrants of these different ethnic groups and white natives. Some clear differences emerge across different ethnicities. Black African immigrants are the most highly educated, relative to white natives. This is the case for all years we consider, although the gap is decreasing over time. Conversely, the positive education gap between white immigrants and white natives has increased by slightly less than one year between 1993-94 and 2008-09. Likewise, the gap for ethnic Chinese immigrants has increased by more than one year over the same time period.

Interesting is the education gap between white UK natives and immigrants from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. While Indians in 2008-09 have left full time education on average 2.1 years later than natives (up from 1.4 in 2003-04), Pakistanis and Bangladeshis perform less well. The gap in educational achievement for Pakistani immigrants is closing over time: from having one year less of schooling than white natives in 1993-94, to -0.6 years in 2000-01, to not being significantly different in 2008-09. However, accounting for the differences in age structure increases the educational disadvantage of ethnic Pakistanis, which becomes negative and statistically significant also in 2008-09, suggesting that it is mainly younger

individuals who from these groups who have changed the balance in relative educational attainment. The gap reduces over time for ethnic Bangladeshis as well, although less rapidly than for Pakistanis: in 2008-09 ethnic Bangladeshis had on average 0.2 years less education than white UK natives; the gap increases to a disadvantage of 0.5 years when we account for differences in the age structure.

Table 4.1.4 shows that the gap in educational achievements of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis is due to the lower educational level of women in these communities. Although this gap is reducing over time, in 2008-09, Pakistani women had about one year less education than white native women, while the gap is 0.8 years for Bangladeshi women. Conversely, men from these ethnic groups have a positive education gap, compared to white British born men.

Interestingly, there is considerable heterogeneity in immigrant-native education gaps across UK regions, as Table 4.1.5 shows. In 2008-09, Scotland and the North East are the regions with the highest education differentials: immigrants in these regions have left full time education on average 2.4 and 2.7 years later than natives, respectively. On the other hand, in the West Midlands and in London the educational gap is less than one year. The West Midlands have experienced a considerable growth in the relative immigrant-native qualification: in 1993-94 the education gap was -0.25, it was not statistically significant in 2000-01, and turns to positive in 2008-09.

### **4.1.2 Employment**

We now turn to the differences in employment rates (defined as the ratio of individuals with a job over individuals in the working age population, excluding those in full time education) between immigrants and natives. As before, we first construct *static* indicators of employment, which can be interpreted as the percentage point difference in the employment

rate between immigrants and natives. We then compute two *conditional* indicators. The first conditional indicator accounts for the difference in the regional distribution of immigrants and natives, while the second conditional indicator accounts, *in addition*, for differences in age structure and in education.

Figure 4.1.2 shows that, despite their higher educational achievements, immigrants have a lower employment rate than natives: in both 1993-94 and 2000-01 immigrants' employment rate is 10.5 percentage points lower than that of natives'. However in 2008-09 this gap has reduced to 2.7 percentage points. The most disadvantaged groups are immigrants from the Indian Sub-Continent and the Middle East, while the employment rate of immigrants from Oceania is higher than natives' in all years. Remarkably, Eastern European immigrants show a lower employment probability in 1993-94 and 2000-01, but their employment rate is 10.6 percentage points higher than natives' in 2008-09. This is clearly a composition effect, and due to the large inflow of highly qualified individuals from that group after 2003.

Columns 2, 5 and 7 of Table 4.1.6 show that controlling for the geographical distribution of immigrants and natives does not have any effect on the employment gap in 1993-94, while it slightly increases immigrants' employment disadvantage in the two latter periods. This indicates that immigrants tend, in 2000-01 and 2008-09, to be located in regions with higher employment. Columns 3, 6 and 9 report the difference in employment rates of immigrants and natives when we condition additionally on age and education. Conditioning on these variables increases the gap for all years, but it has a dramatic effect in 2008-09, when the gap increases from 2.7 to 10.2 percentage points. This indicates, therefore, that the decrease in the immigrant-native employment gap over time shown in columns 1, 4 and 7 is largely due to changes in immigrants' composition in terms of age and education. Once all observable

characteristics are conditioned out, no immigrant group displays any employment advantage with respect to natives (the only exception is Oceania in 2000-01). On the contrary, immigrants from all countries of origin are less likely to be employed than natives who live in the same region and have the same age and education (again, with the only exception of immigrants from Oceania).

Table 4.1.7 draws distinction between men and women, again for different origin regions. The figures in the Table show that the immigrant-native employment gap is larger for women than for men. In the first two periods we consider, employment of both men and women is lower than that of natives; however, the employment rate of immigrant men is 2.7 percentage points higher than for native men in 2008-09. This is due to immigrants' favourable age- and education composition: if immigrant men had the same age, education and geographical distribution than native men, their employment probability would be 4.7 percentage points lower. Immigrant women's employment gap is for all origin countries larger than that of immigrant men (Oceania is the exception). The difference is stronger for immigrants from the Indian Sub-Continent and the Middle East.

In Table 4.1.8 we have constructed indicators of employment integration by ethnic group. Perhaps unsurprisingly, white immigrants have the lowest employment gap relative to natives. In 2008-09 their employment rate is even 4.6 percentage points higher than that of natives'. However, once we condition on observable characteristics, they too display a 3.8 percentage points lower employment probability than white natives. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are the two most disadvantaged ethnic groups for all years. Moreover, in 2008-09 their employment gap increases when we condition on their observable characteristics. The same is the case for to Black Africans.

Table 4.1.9 displays differences in employment probabilities by gender for each ethnic group. Pakistani and Bangladeshi women exhibit the largest gaps, in the order of 50 percentage

points, which remains stable over time. Immigrants of Black-Caribbean ethnicity are unique in that they are the only group for which the employment gap is larger for men. In 2008-09 Caribbean women are just 2.8 percentage points less likely than white native women of having a job, versus 20 percentage points of Caribbean men. Moreover, this negative differential turns around when we condition on individual characteristics: if they had the same age and education than white native women, Caribbean immigrant women would be 2.8 percentage points more likely to be employed.

Table 4.1.10 displays immigrant-native employment gaps by region. Although there are considerable differences across regions in immigrant-native employment differentials, after conditioning on age and education, the employment rate of immigrants is lower than that of natives everywhere. However, in 2008-09 in the North East, the Eastern region, and in Wales immigrants and natives have the same (unconditional) probability of employment, and the employment rate is higher for immigrants than for natives in the South East, the South West, and Scotland. When individual characteristics are conditioned out, all these regions display employment differentials, relative to other regions, ranging from 4.4 percentage points in the South west to 8.5 percentage points in the Eastern region. The North East has one of the highest conditional employment differentials, at 11.3 percentage points.

### **4.1.3 Wages**

Figure 4.1.3 displays wage differentials between immigrants and natives. The figure shows that the wages of immigrants were 8.5 percent higher than those of natives' in 1993-94, 10 percent higher in 2000-01, but not significantly different from those of natives' in 2008-09 (see also the standard errors reported in columns 1, 4 and 7 of Table wage\_1). It seems therefore that the higher relative employment of recent years (see table empl\_1) has coincided with lower relative wages.

Interestingly, if we condition on region of residence, as we do in columns 2, 5 and 8 of Table

4.1.11, the average wage advantage of natives in the two early periods disappears, and the immigrant-native wage gap in 2008-09 turns to a 10 percent disadvantage for immigrants. These results suggest that immigrants are more concentrated than natives in regions with a higher wage level (like London). Further, columns 3, 6 and 9 (which condition on age and education in addition) demonstrate that if immigrants and natives were identical also in terms of age and education, immigrants' wage differentials would be negative for all years. The latest years display the highest immigrant wage disadvantage.

Conditional on age, education and years since migration, immigrants from Western Europe, America and Oceania have for all years higher average wages than natives. However, except for immigrants from Oceania, the wage differentials turn significantly negative for all these groups when we condition on their age, education, and region of residence. It is also worth noting that while Eastern European immigrants did not have any (unconditional) wage disadvantage in 1993-94 and 2000-01, they have a 32 percent disadvantage in 2008-09. This may be due to downgrading of recently arrived immigrant cohorts from these countries – see Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) for details. On the other hand, their conditional wage disadvantage does not change much, which could mean that there have been changes in their relative composition over time.

Table 4.1.12 reports indicators of immigrants' wage disadvantage by gender. Immigrant women earn on average higher wages than native women also in 2008-09, when the average wages of immigrants are lower than natives'. Further, in 1993-94 and 2000-01 the positive unconditional immigrant-native wage gap is higher for women than for men. Moreover, also the conditional indicator, reported in even columns, shows that the wage disadvantage of immigrant women is lower than the wage disadvantage of immigrant men.

We now turn to the analysis by ethnic groups. Table 4.1.13 shows that in all years white

immigrants earn on average higher wages than white natives. This is due to their location choices (as shown by columns 2, 5 and 8) and to their age-education composition (see columns 3, 6 and 9). In 2008-09, the foreign-born ethnic minorities with the higher positive wage differential relative to white natives are Indians and Chinese, with average wages being almost 8 percent higher than natives'. Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants, on the other hand, are those with the highest wage disadvantage. Table 4.1.14, which reports the wage gap between immigrants from different ethnicities and white natives, confirms these differences. It is interesting to notice though that the wage differentials of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are much higher among men than among women, which is probably an indication of more selective labour market participation among women.

As regards wage differentials, there are considerable differences over time and across regions, as displayed in table 4.1.15. In 1993-94, only immigrants in London are earning on average less than natives, while immigrants in Wales and Scotland were earning significantly more. In all other regions there are no significant *unconditional* wage differences.

However, in most regions, once age and education are controlled for (in other words, one we compare immigrants with natives who are identical with respect to age and measured education), wage differentials turn negative, and become non-positive also in Wales and Scotland. In 2008-09 on the other hand, immigrants-natives wage differentials are significantly negative in all regions except for the North East and the South east, ranging from -16.5 percent in the North West to -3.8 percent in the Eastern region. The conditional differentials are instead negative for all regions, and range between -12.7 percent in the South East and 26.8 percent in the North West.

### **4.2 Economic Integration over Time**

In this section, we study the evolution of the same outcomes as above (education, employment, and wages), but we distinguish between seven different immigrant cohorts,

defined on the basis of their years of first arrival in the UK: 1980/1983, 1984/1987, 1988/1991, 1992/1995, 1996/1999, 2000/2003, and 2004/2007. In the previous section, our analysis showed how immigrant populations compared to UK born individuals at three different points in time. We now follow the same cohorts over time, which adds a dynamic component, as it allows assessing the way immigrant cohorts improve during their migration history in the UK. Of course, based on the data we have available, we are not able to assess changes in cohort outcomes due to out-migration (see Dustmann and Weiss 2007 for an assessment). However, the estimates we provide are – in our view – important from a policy perspective, as they speak to the question “how does the performance of those immigrants who stay in the UK, and who arrive in year Y, change over time?” Our analysis also allows assessing the differences in immigrant quality (or selective out-migration), as we compare immigrant cohorts that arrived at different time periods. As before, our reference point will always be the native populations. And – again as before – we provide raw differentials, and differentials conditional on a set of observable characteristics, like age and education.

### ***4.2.1 Education***

Table 4.2.1 reports the immigrant-native differential for education, measured – as before – as the age at which individuals left full time education, for each cohort and at three different points in time. As explained above, the average education level for immigrants may change with time spent in the UK either because they acquire new education in the UK, or because of selective outmigration. If for instance the least educated immigrants from each cohort return to their home country earlier, then the immigrant-native educational differential will increase. The table reveals two important features. First, at any point in time, the more recent immigrant cohorts are more educated than earlier cohorts. Secondly, the education gap with natives decreases with time in the UK, which indicates that it is the more educated individuals of each cohort that tend to re-emigrate after some years spent in the UK.

This positively selected outmigration is visible for all origin groups except for immigrants from Oceania, as we show in Table A1 in the Appendix. In the case of immigrants from Oceania, the educational gap with natives increases over time.

### **4.2.2 Employment**

We now turn to employment. In Table 4.2.2 we display the employment gaps between immigrants and natives for the different cohorts. The entries in the Table show that the immigrant-native employment gap tends to close with time in the UK for all cohorts, both when observable characteristics are not controlled for, and when they are. Yet, the conditional employment gaps are negative for all cohorts, even after many years since migration.

Table A2 in the Appendix reports the immigrant-native employment gap by area of origin. It shows considerable heterogeneity across different origin groups. For instance, the 1980-84 cohorts of Eastern European immigrants has a positive conditional employment differential in 2008-09. Other cohort from other origins have no positive employment differentials, except for some Oceanian cohorts.

### **4.2.3 Wages**

Table 4.2.3 displays immigrants-native average wage differentials for different cohorts over time. Here no clear patterns emerges. The differentials for the 1980/83 cohorts decrease over time, while for other cohorts this is not the case. As of 2008-09, the earliest cohorts have positive wage differentials that tend decrease for more recent cohorts, and become negative for the 2000/2003 and 2004/07 cohorts.

Eastern European immigrants have the highest negative wage gaps even after many years in the country, as shown in Table A3 in the Appendix, which reports the evolution of wage differentials by cohort and country of origin.

### **4.3 Non-Economic Integration**

In this section we analyse the “non-economic” integration of first-generation immigrants in the UK, based on the pooled 2007 and 2008 Citizenship Surveys. We study the non-economic integration of immigrants in terms of:

- Fluency in English
- Belonging
- Civic participation

We form slightly different origin groups, as the Citizenship Survey reports country of origin differently from the LFS.

#### ***4.3.1 Fluency in English***

The Citizenship Survey contains information on self-reported English fluency in speaking, writing and reading, classified as "poor", "below average", "fairly good" and "very good". We have reclassified all variables to be dichotomous, comparing those who report a “very good” ability in speaking, reading or writing English versus all the other categories. Unfortunately, there is no information on speaking ability for natives. We therefore compute our indicators of integration for writing and reading fluency only. We should also emphasise that self-reported language measures are not objectively measured indications of language proficiency, and contain at least two sources of measurement error, as discussed in Dustmann and van Soest (2002). First, simple reporting error. Dustmann and van Soest demonstrate that this error can be substantial in self-reported language outcome variables. Secondly, individual specific differences in scales, whereby different individuals consider different levels of proficiency as necessary to be classified as for instance “very good”. We ignore these issues in our analysis below.

Table 4.3.1 reports the gaps in reading and writing fluency between immigrants and natives.

## The Socio-Economic Integration of Migrants

The first row reports the average gap for all immigrants, while rows 2 to 10 report the gap for immigrants from different origin countries. On average immigrants are 18 percentage points less likely than natives to be proficient in reading (column 1) and 19.5 percentage points less likely to be proficient in writing. When we condition on age and education (columns 2 and 4) this gap diminishes only slightly to, respectively, 15 and 17 percentage points. Obviously, large differences exist between different areas of origin. Immigrants from most English-speaking countries, like Jamaica, Oceania and Canada have the same level of writing and reading fluency than British natives. Irish immigrants have an unconditional reading advantage relative to natives, which increases once we account for the differences in education and age structure. Moreover, once observable characteristics are controlled for, Irish immigrants also display a higher average writing fluency. As said above, this may be due to their better proficiency in writing and reading, or differences in the scales of language proficiency assessment between the two groups. Among the remaining groups, those with the highest conditional and unconditional gap relative to natives are Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants. For both groups the gap is above 20 percentage points in reading as well as writing. Moreover, the conditional gap is smaller than the unconditional, indicating that they are on average less educated than natives.

We investigate gender differences in Table 4.3.2, which shows that in both reading and writing the unconditional gap of immigrant women relative to native women is higher than the gap among men: The reading (writing) gap is 19.5 (22) percentage points among women and 17 (17) percentage points among men. However, this is largely due to the lower average level of education of women: the conditional reading gap is in fact smaller for women (15 percentage points) than for men (16 percentage points), while the difference in the conditional writing gap between men and women is less than two percentage points (17.4

versus 16). There is substantial gender heterogeneity in reading and writing gaps even within areas of origin. Women from Ireland and from Oceania and Canada display higher average reading ability than native women, even after conditioning on age and education, while no significant differences exist for men from the same countries. As regards writing proficiency, it is only Irish women who have an advantage over British natives. In all other origin groups, women's gap are on average higher (or equal) than men's, although conditioning on age and education tends to reduce gender differences. Gender differences are particularly large among Pakistani and East African immigrants.

Table 4.3.3 reports average differences in reading and writing fluency between white natives and immigrants of different ethnicities. The only ethnic group that does not have any disadvantage with respect to white natives are the Black-Caribbean, consistent with results of Table 4.3.1. Immigrants from all other ethnicities instead display significant gaps in reading and writing fluency relative to white natives. In particular, Chinese immigrants appear to be the most disadvantaged group, with an unconditional gap of 37 percentage points in reading and 43 percentage points in writing. The gap reduces to, respectively, 31.5 and 38 percentage points, when we condition on age and education.

Table 4.3.4 reports results by ethnicity and gender. Black Caribbean men have on average an unconditional advantage in reading proficiency relative to white native men, but their advantage disappears when we condition on observable characteristics. Conversely, they also have an advantage in writing fluency over white natives, which increases slightly when age and education are controlled for. Black Caribbean women, instead, do not display any significant differences from white native women.

Looking at regional differences, Wales is the region with least differences between

immigrants and natives in English proficiency: as we show in Table 4.3.5, there is no significant difference in reading, conditional or unconditional on observable characteristics, and the differences in writing do not survive the introduction of age and education controls. All other regions exhibit significant immigrant-native differences in English fluency between immigrants and natives in both reading and writing. The region with the highest gap is the North East, while the Eastern region has the smallest immigrant-native differences.

### **4.3.2 *Belonging***

An important dimension of integration is how much an individual feels she belongs to the country where she lives in. In this section we analyse the differences in sense of belonging to Britain between immigrants and natives. Again, our analysis is based on data from the Citizenship survey (see Manning and Roy 2010 for an analysis based on the LFS, and Modood et al. 1997 for an earlier quantitative study on a similar issue). In particular, we analyse answers to the question: “How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?”. Responses are classified on a 4 point scale, with individuals having the option of saying they feel “very strongly”, “fairly strongly”, “not very strongly” and “not at all strongly”. As an indicator of belonging we use the proportion of individuals in each group who answer that they feel very strongly they belong to Britain, as compared to the other categories.

Table 4.3.6 shows that the proportion of individuals who feel they belong very strongly to Britain is 14 percentage points higher among natives than immigrants (column 1). However, part of this difference is explained by differences in composition between immigrants and natives: after conditioning on age and education the gap reduces to 11 percentage points (column 4). Women have on average lower feelings of belonging than men. Interestingly, after conditioning on age and education, there are no significant immigrant-native differences

in belonging for men, while there are considerable differences for women (columns 5 and 6). Rows 2-10 report the differences in belonging by area of origin, and show that immigrants from Ireland, India, Jamaica, and the Rest of New Commonwealth have no (conditional or unconditional) differences from natives in their feelings of belonging, irrespective of gender. Conversely, immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Eastern African New Commonwealth have stronger feelings of belonging to Britain than native –born British. Interestingly, for Pakistani and especially Bangladeshi immigrants this is only due to stronger feelings of men while no significant differences exist for women. Finally, immigrants from Oceania and Canada, and all other immigrants, have less strong feelings of belonging to Britain than natives. These results are interesting and – in our view – quite unexpected.

Table 4.3.7 reports differences in belonging between white natives and immigrants from different ethnicities. White and Chinese immigrants are those with the lowest sense of belonging: the difference in the share of those who feel they belong “very strongly” to Britain between Chinese immigrants and white natives is 47.5 percentage points, and observable characteristics account for only about 5 percentage points. Among other ethnicities, the share of immigrants of Indian and Pakistani ethnicity who feel they belong very strongly to Britain is higher than among white natives. When we condition on age and education, the gap becomes even larger. Moreover, Bangladeshi immigrants’ belonging to Britain is higher than the belonging of white natives with the same age-education profile. No significant differences in belonging exist instead for Black Caribbean and Black African immigrants, relative to natives. White immigrants and all immigrants of mixed ethnicities have less sense of belonging than white natives. Looking at gender differences, for all ethnicities it is men who have stronger feelings of belonging, rather than women.

Table 4.3.8 looks at regional differences in immigrants’ belonging, and shows substantial

heterogeneity between regions. While in the North East, the North West, and London, immigrants have lower sense of belonging than natives, no significant differences exist in other regions (although the point estimate is negative almost everywhere). Even in the regions where a significant difference exist, this is due to lower belonging on the side of women, as demonstrated in columns 2,3, 5 and 6.

### ***4.3.3 Civic Participation***

We now analyse differences in civic participation between immigrants and natives. Again, our analysis is based on the Citizenship Survey. We compute an indicator variable, being equal to one if the individual had any civic participation over the last year, as opposed to none. We report the differences in the probability of having any direct civic participation over the last year<sup>8</sup>, between white natives and any immigrant- or ethnic group.

Table 4.3.9 shows in column 1 that immigrants are on average less likely than natives to engage in any form of civic participation, although the difference is not dramatic (1.8 percentage points). When we consider men and women separately, the estimates are less precise, resulting in a larger gap for men (2.1 percentage points), that is however only statistically significant at 10%, and a non-significant 1.4 percentage points gap for women.

Column 4 displays the immigrant-native gap in civic participation conditional on age and education. The gap is larger (2.7 percentage points), and more precisely estimated. The gap is larger than average for men (3.2 percentage points), while it is not significant for women. The

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<sup>8</sup> The forms of civic participation we consider are: whether the individual has been a local councillor, a school governor, a volunteer special constable, or a magistrate in last 12 months, whether the individual is a member of a group making decisions on local health services, of a decision making group set up to regenerate the local area, of a decision making group set up to tackle local crime problems, of a tenants' group decision making committee, of a group making decisions on local education services, of a group making decisions on local services for young people, or of a group making decisions on services in the local community.

analysis by country of origin (rows 2-10) is not very informative. Immigrants from different countries identified in the survey have no significant conditional or unconditional gap in civic participations to natives. The only group that exhibits a negative and significant gap is the residual group of immigrants from “other” countries.

Differentiating by gender provides instead some more insight: Jamaican men are significantly less likely than British-born men to have any civic participation, and the gap persists also when we control for differences in age and education. Conversely, men from all other groups do not display any significant difference. As regards women, Pakistani immigrants are almost 6 percentage points less likely than British women to engage in any form of civic participation. The gap is only partly due to differences in age and education structure: conditioning out these variables reduces only slightly the gap to 4.8 percentage points. However, once we control for age and education, Indian women do display significantly lower civic participation than native women, with a gap of over 5 percentage points.

In Table 4.3.10 we explore differences between ethnicities. Immigrants of Chinese ethnicity are those who have the highest gap to white natives in civic participation, 7 percentage points. Indian immigrants also display a significant gap of 2.5 percentage points to natives. Conditioning on age and education, as we do in column 4, increases the gap for both ethnic groups, though the increase is much larger for Indians, from 2.5 to 3.8 percentage points, than for Chinese. Among Chinese immigrants, it is only men who have significantly lower levels of civic participation than natives, as shown in column 2, while Chinese women do not display any significant gap from native women. Conversely, no significant differences exist between Indian men and women, although when we examine each gender separately the measurement is less precise and the gaps are only significant at 10%. As we noted in Table

4.3.9, moreover, Pakistani women have significantly lower levels of civic participation than white native women. Notice also that Black-Caribbean women have an unconditional higher probability than white native women to engage in some form of civic participation. When age and education are conditioned out, however, the Black-Caribbean women's advantage disappears.

While in most regions immigrants and natives have similar behaviour in terms of civic participation, in the Eastern region, London, and Wales there is a significant gap in the proportion of immigrants and natives who engage in some form of civic participation. Conditioning the probability of civic participation on age and education does not affect the results. The regional patterns of gaps in civic participation is to some extent different across genders, as displayed in Table 4.3.11: immigrant men have a gap relative to natives in the Eastern region, London, and the South West, while immigrant women have a significantly lower probability of civic participation relative to natives only in London and (to a lesser extent) in Wales. The conditional gaps are very similar to the unconditional ones, with the only exception of the gap for immigrant men in Wales, which becomes statistically significant when age and education are controlled for.

## **5. Dynastic Aspects: Integration and Performance of Second Generation**

### **Immigrants**

Integration of foreign born individuals is a long term process. In the previous section we considered indicators of performance and integration of foreign born individuals only. In this section we focus on the descendents of immigrants, by developing indicators of *dynastic* performance.

To study the intergenerational aspects of the performance of immigrant communities, one would ideally require longitudinal data on immigrants and their children, where children are observed at later stages of their life cycle. Such data exists for some countries (see e.g. Dustmann (2008) for an analysis for Germany), but not for the UK. Specifically, the Citizenship Survey does not go back long enough in time to allow intergenerational comparisons, while the LFS has a longer time span, but it does not have information on parents' country of birth. We will therefore devise an indirect way of identifying second generation immigrants in the LFS, relying on the information on ethnicity. Information on ethnicity is the only way to identify descendents of immigrants in the LFS. Thus, our analysis is restricted to native-born individuals of ethnic minority origin. One can argue that these are the most interesting groups if it comes to dynastic aspects of integration and performance of immigrants. As we show in Table 3.3, ethnic minorities in 2008-09 represent 5.8% of the native born population.<sup>9</sup>

### **5.1 Economic integration of native-born minorities**

#### **5.1.1 Education**

We report in table 5.1 the differences in educational achievement (expressed as years of

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<sup>9</sup> Individuals of ethnic minority origin constitute 53 percent of the immigrant population.

education) between native born individuals of different ethnicities and white natives. Note that – other than before – in this case, the numbers are comparable, as all individuals are born in the UK, and have thus been exposed to the same education system. In all years and for all ethnic groups, the educational achievement of British-born minorities is higher than of white natives. This is only partially due to the differences in the age structure between white and non-white natives. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show that even when we condition on the age structure, minority members have more years of full time education than natives. The few exceptions are individuals of Caribbean descent in 2000-01 and 2008-09, ethnic Pakistanis in 1993-94 and ethnic Bangladeshis in 2000-01. Chinese are the ethnic group with the highest educational achievement in all years, and the gap with white natives has increased over time: in 2008-09 the average British-born individual of Chinese ethnicity had left full time education more than three years later her white counterpart. Individuals of Black-African and Indian descent had also in 2008-09 on average about 2.4 more years of education than whites. An analysis by gender, reported in Table 5.2, highlights significant differences between ethnic groups. For most minority groups, men have a larger educational advantage relative to natives than women. The exceptions are Chinese, in the years before 2008-09, and the Black-Caribbean. The case of the Black Caribbean is particularly interesting as the educational advantage of women relative to men is substantial in all years. In 2008-09 Black-Caribbean men's average education is not statistically different from that of white natives, when we control for age composition. Yet, even after accounting for differences in age composition, Black-Caribbean women have on average 1/3 of a year more schooling than white native women.

### ***5.1.2 Employment***

The higher educational achievement of British-born ethnic minorities is not reflected by higher employment probabilities. Table 5.3 reports the differences in employment

probabilities for working age individuals not in full time education, between native-born ethnic minorities and whites. With the exception of the Chinese, all ethnic minority groups display a lower probability of employment than whites (when age, education and regional distribution are controlled for), although the gap is closing over time. For instance native-born individuals of Caribbean ancestry were in 1993-94 15 percentage points less likely than whites to have a job, while in 2000-01, the gap has reduced to 7.3 percentage points, and there is no statistically significant difference in 2008-09. However, when we compare ethnic Caribbean and whites with the same geographical distribution, education level, and age structure, the gap increases to 17 percentage points in 1993-94, 11 percentage points in 2000-01 and 12 percentage points in 2008-09. A similar pattern is visible for the other ethnic groups, except for the Chinese. Bangladeshis are in 2008-09 the group with the highest employment gap relative to whites.

Table 5.4 reports employment gaps by gender for each ethnic group. The entries in the Table show that the employment disadvantage of ethnic Bangladeshis is due to the low employment probabilities of women. In contrast, the employment probability of ethnic Bangladeshi men is not significantly different from whites, and only 5 percentage points lower if we control for age, education, and regional distribution. Pakistani women have also a much higher employment gap than Pakistani men, while for all other groups the *conditional* gaps are very similar between men and women.

### **5.1.3 Wages**

In table 5.5 we report the average gap in gross hourly wages between UK born minorities and whites. Columns 1, 4 and 7 show that for all years the *unconditional* gap in average wages is statistically not significantly different from zero for most groups (the exceptions are the negative gap for Pakistanis in 1993-94 and 2008-09 and the positive gap for Indians in 2000-

01 and 2008-09 and for African Blacks in 2008-09). However, controlling for regional distribution, as we do in columns 2, 5 and 8, turns the gap negative for all ethnic minorities. This shows that the wage advantage these groups have over natives is due to ethnic minority individuals living predominantly in high-wage metropolitan areas, foremost London, as we discuss in section 3.

Conditioning on regional distribution in 2008-09 drives the wage advantage of the Black-African group to zero, and increases the wage disadvantage of individuals of Caribbean descent to 10 percent.

In columns 3, 6 and 9 we report results where we condition not only the regional distribution, but also the age and education structure. In 2008-09, the inclusion of these additional controls leads to a negative wage gaps for all minority groups, including the Chinese, with the exception of the Indians and the Bangladeshis.

Table 5.6 reports indicators of wage integration by gender. Both the unconditional and the conditional indicators show that the wage gap of women is smaller than the wage gap of men for all ethnic groups and in all years. This is possibly due to more selective labour market participation of ethnic minority women.

### **5.2 Inter-generational aspects of immigrants' economic Integration**

In this section, we relate immigrant minorities born in the UK to their parent generation. Since we do not have information on parents' country of birth in the LFS, we construct the relationships between UK born immigrants and their children by matching respective birth cohorts.. Our methodology is based on, and extends, Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010).

The idea is as follows. We construct for the years 1979-1988 (we need to pool LFS waves to obtain sufficiently large samples) the labour market outcomes for the cohort of foreign born ethnic minority individuals and white natives who are born between 1933-1964. For years

2000-2010, we observe the same outcomes for UK-born ethnic minority individuals and their white peers who are born between 1963 and 1975, and whose “parent generation” we observe in the 1979-1988 survey. Comparison of the distance in outcomes between these groups (white natives and various ethnic minority groups, as well as individuals in the parents’ and in the children’s generation within groups) allows us to obtain measures of the intergenerational progress of different groups. This provides an additional “indicator” for performance.

The analysis in this case will be limited to education and employment, as no wage information is available in the LFS before 1992.

### **5.2.1 Education**

Figure 5.1 plots on the vertical axis the average age at which individuals in the “parent generation” (as described above) left full time education. The horizontal axis carries the average age at which individuals in the “children generation” left full time education. The grey lines through each dot denote the 95% confidence interval.

Entries for each group are below the diagonal line, which denotes equality of education level between parents and children generation. This indicates that children of all groups are more highly educated than their parents, and reflects a secular trend of increase in education. All the dots in the figure are on the right of the vertical scattered line, which crosses the “whites” dot. Thus, UK-born minorities have on average a higher educational level than their white peers. Conversely, only the African, Chinese, and Indian entries are above the horizontal scattered line, indicating the average education of the white parent generation. Caribbean, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi immigrants from the earlier generation had a lower educational level than white natives. Interestingly, although children of all minority groups outperform white natives in their educational outcomes, there is a strong intra-community intergenerational correlation in education. Children of Chinese, Indian, and African

backgrounds have on average higher education than children from Caribbean, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi backgrounds.

### **5.2.2 Employment**

As we note earlier, the higher educational achievements of ethnic minorities does not correspond a higher probability of employment. Figure 5.2 plots for each ethnic group the employment rate of the parent generation versus the employment rate of the children generation. The figure is constructed in the same way of Figure 5.1.

Dots below the 45 degrees line indicate that the children generation has a higher employment rate than the parent generation. This is the case for all ethnic groups, except for the descendants of Black Caribbean immigrants. While the employment rate of Caribbean immigrants born between 1933 and 1964 (and observed in 1979-1988) was higher than that of white natives of the same cohort, the employment probability of their UK-born descendants (observed in 2000-10) is lower than that of comparable white native peers, and but still higher than that of native born individuals of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis of both cohorts have the lowest employment rates, but this is largely due to the extremely low labour market participation of women from these communities.

## **5.3 Non-economic integration of immigrants' descendants**

### **5.3.1 Marriage behaviour**

One important dimension of integration is the degree of interethnic marriages for each ethnic group of individuals who are *born in the UK*. In this section we study the marriage behaviour of UK-born ethnic minorities<sup>10</sup>. We use the LFS, which we pool for the years 1992-2010 to

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<sup>10</sup> See Dustmann and Fabbri 2005 for an analysis of marriage behaviour of ethnic minority individuals in the UK.

obtain a large enough sample. Although having the advantage of increasing the sample size, this prevents us from studying the evolution over time of interethnic marriages. We consider as “married” both legally married as well as cohabiting couples.

The interethnic marriage behaviour of ethnic minority men and women is summarised in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, respectively. The figures show substantial heterogeneity between ethnic groups, and between genders within the same ethnic group. Men and women of Chinese background are those with the lowest share of intra-ethnic marriages: 61% of UK-born Chinese men are married to a non-ethnically Chinese woman, and the rate is even higher for women at 72%. Native born Black Caribbean men have also low rates of endogamy, with 63% of them having a non-Caribbean partner. Conversely, only 44% of British native married Black Caribbean women have a non-Caribbean partner. A similar gender pattern is apparent for the Black-African minority, although over 60% of men and women with an African background have a partner of the same ethnicity. Pakistani and Bangladeshi are by far the ethnic group with the highest endogamy rate, which is particularly high among women of Bangladeshi background. Over 85% of ethnic Pakistani men and women who are married have a partner of the same ethnicity, while among the Bangladeshi minority this share is 74% among men and 93% among women. Moreover, a substantial fraction of UK natives that are ethnically Pakistani or Bangladeshi have a partner who is not born in the UK, but a first generation immigrant from that respective country: 58% of married British born ethnically Pakistani men and 56% of British born ethnically Bangladeshi men have a partner who is born in, respectively, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Among second and higher generation Pakistani women, this percentage is even higher: 66% of UK born married women of Pakistani origin have a Pakistani-born partner, while among second and higher generation Bangladeshi women, this share rises to 83%.

### 5.3.2 *Civic integration*

The Citizenship Survey has information on parents' country of birth, which allows direct identification of second generation immigrants. We use that information in this section to analyse the non-economic integration of second-generation immigrants relative to natives, based on their fluency in English, their sense of belonging to Britain, and their civic participation.

#### 5.3.2.1 *Fluency in English*

Table 5.7 shows that there is no difference in (self-assessed) reading and writing proficiency between second generation immigrants and natives, conditional or unconditional on age and education. This is not surprising, as we are assessing responses of adult individuals who were born and raised in the UK, and hence we would expect their fluency in English to be the same as the descendants of natives. However, when we explore ethnic differences (rows 2-10), it turns out that individuals of Indian and Pakistani descent have a higher likelihood than natives to classify themselves as having a very good reading proficiency, and the difference survives age and education controls. As regards writing, instead, it is only individuals of Indian descent who on average claim to have a statistically significant higher proficiency than natives.

Table 5.8 looks at gender differences, and shows that second generation immigrant men have significantly higher probability than natives to claim they have a very good writing proficiency, while no differences exist for reading. However, this advantage is entirely attributable to the favourable age and education structure of second generation men, as demonstrated by the conditional results in column 4, which show no significant difference.

The analysis by separate ethnic groups shows that second generation Indian men are more likely to claim a high reading and writing proficiency, but this is totally explained by their age and education structure. Vice versa, the advantage of second generation Pakistani men

increases when we control for age and education. Among women, second generation Indians have consistently higher self-assessed reading and writing proficiency, both conditional and unconditional on observable characteristics. Second generation Chinese women also appear to have a higher confidence in their reading and writing skills than native women.

We explore regional differences in Table 5.9. The results show that second generation immigrants in the North East, the East Midlands, the west Midlands, and Wales have a higher probability than natives to rank themselves as having a very good reading and writing proficiency. Controlling for age and education has only minor effects on the estimates.<sup>11</sup>

### 5.3.2.2 *Belonging*

Do second generation immigrants feel they belong to Britain as much as the descendants of native-born citizens? The results in the first row of Table 5.10 suggest a positive answer, indicating no difference in responses to the question of how strongly individuals feel they belong to Britain between second generation immigrants and natives. Rows 2 to 10 indicate however that there is substantial heterogeneity among different ethnicities. On the one hand, second generation Black Caribbean are significantly less likely than white natives to feel they belong to Britain. Differences in age and education structure explain only about a third of the gap. On the other hand, second generation Pakistanis are more likely than white natives to feel strongly they belong to Britain, and the gap almost doubles when we condition out differences in composition. The analysis by gender shows that, in both cases, it is women who drive the results, while no significant differences exist among second generation men, and after we control for age and education.

There is not much regional heterogeneity in feelings of belonging of second generation immigrants, as we show in Table 5.11. London is the only region where a significant

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<sup>11</sup> The sample size in some regions is very small, so these estimates should be interpreted with some caution.

difference in the sense of belonging exists between second generation immigrants and natives. However, the gap is explained by differences in composition of the second generation and native population, and disappears when we control for age and education. Looking across gender groups, second generation immigrant men do not display significant differences from native men anywhere, although in London the unconditional gap is significant at 10%. Conversely, Second generation women in the North East are significantly less likely than native women to have strong feeling of belonging to Britain.

### 5.3.2.3 *Civic participation*

Table 5.12 displays differences in civic participation (defined as in section 4.3.3) between second generation immigrants and natives, and shows that that there are no significant differences in civic participation, neither overall (columns 1 and 4) nor by gender (column 2,3 and 5,6). However, some differences exist for second generation immigrants of specific backgrounds. The descendants of white and of Chinese immigrants display significant lower probabilities of engaging in any form of civic participation than white natives. The gap is about twice as large for Chinese second generation immigrants than for Whites, and survives the introduction of age and education controls. However, while in the case of White second generation immigrants the gap is entirely due to the lower civic participation of men, among Chinese second generation immigrants there are almost no gender differences. Conversely, second generation Caribbean immigrant have higher probability of civic participation than natives, and this is attributable to the higher civic participation of Caribbean women only.

As regards regional differences, reported in Table 5.13, second generation immigrants in the North East are significantly less likely than natives to engage in any form of civic participation, and this applies to both men and women. In the East Midlands and the South West, instead, there are no overall differences, although second generation immigrant men do display a significant gap in probability of civic participation relative to natives. Similarly, in

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Wales there are no overall differences, but second generation immigrant women have significantly lower probability of civic participation than native women.

## 6. International Comparisons

### 6.1 Immigrants' economic integration in Europe: a comparative analysis

In this section we put the evidence we report for the UK in an international context. We draw on the EU Labour Force Survey (EULFS), pooling the years 2006-2008, to study the relative performance of immigrants and natives in different EU countries, and put the UK situation in a comparative European perspective. It is important to note that the definition of “Immigrants” (which in our study follows the definition in the Anglo-Saxon literature, as an individual who is foreign born) follows the national convention in the EULFS. While in most countries, the EULFS reports country of birth, and we use that variable to identify immigrants, in the case of Germany only nationality is available. Therefore “immigrants” will be defined as “foreign born” in all countries except for Germany, where they will be defined as “foreign nationals”. This is important to keep in mind when assessing the international comparisons.

Table 6.1 reports the share of immigrants in the total population in different EU countries, broken down by countries of origin, and overall, pooling the years 2006-2008. The share of immigrants in the UK is lower than in many other EU countries; in fact, the UK ranges sixth in terms of its share of immigrant population in the group of 15 EU countries

Table 6.2 reports the immigrant-native employment rate differential in different EU countries, both overall and broken down by gender. Column 1 reports the unconditional gap, while column 2 controls for region of residence within the country and age, and column 3 controls additionally for education. The gap in the UK is smaller than in Germany, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands for instance. In Southern European countries and in Ireland, instead, the employment differential is positive: immigrants have a higher employment probability than natives. What is more, this is not due to differences in gender composition,

as employment advantages are present for both men and women. Conditioning on age and on region of residence (to account for the possibility that immigrants settle in regions with higher employment rates), as we do in column 2, turns the coefficient negative in all countries, except for Greece, and increases the size of the employment gap in countries where immigrants already had an employment disadvantage. This indicates that immigrants tend to be younger and/or to settle in regions with higher average employment rates.

Finally, controlling for the educational composition of the immigrant and native workforce tends to slightly reduce the employment gap in all countries. It is also worth noting that in almost all countries the *conditional* gap of column 3 is larger than the *unconditional* gap of column 1, which indicates that immigrants tend to be younger and with a more favourable education structure than natives, and to settle in regions with higher average employment rates.

We do not have wage information in the EULFS, therefore we cannot compare the wage gap between immigrants and natives across EU countries. Rather, we analyse the differences between immigrants and natives in labour market performance looking at the differences in their occupational distribution.

Table 6.3 reports the Duncan dissimilarity index for the distribution of immigrants and natives across occupations, corrected to account for sampling error (see Carrington and Troske 1997 and Hellerstein and Neumark 2008). The index can be interpreted as the percentage of immigrants that should change occupation for immigrants and natives to have the same occupational distribution. Therefore, the higher the index, the more dissimilar is the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives.

The first column of Table 6.3 reports the overall index. The entries show that the UK value is lower than that for most other countries (except Finland, Portugal and Ireland), which

suggests that segregation is lower. The Duncan index can be easily interpreted: It indicates that in the UK 10 percent of immigrants would have to change jobs to equalize the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives. In Germany, this share is 19 percent, and in France 12.2 percent.

One reason for the differences in the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives might simply be due to differences in the composition of the two populations, e.g. due to different education structures. To address this, we divide the population in three education groups based on the ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) classification, and compute the Duncan dissimilarity index within each group<sup>12</sup>.

We report the results in columns 2 to 4. The index is lower for low education groups, while it increases with the level of education. The exception is again the UK. However, note that the educational classification of immigrants in the UK in the EULFS may be problematic, as it is based on highest qualification achieved, while the UK LFS in principle records all foreign qualifications as “other qualifications” (see the discussion in the Appendix of Manacorda et al. (2011)). The last column reports an average of the values of the Duncan index in each education group, weighted by the share of each group in the total population. This gives a measure of occupational dissimilarity conditional on the educational composition of immigrants and natives in each country.

In Figure 6.1 we plot the share of immigrants in each country with tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 and 6) on the horizontal axis, versus the Duncan index of dissimilarity for the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives on the vertical axis. The results show a

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<sup>12</sup> As we have noted above, the classification of immigrants’ education based on highest qualification achieved may be problematic, and we typically use years of education as an indicator of schooling. However, the EULFS does not have any information on years of education, therefore we are forced to use highest qualification achieved as a measure of education.

strong negative correlation between immigrants' education and occupational dissimilarity: the line plotted through the dots has a statistically significant slope of -0.25. This indicates that in countries where immigrants are more highly educated their occupational distribution is also more similar to that of natives.

As immigrants spend more time in the host country, and acquire country-specific human capital, their occupational distribution becomes more similar to that of natives. This is shown in Figure 6.2, which plots the Duncan index in five countries against time spent in the country. In all countries, except for Germany, the value of the index decreases over time. Regardless of which cohort is considered, however, the UK is the country with the lowest occupational dissimilarity between immigrants and natives.

### **6.2 Educational achievement of immigrants' children: a cross-country perspective**

The numbers above indicate that immigrants' labour market integration in the UK compares favourably relative to other EU countries. We now investigate the UK standing in terms of the relative educational achievements of the children of immigrants. We use the OECD PISA 2006 data to investigate the schooling achievements of the children of immigrants in the UK relative to other OECD countries (see Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzara 2011 for a broader analysis). We distinguish between two groups: First, children who are born abroad, but attend school in the host country. We refer to these as "1.5 generation". Secondly, children who are born in the host country; we refer to those as "second generation".

Table 6.4 reports the conditional and unconditional gaps in reading and maths test scores for 1.5 and second generation immigrants relative to natives for the UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the US, Canada, and Australia.

Panel A reports results for reading tests scores, and shows (column I) that in all countries, except for Australia, 1.5 generation immigrants at age 15 have lower reading scores than their native peers. In the UK the gap is about 2.5 times larger than in Canada, but smaller than in

all other countries. Italy is the country where immigrant children have the worst performance at school.

In the next columns we condition on background characteristics. Column II shows that most of these gaps disappear once we control for the language spoken at home. Controlling for this, the gap becomes statistically insignificant in the UK, Canada, Germany and the US, while it is substantially reduced in all other countries, except for Spain. Controlling, in addition, for parental educational and occupational background, and for family wealth, further reduces the gap for all countries.

Those who are born in the home country (“Second generation”), on the other hand, are less disadvantaged in all countries. Only in Germany and France the achievement gap between second generation and native kids is significantly negative, while it is positive in Australia. Controlling for language spoken at home and for family background, the gap disappears in all countries. Moreover, in the UK (as well as in Australia and Canada) second generation immigrants outperform the children of native-born parents after controlling for differences in backgrounds.

Maths score results paint a similar picture. In this case, though, no significant differences emerge between 1.5 or second generation immigrants and native test scores in the UK, conditional or unconditional on family characteristics.

We have plotted in Figure 6.3 gaps in maths scores for 1.5 generation immigrants (on the horizontal axis) versus gaps for second generation immigrants (on the vertical axis). The graph shows clearly a positive correlation between gaps for 1.5 and second generation immigrants. Moreover, conditioning on family characteristics reduces the gap for both generations in all countries, as shown in Figure 6.4.

## 7. Conclusion

In this report, we provide a comprehensive analysis of indicators of integration and of differences between native born whites and immigrants and their descendants for the UK. Our analysis covers different dimensions. The first dimension is the different indicators that we investigate. First, we consider economic indicators. Economic indicators comprise educational achievements, employment, and wages. Second, we consider non-economic indicators of similarity. These comprise language skills, civic integration, and identity with Britishness, and marriage behaviour. We do this for all immigrants, for breakdowns of immigrants from different origin countries, and for immigrants of different ethnicities.

A second dimension refers to the way we compute differences in these indicators. First, we compare immigrant and native populations who are resident in the UK at different points in time. We compute these comparisons as differences in raw numbers, and differences conditional on characteristics which characterise individuals. The first answers simple questions like “What is the difference in employment between immigrants and natives who are resident in the UK in 2009/2010?”. The second answers questions like “What is the difference in employment between immigrants and natives who are resident in the UK in 2009/2010, if immigrants and natives had the same regional distribution and the same age- and education structure”. Both are important and policy relevant.

Second, we distinguish the differences along different sub-dimensions: By country of origin, by ethnicity, and where immigrants settle in the UK.

Third, we consider more “dynamic” measures of integration. Here we follow a particular entry cohort over time in the UK, and display their changes in economic outcomes. Finally, we investigate the next generations, the offspring of immigrants. This is important to assess

the long term integration of Britain's immigrant groups, and to isolate possible sources of problems with respect to how various groups can be supported in the next generation.

All this provides us with a comprehensive picture about the integration of immigrant populations and their children in the British labour market and society. To put this in an international context, and to establish where the UK has deficits, or is doing better than other countries, we provide analysis on some of the key economic indicators of immigrant populations in other European countries, as well as in the US, Canada and Australia. These indicators relate to employment and education differentials, to occupational segregation, and (for the second generation) to comparisons of differences in school tests between natives and immigrants across different countries. We believe that this comprehensive work is a useful tool to provide factual evidence to the debate about migration in the UK, and helps to devise politics that are improving the integration of Britain's immigrant- and minority populations.

Our report provides many interesting and surprising results, with the most important ones summarised in the Executive Summary. One outstanding feature of immigration to Britain is the sustained high level of education of immigrant populations, relative to the native born white population. We conclude in our analysis that immigrants to the UK are, and have been over the last two decades, well educated, and in most cases achieved higher educational attainments than natives in the same age groups. This is quite outstanding in an international comparison: Here the UK stands out as the European country with the best educated immigrant population. These educational advantages of first generation immigrants carry over to the next generation, with immigrant children in the UK being among the highest achieving (in terms of education) across European countries.

Our work is much in line with recent work by Dustmann, Machin and Schoenberg (2010) which draws a positive picture about the achievements of British ethnic minority children at the various stages in the UK public school system. Our report illustrates – in line with these

findings - that British born ethnic minority children exhibit on average higher levels of education than children of white native born parents. However, we also point out large heterogeneity across different origin and ethnic groups, with individuals of Indian and Chinese background, and who are born in the UK, performing strongest.

Despite the relatively high levels of education, immigrants in the UK exhibit lower employment rates than natives. The most disadvantaged groups are immigrants from the Indian Sub-Continent and the Middle East, while the employment rate of immigrants from Oceania is higher than natives' for all years. On the other hand, immigrants earn in the first two periods we consider (1993-1994, 2000-2001) higher wages than natives, and this is the case for both males and females. In the last years, 2008-2009, the raw differential turns negative for males, but remains positive for females. However, this advantage disappears in each of the years considered when controlling for regional allocation, education and age structure. Likewise, we find that ethnic minority individuals born in the UK are earning higher wages than their native peers; however, if we control for regional allocation, education and age structure, this advantage turns into a disadvantage. Thus, the higher wages minority individuals obtain are due to the fact that they live predominantly in high-wage London, and are better educated.

There are large language differences between immigrants and natives in reading and writing proficiency. The lowest levels of reading and writing proficiency are exhibited by Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants. There is no overall difference in (self-assessed) reading and writing proficiency between second generation immigrants and natives, conditional or unconditional on age and education.

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Interesting is also that, while overall the proportion of individuals who feel they belong very strongly to Britain is 14 percentage points higher among natives than immigrants, immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Eastern African New Commonwealth have stronger feelings of belonging to Britain than native –born British. Some of these groups - Pakistanis and Bangladeshis – are at the same time seriously disadvantaged in the labour market.

Overall, our report draws a fairly positive picture about Britain’s immigrant and ethnic minority populations, in particular in comparison with other countries. However, there are also some worrying features, like for instance the lower wages of British born minority individuals when compared to British born whites with the *same* age structure, regional allocation and education. It is important in our view to understand why these differences exist. Further, there are some particularities among some of Britain’s immigrant groups, like the fairly low labour market involvement of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, which is particularly surprising for those who are born in the UK. Again, some reasons may lay in the marriage pattern, where a high fraction of these women and men – although born in the UK - are married to non-British born men and women of the same ethnic group. This may lead to exacerbate individual disadvantage on the level of the family, as has been emphasised by Dustmann and Fabbri (2005). Again, additional work into these aspects should shed further light on these issues. Also surprising is the high feeling of belonging to Britain for exactly those groups that are more disadvantaged in the labour market, like the Bangladeshis and the Pakistanis.

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
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
## Figures

**Figure 4.1: Immigrant-natives education gap**




The figure reports average gap in years of education between immigrants and natives. Source: LFS, various years

**Figure 4.2: Immigrants-natives employment gap**




The figure reports average percentage points gap in employment probabilities between immigrants and natives. Source: LFS, various years

**Figure 4.3: Immigrants-natives wage gap**




The figure reports average percentage gap in gross hourly wages between immigrants and natives. Source: LFS, various years.

**Figure 5.1: Intergenerational transmission of education by ethnic group**




The figure plots the mean age at which native-born individuals of different ethnic groups in the 1963-1975 birth cohort, observed in 2000-10 (the children generation), left full time education - on the horizontal axis, versus the mean age at which foreign born individuals of different ethnic groups and native born whites in the birth cohort 1933-64, observed in 1979-88 (the parent generation), left full time education. Source: LFS, various years

**Figure 5.2: Intergenerational transmission of employment probability**




*The figure plots the employment probability of native-born individuals of different ethnic groups in the 1963-1975 birth cohort, observed in 2000-10 (the children generation) - on the horizontal axis, versus the employment probability of foreign born individuals of different ethnic groups and native born whites in the birth cohort 1933-64, observed in 1979-88 (the parent generation). Source: LFS, various years*

**Figure 5.3: Marriage patterns of ethnic minority men**




The figure reports, for each ethnic minority group, the share of native-born men married or cohabiting with an immigrant of the same ethnicity, a native of the same ethnicity, an immigrant of a different ethnicity, a white native, or a native of another ethnic minority group. Source: LFS, 1992-2010.

**Figure 5.4: Marriage patterns of ethnic minority women**




The figure reports, for each ethnic minority group, the share of native-born women married or cohabiting with an immigrant of the same ethnicity, a native of the same ethnicity, an immigrant of a different ethnicity, a white native, or a native of another ethnic minority group. Source: LFS, 1992-2010.

**Figure 6.1: Immigrants' education and occupational segregation**




The figure plots the share of immigrants in each country with education levels 5 or 6 (on the horizontal axis) versus the value of the Duncan dissimilarity index for occupational distribution of immigrants and natives in the country. Source: EULFS, years 2006-2008.


**Figure 6.2: Occupational segregation and years since migration**



The figure plots the Duncan dissimilarity index for occupational distribution of immigrants and natives in several countries versus years of residence in the country. Source: EULFS, years 2006-2008.



The figure plots the unconditional gap in mathematics test scores between 1.5 immigrants (born abroad and emigrated before age 15) and natives versus the gap in mathematics test score between second generation immigrants (born in the host country from foreign-born parents) in different countries. Source: PISA 2006.



The figure plots the gap in mathematics test scores conditional on language spoken at home, parental education and occupation and wealth between 1.5 immigrants (born abroad and emigrated before age 15) and natives versus the gap in mathematics test score between second generation immigrants (born in the host country from foreign-born parents) in different countries. Source: PISA 2006.

## Tables

**Table 3.1: Share of immigrants in working age population**

	1993-1994	2000-2001	2008-2009
All Immigrants	6.88	7.88	11.37
Western Europe	33.85	31.31	22.02
Eastern Europe	2.97	3.59	13.11
Americas	11.77	11.68	8.97
Africa	14.76	17.43	18.88
Indian Sub-Continent	20.70	19.23	18.64
Middle East	2.87	3.17	3.29
Rest of Asia	8.72	9.01	10.90
Oceania	2.99	3.47	2.72
Other	1.37	1.12	1.47

*The table reports in the first line the share of immigrants in working age population in years 1994-94 pooled, 2000-01 pooled, and 2008-09 pooled. Lines 2-10 reports the share of immigrants from each area of origin in the total working age foreign-born population for each period.*

*Source: LFS, several years.*

**Table 3.2: Regional distribution of immigrants and natives**

	1993-1994		2000-2001		2008-2009	
	Natives	Immigrants	Natives	Immigrants	Natives	Immigrants
North East	4.87	1.34	4.70	1.38	4.62	1.87
North West	12.51	7.89	12.30	6.27	12.08	7.45
Yorks & Humbers.	9.08	5.55	8.97	5.20	9.12	5.88
East Midlands	7.40	5.19	7.51	4.77	7.70	5.44
West Midlands	9.40	8.97	9.31	8.23	9.17	8.29
Eastern	9.34	7.49	9.56	7.56	9.78	8.07
London	10.18	39.97	10.12	43.31	9.59	38.66
South East	13.73	12.71	14.03	12.73	14.17	12.79
South West	8.66	4.92	8.86	5.08	9.20	4.89
Wales	5.38	1.94	5.37	1.80	5.41	1.94
Scotland	9.45	4.02	9.28	3.68	9.15	4.71

*The table reports the distribution of working age (16-64) natives and immigrants across Government Office Regions in years 1993-94 pooled, 2000-01 pooled, and 2008-09 pooled.*

*Source: LFS, several years.*

**Table 3.3: Ethnic composition of native population**

	1993-94	2000-01	2008-09
White	97.14	96.14	94.24
Black - Caribbean	0.55	0.65	0.77
Black - African	0.17	0.30	0.55
Indian	0.71	0.81	1.03
Pakistani	0.52	0.72	1.09
Bangladeshi	0.13	0.22	0.39
Chinese	0.07	0.09	0.13
Other - mixed	0.71	1.06	1.82

*The table reports the ethnic composition of the working age (16-64) native British population in years 1994-94 pooled, 2000-01 pooled, and 2008-09 pooled.*

*Source: LFS, several years.*

**Table 3.4: Regional distribution of white and non-white natives**

	1993-1994		2000-2001		2008-2009	
	White	Minority	White	Minority	White	Minority
North East	4.84	1.07	4.70	1.04	4.64	1.74
North West	12.41	8.66	12.19	7.16	11.97	8.22
Yorks & Humbers.	8.93	7.28	8.80	7.03	8.95	7.15
East Midlands	7.35	5.59	7.47	5.07	7.63	5.93
West Midlands	9.11	13.73	8.94	12.89	8.64	12.58
Eastern	9.47	5.03	9.73	5.19	9.95	6.68
London	10.16	46.27	9.90	49.13	9.21	42.21
South East	14.05	7.18	14.46	7.07	14.63	9.07
South West	8.78	2.10	9.05	2.29	9.48	2.58
Wales	5.39	1.16	5.39	1.24	5.49	1.27
Scotland	9.51	1.93	9.38	1.89	9.41	2.57

*The table reports the distribution of working age (16-64) white natives and ethnic minority natives across Government Office Regions in years 1993-94 pooled, 2000-01 pooled, and 2008-09 pooled.*

*Source: LFS, several years.*

**Table 4.1.1: Immigrants-natives education gap**

	1993-1994		2000-2001		2008-2009	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All Immigrants	1.197*** (0.017)	1.200*** (0.017)	1.506*** (0.018)	1.465*** (0.018)	1.770*** (0.017)	1.577*** (0.017)
Western Europe	0.525*** (0.018)	0.615*** (0.018)	1.082*** (0.021)	1.093*** (0.020)	1.376*** (0.024)	1.308*** (0.023)
Eastern Europe	3.128*** (0.076)	3.488*** (0.074)	2.804*** (0.065)	2.680*** (0.063)	2.644*** (0.029)	2.214*** (0.028)
Americas	1.565*** (0.030)	1.644*** (0.029)	1.907*** (0.033)	1.967*** (0.032)	2.078*** (0.036)	2.002*** (0.035)
Africa	2.260*** (0.025)	2.110*** (0.025)	2.291*** (0.025)	2.172*** (0.025)	1.918*** (0.024)	1.731*** (0.024)
Indian Sub-Continent	0.086*** (0.022)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.341*** (0.025)	0.304*** (0.024)	1.011*** (0.024)	0.849*** (0.024)
Middle East	4.307*** (0.061)	4.218*** (0.059)	3.438*** (0.062)	3.353*** (0.061)	2.227*** (0.060)	1.971*** (0.059)
Rest of Asia	2.396*** (0.033)	2.258*** (0.033)	2.091*** (0.036)	2.002*** (0.036)	2.142*** (0.033)	1.898*** (0.032)
Oceania	2.227*** (0.058)	2.040*** (0.056)	2.238*** (0.056)	2.031*** (0.055)	2.542*** (0.062)	2.243*** (0.060)
Other	-0.043 (0.083)	0.164* (0.081)	-0.258* (0.109)	-0.026 (0.107)	-0.029 (0.093)	0.017 (0.090)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	695715	695715	602302	602302	553780	553780

*The table reports the average difference (in years) in the age at which individuals left full time education between immigrant and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

## The Socio-Economic Integration of Migrants

**Table 4.1.2: Immigrants-natives education gap, by gender**

	1993-1994				2000-2001				2008-2009			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
All immigrants	1.587*** (0.026)	0.831*** (0.023)	1.600*** (0.025)	0.827*** (0.023)	1.809*** (0.027)	1.221*** (0.025)	1.772*** (0.027)	1.175*** (0.024)	2.051*** (0.025)	1.509*** (0.023)	1.872*** (0.024)	1.302*** (0.022)
Western Europe	0.453*** (0.028)	0.589*** (0.023)	0.545*** (0.027)	0.687*** (0.023)	0.946*** (0.031)	1.209*** (0.027)	0.962*** (0.031)	1.220*** (0.027)	1.434*** (0.036)	1.327*** (0.031)	1.360*** (0.035)	1.265*** (0.030)
Eastern Europe	2.868*** (0.119)	3.349*** (0.096)	3.453*** (0.116)	3.548*** (0.093)	2.753*** (0.110)	2.841*** (0.078)	2.707*** (0.108)	2.664*** (0.076)	2.338*** (0.043)	2.940*** (0.038)	1.968*** (0.042)	2.445*** (0.037)
Americas	1.476*** (0.046)	1.642*** (0.037)	1.584*** (0.045)	1.707*** (0.036)	1.864*** (0.052)	1.944*** (0.042)	1.917*** (0.051)	2.025*** (0.041)	2.079*** (0.057)	2.086*** (0.046)	1.994*** (0.056)	2.015*** (0.045)
Africa	2.899*** (0.037)	1.582*** (0.034)	2.728*** (0.036)	1.443*** (0.033)	2.831*** (0.038)	1.754*** (0.034)	2.719*** (0.037)	1.618*** (0.033)	2.626*** (0.036)	1.255*** (0.032)	2.454*** (0.036)	1.051*** (0.031)
Indian Sub-Continent	1.019*** (0.032)	-0.860*** (0.029)	1.060*** (0.032)	-0.897*** (0.028)	1.255*** (0.036)	-0.605*** (0.033)	1.234*** (0.036)	-0.670*** (0.033)	1.678*** (0.036)	0.327*** (0.033)	1.523*** (0.035)	0.154*** (0.032)
Middle East	5.196*** (0.083)	2.985*** (0.089)	5.093*** (0.081)	2.882*** (0.086)	4.000*** (0.085)	2.604*** (0.093)	3.896*** (0.083)	2.536*** (0.090)	2.333*** (0.080)	2.031*** (0.093)	2.121*** (0.078)	1.722*** (0.090)
Rest of Asia	3.033*** (0.053)	1.875*** (0.042)	2.884*** (0.052)	1.753*** (0.041)	2.401*** (0.056)	1.835*** (0.047)	2.293*** (0.055)	1.768*** (0.045)	2.428*** (0.051)	1.921*** (0.042)	2.212*** (0.050)	1.647*** (0.040)
Oceania	2.565*** (0.094)	1.978*** (0.071)	2.375*** (0.091)	1.796*** (0.069)	2.338*** (0.081)	2.129*** (0.077)	2.149*** (0.080)	1.886*** (0.075)	2.783*** (0.089)	2.279*** (0.085)	2.493*** (0.088)	1.980*** (0.082)
Other	-0.270* (0.128)	0.16 (0.106)	0.001 (0.124)	0.330** (0.103)	-0.323 (0.165)	-0.197 (0.142)	-0.063 (0.162)	0.021 (0.139)	-0.139 (0.147)	0.063 (0.117)	-0.16 (0.144)	0.179 (0.113)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	350867	344848	350867	344848	300664	301638	300664	301638	264396	289384	264396	289384

*The table reports the average difference (in years) in the age at which individuals left full time education between immigrant and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10), by gender. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Separate regressions have been run for men and women. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.1.3: Minority Immigrants- White natives education gap**

	1993-1994		2000-2001		2008-2009	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White immigrants	1.362*** (0.014)	1.403*** (0.014)	1.799*** (0.017)	1.762*** (0.016)	2.119*** (0.016)	1.917*** (0.015)
Black - Caribbean	-0.223*** (0.040)	0.038 (0.039)	-0.323*** (0.054)	-0.073 (0.053)	-0.257*** (0.060)	-0.04 (0.059)
Black - African	2.894*** (0.047)	2.688*** (0.046)	2.468*** (0.046)	2.265*** (0.045)	2.201*** (0.037)	1.913*** (0.037)
Indian	1.382*** (0.026)	1.337*** (0.025)	1.664*** (0.032)	1.687*** (0.032)	2.099*** (0.031)	2.009*** (0.030)
Pakistani	-0.993*** (0.036)	-1.092*** (0.035)	-0.571*** (0.043)	-0.716*** (0.042)	-0.041 (0.040)	-0.239*** (0.039)
Bangladeshi	-1.034*** (0.059)	-1.137*** (0.057)	-0.483*** (0.063)	-0.679*** (0.061)	-0.214*** (0.061)	-0.547*** (0.059)
Chinese	1.795*** (0.059)	1.642*** (0.057)	1.852*** (0.076)	1.774*** (0.074)	2.845*** (0.065)	2.618*** (0.063)
Other - mixed	2.850*** (0.036)	2.737*** (0.035)	2.393*** (0.035)	2.290*** (0.035)	1.890*** (0.025)	1.623*** (0.024)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	687548	687548	518892	518892	539601	539601

*The table reports the average difference (in years) in the age at which individuals left full time education between immigrants from different ethnic groups and white natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on an immigrant dummy interacted with dummies for ethnic groups. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

## The Socio-Economic Integration of Migrants

**Table 4.1.4: Minority Immigrants - White natives education gap, by gender**

	1993-1994				2000-2001				2008-2009			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
White immigrants	1.406*** (0.022)	1.322*** (0.018)	1.452*** (0.022)	1.367*** (0.018)	1.783*** (0.025)	1.816*** (0.022)	1.754*** (0.025)	1.773*** (0.021)	2.130*** (0.024)	2.112*** (0.021)	1.943*** (0.023)	1.894*** (0.020)
Black - Caribbean	-0.521*** (0.062)	0.041 (0.050)	-0.170** (0.060)	0.236*** (0.049)	-0.494*** (0.083)	-0.173* (0.069)	-0.231** (0.082)	0.085 (0.067)	-0.513*** (0.098)	-0.066 (0.076)	-0.341*** (0.096)	0.199** (0.073)
Black – African	3.944*** (0.072)	1.862*** (0.062)	3.764*** (0.070)	1.614*** (0.060)	3.456*** (0.072)	1.664*** (0.058)	3.262*** (0.070)	1.445*** (0.057)	3.186*** (0.058)	1.374*** (0.049)	2.934*** (0.057)	1.046*** (0.047)
Indian	2.058*** (0.038)	0.675*** (0.034)	2.020*** (0.037)	0.615*** (0.033)	2.249*** (0.048)	1.078*** (0.043)	2.278*** (0.047)	1.085*** (0.042)	2.698*** (0.045)	1.487*** (0.042)	2.607*** (0.045)	1.398*** (0.041)
Pakistani	0.363*** (0.054)	-2.378*** (0.047)	0.283*** (0.053)	-2.506*** (0.046)	0.778*** (0.063)	-1.926*** (0.057)	0.645*** (0.062)	-2.100*** (0.055)	0.843*** (0.058)	-0.985*** (0.055)	0.671*** (0.057)	-1.216*** (0.053)
Bangladeshi	-0.144 (0.089)	-1.914*** (0.077)	-0.166 (0.087)	-2.107*** (0.075)	0.208* (0.090)	-1.259*** (0.086)	0.046 (0.089)	-1.508*** (0.084)	0.384*** (0.089)	-0.830*** (0.083)	0.086 (0.088)	-1.213*** (0.080)
Chinese	2.187*** (0.090)	1.442*** (0.075)	2.026*** (0.088)	1.300*** (0.073)	2.314*** (0.123)	1.519*** (0.094)	2.226*** (0.121)	1.460*** (0.092)	3.169*** (0.105)	2.630*** (0.080)	2.988*** (0.103)	2.355*** (0.078)
Other - mixed	3.854*** (0.054)	1.894*** (0.046)	3.712*** (0.053)	1.805*** (0.045)	2.770*** (0.052)	2.006*** (0.048)	2.649*** (0.051)	1.924*** (0.046)	2.204*** (0.037)	1.592*** (0.033)	1.973*** (0.037)	1.288*** (0.032)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	347077	340471	347077	340471	259473	259419	259473	259419	257793	281808	257793	281808

*The table reports the average difference (in years) in the age at which individuals left full time education between immigrants from different ethnic groups and white natives, by gender. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on an immigrant dummy interacted with dummies for ethnic groups. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.1.5: Immigrants-natives education gap by region**

	1993-1994		2000-2001		2008-2009	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
North East	1.454*** (0.160)	1.355*** (0.158)	2.019*** (0.135)	1.894*** (0.135)	2.730*** (0.121)	2.511*** (0.118)
North West	0.617*** (0.066)	0.636*** (0.064)	0.945*** (0.077)	0.928*** (0.076)	1.271*** (0.056)	1.069*** (0.054)
Yorks & Humbers.	0.145 (0.079)	0.151 (0.078)	0.504*** (0.090)	0.457*** (0.089)	1.202*** (0.065)	1.007*** (0.063)
East Midlands	0.951*** (0.060)	0.958*** (0.059)	1.037*** (0.070)	1.036*** (0.069)	1.514*** (0.060)	1.333*** (0.059)
West Midlands	-0.249*** (0.060)	-0.198*** (0.059)	0.094 (0.068)	0.130 (0.067)	0.864*** (0.057)	0.721*** (0.056)
Eastern	1.395*** (0.058)	1.398*** (0.057)	1.606*** (0.057)	1.572*** (0.056)	1.971*** (0.050)	1.798*** (0.049)
London	0.994*** (0.029)	1.048*** (0.029)	0.865*** (0.031)	0.881*** (0.031)	0.952*** (0.035)	0.886*** (0.034)
South East	1.301*** (0.044)	1.288*** (0.043)	1.763*** (0.046)	1.727*** (0.045)	1.853*** (0.040)	1.676*** (0.039)
South West	1.075*** (0.064)	1.079*** (0.063)	1.531*** (0.066)	1.506*** (0.065)	1.862*** (0.061)	1.628*** (0.060)
Wales	1.440*** (0.129)	1.422*** (0.126)	2.308*** (0.135)	2.256*** (0.133)	1.633*** (0.093)	1.442*** (0.090)
Scotland	1.847*** (0.082)	1.778*** (0.080)	2.198*** (0.087)	2.114*** (0.086)	2.393*** (0.063)	2.097*** (0.062)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	695715	695715	602302	602302	553780	553780

*The table reports the average difference (in years) in the age at which individuals left full time education between immigrants and natives in each Government Office Region. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years at which individuals left full time education on an immigrant dummy interacted with region dummies. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects and regional dummies. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.1.6: Immigrants-natives employment gap**

	1993-1994			2000-2001			2008-2009		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
All Immigrants	-0.105*** (0.002)	-0.105*** (0.002)	-0.135*** (0.002)	-0.105*** (0.002)	-0.111*** (0.002)	-0.140*** (0.002)	-0.027*** (0.002)	-0.034*** (0.002)	-0.102*** (0.002)
Western Europe	-0.053*** (0.003)	-0.055*** (0.003)	-0.066*** (0.003)	-0.050*** (0.003)	-0.058*** (0.003)	-0.073*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.046*** (0.003)
Eastern Europe	-0.074*** (0.014)	-0.074*** (0.014)	-0.111*** (0.014)	-0.189*** (0.010)	-0.195*** (0.010)	-0.239*** (0.010)	0.106*** (0.005)	0.101*** (0.005)	-0.009* (0.004)
Americas	-0.066*** (0.005)	-0.066*** (0.005)	-0.096*** (0.005)	-0.071*** (0.005)	-0.078*** (0.005)	-0.109*** (0.005)	-0.013* (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.067*** (0.005)
Africa	-0.080*** (0.005)	-0.079*** (0.005)	-0.133*** (0.005)	-0.070*** (0.004)	-0.077*** (0.004)	-0.125*** (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.043*** (0.004)	-0.118*** (0.004)
Indian Sub-Continent	-0.231*** (0.004)	-0.228*** (0.004)	-0.249*** (0.004)	-0.239*** (0.004)	-0.240*** (0.004)	-0.258*** (0.004)	-0.152*** (0.004)	-0.153*** (0.004)	-0.211*** (0.004)
Middle East	-0.180*** (0.011)	-0.174*** (0.011)	-0.253*** (0.011)	-0.209*** (0.010)	-0.212*** (0.010)	-0.272*** (0.010)	-0.223*** (0.010)	-0.226*** (0.010)	-0.313*** (0.009)
Rest of Asia	-0.105*** (0.006)	-0.105*** (0.006)	-0.164*** (0.006)	-0.105*** (0.006)	-0.111*** (0.006)	-0.158*** (0.006)	0.008 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.098*** (0.005)
Oceania	0.059*** (0.010)	0.055*** (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.081*** (0.009)	0.073*** (0.009)	0.026** (0.009)	0.135*** (0.010)	0.124*** (0.010)	0.012 (0.009)
Other	-0.167*** (0.015)	-0.164*** (0.015)	-0.154*** (0.015)	-0.147*** (0.017)	-0.152*** (0.017)	-0.130*** (0.017)	-0.089*** (0.015)	-0.095*** (0.015)	-0.080*** (0.013)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes								
Region dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
N	695715	695715	695715	602302	602302	602302	553780	553780	553780

The table reports the average difference in employment probability between immigrants and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for employment status on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

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**Table 4.1.7: Immigrants-natives employment gap, by gender**

	1993-1994				2000-2001				2008-2009			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Men	Women										
All immigrants	-0.078*** (0.003)	-0.125*** (0.003)	-0.100*** (0.003)	-0.159*** (0.003)	-0.060*** (0.003)	-0.141*** (0.003)	-0.092*** (0.003)	-0.178*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.003)	-0.074*** (0.003)	-0.047*** (0.002)	-0.148*** (0.003)
Western Europe	-0.064*** (0.005)	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.063*** (0.004)	-0.064*** (0.005)	-0.042*** (0.004)	-0.052*** (0.005)	-0.056*** (0.004)	-0.084*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.067*** (0.005)
Eastern Europe	-0.105*** (0.019)	-0.037 (0.020)	-0.064*** (0.019)	-0.123*** (0.019)	-0.165*** (0.015)	-0.184*** (0.014)	-0.191*** (0.015)	-0.246*** (0.014)	0.146*** (0.006)	0.069*** (0.007)	0.040*** (0.006)	-0.054*** (0.006)
Americas	-0.054*** (0.007)	-0.065*** (0.008)	-0.068*** (0.007)	-0.110*** (0.008)	-0.055*** (0.007)	-0.071*** (0.007)	-0.079*** (0.007)	-0.122*** (0.007)	-0.015 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.068*** (0.007)	-0.055*** (0.007)
Africa	-0.064*** (0.006)	-0.098*** (0.007)	-0.124*** (0.006)	-0.142*** (0.007)	-0.037*** (0.005)	-0.101*** (0.006)	-0.095*** (0.005)	-0.146*** (0.006)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.069*** (0.005)	-0.080*** (0.005)	-0.146*** (0.005)
Indian Sub-Continent	-0.130*** (0.005)	-0.332*** (0.006)	-0.146*** (0.005)	-0.340*** (0.006)	-0.100*** (0.005)	-0.381*** (0.006)	-0.124*** (0.005)	-0.386*** (0.006)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.310*** (0.006)	-0.066*** (0.005)	-0.357*** (0.005)
Middle East	-0.142*** (0.013)	-0.256*** (0.018)	-0.208*** (0.013)	-0.329*** (0.018)	-0.211*** (0.012)	-0.224*** (0.016)	-0.268*** (0.011)	-0.289*** (0.016)	-0.160*** (0.011)	-0.361*** (0.016)	-0.239*** (0.010)	-0.459*** (0.015)
Rest of Asia	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.149*** (0.009)	-0.096*** (0.008)	-0.204*** (0.009)	-0.037*** (0.008)	-0.150*** (0.008)	-0.091*** (0.008)	-0.201*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.007)	-0.017* (0.007)	-0.047*** (0.007)	-0.127*** (0.007)
Oceania	0.057*** (0.015)	0.076*** (0.014)	0.006 (0.015)	0.026 (0.014)	0.071*** (0.011)	0.090*** (0.014)	0.013 (0.011)	0.039** (0.013)	0.123*** (0.013)	0.145*** (0.014)	0.001 (0.012)	0.024 (0.013)
Other	-0.218*** (0.021)	-0.114*** (0.022)	-0.177*** (0.020)	-0.117*** (0.021)	-0.192*** (0.023)	-0.098*** (0.025)	-0.154*** (0.022)	-0.094*** (0.025)	-0.108*** (0.021)	-0.063** (0.020)	-0.108*** (0.019)	-0.048** (0.018)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes											
Region dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	350867	344848	350867	344848	300664	301638	300664	301638	264396	289384	264396	289384

*The table reports the average difference in employment probability between immigrants and natives by gender for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for employment status on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.1.8: Minority Immigrants- White natives employment gap**

	1993-1994			2000-2001			2008-2009		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
White immigrants	-0.035*** (0.003)	-0.041*** (0.003)	-0.068*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.046*** (0.003)	-0.077*** (0.003)	0.046*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.003)	-0.038*** (0.002)
Black - Caribbean	-0.120*** (0.007)	-0.122*** (0.007)	-0.107*** (0.007)	-0.120*** (0.009)	-0.129*** (0.009)	-0.105*** (0.008)	-0.111*** (0.010)	-0.119*** (0.010)	-0.054*** (0.009)
Black - African	-0.279*** (0.009)	-0.278*** (0.009)	-0.335*** (0.009)	-0.186*** (0.007)	-0.196*** (0.007)	-0.243*** (0.007)	-0.101*** (0.006)	-0.111*** (0.006)	-0.205*** (0.006)
Indian	-0.076*** (0.005)	-0.079*** (0.005)	-0.118*** (0.005)	-0.084*** (0.005)	-0.092*** (0.005)	-0.127*** (0.005)	-0.029*** (0.005)	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.098*** (0.005)
Pakistani	-0.358*** (0.007)	-0.355*** (0.007)	-0.371*** (0.006)	-0.337*** (0.007)	-0.335*** (0.007)	-0.355*** (0.007)	-0.247*** (0.006)	-0.243*** (0.006)	-0.305*** (0.006)
Bangladeshi	-0.433*** (0.011)	-0.432*** (0.011)	-0.426*** (0.011)	-0.388*** (0.010)	-0.393*** (0.010)	-0.393*** (0.010)	-0.258*** (0.010)	-0.263*** (0.010)	-0.334*** (0.009)
Chinese	-0.111*** (0.011)	-0.111*** (0.011)	-0.167*** (0.010)	-0.135*** (0.012)	-0.142*** (0.012)	-0.188*** (0.012)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.105*** (0.009)
Other - mixed	-0.163*** (0.006)	-0.165*** (0.006)	-0.227*** (0.006)	-0.166*** (0.006)	-0.177*** (0.006)	-0.221*** (0.006)	-0.057*** (0.004)	-0.067*** (0.004)	-0.160*** (0.004)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes								
Region dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
N	687548	687548	687548	518892	518892	518892	539601	539601	539601

The table reports the average difference in employment probability between minority immigrants and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

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**Table 4.1.9: Minority Immigrants - White natives employment gap, by gender**

	1993-1994				2000-2001				2008-2009			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Men	Women										
White immigrants	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.004)	-0.054*** (0.003)	-0.073*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.044*** (0.004)	-0.052*** (0.004)	-0.094*** (0.004)	0.073*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.004)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.063*** (0.003)
Black - Caribbean	-0.166*** (0.010)	-0.070*** (0.010)	-0.121*** (0.010)	-0.078*** (0.010)	-0.192*** (0.012)	-0.049*** (0.012)	-0.155*** (0.011)	-0.049*** (0.012)	-0.205*** (0.014)	-0.028* (0.013)	-0.151*** (0.013)	0.029* (0.012)
Black - African	-0.298*** (0.011)	-0.257*** (0.013)	-0.361*** (0.011)	-0.298*** (0.013)	-0.145*** (0.010)	-0.208*** (0.010)	-0.215*** (0.010)	-0.248*** (0.010)	-0.037*** (0.008)	-0.147*** (0.008)	-0.145*** (0.008)	-0.241*** (0.008)
Indian	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.125*** (0.007)	-0.075*** (0.006)	-0.155*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.138*** (0.008)	-0.066*** (0.007)	-0.176*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.007)	-0.104*** (0.007)	-0.026*** (0.006)	-0.166*** (0.007)
Pakistani	-0.180*** (0.009)	-0.536*** (0.010)	-0.204*** (0.008)	-0.530*** (0.010)	-0.135*** (0.009)	-0.536*** (0.010)	-0.171*** (0.009)	-0.528*** (0.010)	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.479*** (0.009)	-0.096*** (0.008)	-0.524*** (0.009)
Bangladeshi	-0.293*** (0.014)	-0.568*** (0.016)	-0.284*** (0.014)	-0.550*** (0.016)	-0.208*** (0.013)	-0.593*** (0.015)	-0.231*** (0.012)	-0.568*** (0.015)	-0.054*** (0.013)	-0.469*** (0.014)	-0.147*** (0.012)	-0.522*** (0.013)
Chinese	-0.025 (0.014)	-0.181*** (0.015)	-0.079*** (0.014)	-0.232*** (0.015)	-0.052** (0.017)	-0.179*** (0.017)	-0.102*** (0.017)	-0.231*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.065*** (0.014)	-0.115*** (0.013)
Other - mixed	-0.128*** (0.009)	-0.191*** (0.009)	-0.196*** (0.008)	-0.248*** (0.009)	-0.120*** (0.007)	-0.211*** (0.008)	-0.177*** (0.007)	-0.262*** (0.008)	-0.01 (0.005)	-0.100*** (0.006)	-0.108*** (0.005)	-0.203*** (0.005)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes											
Region dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	347077	340471	347077	340471	259473	259419	259473	259419	257793	281808	257793	281808

*The table reports the average difference in employment probability between minority immigrants and natives by gender for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.1.10: Immigrants-natives employment gap by region**

	1993-1994		2000-2001		2008-2009	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
North East	-0.033 (0.018)	-0.077*** (0.018)	-0.032 (0.017)	-0.078*** (0.017)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.113*** (0.012)
North West	-0.157*** (0.008)	-0.184*** (0.008)	-0.118*** (0.009)	-0.147*** (0.009)	-0.046*** (0.007)	-0.125*** (0.007)
Yorks & Humbers.	-0.168*** (0.009)	-0.188*** (0.009)	-0.157*** (0.009)	-0.186*** (0.009)	-0.074*** (0.008)	-0.149*** (0.007)
East Midlands	-0.106*** (0.009)	-0.134*** (0.009)	-0.089*** (0.009)	-0.118*** (0.009)	-0.029*** (0.008)	-0.103*** (0.007)
West Midlands	-0.161*** (0.007)	-0.178*** (0.007)	-0.193*** (0.008)	-0.211*** (0.008)	-0.107*** (0.007)	-0.168*** (0.007)
Eastern	-0.056*** (0.007)	-0.093*** (0.007)	-0.065*** (0.007)	-0.105*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.085*** (0.006)
London	-0.116*** (0.004)	-0.144*** (0.004)	-0.141*** (0.004)	-0.163*** (0.004)	-0.069*** (0.004)	-0.107*** (0.004)
South East	-0.063*** (0.006)	-0.098*** (0.006)	-0.061*** (0.005)	-0.100*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	-0.056*** (0.004)
South West	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.062*** (0.009)	-0.058*** (0.008)	-0.094*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.007)	-0.044*** (0.007)
Wales	-0.049** (0.015)	-0.084*** (0.015)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.054*** (0.015)	0.011 (0.013)	-0.063*** (0.012)
Scotland	-0.065*** (0.010)	-0.110*** (0.010)	-0.029** (0.010)	-0.076*** (0.010)	0.023** (0.008)	-0.083*** (0.008)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	695715	695715	602302	602302	553780	553780

*The table reports the average difference in employment probability between immigrants and natives in each Government Office Region. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy variable for employment status on an immigrant dummy interacted with region dummies. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects and regional dummies. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.1.11: Immigrants-natives wage gap**

	1993-1994			2000-2001			2008-2009		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
All Immigrants	0.085*** (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.128*** (0.010)	0.101*** (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.125*** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.099*** (0.007)	-0.194*** (0.006)
Western Europe	0.064*** (0.015)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.068*** (0.013)	0.097*** (0.011)	0.008 (0.011)	-0.055*** (0.010)	0.124*** (0.011)	0.033** (0.011)	-0.039*** (0.010)
Eastern Europe	-0.083 (0.064)	-0.177** (0.063)	-0.367*** (0.056)	-0.009 (0.044)	-0.115** (0.043)	-0.223*** (0.038)	-0.318*** (0.013)	-0.355*** (0.013)	-0.383*** (0.011)
Americas	0.168*** (0.025)	0.060* (0.025)	-0.086*** (0.022)	0.170*** (0.019)	0.051** (0.019)	-0.097*** (0.016)	0.097*** (0.018)	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.127*** (0.015)
Africa	0.141*** (0.023)	0.023 (0.023)	-0.158*** (0.020)	0.138*** (0.014)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.149*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.012)	-0.080*** (0.012)	-0.200*** (0.010)
Indian Sub-Continent	-0.048* (0.023)	-0.121*** (0.022)	-0.261*** (0.020)	-0.085*** (0.017)	-0.177*** (0.017)	-0.293*** (0.015)	-0.044** (0.014)	-0.112*** (0.014)	-0.245*** (0.012)
Middle East	0.389*** (0.061)	0.287*** (0.060)	-0.011 (0.053)	0.262*** (0.041)	0.126** (0.040)	-0.088* (0.036)	0.071 (0.036)	-0.04 (0.036)	-0.175*** (0.031)
Rest of Asia	0.093** (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.200*** (0.027)	0.056** (0.021)	-0.067** (0.021)	-0.254*** (0.019)	-0.048** (0.016)	-0.154*** (0.016)	-0.305*** (0.014)
Oceania	0.259*** (0.040)	0.135*** (0.040)	0.052 (0.035)	0.384*** (0.027)	0.258*** (0.027)	0.152*** (0.024)	0.393*** (0.026)	0.265*** (0.026)	0.155*** (0.023)
Other	-0.12 (0.073)	-0.276*** (0.072)	-0.295*** (0.064)	-0.066 (0.059)	-0.226*** (0.058)	-0.194*** (0.051)	-0.114* (0.048)	-0.221*** (0.047)	-0.215*** (0.042)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
N	65218	65218	65218	106682	106682	106682	95841	95841	95841

The table reports the average percentage difference in gross hourly wages between immigrants and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of log-wages on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

**Table 4.1.12: Immigrants-natives wage gap, by gender**

	1993-1994				2000-2001				2008-2009			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
All imm.	0.046** (0.015)	0.135*** (0.014)	-0.161*** (0.014)	-0.087*** (0.013)	0.057*** (0.012)	0.148*** (0.010)	-0.163*** (0.011)	-0.088*** (0.009)	-0.046*** (0.010)	0.028*** (0.009)	-0.233*** (0.009)	-0.164*** (0.008)
Western Europe	0.048* (0.023)	0.111*** (0.019)	-0.065*** (0.019)	-0.038* (0.016)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.143*** (0.014)	-0.063*** (0.014)	-0.037** (0.013)	0.109*** (0.017)	0.140*** (0.014)	-0.047** (0.015)	-0.030* (0.013)
Eastern Europe	-0.061 (0.093)	-0.093 (0.082)	-0.229** (0.079)	-0.487*** (0.071)	0.094 (0.076)	-0.009 (0.050)	-0.134* (0.064)	-0.240*** (0.044)	-0.368*** (0.019)	-0.271*** (0.017)	-0.403*** (0.016)	-0.381*** (0.015)
Americas	0.149*** (0.038)	0.211*** (0.032)	-0.098** (0.032)	-0.061* (0.028)	0.134*** (0.029)	0.225*** (0.023)	-0.130*** (0.024)	-0.046* (0.020)	0.126*** (0.028)	0.093*** (0.022)	-0.112*** (0.024)	-0.123*** (0.019)
Africa	0.119*** (0.032)	0.165*** (0.030)	-0.180*** (0.028)	-0.140*** (0.026)	0.132*** (0.021)	0.139*** (0.019)	-0.165*** (0.018)	-0.142*** (0.017)	-0.01 (0.017)	0.080*** (0.016)	-0.271*** (0.015)	-0.135*** (0.014)
Indian Sub-Continent	-0.140*** (0.030)	0.028 (0.033)	-0.354*** (0.025)	-0.186*** (0.029)	-0.168*** (0.022)	-0.028 (0.026)	-0.379*** (0.019)	-0.229*** (0.023)	-0.113*** (0.019)	0.003 (0.021)	-0.309*** (0.016)	-0.203*** (0.018)
Middle East	0.288*** (0.075)	0.457*** (0.099)	-0.078 (0.064)	0.017 (0.086)	0.164** (0.059)	0.365*** (0.054)	-0.149** (0.050)	-0.022 (0.047)	-0.023 (0.044)	0.155* (0.069)	-0.248*** (0.038)	-0.113 (0.060)
Rest of Asia	0.088* (0.045)	0.117** (0.039)	-0.222*** (0.038)	-0.158*** (0.034)	0.002 (0.032)	0.125*** (0.027)	-0.316*** (0.027)	-0.172*** (0.023)	-0.092*** (0.024)	0.002 (0.020)	-0.363*** (0.021)	-0.242*** (0.017)
Oceania	0.236*** (0.060)	0.307*** (0.050)	0.044 (0.051)	0.083 (0.044)	0.354*** (0.039)	0.413*** (0.036)	0.133*** (0.033)	0.166*** (0.031)	0.421*** (0.039)	0.355*** (0.035)	0.183*** (0.033)	0.109*** (0.030)
Other	-0.389*** (0.108)	0.15 (0.093)	-0.553*** (0.092)	-0.029 (0.081)	-0.098 (0.088)	-0.023 (0.074)	-0.215** (0.074)	-0.177** (0.064)	-0.217** (0.077)	-0.008 (0.059)	-0.187** (0.065)	-0.211*** (0.051)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	32236	32982	32236	32982	52064	54618	52064	54618	45745	50096	45745	50096

The table reports the average percentage difference in gross hourly wages by gender between immigrants and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of log-wages on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

**Table 4.1.13: Minority Immigrants- White natives wage gap**

	1993-1994			2000-2001			2008-2009		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
White immigrants	0.139*** (0.012)	0.054*** (0.012)	-0.049*** (0.010)	0.179*** (0.009)	0.080*** (0.009)	-0.023** (0.008)	0.042*** (0.007)	-0.042*** (0.007)	-0.121*** (0.007)
Black - Caribbean	-0.013 (0.035)	-0.160*** (0.034)	-0.179*** (0.031)	-0.034 (0.028)	-0.180*** (0.028)	-0.193*** (0.024)	-0.124*** (0.033)	-0.274*** (0.032)	-0.266*** (0.028)
Black - African	0.046 (0.050)	-0.149** (0.049)	-0.350*** (0.044)	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.211*** (0.027)	-0.372*** (0.024)	-0.085*** (0.019)	-0.251*** (0.019)	-0.377*** (0.017)
Indian	0.005 (0.024)	-0.100*** (0.024)	-0.267*** (0.021)	0.029 (0.018)	-0.102*** (0.018)	-0.272*** (0.016)	0.077*** (0.016)	-0.027 (0.015)	-0.201*** (0.014)
Pakistani	-0.152** (0.048)	-0.181*** (0.047)	-0.268*** (0.042)	-0.201*** (0.033)	-0.261*** (0.032)	-0.362*** (0.028)	-0.244*** (0.029)	-0.285*** (0.028)	-0.380*** (0.025)
Bangladeshi	-0.412*** (0.080)	-0.559*** (0.079)	-0.564*** (0.070)	-0.457*** (0.049)	-0.579*** (0.048)	-0.570*** (0.043)	-0.330*** (0.042)	-0.447*** (0.041)	-0.460*** (0.036)
Chinese	0.066 (0.060)	-0.043 (0.059)	-0.282*** (0.053)	0.007 (0.046)	-0.115* (0.045)	-0.319*** (0.039)	0.079* (0.033)	-0.033 (0.033)	-0.215*** (0.029)
Other - mixed	0.100** (0.034)	-0.045 (0.034)	-0.264*** (0.030)	0.094*** (0.020)	-0.083*** (0.020)	-0.244*** (0.018)	-0.088*** (0.013)	-0.218*** (0.013)	-0.316*** (0.011)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes								
Region dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
N	64671	64671	64671	105148	105148	105148	93692	93692	93692

The table reports the average percentage difference in gross hourly wages between minority immigrants and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of log wages on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

## The Socio-Economic Integration of Migrants

**Table 4.1.14: Minority Immigrants - White natives wage gap, by gender**

	1993-1994				2000-2001				2008-2009			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
White immigrants	0.135*** (0.017)	0.169*** (0.015)	-0.037* (0.015)	-0.033* (0.013)	0.173*** (0.013)	0.197*** (0.011)	-0.019 (0.011)	-0.019 (0.010)	0.027* (0.011)	0.052*** (0.010)	-0.131*** (0.009)	-0.121*** (0.009)
Black - Caribbean	-0.157** (0.053)	0.143*** (0.043)	-0.301*** (0.045)	-0.061 (0.037)	-0.142** (0.044)	0.086* (0.034)	-0.289*** (0.037)	-0.087** (0.030)	-0.256*** (0.057)	-0.001 (0.037)	-0.345*** (0.048)	-0.173*** (0.033)
Black - African	-0.085 (0.071)	0.186** (0.065)	-0.447*** (0.060)	-0.249*** (0.057)	-0.081* (0.039)	0.078* (0.036)	-0.433*** (0.033)	-0.313*** (0.031)	-0.160*** (0.027)	-0.014 (0.026)	-0.470*** (0.023)	-0.282*** (0.023)
Indian	-0.008 (0.033)	0.006 (0.032)	-0.293*** (0.028)	-0.261*** (0.028)	-0.01 (0.026)	0.062* (0.025)	-0.328*** (0.022)	-0.229*** (0.021)	0.070** (0.022)	0.054* (0.021)	-0.218*** (0.019)	-0.206*** (0.019)
Pakistani	-0.279*** (0.056)	-0.051 (0.089)	-0.405*** (0.048)	-0.151* (0.077)	-0.311*** (0.040)	-0.105 (0.056)	-0.476*** (0.034)	-0.250*** (0.048)	-0.344*** (0.035)	-0.144** (0.053)	-0.480*** (0.030)	-0.279*** (0.046)
Bangladeshi	-0.622*** (0.090)	0.043 (0.170)	-0.689*** (0.077)	-0.363* (0.148)	-0.612*** (0.057)	-0.190 (0.102)	-0.713*** (0.048)	-0.278** (0.088)	-0.451*** (0.053)	-0.172* (0.073)	-0.596*** (0.045)	-0.270*** (0.063)
Chinese	-0.038 (0.087)	0.182* (0.077)	-0.376*** (0.074)	-0.157* (0.067)	-0.036 (0.076)	0.088 (0.053)	-0.352*** (0.064)	-0.241*** (0.046)	-0.039 (0.056)	0.194*** (0.039)	-0.318*** (0.048)	-0.109** (0.034)
Other - mixed	0.105* (0.047)	0.072 (0.047)	-0.292*** (0.040)	-0.244*** (0.041)	0.044 (0.028)	0.136*** (0.027)	-0.291*** (0.024)	-0.202*** (0.024)	-0.156*** (0.019)	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.388*** (0.016)	-0.243*** (0.015)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	31981	32690	31981	32690	51350	53798	51350	53798	44761	48931	44761	48931

*The table reports the average percentage difference in gross hourly wages between minority immigrants and natives by gender for all immigrants pooled (row 1), and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of log wages on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.1.15: Immigrants-natives wage gap by region**

	1993-1994		2000-2001		2008-2009	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
North East	-0.066 (0.097)	-0.225* (0.090)	-0.056 (0.067)	-0.157** (0.059)	0.026 (0.037)	-0.162*** (0.033)
North West	-0.017 (0.042)	-0.128** (0.039)	0.022 (0.029)	-0.106*** (0.026)	-0.165*** (0.021)	-0.268*** (0.019)
Yorks & Humbers.	0.001 (0.041)	-0.120*** (0.036)	0.013 (0.035)	-0.115*** (0.031)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.232*** (0.020)
East Midlands	0.045 (0.041)	-0.088* (0.036)	-0.021 (0.030)	-0.128*** (0.028)	-0.133*** (0.020)	-0.218*** (0.018)
West Midlands	-0.050 (0.031)	-0.138*** (0.029)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.133*** (0.025)	-0.118*** (0.022)	-0.213*** (0.020)
Eastern	0.044 (0.032)	-0.096** (0.030)	0.079** (0.027)	-0.064** (0.024)	-0.038* (0.019)	-0.157*** (0.017)
London	-0.077*** (0.018)	-0.202*** (0.017)	-0.114*** (0.014)	-0.200*** (0.013)	-0.149*** (0.015)	-0.220*** (0.013)
South East	0.038 (0.026)	-0.060* (0.024)	0.093*** (0.019)	-0.043* (0.017)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.127*** (0.014)
South West	0.051 (0.041)	-0.065 (0.039)	0.083** (0.028)	-0.049 (0.026)	-0.046* (0.022)	-0.156*** (0.021)
Wales	0.234** (0.072)	0.094 (0.062)	0.099 (0.058)	-0.052 (0.049)	-0.126*** (0.036)	-0.221*** (0.034)
Scotland	0.115* (0.051)	-0.016 (0.046)	0.150*** (0.032)	-0.016 (0.028)	-0.055* (0.024)	-0.156*** (0.021)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	65218	65218	106682	106682	95841	95841

*The table reports the average percentage difference in gross hourly wages between immigrants and natives in each Government Office Region. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of log-wages on an immigrant dummy interacted with region dummies. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects and regional dummies. Age controls are age and age squared. . Education controls are dummies for three education levels.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.2.16: Immigrants-natives education gap, by entry cohort**

Entry cohort	1993-94		2000-01		2009-10	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1980/1983	1.433*** (0.077)	1.192*** (0.077)	1.279*** (0.077)	1.140*** (0.078)	1.200*** (0.080)	0.992*** (0.080)
1984/1987	1.932*** (0.066)	1.638*** (0.065)	1.507*** (0.067)	1.317*** (0.067)	1.521*** (0.070)	1.312*** (0.070)
1988/1991	2.476*** (0.055)	2.168*** (0.055)	1.964*** (0.064)	1.717*** (0.064)	1.384*** (0.070)	1.120*** (0.070)
1992/1995			2.316*** (0.064)	2.021*** (0.064)	2.046*** (0.074)	1.720*** (0.073)
1996/1999			2.808*** (0.048)	2.477*** (0.049)	2.108*** (0.059)	1.721*** (0.058)
2000/2003					2.296*** (0.042)	1.885*** (0.042)
2004/2007					2.779*** (0.033)	2.361*** (0.033)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Gender	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	656462	656462	575922	575922	531408	531408

*The table reports the average difference (in years) in the age at which individuals left full time education between immigrants from different entry cohorts and natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on immigrant cohorts dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.2.2: Immigrants-natives employment gap, by entry cohort**

	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
1980/1983	-0.178*** (0.009)	-0.210*** (0.008)	-0.115*** (0.009)	-0.144*** (0.008)	-0.016 (0.009)	-0.106*** (0.009)
1984/1987	-0.146*** (0.008)	-0.187*** (0.007)	-0.092*** (0.008)	-0.130*** (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.083*** (0.008)
1988/1991	-0.203*** (0.007)	-0.246*** (0.006)	-0.122*** (0.007)	-0.175*** (0.007)	-0.042*** (0.008)	-0.134*** (0.007)
1992/1995			-0.155*** (0.007)	-0.207*** (0.007)	-0.041*** (0.008)	-0.163*** (0.007)
1996/1999			-0.155*** (0.006)	-0.219*** (0.005)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.143*** (0.006)
2000/2003					0.013** (0.004)	-0.122*** (0.004)
2004/2007					0.038*** (0.004)	-0.085*** (0.004)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Gender	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	656462	656462	575922	575922	531408	531408

*The table reports the average difference in employment probability between immigrants from different entry cohorts and natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for employment status on immigrant cohorts dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.2.3: Immigrants-natives wage gap, by entry cohort**

	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
1980/1983	0.031 (0.045)	-0.225*** (0.042)	-0.010 (0.028)	-0.171*** (0.027)	0.119*** (0.030)	-0.119*** (0.027)
1984/1987	0.092* (0.038)	-0.165*** (0.034)	0.057 (0.030)	-0.192*** (0.026)	0.095** (0.029)	-0.123*** (0.025)
1988/1991	0.114*** (0.033)	-0.166*** (0.031)	0.107*** (0.026)	-0.223*** (0.025)	0.036 (0.026)	-0.176*** (0.023)
1992/1995			0.036 (0.027)	-0.243*** (0.025)	0.088** (0.029)	-0.185*** (0.026)
1996/1999			0.109*** (0.023)	-0.150*** (0.020)	0.077*** (0.021)	-0.178*** (0.019)
2000/2003					-0.002 (0.015)	-0.229*** (0.014)
2004/2007					-0.169*** (0.012)	-0.324*** (0.010)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Gender	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	62233	62233	102860	102860	92842	92842

*The table reports the average percentage difference gross hourly wages between immigrants from different entry cohorts and natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of log wages for employment status on immigrant cohorts dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.1: Immigrants-Natives reading and writing gaps**

	Reading		Writing	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
All immigrants	-0.180*** (0.017)	-0.152*** (0.014)	-0.195*** (0.017)	-0.166*** (0.015)
Ireland	0.043** (0.015)	0.033 (0.024)	0.063*** (0.015)	0.052* (0.025)
India	-0.140*** (0.021)	-0.135*** (0.020)	-0.129*** (0.021)	-0.126*** (0.021)
Pakistan	-0.272*** (0.036)	-0.238*** (0.034)	-0.302*** (0.036)	-0.267*** (0.034)
Bangladesh	-0.221*** (0.051)	-0.186*** (0.047)	-0.233*** (0.053)	-0.196*** (0.048)
Jamaica	-0.004 (0.026)	0.022 (0.031)	0.016 (0.026)	0.042 (0.032)
East African New CW	-0.083** (0.027)	-0.082** (0.026)	-0.089** (0.030)	-0.091** (0.029)
Rest of New CW	-0.045* (0.019)	-0.058** (0.020)	-0.037 (0.020)	-0.054** (0.021)
Oceania and Canada	0.025 (0.038)	0.018 (0.039)	0.033 (0.039)	0.022 (0.041)
Other	-0.245*** (0.025)	-0.204*** (0.022)	-0.271*** (0.026)	-0.229*** (0.023)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	9442	9442	9442	9442

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in reading (cols.1-2) and writing (cols. 3-4) proficiency between immigrants and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1) and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for English fluency on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.2: Immigrants-natives gaps in reading and writing, by gender**

	Reading				Writing			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
All immigrants	-0.166*** (0.024)	-0.195*** (0.023)	-0.160*** (0.022)	-0.147*** (0.018)	-0.166*** (0.025)	-0.222*** (0.024)	-0.160*** (0.023)	-0.174*** (0.020)
Ireland	0.044 (0.027)	0.046*** (0.006)	0.007 (0.036)	0.053* (0.024)	0.075** (0.028)	0.051*** (0.006)	0.037 (0.039)	0.062* (0.027)
India	-0.098*** (0.026)	-0.191*** (0.034)	-0.115*** (0.026)	-0.167*** (0.032)	-0.086** (0.028)	-0.178*** (0.034)	-0.108*** (0.027)	-0.155*** (0.032)
Pakistan	-0.230*** (0.047)	-0.332*** (0.055)	-0.221*** (0.044)	-0.272*** (0.053)	-0.244*** (0.047)	-0.381*** (0.056)	-0.232*** (0.044)	-0.324*** (0.055)
Bangladesh	-0.198** (0.065)	-0.243** (0.082)	-0.195** (0.064)	-0.179* (0.072)	-0.220** (0.069)	-0.237** (0.083)	-0.210** (0.067)	-0.177* (0.069)
Jamaica	0.053* (0.023)	-0.043 (0.037)	0.093 (0.048)	-0.012 (0.039)	0.083*** (0.023)	-0.032 (0.037)	0.132* (0.053)	-0.005 (0.040)
East African New CW	-0.058 (0.040)	-0.109** (0.036)	-0.089* (0.040)	-0.079* (0.035)	-0.038 (0.043)	-0.143*** (0.041)	-0.077 (0.042)	-0.114** (0.039)
Rest of New CW	-0.022 (0.027)	-0.070** (0.027)	-0.060* (0.029)	-0.059* (0.027)	-0.007 (0.028)	-0.068* (0.029)	-0.05 (0.030)	-0.060* (0.029)
Oceania and Canada	-0.022 (0.097)	0.047*** (0.005)	-0.057 (0.092)	0.051* (0.021)	0.009 (0.096)	0.037 (0.019)	-0.039 (0.089)	0.042 (0.029)
Other	-0.234*** (0.038)	-0.254*** (0.034)	-0.210*** (0.033)	-0.199*** (0.027)	-0.245*** (0.039)	-0.295*** (0.035)	-0.218*** (0.036)	-0.240*** (0.030)
year & quarter dummies	Yes							
Region dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	4374	5068	4374	5068	4374	5068	4374	5068

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in reading (cols.1-2) and writing (cols. 3-4) proficiency between immigrants and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1) and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10) by gender. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for English fluency on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.3: Minority immigrants-white natives reading and writing gap**

	Reading		Writing	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White immigrants	-0.166*** (0.028)	-0.132*** (0.023)	-0.187*** (0.029)	-0.152*** (0.024)
Black - Caribbean	0.005 (0.017)	0.025 (0.021)	0.024 (0.017)	0.045* (0.022)
Black - African	-0.098*** (0.018)	-0.097*** (0.020)	-0.099*** (0.019)	-0.101*** (0.021)
Indian	-0.141*** (0.017)	-0.127*** (0.018)	-0.131*** (0.018)	-0.119*** (0.018)
Pakistani	-0.270*** (0.035)	-0.234*** (0.032)	-0.309*** (0.035)	-0.272*** (0.034)
Bangladeshi	-0.240*** (0.051)	-0.196*** (0.047)	-0.251*** (0.052)	-0.202*** (0.048)
Chinese	-0.367*** (0.057)	-0.315*** (0.049)	-0.432*** (0.056)	-0.376*** (0.050)
Other - mixed	-0.328*** (0.027)	-0.296*** (0.029)	-0.335*** (0.027)	-0.303*** (0.029)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	7922	7922	7922	7922

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in reading (cols.1-2) and writing (cols. 3-4) proficiency between immigrants from different ethnic groups and white natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for English fluency on an immigrant dummy interacted with dummies for ethnic groups. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of year and quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.4: Minority immigrants-white natives reading and writing gap**

	Reading				Writing			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
White immigrants	-0.158*** (0.043)	-0.174*** (0.037)	-0.146*** (0.037)	-0.124*** (0.027)	-0.160*** (0.045)	-0.212*** (0.038)	-0.147*** (0.039)	-0.160*** (0.030)
Black - Caribbean	0.053** (0.018)	-0.032 (0.025)	0.057 (0.031)	0.004 (0.029)	0.085*** (0.018)	-0.026 (0.026)	0.096** (0.034)	0.01 (0.030)
Black - African	-0.057* (0.024)	-0.146*** (0.026)	-0.091*** (0.027)	-0.108*** (0.029)	-0.046 (0.026)	-0.160*** (0.028)	-0.081** (0.030)	-0.126*** (0.031)
Indian	-0.101*** (0.023)	-0.188*** (0.026)	-0.115*** (0.024)	-0.149*** (0.027)	-0.085*** (0.024)	-0.184*** (0.027)	-0.101*** (0.025)	-0.145*** (0.027)
Pakistani	-0.227*** (0.045)	-0.331*** (0.053)	-0.220*** (0.042)	-0.265*** (0.052)	-0.251*** (0.046)	-0.388*** (0.055)	-0.240*** (0.044)	-0.324*** (0.054)
Bangladeshi	-0.204** (0.065)	-0.279*** (0.081)	-0.199** (0.064)	-0.197** (0.072)	-0.225** (0.069)	-0.273*** (0.082)	-0.210** (0.068)	-0.193** (0.069)
Chinese	-0.359*** (0.091)	-0.375*** (0.068)	-0.288*** (0.076)	-0.338*** (0.061)	-0.451*** (0.088)	-0.411*** (0.069)	-0.368*** (0.076)	-0.374*** (0.065)
Other - mixed	-0.350*** (0.040)	-0.302*** (0.034)	-0.342*** (0.041)	-0.244*** (0.038)	-0.346*** (0.040)	-0.321*** (0.034)	-0.336*** (0.042)	-0.265*** (0.037)
year & quarter dummies	Yes							
Region dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	3672	4250	3672	4250	3672	4250	3672	4250

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in reading (cols.1-2) and writing (cols. 3-4) proficiency between immigrants from different ethnic groups and white natives, by gender. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for English fluency on an immigrant dummy interacted with dummies for ethnic groups. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Separate regressions by gender. All regressions include interactions of year and quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.5: Immigrants-Natives reading and writing gap, by region**

	Reading		Writing	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
North East	-0.337*** (0.097)	-0.305*** (0.083)	-0.339*** (0.098)	-0.308*** (0.083)
North West	-0.252*** (0.061)	-0.212*** (0.056)	-0.285*** (0.061)	-0.242*** (0.056)
Yorks & Humbers.	-0.161** (0.058)	-0.151** (0.056)	-0.164** (0.061)	-0.154** (0.058)
East Midlands	-0.200** (0.066)	-0.157** (0.055)	-0.220** (0.067)	-0.176** (0.057)
West Midlands	-0.144** (0.050)	-0.135** (0.043)	-0.109* (0.051)	-0.102* (0.043)
Eastern	-0.112* (0.047)	-0.074 (0.042)	-0.104* (0.047)	-0.063 (0.042)
London	-0.215*** (0.027)	-0.173*** (0.022)	-0.250*** (0.029)	-0.204*** (0.025)
South East	-0.135*** (0.040)	-0.115** (0.038)	-0.141*** (0.040)	-0.120** (0.038)
South West	-0.230* (0.107)	-0.148 (0.081)	-0.212* (0.107)	-0.124 (0.079)
Wales	-0.159 (0.118)	-0.086 (0.125)	-0.303* (0.137)	-0.224 (0.139)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	9442	9442	9442	9442

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in reading (cols.1-2) and writing (cols. 3-4) between immigrants and natives in each Government Office Region. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for English fluency on an immigrant dummy interacted with region dummies. All regressions include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects and regional dummies. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.6: Immigrants-natives gap in feelings of belonging to Britain, by country of origin**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
All immigrants	-0.136*** (0.024)	-0.095** (0.036)	-0.179*** (0.032)	-0.107*** (0.024)	-0.055 (0.037)	-0.163*** (0.030)
Ireland	0.096 (0.078)	0.09 (0.103)	0.112 (0.117)	0.045 (0.076)	0.053 (0.099)	0.048 (0.113)
India	-0.012 (0.037)	0.034 (0.043)	-0.069 (0.065)	-0.005 (0.039)	0.05 (0.046)	-0.074 (0.065)
Pakistan	0.127*** (0.036)	0.149** (0.049)	0.104 (0.054)	0.174*** (0.038)	0.201*** (0.052)	0.147** (0.055)
Bangladesh	0.141* (0.068)	0.198* (0.080)	0.077 (0.117)	0.244*** (0.072)	0.326*** (0.087)	0.157 (0.123)
Jamaica	0.008 (0.063)	0.076 (0.097)	-0.04 (0.082)	0.012 (0.065)	0.122 (0.105)	-0.07 (0.081)
East African New CW	0.191*** (0.049)	0.190** (0.063)	0.194* (0.076)	0.189*** (0.049)	0.182** (0.062)	0.192* (0.077)
Rest of New CW	-0.033 (0.042)	0.002 (0.055)	-0.066 (0.065)	-0.015 (0.045)	0.03 (0.059)	-0.063 (0.071)
Oceania and Canada	-0.382** (0.136)	-0.490* (0.249)	-0.305* (0.141)	-0.386** (0.136)	-0.504* (0.243)	-0.304* (0.143)
Other	-0.231*** (0.034)	-0.187*** (0.053)	-0.275*** (0.043)	-0.187*** (0.032)	-0.128* (0.051)	-0.253*** (0.039)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	18121	8275	9845	18121	8275	9845

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of immigrants and natives who feel they belong strongly to Britain for all immigrants pooled (row 1) and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10), overall (columns 1 and 4) and by gender (columns 2,3, 5 and 6). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for feeling of belonging to Britain on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.7: Immigrants- white natives gap in feelings of belonging to Britain, by ethnicity and gender**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
White immigrants	-0.214*** (0.038)	-0.186** (0.059)	-0.242*** (0.049)	-0.185*** (0.036)	-0.144* (0.057)	-0.229*** (0.044)
Black - Caribbean	-0.072 (0.051)	0.009 (0.074)	-0.131 (0.069)	-0.064 (0.054)	0.057 (0.080)	-0.155* (0.072)
Black - African	-0.054 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.051)	-0.107* (0.045)	-0.002 (0.038)	0.05 (0.056)	-0.061 (0.052)
Indian	0.068** (0.026)	0.085* (0.036)	0.055 (0.037)	0.088** (0.029)	0.112** (0.041)	0.067 (0.042)
Pakistani	0.118** (0.036)	0.142** (0.048)	0.092 (0.053)	0.167*** (0.038)	0.193*** (0.052)	0.144** (0.056)
Bangladeshi	0.126 (0.067)	0.187* (0.078)	0.054 (0.116)	0.239*** (0.071)	0.323*** (0.086)	0.147 (0.123)
Chinese	-0.475*** (0.070)	-0.486*** (0.099)	-0.473*** (0.097)	-0.421*** (0.070)	-0.391*** (0.102)	-0.453*** (0.098)
Other - mixed	-0.143*** (0.038)	-0.095 (0.062)	-0.193*** (0.043)	-0.088* (0.042)	-0.02 (0.067)	-0.158** (0.048)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	15276	7041	8234	15276	7041	8234

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of immigrants and natives who feel they belong strongly to Britain for immigrants of different ethnicities, overall (columns 1 and 4) and by gender (columns 2,3, 5 and 6). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for feeling of belonging to Britain on an immigrant dummy interacted with ethnicity dummies. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.8: Immigrants- natives gap in feelings of belonging to Britain, by region**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
North East	-0.374*	-0.255	-0.523	-0.352*	-0.235	-0.499
	(0.170)	(0.213)	(0.275)	(0.167)	(0.205)	(0.278)
North West	-0.233*	-0.237	-0.232*	-0.208*	-0.221	-0.210*
	(0.092)	(0.145)	(0.110)	(0.089)	(0.140)	(0.107)
Yorks & Humbers.	-0.159	-0.231	-0.074	-0.138	-0.202	-0.069
	(0.091)	(0.141)	(0.105)	(0.089)	(0.134)	(0.110)
East Midlands	-0.063	-0.171	0.05	-0.034	-0.132	0.065
	(0.100)	(0.159)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.135)	(0.088)
West Midlands	-0.056	0.102	-0.222	-0.045	0.119	-0.214
	(0.079)	(0.100)	(0.115)	(0.079)	(0.099)	(0.113)
Eastern	-0.052	0.056	-0.153	-0.036	0.059	-0.132
	(0.077)	(0.120)	(0.098)	(0.076)	(0.118)	(0.099)
London	-0.156***	-0.06	-0.255***	-0.135**	-0.042	-0.236***
	(0.046)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.059)
South East	-0.088	-0.064	-0.119	-0.087	-0.043	-0.140*
	(0.059)	(0.096)	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.096)	(0.063)
South West	-0.125	-0.096	-0.149	-0.089	-0.02	-0.139
	(0.098)	(0.153)	(0.124)	(0.094)	(0.148)	(0.118)
Wales	0.12	0.126	0.117	0.113	0.059	0.139
	(0.141)	(0.247)	(0.168)	(0.135)	(0.241)	(0.154)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	18121	8275	9845	18121	8275	9845

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of immigrants and natives who feel they belong strongly to Britain in each Government Office Region. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for feeling of belonging to Britain on an immigrant dummy interacted with region dummies. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.9: Immigrants-natives gap in civic participation, by country of origin and gender**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
All immigrants	-0.018* (0.008)	-0.021 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.027** (0.009)	-0.032* (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)
Ireland	0.043 (0.045)	0.033 (0.056)	0.055 (0.074)	0.01 (0.046)	0.004 (0.057)	0.018 (0.075)
India	-0.01 (0.018)	0.006 (0.028)	-0.034 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.053** (0.019)
Pakistan	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.016)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.048** (0.018)
Bangladesh	0.011 (0.026)	0.008 (0.035)	0.014 (0.037)	0.024 (0.027)	0.011 (0.037)	0.041 (0.039)
Jamaica	-0.001 (0.024)	-0.060* (0.029)	0.029 (0.033)	-0.015 (0.024)	-0.063* (0.031)	0.005 (0.033)
East African New CW	0.013 (0.023)	0.02 (0.037)	0.004 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.005 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.030)
Rest of New CW	0 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.019)	0.021 (0.050)	-0.013 (0.025)	-0.031 (0.021)	0.008 (0.047)
Oceania and Canada	0.031 (0.049)	-0.007 (0.073)	0.061 (0.065)	0.008 (0.049)	-0.037 (0.074)	0.047 (0.065)
Other	-0.034*** (0.009)	-0.038** (0.014)	-0.029* (0.013)	-0.039*** (0.011)	-0.045** (0.016)	-0.033* (0.014)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	18266	8333	9932	18266	8333	9932

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of immigrants and natives who have or have had during the last 12 months any form of civic participation for all immigrants pooled (row 1) and immigrants from different origin countries (rows 2-10), overall (columns 1 and 4) and by gender (columns 2,3, 5 and 6). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for civic participation on an immigrant dummy (row 1), or on country of origin dummies (rows 2-10). Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of year and quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.10: Immigrants- white natives gap in civic participation, by ethnicity and gender**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
White immigrants	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.023 (0.018)	-0.01 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.013)	-0.034 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.018)
Black - Caribbean	0.025 (0.020)	-0.024 (0.032)	0.056* (0.026)	0.013 (0.021)	-0.028 (0.032)	0.037 (0.027)
Black - African	0.001 (0.012)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.018)
Indian	-0.025* (0.010)	-0.025 (0.014)	-0.027 (0.015)	-0.038** (0.012)	-0.039* (0.017)	-0.039* (0.016)
Pakistani	-0.027 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.016)	-0.025 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.043* (0.017)
Bangladeshi	0.02 (0.026)	0.004 (0.034)	0.041 (0.040)	0.038 (0.027)	0.009 (0.036)	0.075 (0.041)
Chinese	-0.070*** (0.017)	-0.101*** (0.011)	-0.045 (0.030)	-0.072*** (0.018)	-0.104*** (0.015)	-0.052 (0.030)
Other - mixed	-0.027** (0.010)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.044*** (0.012)	-0.031** (0.012)	-0.02 (0.018)	-0.044** (0.014)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	15389	7090	8298	15389	7090	8298

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of immigrants and natives who have or have had within the last 12 months any form of civic participation for immigrants of different ethnicities, overall (columns 1 and 4) and by gender (columns 2,3, 5 and 6). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for civic participation on an immigrant dummy interacted with ethnicity dummies. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 4.3.11: Immigrants- white natives gap in civic participation, by region and gender**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
North East	0.010 (0.047)	0.038 (0.068)	-0.019 (0.057)	0.006 (0.044)	0.035 (0.064)	-0.025 (0.057)
North West	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.026 (0.027)	0.022 (0.044)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.025 (0.027)	0.025 (0.043)
Yorks & Humbers.	0.087 (0.048)	0.112 (0.065)	0.062 (0.072)	0.085 (0.047)	0.108 (0.064)	0.061 (0.067)
East Midlands	0.025 (0.032)	-0.011 (0.028)	0.066 (0.055)	0.025 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.029)	0.068 (0.057)
West Midlands	0.000 (0.035)	0.050 (0.058)	-0.052 (0.033)	-0.005 (0.034)	0.047 (0.056)	-0.058 (0.033)
Eastern	-0.049* (0.021)	-0.087*** (0.019)	-0.014 (0.036)	-0.053* (0.021)	-0.092*** (0.019)	-0.016 (0.035)
London	-0.059*** (0.015)	-0.056** (0.021)	-0.062** (0.020)	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060** (0.022)	-0.059** (0.020)
South East	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.035)	0.003 (0.028)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.010 (0.028)
South West	-0.056 (0.031)	-0.097** (0.036)	-0.022 (0.047)	-0.055 (0.030)	-0.091** (0.035)	-0.028 (0.047)
Wales	-0.063** (0.021)	-0.064 (0.037)	-0.062* (0.024)	-0.080*** (0.023)	-0.093* (0.039)	-0.062* (0.027)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	18266	8333	9932	18266	8333	9932

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of immigrants and natives who have or have had within the last 12 months any form of civic participation in each Government Office Region. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for civic participation on an immigrant dummy interacted with ethnicity dummies. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 5.1: Minority - White natives education gap**

	1993-1994		2000-2001		2008-2009	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ethnic Minority	1.055*** (0.029)	0.669*** (0.029)	1.217*** (0.032)	0.847*** (0.032)	1.331*** (0.028)	0.926*** (0.028)
Black - Caribbean	0.692*** (0.040)	0.294*** (0.040)	0.447*** (0.051)	0.097 (0.050)	0.473*** (0.053)	0.102 (0.053)
Black - African	2.370*** (0.134)	1.993*** (0.135)	2.946*** (0.149)	2.588*** (0.149)	2.474*** (0.151)	2.078*** (0.150)
Indian	1.660*** (0.067)	1.264*** (0.067)	2.057*** (0.067)	1.644*** (0.066)	2.359*** (0.056)	1.903*** (0.056)
Pakistani	0.554*** (0.093)	0.157 (0.093)	1.064*** (0.088)	0.660*** (0.087)	0.955*** (0.063)	0.502*** (0.063)
Bangladeshi	1.357*** (0.218)	0.978*** (0.216)	0.447* (0.174)	0.012 (0.175)	1.454*** (0.156)	1.013*** (0.155)
Chinese	1.948*** (0.245)	1.612*** (0.242)	2.503*** (0.219)	2.229*** (0.209)	3.314*** (0.184)	2.885*** (0.182)
Other - mixed	0.875*** (0.058)	0.516*** (0.058)	0.924*** (0.063)	0.590*** (0.063)	0.956*** (0.051)	0.608*** (0.050)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	639596	639596	481821	481821	486680	486680

*The table reports the average difference (in years) in the age at which individuals left full time education between non-white and white natives (row 1), and between natives from different ethnic groups and white natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on dummies for ethnic groups, for natives only. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of year and quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 5.2: Minority - White natives education gap, by gender**

	1993-1994				2000-2001				2008-2009			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Men	Women										
Ethnic Minority	1.084*** (0.043)	1.028*** (0.039)	0.708*** (0.043)	0.634*** (0.039)	1.369*** (0.049)	1.078*** (0.042)	1.021*** (0.049)	0.688*** (0.042)	1.419*** (0.042)	1.248*** (0.038)	1.080*** (0.041)	0.774*** (0.037)
Black - Caribbean	0.501*** (0.061)	0.858*** (0.052)	0.101 (0.060)	0.463*** (0.052)	0.487*** (0.080)	0.413*** (0.065)	0.137 (0.079)	0.064 (0.064)	0.186* (0.080)	0.729*** (0.071)	-0.138 (0.079)	0.309*** (0.071)
Black - African	2.585*** (0.207)	2.169*** (0.171)	2.216*** (0.210)	1.783*** (0.171)	3.188*** (0.238)	2.732*** (0.186)	2.850*** (0.237)	2.338*** (0.186)	2.738*** (0.239)	2.269*** (0.191)	2.371*** (0.238)	1.840*** (0.189)
Indian	1.744*** (0.097)	1.565*** (0.091)	1.367*** (0.096)	1.146*** (0.091)	2.173*** (0.098)	1.938*** (0.090)	1.788*** (0.098)	1.497*** (0.089)	2.459*** (0.079)	2.236*** (0.080)	2.076*** (0.078)	1.705*** (0.079)
Pakistani	1.105*** (0.123)	0.010 (0.136)	0.734*** (0.123)	-0.415** (0.135)	1.566*** (0.141)	0.611*** (0.105)	1.216*** (0.140)	0.152 (0.105)	1.338*** (0.093)	0.574*** (0.084)	0.970*** (0.093)	0.028 (0.084)
Bangladeshi	1.815*** (0.394)	1.074*** (0.250)	1.478*** (0.386)	0.678** (0.248)	0.968*** (0.284)	-0.082 (0.181)	0.610* (0.281)	-0.589** (0.184)	1.839*** (0.250)	1.121*** (0.191)	1.497*** (0.247)	0.576** (0.190)
Chinese	1.760*** (0.300)	2.200*** (0.405)	1.461*** (0.290)	1.835*** (0.408)	1.980*** (0.310)	3.077*** (0.297)	1.741*** (0.297)	2.757*** (0.283)	3.344*** (0.249)	3.268*** (0.271)	3.013*** (0.245)	2.734*** (0.268)
Other - mixed	0.780*** (0.085)	0.955*** (0.080)	0.431*** (0.084)	0.591*** (0.080)	0.952*** (0.094)	0.901*** (0.086)	0.637*** (0.093)	0.554*** (0.085)	0.924*** (0.075)	0.988*** (0.070)	0.649*** (0.074)	0.564*** (0.069)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes											
Age controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	324219	315377	324219	315377	241904	239917	241904	239917	233541	253139	233541	253139

The table reports the average difference (in years) in the age at which individuals left full time education between non-white and white natives (row 1), and between natives from different ethnic groups and white natives., by gender. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on dummies for ethnic groups for natives only. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

**Table 5.3: Minority - White natives employment gap**

	1993-1994			2000-2001			2008-2009		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Ethnic Minority	-0.154*** (0.006)	-0.156*** (0.006)	-0.174*** (0.006)	-0.089*** (0.005)	-0.099*** (0.005)	-0.128*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.120*** (0.004)
Black - Caribbean	-0.151*** (0.009)	-0.153*** (0.009)	-0.168*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.086*** (0.009)	-0.107*** (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.120*** (0.008)
Black - African	-0.262*** (0.022)	-0.260*** (0.022)	-0.302*** (0.022)	-0.059** (0.019)	-0.076*** (0.019)	-0.126*** (0.018)	0.043* (0.017)	0.021 (0.018)	-0.097*** (0.017)
Indian	-0.044*** (0.011)	-0.047*** (0.011)	-0.076*** (0.011)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.020* (0.009)	-0.070*** (0.009)	0.081*** (0.007)	0.074*** (0.007)	-0.057*** (0.007)
Pakistani	-0.274*** (0.016)	-0.269*** (0.017)	-0.272*** (0.016)	-0.210*** (0.013)	-0.208*** (0.013)	-0.232*** (0.013)	-0.149*** (0.010)	-0.146*** (0.010)	-0.235*** (0.010)
Bangladeshi	-0.193*** (0.048)	-0.199*** (0.049)	-0.210*** (0.047)	-0.284*** (0.035)	-0.293*** (0.035)	-0.281*** (0.034)	-0.083*** (0.022)	-0.096*** (0.022)	-0.154*** (0.021)
Chinese	0.018 (0.040)	0.029 (0.040)	-0.011 (0.040)	-0.072* (0.035)	-0.077* (0.035)	-0.125*** (0.034)	0.144*** (0.018)	0.131*** (0.018)	0.001 (0.017)
Other - mixed	-0.174*** (0.012)	-0.177*** (0.012)	-0.190*** (0.011)	-0.096*** (0.010)	-0.107*** (0.010)	-0.127*** (0.010)	-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.045*** (0.008)	-0.113*** (0.008)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes								
Region dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
N	639596	639596	639596	481821	481821	481821	486680	486680	486680

The table reports the average difference in employment probability between non-white and white natives (row 1), and between natives from different ethnic groups and white natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of a dummy for employment status on dummies for ethnic groups, for natives only. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

**Table 5.4: Minority - White natives employment gap, by gender**

	1993-1994				2000-2001				2008-2009			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Men	Women										
Ethnic Minority	-0.178*** (0.008)	-0.125*** (0.008)	-0.205*** (0.008)	-0.140*** (0.008)	-0.074*** (0.007)	-0.096*** (0.007)	-0.130*** (0.007)	-0.116*** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.102*** (0.005)	-0.134*** (0.006)
Black - Carib	-0.196*** (0.014)	-0.102*** (0.013)	-0.221*** (0.014)	-0.116*** (0.012)	-0.077*** (0.013)	-0.061*** (0.012)	-0.135*** (0.013)	-0.071*** (0.012)	-0.031* (0.012)	0.016 (0.012)	-0.131*** (0.012)	-0.106*** (0.012)
Black - African	-0.358*** (0.032)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.402*** (0.032)	-0.204*** (0.030)	-0.027 (0.025)	-0.081** (0.027)	-0.107*** (0.024)	-0.132*** (0.026)	0.055* (0.024)	0.045 (0.025)	-0.086*** (0.023)	-0.095*** (0.023)
Indian	-0.070*** (0.016)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.110*** (0.015)	-0.044** (0.016)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.088*** (0.012)	-0.047*** (0.013)	0.060*** (0.010)	0.096*** (0.011)	-0.063*** (0.009)	-0.051*** (0.011)
Pakistan	-0.253*** (0.024)	-0.291*** (0.022)	-0.259*** (0.024)	-0.282*** (0.021)	-0.130*** (0.018)	-0.275*** (0.018)	-0.171*** (0.018)	-0.275*** (0.018)	-0.064*** (0.014)	-0.234*** (0.014)	-0.146*** (0.013)	-0.317*** (0.014)
Bangl.	-0.044 (0.069)	-0.265*** (0.060)	-0.042 (0.070)	-0.286*** (0.056)	-0.208*** (0.048)	-0.358*** (0.048)	-0.224*** (0.046)	-0.328*** (0.047)	0.012 (0.028)	-0.159*** (0.030)	-0.051* (0.026)	-0.233*** (0.030)
Chinese	-0.112 (0.058)	0.180*** (0.046)	-0.134* (0.058)	0.144** (0.048)	-0.176*** (0.052)	0.041 (0.045)	-0.221*** (0.050)	-0.028 (0.045)	0.088*** (0.025)	0.199*** (0.027)	-0.021 (0.024)	0.021 (0.024)
Other - mixed	-0.175*** (0.017)	-0.161*** (0.016)	-0.197*** (0.017)	-0.172*** (0.015)	-0.083*** (0.014)	-0.099*** (0.014)	-0.130*** (0.014)	-0.112*** (0.013)	-0.037*** (0.011)	-0.023* (0.011)	-0.106*** (0.011)	-0.110*** (0.011)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes											
Region dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	324219	315377	324219	315377	241904	239917	241904	239917	233541	253139	233541	253139

The table reports the average difference in employment between non-white and white natives (row 1), and between natives from different ethnic groups and white natives, by gender. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of a dummy for employment status on dummies for ethnic groups, for natives only. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

**Table 5.5: Minority - White natives wage gap**

	1993-1994			2000-2001			2008-2009		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Ethnic Minority	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.115*** (0.022)	-0.071*** (0.020)	0.048*** (0.014)	-0.081*** (0.014)	-0.080*** (0.013)	0.048*** (0.013)	-0.062*** (0.013)	-0.079*** (0.011)
Black – Caribbean	0.023 (0.036)	-0.099** (0.034)	-0.052 (0.033)	0.045 (0.023)	-0.114*** (0.023)	-0.095*** (0.022)	0.042 (0.024)	-0.104*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.022)
Black – African	-0.116 (0.064)	-0.276*** (0.065)	-0.300*** (0.062)	0.077 (0.070)	-0.150* (0.071)	-0.248*** (0.067)	0.115* (0.055)	-0.056 (0.058)	-0.153** (0.054)
Indian	0.036 (0.043)	-0.044 (0.044)	-0.009 (0.043)	0.080** (0.029)	0.000 (0.029)	-0.036 (0.025)	0.156*** (0.027)	0.068* (0.027)	-0.013 (0.022)
Pakistani	-0.370*** (0.090)	-0.360*** (0.089)	-0.148* (0.069)	-0.018 (0.046)	-0.073 (0.042)	-0.064 (0.038)	-0.121*** (0.033)	-0.148*** (0.032)	-0.132*** (0.027)
Bangladeshi	0.210 (0.171)	-0.005 (0.176)	-0.082 (0.128)	-0.075 (0.107)	-0.177 (0.125)	-0.077 (0.110)	-0.001 (0.087)	-0.155 (0.084)	-0.143 (0.074)
Chinese	0.028 (0.074)	-0.120 (0.079)	-0.176 (0.131)	0.055 (0.107)	-0.078 (0.111)	-0.135 (0.094)	0.096 (0.067)	-0.055 (0.065)	-0.174** (0.055)
Other - mixed	0.011 (0.049)	-0.096* (0.048)	-0.071 (0.041)	0.049 (0.027)	-0.097*** (0.026)	-0.064** (0.022)	0.017 (0.025)	-0.095*** (0.025)	-0.057** (0.021)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
N	61197	61197	61197	99388	99388	99388	85333	85333	85333

*The table reports the percentage average difference in gross hourly wages between non-white and white natives (row 1), and between natives from different ethnic groups and white natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of log-wages on dummies for ethnic groups, for natives only. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

## The Socio-Economic Integration of Migrants

**Table 5.6: Minority - White natives wage gap, by gender**

	1993-1994				2000-2001				2008-2009			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Ethnic Minority	-0.142*** (0.035)	0.126*** (0.028)	-0.086** (0.031)	-0.055* (0.026)	-0.049* (0.021)	0.155*** (0.018)	-0.130*** (0.019)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.028 (0.020)	0.127*** (0.017)	-0.132*** (0.017)	-0.021 (0.014)
Black - Carib	-0.131* (0.064)	0.185*** (0.040)	-0.096 (0.060)	-0.003 (0.037)	-0.076* (0.036)	0.176*** (0.030)	-0.168*** (0.034)	-0.016 (0.027)	-0.065 (0.040)	0.151*** (0.027)	-0.193*** (0.035)	-0.022 (0.026)
Black - African	-0.240** (0.091)	0.017 (0.088)	-0.306** (0.096)	-0.290*** (0.067)	-0.103 (0.116)	0.284*** (0.056)	-0.379*** (0.109)	-0.101 (0.062)	0.110 (0.074)	0.115 (0.079)	-0.108 (0.065)	-0.224** (0.078)
Indian	0.001 (0.064)	0.068 (0.050)	0.034 (0.066)	-0.065 (0.047)	0.018 (0.040)	0.142*** (0.042)	-0.051 (0.034)	-0.016 (0.037)	0.090* (0.042)	0.221*** (0.035)	-0.066 (0.034)	0.044 (0.026)
Pakistan	-0.513*** (0.127)	-0.210 (0.109)	-0.203* (0.090)	-0.071 (0.095)	-0.071 (0.059)	0.037 (0.070)	-0.140** (0.046)	0.011 (0.063)	-0.188*** (0.048)	-0.060 (0.042)	-0.183*** (0.039)	-0.075* (0.036)
Banglad	-0.055 (0.240)	0.556*** (0.112)	-0.223 (0.132)	0.192* (0.090)	0.052 (0.093)	-0.217 (0.135)	-0.011 (0.075)	-0.163 (0.207)	0.024 (0.167)	0.005 (0.080)	-0.165 (0.146)	-0.123* (0.062)
Chinese	0.090 (0.072)	0.068 (0.076)	0.075 (0.073)	-0.316** (0.113)	-0.016 (0.156)	0.142 (0.145)	-0.162 (0.129)	-0.084 (0.140)	-0.086 (0.097)	0.324*** (0.078)	-0.274*** (0.078)	-0.043 (0.065)
Other - mixed	-0.148* (0.064)	0.180* (0.075)	-0.094* (0.047)	-0.055 (0.070)	-0.067 (0.043)	0.176*** (0.033)	-0.097** (0.034)	-0.006 (0.029)	-0.055 (0.039)	0.095** (0.033)	-0.099** (0.031)	-0.006 (0.028)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	30301	30896	30301	30896	48504	50884	48504	50884	40490	44843	40490	44843

The table reports the percentage average difference in gross hourly wages between non-white and white natives (row 1), and between natives from different ethnic groups and white natives, by gender. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of log-wages on dummies for ethnic groups, for natives only. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

**Table 5.7: Second generation immigrants-natives reading and writing gaps, by parental ethnicity**

	Reading		Writing	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Second generation immigrants	0.019 (0.011)	0.014 (0.012)	0.023 (0.012)	0.014 (0.013)
White immigrants parents	0.016 (0.025)	0.005 (0.025)	0.022 (0.027)	0.005 (0.027)
Black – Caribbean parents	0.013 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.018)	0.012 (0.020)	-0.013 (0.021)
Black – African parents	0.004 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.029)	0.009 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.032)
Indian parents	0.033** (0.011)	0.030* (0.013)	0.045*** (0.012)	0.041** (0.015)
Pakistani parents	0.036** (0.012)	0.053*** (0.014)	0.015 (0.023)	0.035 (0.025)
Bangladeshi parents	-0.04 (0.050)	-0.04 (0.051)	-0.02 (0.050)	-0.021 (0.051)
Chinese parents	-0.025 (0.074)	-0.032 (0.080)	-0.006 (0.074)	-0.014 (0.083)
Other – mixed immigrant parents	0.022 (0.033)	0.017 (0.034)	0.042 (0.033)	0.034 (0.035)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
N (upper panel)	6358	6358	6358	6358
N (lower panel)	5923	5923	5923	5923

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in reading (cols.1-2) and writing (cols. 3-4) proficiency between second generation immigrants and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1) and immigrants from different ethnic origins and white natives (rows 2-10). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for English fluency on a second generation immigrant dummy (row 1), or on a second generation immigrant dummy interacted with ethnicity dummies (rows 2-10). The sample is composed of UK born individuals only. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 5.8: Second generation immigrants-natives reading and writing gaps, by parental ethnicity and gender**

	Reading				Writing			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Second generation immigrants	0.024 (0.015)	0.016 (0.016)	0.015 (0.018)	0.018 (0.016)	0.040* (0.017)	0.008 (0.018)	0.027 (0.020)	0.006 (0.018)
White immigrants	0.026 (0.032)	0.007 (0.038)	0.01 (0.034)	0.004 (0.038)	0.045 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.041)	0.019 (0.038)	-0.007 (0.040)
Black - Caribbean	0.021 (0.031)	0.003 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.021 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.040)	-0.013 (0.021)
Black - African	0.01 (0.040)	0.01 (0.024)	-0.016 (0.045)	0.017 (0.028)	0.023 (0.043)	0.008 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.050)	0.007 (0.030)
Indian	0.038* (0.017)	0.035*** (0.011)	0.028 (0.022)	0.038** (0.014)	0.053** (0.020)	0.048*** (0.010)	0.041 (0.026)	0.047*** (0.014)
Pakistani	0.051** (0.018)	0.02 (0.014)	0.068** (0.022)	0.042* (0.018)	0.058* (0.023)	-0.029 (0.040)	0.082** (0.028)	-0.009 (0.042)
Bangladeshi	-0.054 (0.081)	-0.011 (0.042)	-0.059 (0.084)	-0.002 (0.043)	-0.024 (0.080)	-0.002 (0.042)	-0.026 (0.084)	0.001 (0.044)
Chinese	-0.034 (0.098)	0.051*** (0.007)	-0.047 (0.110)	0.044** (0.016)	-0.004 (0.098)	0.059*** (0.008)	-0.012 (0.117)	0.039* (0.019)
Other - mixed	0.01 (0.058)	0.046*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.062)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.039 (0.058)	0.056*** (0.005)	0.036 (0.064)	0.043*** (0.010)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N (upper panel)	2909	3449	2909	3449	2909	3449	2909	3449
N (lower panel)	2704	3219	2704	3219	2704	3219	2704	3219

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in reading (cols.1-2) and writing (cols. 3-4) proficiency between second generation immigrants and natives for all immigrants pooled (row 1) and immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds (rows 2-10) by gender. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for English fluency on a second-generation immigrant dummy (row 1), or on a second-generation dummy interacted with ethnicity dummies (rows 2-10). Separate regressions by gender. The sample is composed of UK-born individuals only. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 5.9: Second generation immigrants-natives reading and writing gaps, by region**

	Reading		Writing	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
North East	0.043** (0.015)	0.075*** (0.020)	0.062*** (0.018)	0.106*** (0.023)
North West	0.034 (0.018)	0.034 (0.019)	0.028 (0.025)	0.026 (0.025)
Yorks & Humbers.	0.041 (0.032)	0.05 (0.033)	0.018 (0.044)	0.029 (0.046)
East Midlands	0.113*** (0.020)	0.116*** (0.020)	0.119*** (0.024)	0.120*** (0.024)
West Midlands	0.037* (0.017)	0.037* (0.017)	0.056* (0.023)	0.053* (0.022)
Eastern	0.01 (0.041)	0.018 (0.041)	-0.014 (0.054)	-0.007 (0.049)
London	-0.021 (0.022)	-0.018 (0.022)	-0.02 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)
South East	0.021 (0.018)	0.029 (0.022)	0.033 (0.019)	0.044 (0.025)
South West	-0.09 (0.098)	-0.107 (0.099)	-0.067 (0.098)	-0.09 (0.100)
Wales	0.090*** (0.021)	0.106*** (0.023)	0.119*** (0.024)	0.135*** (0.026)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	6358	6358	6358	6358

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in reading (cols.1-2) and writing (cols. 3-4) between second generation immigrants and natives in each Government Office Region. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for English fluency on a second generation immigrant dummy interacted with region dummies. The sample is restricted to UK born individuals only. All regressions include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects and regional dummies. Age controls are age and age squared. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 5.10: Second generation immigrants-natives gap in feelings of belonging to Britain, by parental origin and gender.**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
Second generation immigrants	-0.031 (0.033)	-0.054 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.038)	0.005 (0.033)	0 (0.051)	0.015 (0.041)
White immigrants	-0.044 (0.077)	-0.1 (0.125)	0.01 (0.082)	-0.048 (0.074)	-0.095 (0.116)	0 (0.083)
Black - Caribbean	-0.156*** (0.039)	-0.156* (0.064)	-0.162*** (0.048)	-0.100* (0.044)	-0.071 (0.069)	-0.133* (0.056)
Black - African	-0.063 (0.065)	0.09 (0.096)	-0.232** (0.081)	0.013 (0.071)	0.202 (0.106)	-0.189* (0.087)
Indian	0.009 (0.037)	0.021 (0.050)	0.005 (0.054)	0.075 (0.040)	0.102 (0.055)	0.057 (0.058)
Pakistani	0.088* (0.039)	0.003 (0.055)	0.193*** (0.049)	0.154*** (0.041)	0.09 (0.060)	0.241*** (0.051)
Bangladeshi	0.019 (0.084)	0.048 (0.112)	-0.004 (0.126)	0.124 (0.088)	0.2 (0.117)	0.054 (0.130)
Chinese	-0.129 (0.097)	-0.161 (0.127)	-0.004 (0.122)	-0.101 (0.099)	-0.114 (0.131)	-0.009 (0.126)
Other - mixed	-0.123 (0.067)	-0.151 (0.093)	-0.096 (0.093)	-0.056 (0.070)	-0.037 (0.095)	-0.071 (0.098)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N (top panel)	12297	5517	6779	12297	5517	6779
N (bottom panel)	11570	5191	6378	11570	5191	6378

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of second generation immigrants and natives who feel they belong strongly to Britain for all second generation immigrants pooled (row 1) and for second generation immigrants of different ethnicities (rows 2-10), overall (columns 1 and 4) and by gender (columns 2,3, 5 and 6). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for feeling of belonging to Britain on a second generation immigrant dummy interacted, and on a second generation immigrant dummy interacted with ethnicity dummies. Regressions are run on the sample of UK born only. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of year and quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 5.11: Second generation immigrants-natives gap in feelings of belonging to Britain, by region.**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
North East	-0.141 (0.169)	0.234 (0.313)	-0.362** (0.113)	-0.16 (0.185)	0.258 (0.297)	-0.405** (0.127)
North West	0.047 (0.087)	-0.063 (0.104)	0.166 (0.128)	0.076 (0.085)	-0.042 (0.103)	0.202 (0.122)
Yorks & Humbers.	0.05 (0.083)	-0.011 (0.108)	0.151 (0.121)	0.106 (0.086)	0.031 (0.111)	0.222 (0.126)
East Midlands	0.109 (0.089)	0.139 (0.123)	0.07 (0.117)	0.155 (0.092)	0.2 (0.129)	0.098 (0.123)
West Midlands	0.045 (0.073)	0.086 (0.108)	0.002 (0.098)	0.069 (0.074)	0.117 (0.111)	0.02 (0.099)
Eastern	0.05 (0.120)	0.205 (0.165)	-0.111 (0.160)	0.07 (0.115)	0.198 (0.156)	-0.068 (0.158)
London	-0.142* (0.066)	-0.178 (0.110)	-0.107 (0.067)	-0.096 (0.065)	-0.105 (0.105)	-0.082 (0.068)
South East	-0.027 (0.077)	-0.074 (0.094)	0.035 (0.122)	-0.027 (0.081)	-0.113 (0.093)	0.071 (0.127)
South West	0.236 (0.136)	0.09 (0.186)	0.291 (0.174)	0.179 (0.125)	0.112 (0.216)	0.22 (0.159)
Wales	-0.051 (0.355)	0.311 (0.451)	-0.383 (0.480)	-0.071 (0.326)	0.225 (0.430)	-0.358 (0.445)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12297	5517	6779	12297	5517	6779

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of second generation immigrants and natives who feel they belong strongly to Britain in each Government Office Region. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for feeling of belonging to Britain on a second generation immigrant dummy interacted with region dummies. Regressions are run on UK born individuals only. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 5.12: Second generation immigrants-natives gap in feelings of belonging to Britain, by parental origin and gender.**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
Second generation immigrants	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.022 (0.014)	0.007 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.025 (0.016)	0.001 (0.017)
White immigrants	-0.047* (0.020)	-0.067** (0.025)	-0.029 (0.032)	-0.064** (0.021)	-0.079** (0.026)	-0.051 (0.033)
Black - Caribbean	0.062** (0.021)	0.013 (0.035)	0.100*** (0.025)	0.052* (0.023)	0.01 (0.038)	0.084** (0.028)
Black - African	0.062 (0.040)	0.083 (0.062)	0.037 (0.046)	0.062 (0.043)	0.079 (0.067)	0.041 (0.046)
Indian	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.021)
Pakistani	0.014 (0.021)	0.012 (0.028)	0.019 (0.030)	0.038 (0.021)	0.03 (0.030)	0.048 (0.030)
Bangladeshi	0.095* (0.047)	0.092 (0.076)	0.097 (0.058)	0.112* (0.048)	0.098 (0.077)	0.128* (0.060)
Chinese	-0.113*** (0.004)	-0.114*** (0.006)	-0.112*** (0.006)	-0.118*** (0.011)	-0.115*** (0.015)	-0.125*** (0.016)
Other - mixed	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.044 (0.027)	0.036 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.024)	-0.039 (0.029)	0.031 (0.036)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N (top panel)	12381	5548	6832	12381	5548	6832
N (bottom panel)	11643	5218	6424	11643	5218	6424

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of second generation immigrants and natives who have or have had during the last 12 months any form of civic participation for all second generation immigrants pooled (row 1) and for second generation immigrants of different ethnicities (rows 2-10), overall (columns 1 and 4) and by gender (columns 2,3, 5 and 6). Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for civic participation to Britain on a second generation immigrant dummy, and on a second generation immigrant dummy interacted with ethnicity dummies. Regressions are run on the sample of UK born only. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 5.13: Second generation immigrants-natives gap in feelings of belonging to Britain, by region.**

	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
North East	-0.086*** (0.013)	-0.079*** (0.020)	-0.091*** (0.017)	-0.096*** (0.024)	-0.091*** (0.024)	-0.104* (0.044)
North West	0.036 (0.045)	0.025 (0.047)	0.056 (0.080)	0.04 (0.048)	0.025 (0.048)	0.066 (0.086)
Yorks & Humbers.	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.034 (0.034)	-0.02 (0.035)	-0.01 (0.025)	-0.029 (0.035)	0.013 (0.037)
East Midlands	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.070*** (0.019)	0.029 (0.051)	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.058** (0.019)	0.039 (0.051)
West Midlands	-0.023 (0.021)	-0.031 (0.031)	-0.014 (0.027)	-0.019 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.01 (0.029)
Eastern	0.012 (0.049)	0.065 (0.089)	-0.039 (0.033)	0.011 (0.047)	0.059 (0.086)	-0.029 (0.034)
London	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.049 (0.028)	0.009 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.021)	-0.033 (0.028)	0.015 (0.030)
South East	-0.046 (0.025)	-0.051 (0.043)	-0.045 (0.027)	-0.051 (0.028)	-0.066 (0.046)	-0.032 (0.027)
South West	-0.077 (0.045)	-0.124*** (0.033)	-0.056 (0.061)	-0.103* (0.046)	-0.118** (0.040)	-0.099 (0.060)
Wales	-0.039 (0.052)	0.003 (0.106)	-0.085*** (0.019)	-0.05 (0.058)	-0.029 (0.119)	-0.075** (0.024)
year & quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12381	5548	6832	12381	5548	6832

*The table reports the average percentage points difference in the share of second generation immigrants and natives who have or have had during the last 12 months any form of civic participation in each Government Office Region. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for civic participation on a second generation immigrant dummy interacted with region dummies. Regressions are run on UK born individuals only. Separate regressions by gender. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table 6.1: Share of immigrants in total population in the EU**

	Countries of origin								Total immigrants
	EU15	NMS12	Other Europe	North Africa and Middle East	other Africa	South and East Asia	North America and Oceania	Latin America	
Austria	2.60	2.91	8.04	0.55	0.20	0.82	0.18	0.22	15.5
Belgium	4.78	0.62	1.53	2.01	1.19	0.60	0.13	0.27	11.1
Germany	1.82	0.59	3.42	0.48	0.14	0.44	0.14	0.12	7.2
Denmark	0.91	0.22	1.27	0.85	0.23	0.78	0.28	0.11	4.7
Spain	1.59	1.75	0.44	1.73	0.37	0.35	0.06	5.41	11.7
Finland	0.74	0.24	0.76	0.15	0.11	0.20	0.04	0.04	2.3
France	2.89	0.31	0.61	4.23	1.24	0.66	0.16	0.25	10.4
Greece	0.43	0.88	4.28	0.77	0.07	0.25	0.17	0.03	6.9
Ireland	6.28	4.46	0.49	0.24	0.78	1.36	0.90	0.21	14.7
Italy	0.83	1.05	1.88	0.96	0.38	0.71	0.14	0.78	6.7
Netherlands	1.75	0.35	1.77	1.78	0.63	1.87	0.25	2.02	10.4
Norway	2.47	0.38	1.16	0.97	0.58	1.73	0.36	0.45	8.1
Portugal	1.17	0.19	0.46	0.02	2.85	0.08	0.13	1.25	6.2
Sweden	4.01	1.22	3.18	2.84	0.59	1.45	0.21	1.00	14.5
UK	1.93	1.41	0.44	0.59	2.05	3.31	0.25	1.07	11.1
Total	1.92	0.91	1.75	1.43	0.78	1.01	0.25	1.07	9.1

*The table reports the share of immigrants from each origin in the total population of some EU states.*

*Source: EU-LFS, years 2006, 2007 and 2008*

**Table 6.2: Immigrant-native employment rate differentials**

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
Austria	-0.083*** (0.000)	-0.049*** (0.000)	-0.107*** (0.000)	-0.111*** (0.000)	-0.071*** (0.000)	-0.141*** (0.000)	-0.087*** (0.000)	-0.052*** (0.000)	-0.121*** (0.000)
Belgium	-0.119*** (0.000)	-0.076*** (0.000)	-0.156*** (0.000)	-0.145*** (0.000)	-0.101*** (0.000)	-0.185*** (0.000)	-0.119*** (0.000)	-0.084*** (0.000)	-0.146*** (0.000)
Germany	-0.097*** (0.000)	-0.058*** (0.000)	-0.131*** (0.000)	-0.122*** (0.000)	-0.088*** (0.000)	-0.153*** (0.000)	-0.083*** (0.000)	-0.055*** (0.000)	-0.114*** (0.000)
Denmark	-0.127*** (0.000)	-0.107*** (0.000)	-0.141*** (0.000)	-0.159*** (0.000)	-0.129*** (0.000)	-0.181*** (0.000)	-0.148*** (0.000)	-0.124*** (0.000)	-0.165*** (0.000)
Spain	0.036*** (0.000)	0.027*** (0.000)	0.054*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.000)	-0.021*** (0.000)	-0.010*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)
Finland	-0.075*** (0.000)	-0.022*** (0.000)	-0.125*** (0.000)	-0.117*** (0.000)	-0.064*** (0.000)	-0.165*** (0.000)	-0.098*** (0.000)	-0.050*** (0.000)	-0.138*** (0.000)
France	-0.067*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)	-0.109*** (0.000)	-0.114*** (0.000)	-0.059*** (0.000)	-0.163*** (0.000)	-0.093*** (0.000)	-0.043*** (0.000)	-0.136*** (0.000)
Greece	0.059*** (0.000)	0.103*** (0.000)	0.019*** (0.000)	0.015*** (0.000)	0.074*** (0.000)	-0.035*** (0.000)	0.029*** (0.000)	0.075*** (0.000)	-0.015*** (0.000)
Ireland	0.033*** (0.000)	0.039*** (0.000)	0.024*** (0.000)	-0.024*** (0.000)	-0.017*** (0.000)	-0.038*** (0.000)	-0.046*** (0.000)	-0.038*** (0.000)	-0.061*** (0.000)
Italy	0.073*** (0.000)	0.121*** (0.000)	0.043*** (0.000)	-0.024*** (0.000)	0.035*** (0.000)	-0.063*** (0.000)	-0.014*** (0.000)	0.041*** (0.000)	-0.048*** (0.000)
Netherlands	-0.145*** (0.000)	-0.117*** (0.000)	-0.165*** (0.000)	-0.184*** (0.000)	-0.149*** (0.000)	-0.211*** (0.000)	-0.168*** (0.000)	-0.140*** (0.000)	-0.189*** (0.000)
Norway	-0.070*** (0.000)	-0.055*** (0.000)	-0.081*** (0.000)	-0.103*** (0.000)	-0.083*** (0.000)	-0.121*** (0.000)	-0.088*** (0.000)	-0.072*** (0.000)	-0.100*** (0.000)
Portugal	0.055*** (0.000)	0.055*** (0.000)	0.059*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	-0.015*** (0.000)	-0.006*** (0.000)	0.013*** (0.000)	-0.021*** (0.000)
Sweden	-0.134*** (0.000)	-0.106*** (0.000)	-0.156*** (0.000)	-0.175*** (0.000)	-0.142*** (0.000)	-0.201*** (0.000)	-0.162*** (0.000)	-0.136*** (0.000)	-0.176*** (0.000)
UK	-0.065*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.000)	-0.120*** (0.000)	-0.087*** (0.000)	-0.044*** (0.000)	-0.128*** (0.000)	-0.089*** (0.000)	-0.047*** (0.000)	-0.128*** (0.000)
Time and region		No			Yes			Yes	
Age		No			Yes			Yes	
Education		No			No			Yes	
Observations	4563672	2238709	2324963	4563672	2238709	2324963	4563672	2238709	2324963

The table reports the differences in employment rate between immigrants and natives in each EU country. Standard errors in parentheses.

\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%

**Table 6.3: Immigrant-natives occupational dissimilarity**

	Overall index	Index of dissimilarity by educational level		
		Low	Medium	High
Austria	20.4	12.2	21.5	21.5
Belgium	13.9	6.0	13.2	17.3
Germany	19.0	6.0	14.5	22.0
Denmark	17.4	13.7	18.7	17.6
Spain	17.3	9.0	18.0	27.5
Finland	8.5	3.6	10.2	16.8
France	12.2	6.2	9.3	14.5
Greece	27.0	18.5	24.6	43.7
Ireland	5.3	4.2	12.5	16.8
Italy	16.6	6.9	26.9	28.5
Netherlands	18.9	15.4	18.6	15.4
Norway	11.1	9.1	11.4	13.5
Portugal	5.7	8.3	12.3	8.2
Sweden	18.2	12.2	17.7	25.4
UK	10.1	13.6	14.3	6.5

*The table reports the Duncan dissimilarity index for the distribution of immigrants and natives across occupations. Column 1 reports the overall index. Columns 2-4 report the index by education group. Source: EULFS, 2006-2008*

**Table 6.4: Difference in test scores between immigrants and natives.**

	Second Generation Immigrants				First Generation Immigrants			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Panel A: Reading								
Australia	10.7**	16.4***	14.1***	14.0***	6.0	16.1***	5.8	7.2
Canada	4.6	12.8***	15.5***	13.5***	-12.0**	6.9	-1.2	0.5
Germany	-68.6***	-34.2***	-7.7	-1.2	-49.4***	-12.3	0.3	10.8
Spain	9.1	11.8	4.4	9.9	-47.4***	-43.9***	-42.3***	-36.1***
France	-22.1**	-18.5	-3.5	-4.5	-35.9**	-27.8*	-22.1	-17.2
UK	4.5	13.6	16.9*	19.1**	-29.3**	-4.4	-15.3	-7.0
Italy	2.2	7.7	8.9	13.4	-75.1***	-47.0***	-35.0**	-30.6*
US*	-9.6	7.4	11.6	10.8	-37.3***	-9.1	-5.7	-5.7
Panel B: Mathematics								
Australia	15.2***	15.7***	13.4***	13.3***	16.1***	16.8***	6.8	8.0*
Canada	-3.9	-2.7	-0.4	-1.6	-0.9	1.8	-4.7	-3.7
Germany	-67.9***	-41.6***	-15.2*	-8.5	-50.9***	-22.6**	-7.5	3.3
Spain	-20.9*	-23.1**	-31.0***	-23.9***	-51.1***	-54.0***	-52.3***	-44.1***
France	-33.2***	-27.2**	-11.3	-12.2	-57.2***	-44.5***	-38.4***	-33.4***
UK	-11.5	-4.1	-0.9	1.2	-13.6	6.7	-3.4	4.5
Italy	-9.5	-8.9	-8.3	-2.5	-45.6***	-38.8***	-27.1**	-21.7
US	-16.5***	0.8	9.7*	7.5	-31.3***	-7.2	-0.8	1.6
Language	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Family								
Background								
occupation and								
education	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
wealth (household								
possessions)	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

The table reports differences in Reading (Panel A) and maths (Panel B) test scores of first and second generation immigrants relative to natives. Source: PISA 2006, except US reading test scores, which come from PISA 2003 as they are not available in 2006.

## Tables Appendix

Table A1: Immigrants-natives education gap, by entry cohort &amp; country of origin

	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 1980-1983 Western Europe	1.685***	1.424***	1.004***	0.807***	0.842***	0.615***
	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.131)
Cohort 1980-1983 Eastern Europe	4.068***	3.924***	4.191***	4.299***	3.470***	3.344***
	(0.380)	(0.367)	(0.596)	(0.587)	(0.475)	(0.487)
Cohort 1980-1983 Americas	3.444***	3.291***	2.947***	2.950***	2.167***	1.993***
	(0.234)	(0.232)	(0.237)	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.237)
Cohort 1980-1983 Africa	2.412***	2.159***	2.374***	2.201***	2.299***	2.113***
	(0.167)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.165)	(0.164)
Cohort 1980-1983 Indian Sub-Continent	-0.086	-0.355**	-0.189	-0.361*	-0.231	-0.429**
	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.163)	(0.161)
Cohort 1980-1983 Middle East	4.940***	4.899***	4.205***	4.185***	3.027***	2.726***
	(0.378)	(0.379)	(0.358)	(0.351)	(0.349)	(0.344)
Cohort 1980-1983 Rest of Asia	1.020***	0.794**	1.075***	1.017***	2.022***	1.802***
	(0.268)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.259)	(0.249)	(0.245)
Cohort 1980-1983 Oceania	1.384***	1.099***	2.049***	1.808***	2.252***	2.043***
	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.307)	(0.319)	(0.435)	(0.445)
Cohort 1984-1987 Western Europe	1.873***	1.526***	1.054***	0.825***	1.220***	0.966***
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.117)	(0.119)
Cohort 1984-1987 Eastern Europe	5.054***	4.853***	1.478**	1.535**	2.946***	3.045***
	(0.349)	(0.340)	(0.486)	(0.478)	(0.516)	(0.509)
Cohort 1984-1987 Americas	3.715***	3.484***	2.887***	2.839***	2.287***	2.113***
	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.213)	(0.217)	(0.216)	(0.222)
Cohort 1984-1987 Africa	2.538***	2.260***	2.384***	2.208***	2.239***	2.023***
	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.131)	(0.130)
Cohort 1984-1987 Indian Sub-Continent	-0.254	-0.543***	-0.224	-0.444**	0.085	-0.156
	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.150)	(0.149)
Cohort 1984-1987 Middle East	3.900***	3.575***	3.647***	3.436***	2.647***	2.488***
	(0.378)	(0.376)	(0.295)	(0.301)	(0.591)	(0.582)
Cohort 1984-1987 Rest of Asia	3.345***	3.080***	2.595***	2.441***	2.678***	2.570***
	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.225)	(0.220)
Cohort 1984-1987 Oceania	2.541***	2.251***	2.291***	2.007***	3.086***	2.936***
	(0.225)	(0.223)	(0.356)	(0.357)	(0.342)	(0.364)

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	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 1988-1991 Western Europe	2.183***	1.833***	1.658***	1.382***	1.326***	1.029***
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.123)	(0.123)
Cohort 1988-1991 Eastern Europe	4.977***	4.766***	5.392***	5.251***	4.538***	4.488***
	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.417)	(0.407)	(0.402)	(0.374)
Cohort 1988-1991 Americas	3.263***	2.981***	3.117***	2.969***	2.230***	2.000***
	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.180)	(0.183)	(0.203)	(0.204)
Cohort 1988-1991 Africa	2.721***	2.386***	2.643***	2.381***	2.386***	2.125***
	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.151)	(0.152)
Cohort 1988-1991 Indian Sub-Continent	0.422**	0.163	0.255	-0.035	-0.675***	-0.984***
	(0.148)	(0.145)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.149)	(0.147)
Cohort 1988-1991 Middle East	5.047***	4.745***	3.258***	3.097***	1.137*	1.066*
	(0.273)	(0.277)	(0.405)	(0.409)	(0.465)	(0.479)
Cohort 1988-1991 Rest of Asia	3.598***	3.322***	2.797***	2.590***	2.201***	1.982***
	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.173)	(0.170)	(0.204)	(0.205)
Cohort 1988-1991 Oceania	2.923***	2.558***	1.782***	1.561***	2.060***	1.758***
	(0.180)	(0.182)	(0.194)	(0.198)	(0.272)	(0.270)
Cohort 1992-1995 Western Europe			2.302***	1.971***	2.698***	2.325***
			(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.135)	(0.134)
Cohort 1992-1995 Eastern Europe			3.126***	2.817***	4.235***	3.897***
			(0.243)	(0.245)	(0.272)	(0.274)
Cohort 1992-1995 Americas			3.435***	3.232***	1.945***	1.707***
			(0.167)	(0.169)	(0.238)	(0.237)
Cohort 1992-1995 Africa			2.492***	2.162***	2.198***	1.896***
			(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.170)	(0.170)
Cohort 1992-1995 Indian Sub-Continent			1.261***	0.919***	0.223	-0.143
			(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.171)	(0.171)
Cohort 1992-1995 Middle East			2.435***	2.286***	2.315***	2.010***
			(0.441)	(0.441)	(0.350)	(0.348)
Cohort 1992-1995 Rest of Asia			2.004***	1.851***	2.229***	2.008***
			(0.190)	(0.188)	(0.197)	(0.195)
Cohort 1992-1995 Oceania			2.464***	2.217***	2.338***	1.919***
			(0.230)	(0.235)	(0.280)	(0.278)

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	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 1996-1999 Western Europe			3.527*** (0.090)	3.161*** (0.090)	2.859*** (0.137)	2.447*** (0.137)
Cohort 1996-1999 Eastern Europe			2.420*** (0.170)	2.085*** (0.171)	2.006*** (0.169)	1.637*** (0.170)
Cohort 1996-1999 Americas			3.184*** (0.129)	2.891*** (0.130)	2.547*** (0.197)	2.219*** (0.196)
Cohort 1996-1999 Africa			2.427*** (0.107)	2.100*** (0.107)	1.968*** (0.120)	1.587*** (0.119)
Cohort 1996-1999 Indian Sub-Continent			1.884*** (0.159)	1.500*** (0.159)	1.157*** (0.136)	0.728*** (0.136)
Cohort 1996-1999 Middle East			3.062*** (0.307)	2.816*** (0.309)	2.478*** (0.300)	2.144*** (0.297)
Cohort 1996-1999 Rest of Asia			2.421*** (0.165)	2.165*** (0.167)	2.112*** (0.182)	1.745*** (0.181)
Cohort 1996-1999 Oceania			3.005*** (0.113)	2.646*** (0.110)	3.170*** (0.217)	2.732*** (0.214)
Cohort 2000-2003 Western Europe					2.521*** (0.114)	2.098*** (0.113)
Cohort 2000-2003 Eastern Europe					2.800*** (0.096)	2.357*** (0.096)
Cohort 2000-2003 Americas					2.673*** (0.153)	2.247*** (0.152)
Cohort 2000-2003 Africa					1.991*** (0.081)	1.633*** (0.081)
Cohort 2000-2003 Indian Sub-Continent					2.395*** (0.097)	1.955*** (0.096)
Cohort 2000-2003 Middle East					0.857*** (0.223)	0.424 (0.220)
Cohort 2000-2003 Rest of Asia					2.315*** (0.127)	1.895*** (0.126)
Cohort 2000-2003 Oceania					3.118*** (0.183)	2.678*** (0.178)

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	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 2004-2007 Western Europe					3.859*** (0.105)	3.436*** (0.103)
Cohort 2004-2007 Eastern Europe					2.613*** (0.041)	2.179*** (0.041)
Cohort 2004-2007 Americas					3.511*** (0.123)	3.106*** (0.122)
Cohort 2004-2007 Africa					2.090*** (0.103)	1.727*** (0.101)
Cohort 2004-2007 Indian Sub-Continent					3.017*** (0.089)	2.582*** (0.088)
Cohort 2004-2007 Middle East					2.188*** (0.354)	1.745*** (0.352)
Cohort 2004-2007 Rest of Asia					2.513*** (0.118)	2.102*** (0.117)
Cohort 2004-2007 Oceania					2.986*** (0.139)	2.557*** (0.137)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Gender	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	656462	656462	575922	575922	531408	531408

*The table reports the average difference (in years) in the age at which individuals left full time education between immigrants from different entry cohorts and countries of origin and natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of years of education on immigrant cohorts dummies interacted with country of origin dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table A2: Immigrants-natives employed gap, by entry cohort & country of origin**

		1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 1980-1983	Western Europe	-0.063*** (0.019)	-0.102*** (0.019)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.028 (0.016)	0.085*** (0.017)	0.004 (0.016)
Cohort 1980-1983	Eastern Europe	-0.273*** (0.057)	-0.324*** (0.055)	-0.153 (0.079)	-0.206** (0.072)	0.105 (0.062)	0.014 (0.059)
Cohort 1980-1983	Americas	-0.008 (0.031)	-0.073* (0.029)	0.080*** (0.022)	0.033 (0.022)	0.003 (0.035)	-0.083* (0.035)
Cohort 1980-1983	Africa	-0.124*** (0.020)	-0.174*** (0.019)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.058*** (0.017)	0.070*** (0.020)	-0.040* (0.020)
Cohort 1980-1983	Indian Sub-Continent	-0.323*** (0.015)	-0.326*** (0.014)	-0.319*** (0.016)	-0.322*** (0.015)	-0.188*** (0.018)	-0.253*** (0.016)
Cohort 1980-1983	Middle East	-0.144** (0.047)	-0.232*** (0.044)	0.004 (0.035)	-0.056 (0.036)	0.100* (0.043)	-0.058 (0.042)
Cohort 1980-1983	Rest of Asia	-0.186*** (0.025)	-0.219*** (0.023)	-0.166*** (0.026)	-0.192*** (0.025)	0.05 (0.026)	-0.064** (0.025)
Cohort 1980-1983	Oceania	-0.016 (0.036)	-0.038 (0.034)	0.113*** (0.034)	0.06 (0.035)	-0.026 (0.053)	-0.138* (0.054)
Cohort 1984-1987	Western Europe	-0.064*** (0.015)	-0.107*** (0.014)	-0.034* (0.014)	-0.062*** (0.014)	0.039* (0.016)	-0.045** (0.015)
Cohort 1984-1987	Eastern Europe	-0.044 (0.061)	-0.105 (0.062)	-0.439*** (0.091)	-0.439*** (0.087)	0.252*** (0.031)	0.210*** (0.023)
Cohort 1984-1987	Americas	-0.028 (0.025)	-0.109*** (0.023)	-0.055* (0.025)	-0.099*** (0.024)	0.045 (0.028)	-0.037 (0.029)
Cohort 1984-1987	Africa	-0.138*** (0.018)	-0.182*** (0.017)	0.021 (0.015)	-0.040** (0.015)	0.024 (0.017)	-0.087*** (0.016)
Cohort 1984-1987	Indian Sub-Continent	-0.305*** (0.015)	-0.305*** (0.014)	-0.265*** (0.016)	-0.273*** (0.015)	-0.155*** (0.019)	-0.232*** (0.017)
Cohort 1984-1987	Middle East	-0.336*** (0.038)	-0.422*** (0.037)	-0.150*** (0.038)	-0.228*** (0.037)	0.04 (0.047)	-0.057 (0.047)
Cohort 1984-1987	Rest of Asia	-0.080*** (0.021)	-0.142*** (0.021)	-0.018 (0.021)	-0.066** (0.020)	0.121*** (0.021)	0.034 (0.020)
Cohort 1984-1987	Oceania	0.065 (0.036)	0.001 (0.035)	-0.091* (0.043)	-0.170*** (0.041)	0.187*** (0.032)	0.056 (0.033)

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	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 1988-1991 Western Europe	-0.079*** (0.012)	-0.117*** (0.011)	-0.029* (0.013)	-0.082*** (0.012)	0.038** (0.013)	-0.059*** (0.013)
Cohort 1988-1991 Eastern Europe	-0.157*** (0.041)	-0.227*** (0.039)	-0.054 (0.045)	-0.147*** (0.043)	-0.01 (0.058)	-0.092 (0.052)
Cohort 1988-1991 Americas	-0.058** (0.019)	-0.117*** (0.018)	-0.01 (0.021)	-0.066** (0.021)	0.028 (0.025)	-0.061* (0.025)
Cohort 1988-1991 Africa	-0.312*** (0.015)	-0.359*** (0.015)	-0.133*** (0.016)	-0.200*** (0.015)	-0.028 (0.016)	-0.131*** (0.016)
Cohort 1988-1991 Indian Sub-Continent	-0.378*** (0.015)	-0.380*** (0.014)	-0.317*** (0.016)	-0.337*** (0.014)	-0.236*** (0.017)	-0.307*** (0.015)
Cohort 1988-1991 Middle East	-0.468*** (0.031)	-0.546*** (0.030)	-0.135*** (0.039)	-0.223*** (0.037)	-0.252*** (0.047)	-0.281*** (0.042)
Cohort 1988-1991 Rest of Asia	-0.276*** (0.018)	-0.339*** (0.018)	-0.103*** (0.021)	-0.163*** (0.020)	0.045* (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.019)
Cohort 1988-1991 Oceania	0.177*** (0.016)	0.122*** (0.016)	0.059* (0.028)	-0.004 (0.027)	0.206*** (0.021)	0.083*** (0.022)
Cohort 1992-1995 Western Europe			-0.084*** (0.013)	-0.130*** (0.012)	0.056*** (0.014)	-0.083*** (0.013)
Cohort 1992-1995 Eastern Europe			-0.082** (0.031)	-0.146*** (0.029)	0.008 (0.032)	-0.139*** (0.030)
Cohort 1992-1995 Americas			-0.101*** (0.022)	-0.160*** (0.022)	0.035 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.029)
Cohort 1992-1995 Africa			-0.195*** (0.015)	-0.251*** (0.014)	-0.052** (0.017)	-0.168*** (0.016)
Cohort 1992-1995 Indian Sub-Continent			-0.266*** (0.018)	-0.312*** (0.016)	-0.202*** (0.019)	-0.312*** (0.017)
Cohort 1992-1995 Middle East			-0.462*** (0.041)	-0.520*** (0.040)	-0.311*** (0.048)	-0.442*** (0.044)
Cohort 1992-1995 Rest of Asia			-0.149*** (0.026)	-0.198*** (0.026)	-0.03 (0.022)	-0.132*** (0.020)
Cohort 1992-1995 Oceania			0.133*** (0.024)	0.080** (0.025)	0.220*** (0.022)	0.034 (0.022)

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		1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 1996-1999	Western Europe			-0.098***	-0.167***	0.061***	-0.083***
				(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Cohort 1996-1999	Eastern Europe			-0.266***	-0.306***	-0.047*	-0.159***
				(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Cohort 1996-1999	Americas			-0.116***	-0.196***	0.039	-0.088***
				(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Cohort 1996-1999	Africa			-0.136***	-0.196***	-0.01	-0.146***
				(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Cohort 1996-1999	Indian Sub-Continent			-0.248***	-0.302***	-0.100***	-0.231***
				(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Cohort 1996-1999	Middle East			-0.424***	-0.503***	-0.226***	-0.346***
				(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Cohort 1996-1999	Rest of Asia			-0.310***	-0.365***	0.050**	-0.084***
				(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Cohort 1996-1999	Oceania			0.132***	0.059***	0.116***	-0.075**
				(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Cohort 2000-2003	Western Europe					0.083***	-0.050***
						(0.011)	(0.011)
Cohort 2000-2003	Eastern Europe					0.104***	-0.032**
						(0.011)	(0.010)
Cohort 2000-2003	Americas					0.085***	-0.052***
						(0.015)	(0.015)
Cohort 2000-2003	Africa					-0.037***	-0.156***
						(0.009)	(0.009)
Cohort 2000-2003	Indian Sub-Continent					-0.043***	-0.189***
						(0.011)	(0.010)
Cohort 2000-2003	Middle East					-0.287***	-0.425***
						(0.023)	(0.022)
Cohort 2000-2003	Rest of Asia					0.056***	-0.085***
						(0.011)	(0.010)
Cohort 2000-2003	Oceania					0.170***	-0.002
						(0.020)	(0.020)

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	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 2004-2007 Western Europe					0.068*** (0.011)	-0.066*** (0.010)
Cohort 2004-2007 Eastern Europe					0.140*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)
Cohort 2004-2007 Americas					0.040** (0.014)	-0.100*** (0.014)
Cohort 2004-2007 Africa					-0.055*** (0.011)	-0.158*** (0.010)
Cohort 2004-2007 Indian Sub-Continent					-0.069*** (0.010)	-0.200*** (0.009)
Cohort 2004-2007 Middle East					-0.365*** (0.030)	-0.480*** (0.027)
Cohort 2004-2007 Rest of Asia					-0.062*** (0.013)	-0.186*** (0.012)
Cohort 2004-2007 Oceania					0.180*** (0.015)	0.040** (0.016)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Gender	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	656462	656462	575922	575922	531408	531408

*The table reports the average difference in employment probability between immigrants from different entry cohorts and countries of origin and natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of a dummy for employment status on immigrant cohorts dummies interacted with country of origin dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*

**Table A3: Immigrants-natives wage gap, by entry cohort & country of origin**

	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 1980-1983 Western Europe	0.079 (0.088)	-0.091 (0.073)	0.019 (0.050)	-0.011 (0.045)	0.079 (0.050)	-0.023 (0.041)
Cohort 1980-1983 Eastern Europe	-0.127 (0.105)	-0.630*** (0.109)	0.722*** (0.005)	0.269*** (0.007)	0.039 (0.166)	-0.373* (0.179)
Cohort 1980-1983 Americas	0.196 (0.133)	-0.221* (0.104)	0.128 (0.082)	-0.109 (0.086)	0.235** (0.080)	-0.025 (0.056)
Cohort 1980-1983 Africa	0.080 (0.120)	-0.273* (0.123)	0.019 (0.053)	-0.213*** (0.049)	0.138* (0.069)	-0.197** (0.064)
Cohort 1980-1983 Indian Sub-Continent	-0.248*** (0.074)	-0.322*** (0.084)	-0.174** (0.054)	-0.316*** (0.058)	-0.031 (0.077)	-0.270*** (0.071)
Cohort 1980-1983 Middle East	0.473 (0.340)	-0.105 (0.286)	-0.013 (0.181)	-0.296* (0.146)	0.233* (0.105)	-0.021 (0.129)
Cohort 1980-1983 Rest of Asia	0.092 (0.132)	-0.321* (0.126)	-0.043 (0.117)	-0.345*** (0.097)	0.171* (0.084)	-0.127 (0.073)
Cohort 1980-1983 Oceania	0.122 (0.146)	-0.001 (0.099)	0.405* (0.171)	0.225 (0.116)	0.470* (0.191)	0.18 (0.124)
Cohort 1980-1983 Other	0.959*** (0.007)	0.385*** (0.010)	-0.125 (0.120)	0.113 (0.155)	0.062 (0.124)	-0.028 (0.112)
Cohort 1984-1987 Western Europe	0.289*** (0.066)	0.088 (0.052)	0.132* (0.058)	-0.008 (0.043)	0.138** (0.053)	0.042 (0.037)
Cohort 1984-1987 Eastern Europe	-0.404 (0.258)	-0.848*** (0.155)	0.667*** (0.005)	0.094*** (0.008)	-0.469*** (0.101)	-0.640*** (0.117)
Cohort 1984-1987 Americas	0.310** (0.111)	-0.068 (0.095)	-0.001 (0.073)	-0.294*** (0.071)	0.154* (0.073)	-0.069 (0.075)
Cohort 1984-1987 Africa	0.072 (0.078)	-0.165* (0.068)	0.084 (0.054)	-0.224*** (0.056)	0.105 (0.054)	-0.210*** (0.049)
Cohort 1984-1987 Indian Sub-Continent	-0.310*** (0.083)	-0.472*** (0.078)	-0.219** (0.074)	-0.463*** (0.068)	0.002 (0.082)	-0.261*** (0.076)
Cohort 1984-1987 Middle East	0.346 (0.240)	-0.22 (0.236)	0.198 (0.133)	-0.163 (0.131)	0.097 (0.128)	-0.268* (0.133)
Cohort 1984-1987 Rest of Asia	-0.102 (0.089)	-0.469*** (0.086)	0.102 (0.067)	-0.228*** (0.064)	-0.052 (0.082)	-0.305*** (0.082)
Cohort 1984-1987 Oceania	0.540*** (0.131)	0.236 (0.150)	0.348 (0.199)	0.096 (0.127)	0.463* (0.201)	0.204 (0.153)
Cohort 1984-1987 Other	-0.168*** (0.007)	-0.062*** (0.008)	-0.348*** (0.082)	-0.770*** (0.199)	-0.366** (0.116)	-0.567*** (0.125)

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	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 1988-1991 Western Europe	0.113*	-0.065	0.223***	-0.02	0.088	-0.042
	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Cohort 1988-1991 Eastern Europe	0.088	-0.428**	0.193	-0.275*	0.090	-0.319**
	(0.200)	(0.160)	(0.179)	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.110)
Cohort 1988-1991 Americas	0.380***	-0.019	0.297**	-0.099	-0.091	-0.246**
	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.081)	(0.094)	(0.078)
Cohort 1988-1991 Africa	0.041	-0.399***	0.107*	-0.305***	0.124**	-0.211***
	(0.076)	(0.092)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Cohort 1988-1991 Indian Sub-Continent	-0.443***	-0.545***	-0.276***	-0.595***	-0.209***	-0.307***
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Cohort 1988-1991 Middle East	0.365	-0.14	-0.054	-0.537**	-0.206	-0.485**
	(0.212)	(0.220)	(0.165)	(0.168)	(0.146)	(0.152)
Cohort 1988-1991 Rest of Asia	0.086	-0.219**	0.121*	-0.255***	0.068	-0.217**
	(0.102)	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.074)
Cohort 1988-1991 Oceania	0.318***	0.014	0.099	-0.102	0.308**	0.228**
	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.121)	(0.104)	(0.118)	(0.078)
Cohort 1988-1991 Other	0.066	-0.123***	0.402***	-0.031***	0.066***	0.322***
	(0.108)	(0.032)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Cohort 1992-1995 Western Europe			0.069	-0.149***	0.287***	-0.014
			(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.044)
Cohort 1992-1995 Eastern Europe			0.087	-0.142	0.124	-0.124
			(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Cohort 1992-1995 Americas			0.214*	-0.138	0.03	-0.157*
			(0.087)	(0.072)	(0.096)	(0.068)
Cohort 1992-1995 Africa			0.028	-0.320***	0.019	-0.297***
			(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Cohort 1992-1995 Indian Sub-Continent			-0.308***	-0.539***	-0.292***	-0.487***
			(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.072)
Cohort 1992-1995 Middle East			0.561	0.055	0.756**	0.254
			(0.315)	(0.371)	(0.237)	(0.178)
Cohort 1992-1995 Rest of Asia			-0.151*	-0.475***	-0.033	-0.290***
			(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.053)
Cohort 1992-1995 Oceania			0.620***	0.404***	0.326*	0.078
			(0.135)	(0.093)	(0.135)	(0.118)
Cohort 1992-1995 Other			0.411***	0.215***	-0.221	-0.121
			(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.197)	(0.207)

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	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 1996-1999 Western Europe			0.166*** (0.037)	-0.091** (0.032)	0.224*** (0.045)	-0.025 (0.038)
Cohort 1996-1999 Eastern Europe			-0.114 (0.113)	-0.259** (0.097)	-0.029 (0.065)	-0.228*** (0.056)
Cohort 1996-1999 Americas			0.320*** (0.091)	-0.02 (0.076)	-0.009 (0.064)	-0.265*** (0.056)
Cohort 1996-1999 Africa			0.014 (0.038)	-0.207*** (0.038)	0.108** (0.041)	-0.153*** (0.038)
Cohort 1996-1999 Indian Sub-Continent			-0.367*** (0.068)	-0.566*** (0.062)	-0.107* (0.055)	-0.347*** (0.045)
Cohort 1996-1999 Middle East			0.293 (0.222)	0.038 (0.170)	0.009 (0.112)	-0.27 (0.154)
Cohort 1996-1999 Rest of Asia			-0.08 (0.089)	-0.413*** (0.078)	-0.097 (0.051)	-0.324*** (0.053)
Cohort 1996-1999 Oceania			0.515*** (0.058)	0.177*** (0.050)	0.633*** (0.085)	0.271*** (0.058)
Cohort 1996-1999 Other			-0.480*** (0.116)	-0.364*** (0.088)	-0.195 (0.156)	-0.448* (0.176)
Cohort 2000-2003 Western Europe					0.059 (0.042)	-0.132*** (0.038)
Cohort 2000-2003 Eastern Europe					-0.086 (0.046)	-0.297*** (0.042)
Cohort 2000-2003 Americas					0.101 (0.060)	-0.120** (0.046)
Cohort 2000-2003 Africa					-0.001 (0.022)	-0.202*** (0.023)
Cohort 2000-2003 Indian Sub-Continent					0.034 (0.039)	-0.262*** (0.034)
Cohort 2000-2003 Middle East					-0.233*** (0.065)	-0.438*** (0.068)
Cohort 2000-2003 Rest of Asia					-0.136*** (0.033)	-0.379*** (0.035)
Cohort 2000-2003 Oceania					0.436*** (0.091)	0.142 (0.075)
Cohort 2000-2003 Other					-0.271*** (0.078)	-0.227*** (0.066)

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	1993-94	1993-94	2000-01	2000-01	2009-10	2009-10
Cohort 2004-2007 Western Europe					0.216*** (0.036)	-0.026 (0.028)
Cohort 2004-2007 Eastern Europe					-0.389*** (0.012)	-0.430*** (0.012)
Cohort 2004-2007 Americas					0.1 (0.055)	-0.166*** (0.048)
Cohort 2004-2007 Africa					-0.186*** (0.031)	-0.380*** (0.030)
Cohort 2004-2007 Indian Sub-Continent					-0.080** (0.031)	-0.323*** (0.028)
Cohort 2004-2007 Middle East					-0.059 (0.190)	-0.324* (0.148)
Cohort 2004-2007 Rest of Asia					-0.207*** (0.044)	-0.457*** (0.040)
Cohort 2004-2007 Oceania					0.437*** (0.050)	0.153*** (0.041)
Cohort 2004-2007 Other					-0.382* (0.149)	-0.254* (0.100)
Year & Quarter dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Age & educ controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Gender	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	62233	62233	102860	102860	92842	92842

*The table reports the average percentage difference in gross hourly wages between immigrants from different entry cohorts and countries of origin and natives. Each difference is the coefficient in a regression of log wages on immigrant cohorts dummies interacted with country of origin dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regression include interactions of Year and Quarters fixed effects. Age controls are age and age squared. Education controls are dummies for three education levels.*

*\* denotes significance at 5%, \*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\*\* denotes significance at 0.1%*