Temporary migration and economic assimilation

Christian Dustmann *

Summary

In this paper I study temporary migration and its consequences for immigrant behaviour. A distinction is made between temporary migration where the return time is exogenous and where the migrant chooses when to return. The consequences of both types of temporary migration for migrant behaviour (as opposed to a permanent migration) are illustrated. The specification of the empirical models will be affected by whether or not migration is non-permanent. The problems that arise for the empirical work are discussed in the second part of the paper. Finally, I summarise some empirical evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that the behaviour of temporary migrants is different from that of permanent migrants.
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1. Introduction

The economic, social, and cultural assimilation of immigrants to the host country environment is one of the core areas of academic research on migration. Besides the interest that it generates within the academic profession, it is also high on the agenda in the public debate. Much of the work carried out by economists in this field is concerned with analysing the economic assimilation of immigrants in the host country labour markets. This is understood to be important for assessing the overall economic contribution of immigrants to the host country economy, which depends largely on the individual economic success of migrants. Precise estimates of the process of economic assimilation are therefore most important for assessing whether migration is beneficial from the host country’s perspective.

The vast empirical literature in this area was stimulated by a paper by Barry Chiswick (1978), using the 1970 US census. He finds that migrants not only assimilate, but overtake natives’ earnings after about one and a half decades in the labour market. A number of important critical remarks in papers by Borjas (1985, 1987) made us aware of possible problems when estimating assimilation patterns using cross sectional data. Borjas argues that regressions based on cross-sectional data may lead to incorrect estimates of assimilation profiles if the quality of incoming cohorts changes. He claims that, in the case of the US, cross sectional studies may have led to an excessively positive evaluation of assimilation patterns. Panel data or repeated cross sections, available for most countries today, are able to deal with these potential sources of estimation bias.

The changing quality of migrant cohorts is not the only source of bias when estimating assimilation profiles. Another problem is selec-

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tive out-migration. If part of the migrant population leaves the country, and if leavers are non-randomly drawn from the overall immigrant population, then this generates a bias in the estimated assimilation profiles of immigrants. In a recent paper, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) model selective out migration within Roy’s (1951) framework of comparative advantage. They demonstrate that out-migration accentuates the selection characterising the inflow of immigrants. To deal with selective return migration empirically is more difficult than to deal with selective immigration. It requires data which precisely records return patterns of immigrants. Only very recently has such data become available (see Coleman and Wadensjö, 1999, for details on some interesting Danish data sources).

But not only the possibly selective character of return migration leads to empirical problems. The mere fact that some immigrants return induces heterogeneity in their behaviour, which is not captured by standard assimilation regressions, as estimated in much of the literature. This heterogeneity is a consequence of the different economic situations they face after a return to their home countries, and on which their current behaviour is conditioned. Temporary migrations may lead to heterogeneity in assimilation patterns between migrants and natives, as well as among immigrants, which are not captured by the standard set of human capital variables.

There are also differences in the nature of temporary migrations, which need to be considered when analysing assimilation profiles. Some migrations are temporary because immigrants have only a limited residence permit, which is often related to a temporary working contract. These types of temporary migrations are, for instance, frequent between south-east Asia and countries of the middle East, and, more recently, between Eastern European countries, and countries of the European Community. Another example is labour migration to Switzerland. Migrants on such a scheme consider the return time as exogenous. Another form of temporary migration are migrations where the migrant leaves by his own choice, and where the return time is a choice variable.

In this paper, I wish to draw attention to the implications of the temporary character of migrations when modelling the behaviour of immigrant workers. I commence by providing some empirical evidence, which shows that temporary migrations are frequent not only in the US, but even more so in Europe. Next I discuss, using the example of human capital accumulation, differences in behaviour be-
between permanent and temporary migrants. Here I distinguish between temporary migrations where the return time is exogenous, and where the migrant chooses the return time.

I briefly illustrate the implications of temporary migrations for empirical work. I discuss the various concepts of temporary migrations, and the measures that may be relevant for empirical analysis. Finally, I provide some empirical evidence which is compatible with the hypothesis that temporary migrants exhibit different behaviour than permanent migrants.

2. Migration and re-migration—some stylised facts

After the Second World War, Europe experienced five major migration waves. Movements in the years between 1945 and 1960 were predominantly caused by the aftermath of the war in Europe (see Zimmermann, 1995, for details). In these years, about 20 million people were displaced, mainly Germans from the former Eastern parts of Germany. Until 1950, 8 million Germans moved from Eastern Europe to West Germany (Hönekopp, 1994). By the late 1950s, this number had increased to 12 million (Schmidt, 1994). The second migration movement was predominantly economically motivated and started in the early 1950s. Between the mid 1950s and 1973, the strong economic development in Northern Europe and the resulting demand for labour led to a large inflow of migrants into central Europe mainly from the peripheral countries of Europe, but also from Turkey, North Africa, South America and Asia. The main receiving countries were Belgium, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. This second large movement came to a halt in 1973/74, the turning point of the rapid economic development in Northern Europe, when countries stopped active recruitment or/and put severe restrictions on further labour immigration.

The third wave of migration after 1973 is characterised by family immigration and reunification of former labour migrants and, as a result of increasing separatist movements and civil wars in many Asian, South American and African countries, rising inequality and by asylum migration. The fourth big movement, the East-West migration, was initiated in the late 1980s by a liberalisation of Soviet policy and accelerated by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Finally, the last movement is mainly one of refugee migration. It is a direct consequence of various struggles for independence and democratisation in
many areas within and around Europe, as a result of the end of the Cold War, and the associated disintegration of the tight power structures it imposed on many parts of the world.

Many of these migrations have been temporary. Labour migrations (the second migration movement) in particular were considered temporary not only by the host countries, but also by the migrants themselves. Switzerland, for instance, had implemented tight policies, which regulated the immigration process, and the rights of the migrant in the country. Newly issued work- and residence permits were all temporary, and there was a maximum number of permits issued per year. On the other hand, no active measures to ensure that immigrants would indeed return were taken by most other European countries (like France and Germany). Although an increasing number of migrants settled permanently in these countries, a large proportion of labour migrants to Europe returned. Böhning (1987, p. 147) estimates that “more than two thirds of the foreign workers admitted to the Federal Republic [of Germany], and more than four fifth in the case of Switzerland, have returned”. Glytsos (1988) reports that of the 1 million Greeks migrating to West Germany between 1960 and 1984, 85 per cent gradually returned home.

Temporary migration is not only a European phenomenon, but also widespread in the US, and in many Asian and South American countries. For instance, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) report that between 1908 and 1957 about 15.7 million persons immigrated to the US and about 4.8 million aliens emigrated. They found that between 20 per cent and 50 per cent of legal immigrants (depending on nationality) re-emigrated from the US in the 1970s. Warren and Peck (1980) estimate that about one third of legal immigrants to the US re-emigrated in the 1960s. Pitayanon (1986) reports that migrations of Thai workers to the Middle East are predominantly temporary.

To obtain reliable figures on inflows and outflows is difficult. It is even more difficult to obtain numbers which are comparable between countries. The reasons are that definitions and registration procedures for migrants differ across countries, and may change within the same countries over time, thus leading to fractions in the data series.

It is nevertheless instructive to look at some numbers on in- and outflows of immigrants to and from European countries. Figure 1 reveals that a substantial number of foreign born individuals leave the immigration countries. For Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland, for instance, emigration was larger than immigration for a number of
years, in particular in the early 1980s. These years were characterised by high unemployment, and initiated a recession period. For Sweden, outflows are larger than inflows for the early 1970s; this coincided with the first oil crisis. Overall, the numbers indicate a substantial outflow of immigrants.

**Figure 1. Inflow and outflow of migrants**

![Graphs showing inflow and outflow of migrants for Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden.](image)

*Note:* Numbers are in Thousands.


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1 See Rooth (1999) for an extensive description of Swedish immigration and immigration policies.
3. Temporary and permanent migrations

In the early economic literature, the sole economic explanation for the decision to migrate is differences in returns to human capital. The migration decision taken by the individual migrant is based on a comparison between the expected and discounted future flow of earnings in the host country, and the future flow of earnings in the home country, minus the cost of migration (see Sjaastad, 1962). If this present net gain to migration is positive, then individuals emigrate. Hicks (1979) remarked in his “Theory of Wages” that differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration. Consequently, the migrant population increases if economic disparity rises. In a more dynamic context, the length of the migration period becomes a further important variable. Migrations may be temporary rather than permanent. Temporary migrations may be enforced by contracts, or they may be the result of the individual’s optimising behaviour. As we have shown above, temporary rather than permanent migrations are often the rule rather than the exception.

A rough classification of migrations is provided in Figure 2. Three main groups of migrations are categorised: temporary migrations, permanent migrations, and political migrations. It is important that the term “temporary” is used from the perspective of the host country: a mi-
grant is a temporary migrant, even if he leaves the home country permanently, as long as he only remains temporarily in the host country. While temporary and permanent migrations are primarily economic in character, political migrants have a dislike of living in their home country. This is often a result of discrimination or of political or ethnic persecution. Political migrants are either permanent or temporary migrants. However, in contrast to the other two groups, whose status is determined by their own decision (based on the economic situation in the two countries) or by the regulations of the host country, the status of political migrants is determined by non-economic factors in the home country. This may have a number of behavioural implications.

Temporary migration may again be sub-classified. One important type of temporary migration is circulatory migration. Here migrant workers move frequently between the host- and the source country. They only stay for a short period in the target country, for example, for the harvest season. Circulatory migration is usually induced by a seasonal excess demand for labour in the immigration country, which cannot be supplied by the native work force at adequate prices. Circulatory migration is often illegal (for instance, from Mexico to the southern states of the USA), and sometimes crucial for the competitiveness of the respective industry (frequently the agricultural sector) in the host country. Harvest workers from Eastern Europe to Germany or from northern Africa to southern Italy are an example of circulatory migrations in Europe.

A transient migration describes a situation where the migrant moves between different host countries without necessarily returning home. Transient migrations were frequent during the 1960s and 1970s where migrants from southern European countries moved between northern European countries. Very recently, an increasing number of (often illegal) migrants from Africa or Asia have entered Europe through Italy, Spain or Portugal and then started to move towards northern countries like Germany, or even Sweden.

A contract migration is a temporary migration where the migrant lives in the host country for a limited number of years, which is regulated by a contract. Labour migrations to Switzerland were predominantly contract migrations. Many circulatory migrations are contract migrations.

Return migration is the type of migration that one usually has in mind when referring to migration as being temporary. Return migra-
tion describes a situation where migrants return to their country of origin by their own choice, often after a significant period abroad. Many migrations to Europe over the last decades fall into this category. As I shall demonstrate below, a permanent migration can be seen as a special case of a return migration.

In much of the empirical research, which analyses the behaviour of immigrants, migrations are implicitly considered as being permanent. However, this is likely to be the case for only a small proportion of migrations. The remainder of the paper focuses on contract migrations and return migrations and compares the economic behaviour of these migrants with that of permanent migrants.

4. A framework for analysis

In simple static models, the economic decisions of individuals are dependent on current economic variables. For instance, labour supply decisions are based on comparisons between an offer wage, and the individual’s reservation wage. In a dynamic setting, expectations about the future may also affect labour market behaviour. For instance, the reservation wage of an individual may be affected by expectations about future wage offers.

In economic models of individuals’ behaviour, we usually assume that the future economic (macro)environment is the same for all individuals. Wages, prices, employment prospects, political stability etc. are variables which characterise this environment. If individuals have the same expectations about these future indicators, then they do not explain any differences in current economic behaviour. If however the future economic (macro)environment differs between individuals, then this needs to be taken into account when explaining differences in behaviour between individuals. Furthermore, if the economic environment can be chosen by the individual (for instance, by migration), then the choice process ought to be modelled in conjunction with the behavioural response of interest.

This is illustrated in Figure 3. Suppose we wish to analyse labour supply, consumption behaviour, or human capital investment of individuals. Econometric models relate the variation in these outcomes to variations in observable individual characteristics (like age and education), and features that characterise the environment of the individual. Consider the first block in the figure (within the dotted circle). If we wish to analyse the economic behaviour of natives, this block contains all the necessary information that we need to consider. As long
as the future (macro)environment in the host country is the same for all individuals (both natives, and permanent migrants), it does not add (over and above individual characteristics) to an explanation of differences in behaviour between individuals.

Within this block, we can now develop a model which explains the human capital investment of immigrants who remain permanently abroad. In what follows, I provide a stylised discussion of human capital investment and economic assimilation of immigrants under the various migration schemes (permanent, temporary, and return migration). For the technically interested reader, I have developed a simple formal model in the appendix.

Upon entry into the host country, it is unlikely that migrants are equally productive than native workers of similar educational attainment and age. The reason is that skills are not easily transferable from one economy to another. Consequently, migrants’ initial earnings should be lower than those of natives with equal characteristics. After entry, migrants invest in skills that are specific for the host economy e.g. language skills. The intensity of this investment process determines the pace of economic adjustment. Investments into skills are costly, and the optimal investment intensity will be such that costs and benefits are equalised. Costs may be opportunity costs, or the costs of attending training courses. Benefits are enhanced productivity (and therefore wages) over the migrant’s future work history in the host country.

One immediate implication of such a simple model is that benefits are lower, the shorter the time the individual spends, after undergoing training, in the labour force (which corresponds to the pay-off period for the investment). This observation has implications for earnings growth of permanent migrants. The pay off period for any investment undertaken into host country specific skills is the shorter, the older the migrant is upon immigration. Accordingly, this simple model predicts that skill investment (and therefore the pace of assimilation) is lower for migrants who arrive at a later age. Evidence for this hypothesis is provided by Friedberg (1993) and Borjas (1995).

The investment intensity also depends on the efficiency with which immigrants accumulate skills. It is likely that skill accumulation is easier for well educated immigrants. Higher education should enhance the learning capacity of the immigrant—for instance, literacy may help when learning a foreign language. But well educated migrants should also expect a higher wage without undertaking any fur-
ther investment. Therefore, training activity creates higher losses in terms of forgone earnings for migrants who are highly educated. Accordingly, the total effect of the skill level upon migration on the investment intensity (and subsequent wage growth) is generally ambiguous.

Figure 3. Migration and labour market behaviour

Now consider migrations that are temporary, and where the return time is exogenous. Above, I have termed these migrations contract migrations. The second block in Figure 3 (within the dashed line) defines the information necessary to model the behaviour of a temporary migrant when the return time is exogenous. The factors which influence the migrant’s behaviour now include characteristics of the home country. Variables that measure individual characteristics are not sufficient any more to explain differences in behaviour between temporary migrants, and natives (or temporary migrants, and permanent migrants). The temporary nature of migration links current decisions of the migrant in the host country to the economic situation in the home economy.
A simple example may illustrate this point. Consider two identical workers in a West European steel manufacturing company. Worker 1 is a native, who intends to spend his entire future life in the residence country. Worker 2 is a migrant from an Eastern European country. Assume that worker 2 has a limited working contract, and that he has to return home after the contract has expired. In his home country, he obtains exactly the same job, but he receives a lower wage. For this worker leisure time is relatively more expensive in the host country than in the home country. For worker 1, on the other hand, leisure time costs the same in the present and in the future. As a consequence, worker 2 chooses to work harder in the host country and to work less at home in the future, where time at the work place has a relatively low value. Worker 1 works equally hard in the present and in the future, since for him leisure has now the same price in both present and future. The extent to which the behaviour of the two workers differs depends on the economic disparity of the two countries, the length of the working contract, and the length of time the immigrant intends to be (economically) active in the home country after return.

This simple model explains a number of stylised facts. For instance, seasonal workers from Eastern European to Western European countries are willing to accept job—wage packages which are not acceptable for natives. Moreover they perform often better (and work harder) than natives. A popular example is the asparagus harvest in many Western European countries, which crucially depends on the contribution of migrant harvest workers. The relatively low wage in their home countries, and the temporary nature of their migration reduces their reservation wages and induces them to work harder while being abroad.

On the other hand, contract migrations may sometimes not take place, when a permanent migration would take place. The reason is that each migration induces certain fixed costs (by giving up friends, house, and by inducing travel costs etc.). Only if the expected gain from receiving a higher return on skills is larger than these costs, will migration take place. Clearly, the gain from the migration depends on the length of time that the migrant is allowed to work for pay abroad. Accordingly, with a short contract, the costs of migration may simply outweigh the benefits.

Now consider human capital investment of migrant workers under a contract migration scheme. It is argued above that for permanent
migrants, skill investments into human capital specific for the host country labour market depend, among others, on the remaining time in the labour force. For contract migrants, investments into human capital which is specific to the host country labour market depend on the contract length. A Polish immigrant to Sweden is unlikely to invest in the Swedish language if he has only a one year working contract, since the investment will not pay off. However, he may change his mind when being offered a 10-year contract.

However the same migrant may be willing to invest in host country specific human capital, even on a short contract, if he obtains a certain return from that investment after going home. Therefore, the higher the transferability of host country human capital to the home country labour market, the greater the investment that will be undertaken, keeping the contract length constant.

This has some important implications for migration policies. Short-term temporary working contracts may severely hinder economic assimilation and improvements in productivity among immigrants. In the recent discussion in Germany about issuing temporary working permits for highly qualified computer specialists, this argument has not received sufficient attention. Temporary contracts may severely hinder important skill investments by the migrant, investments that are crucial to the development of skill potential. For instance, highly trained specialists may be unable to develop their full productivity potential within a host country environment if they lack the language skills that would enable them to freely communicate with the native work force. A temporary contract scheme creates a disincentive to acquiring the important skills that enhance productivity and favour economic and social assimilation.

The temporary migration considered so far assumes that the length of the migration period is exogenously fixed; the migrant either accepts the opportunity to migrate or he does not. We have seen that the length of the offered contract may influence the migration decision, as well as work effort, and human capital investment. However most migrations to the US and countries of the European Union are not contract migrations. They are migrations where the migrant chooses whether or not to return. In the case of a planned return, the migrant chooses the return time. As with contract migration, the migration duration again influences important economic decisions (such as skill investments). However, the migrant’s economic decisions are now jointly taken with the decision whether and when to return. In
Figure 3, the simultaneity of the return decision and economic behaviour is illustrated by adding the two boxes outside the dashed line: individual characteristics, as well as the situation in the home- and host countries determine simultaneously both the return and economic decisions.

What are the implications of this for our simple model on human capital investment? As shown above, the investment decisions of contract migrants are influenced by the length of the working contract. Contract migrants consider the length of migration as an exogenous parameter. Return migrants decide about the migration duration, which influences human capital investment. The migration duration may in turn be influenced by human capital investment decisions. It is obvious that this adds considerable complexity to modelling the behaviour of the individual. Not only is the home country situation an important factor in explaining differences in behaviour, the process which leads to determining the extent to which the migrant will be exposed to the home country has to be modelled as well. Neglect of these interactions when specifying an empirical model of the behaviour of immigrants may lead to misleading conclusions.

5. Why do migrants return?

I shall now discuss in more detail the motives that induce immigrants to return home. In the last section, the consequences of return migration for economic behaviour have been illustrated, without discussing the process that leads to a return migration.

Clearly, one obvious reason for a return is that the labour market situation in the home country improves, relative to that of the host country. However, this is not a sufficient explanation for many of the return migrations that we observe, for instance, the considerable outflow of migrant workers from many European countries, as illustrated in the figures above. These return migrations occur although wages remain persistently higher in the host economy.

What are the circumstances that lead to a return migration? Let us assume that in each period, the migrant weights the benefits of remaining a further unit of time abroad against the costs of doing so. He will decide to return home when the benefits of staying a further unit of time (say a month, or a year) abroad are lower than the cost. When does this situation occur? The most important reason for emigration are higher wages in the host economy. This creates additional wealth, and allows the migrant to increase lifetime consumption.
However, as the first loaf of bread gives more pleasure to a hungry man than the third, the additional benefit of a unit of time in the host country is lower, the longer the migrant has already stayed abroad (and the more wealth he has accumulated). Accordingly, the benefit of migration slowly decreases. This alone does not trigger a return migration, since, whatever the immigrant’s wealth, it is always advantageous to earn a higher wage.

Now assume that migrants enjoy consuming in their home country more than consuming in the host country. It may for example give more pleasure to an immigrant to consume a bottle of wine with friends and family at home than alone in a foreign country. Accordingly, staying abroad is costly for the migrant, because it deprives him of the opportunity to consume during that time at home. Since life is finite, the remaining (potential) time in the home country becomes more precious, the longer the migrant remains abroad, which leads to an increase in the costs of staying abroad.

In the simplest possible model wages are higher in the host country. At the same time, migrants have a preference for living in their home country. In such a setting, migrants emigrate since that increases their lifetime wealth and consumption. This creates the benefit of migration. At the same time, consumption abroad creates less pleasure than consumption at home. This creates the costs of migration. Under plausible assumptions, it is straightforward to show within this model that the benefits of migration decrease over the migration cycle, while the costs are positive, and may increase. This may lead eventually to a return migration—when costs are equal to benefits. The formal conditions are derived within a simple model in the appendix.

No migration, and permanent migration are special cases of this model. For a migration to take place, benefits must initially be higher than costs. If preferences for the home country (relative to the host country) are very strong, despite a large wage differential, no migration will take place. Preferences for the home country (relative to the host country) depend on a number of factors. They may be influenced by the migrant’s family situation, and personal characteristics, such as age and education. A simple framework like the one set out above is able to explain a number of stylised facts, and is compatible with observed heterogeneity in migration durations.

Permanent migration occurs in the model when benefits still exceed costs at the end of the migrant’s lifetime. Again, this may depend
on the preference of the immigrant for the home country. Permanent migrations are therefore a special case of return migrations—they occur when, over an immigrant’s lifetime, the benefits of migration (in our simple model induced by higher wages) are always larger than the costs (in our simple model induced by differences in preferences for consumption).

Locational preferences are only one possible motive that may trigger a return migration. There are other reasons why migrants may return, despite a persistently more favourable economic situation in the home country. One reason that induces a re-migration is a higher purchasing power of the host country currency in the home country. Migration is temporary because it allows the migrant to take advantage of high wages abroad, and lower prices at home. This motive may contribute to return migration of Eastern Europeans, since the purchasing power of western currencies is substantially higher in many Eastern European countries.

A further reason for a return relies solely on human capital considerations. If the return on human capital acquired in the host country is higher at home, then this alone may trigger a re-migration. One situation where this return motive is important are student migrations. Another situation is migration from countries that are in the process of industrialisation. Basic knowledge about work efficiency, organisation at the work place etc., acquired in the industrialised country increases the migrant’s productivity only slightly in the host country, but may be important and highly valued in the home country.

6. Implications for empirical work

6.1. Estimation of wage equations

Most of the empirical analysis of migrants’ economic assimilation in the economic literature is based on regression models, where variables such as earnings or wages are related to human capital variables such as education, labour market experience, and years since migration. The wage equations are usually extensions of specifications used for natives, where the years of residence, and indicator variables for the country of origin are added. These variables pick up differences in the

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2 See Dustmann (1994) for a general framework for investigating return migration and optimal migration durations. In Dustmann (1997), return migration and optimal migration durations are analysed in a stochastic environment.
initial earnings position due to differences in origins, and allow for earnings (and earnings growth) to depend on the past duration of the migrant in the host country. The coefficient for the variable years since migration has been interpreted by some authors as a measure of assimilation (see LaLonde and Topel, 1992). It approximates the growth in wages that is associated with country-specific human capital accumulation, over and above wage growth due to home-country specific labour market experience.

These empirical specifications may be appropriate for migrations that are permanent. Now let us consider contract migrations. As shown above, immigrants with different migration durations differ with respect to the intensity with which they invest into host country specific human capital. Furthermore, even if the durations of migrations are equal, investment intensities may differ among immigrants from different origin countries, because the transferability of human capital accumulated abroad may differ between countries. Accordingly, the length of the migration is an important additional variable to be considered when estimating wage equations for contract migrants. Omitting this variable (and possibly interactions with other regressors) may lead to biased estimates of the other model parameters.

In the case of a return migration where the migrant chooses the optimal return time, the modelling approach becomes more difficult. Now the migration duration is not an exogenous variable in an earnings regression. The discussion above shows that human capital investments (determining earnings and earnings growth) and the optimal migration duration are chosen simultaneously in the case of a return migration. This means that any changes in the migration duration affect human capital investments; on the other hand, any changes in (intended) human capital investments may affect the optimal migration duration. Accordingly, the process that determines wages cannot be separated from the process that determines the optimal duration. A stylised model would consist of two equations:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Wages} &= f(\text{Time in Host Country, Other Factors } W), \\
\text{Time in Host Country} &= g(\text{Skill Investment, Other Factors } T)
\end{align*}
\]

where Other Factors \( j, j = W, T \) include variables that determine wages \((j = W)\) or the time abroad \((j = T)\) such as for instance, age and education. In the case of a return migration, both the time in the host coun-
try and skill investments and accordingly wages, are simultaneous decisions. Hence a more complete model (consisting of (1.a) and (1.b)) is needed to fully describe the migrant’s skill investment when living abroad. In the case of a contract migration, only equation (1.a) needs to be considered. As long as the contract length cannot be influenced by the migrant, skill investment has no effect on the time spent abroad.

If we had a measure for completed migration durations, inclusion of this variable into the wage equation would not be sufficient to estimate wage equations for return migration. An estimate of, for instance, the causal effect of the migration duration on wages cannot be obtained by straightforward regression. It requires estimators that take account of the simultaneity of investment- and duration decisions. This requires the availability of variables which affect the re-migration decision directly while at the same time affecting human capital investments only indirectly, via the re-migration decision. These variables are called instruments. Instruments would be variables that are included in Other Factors T, but not in Other Factors W.

6.2. Intentions and realisations

Suppose now that we observe complete migration histories, i.e. we not only observe when the migrant enters the host country, but also when and whether he leaves again. Such data is becoming increasingly available, in particular in the Scandinavian countries. In this case, we observe something that is equivalent to the duration of the migrant abroad. However, as I show above, the use of this variable would still result in a classical simultaneity bias when we consider return migrants.

Assume that we also have instruments, i.e. variables that explain variations in migration duration, but not in wages, except via the migration duration. Does this allow us to obtain an estimate of the effect of the migration duration on wages? Obviously yes, if the decision process is as simple as indicated by the model we set out above. However, it is not clear that the return realisation (which we observe) is really what we wish to measure. In a completely deterministic world, intention and realisation coincide. In a non-deterministic setting, migrants may re-optimise when obtaining additional information. Migrations initially planned as permanent may become temporary, and vice versa. Therefore, migrations that we observe to be
permanent (or temporary) may have been intended to be temporary (or permanent) at earlier stages.

Since earnings (or other measures of human capital) that we observe today depend on investment decisions taken in previous periods, even data on complete durations seems insufficient. In fact, the final realisation of a return may not at all reflect earlier intentions, on which human capital investments are based. A useful definition for return migration for empirical work should be based on ex-ante intentions rather than on ex-post realisations. Investments undertaken into human capital (as well as consumption- and labour supply choices) are conditioned on intentions at that point in the migration history and not on final realisations.

Empirically, this implies that we need information about the entire history of a migrant’s intentions, which may rarely be ever available. Suppose we only observed completed durations. It is likely that completed migration histories contain certain information about previous intentions and that intentions in previous periods and realisations are positively correlated. If this is the case, and if we are willing to assume that deviations of realisations from intentions are random, we have a classical measurement error problem, which can be taken care of by standard instrumental variable methods. Our instruments would then address the problem of simultaneity and approximation error simultaneously. Clearly, to find such instruments is not a trivial task.

However, to really understand and to model the process of return plans (and its interactions with economic decisions such as human capital investments) requires a dynamic model, where intentions are modelled explicitly. This is attempted in a paper by Adda and Dustmann (2000). In this model, migrants make a decision in each period whether to stay in the host country or to return to the country of origin. In each period, migrants also decide how much investment to allocate to assets specific to the host country, and the country of origin. The decisions taken are based on a comparison of the discounted flow of utility in the two locations and depend on the capital invested in each country, as well as on a series of stochastic shocks, which may lead to revisions of former plans. The data requirements to estimate such a model will both measure final realisations of return plans and the history of intentions. The model is estimated using a panel data

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3 Instrumental variable estimation solves the measurement problem only if the duration variable enters the outcome equation in a linear manner.
set from Germany, following migrants from various origins for 14 years.

6.3. Empirical evidence

There is some empirical evidence to indicate that temporary migrants have a different human capital investment behaviour, and exhibit different labour market participation patterns than permanent migrants. In an earlier paper (Dustmann, 1993), I estimate earnings regressions similar to those of Chiswick (1978) for Germany. I find that immigrants have upon arrival lower earnings than natives. There is however no evidence for the earnings gap to decrease over time in the German labour market. Unlike the findings for many other countries, foreign workers in the German labour market receive lower wages than their native counterparts throughout their working history, other things being equal. There is no earnings-crossover between these two groups.4

Figure 4 reproduces earnings profiles from Chiswick’s (1978) original work for the US (upper panel of Figure 4), and for Germany from my earlier paper (lower panel). Log earnings are represented on the vertical axis while the horizontal axis denotes experience in the US (or German) labour market. Notice that both figures are based on separate estimations for migrants and natives, which impose less restrictions on other model regressors.

The temporary character of migrations to Germany is one possible explanation for these differences. The data used for the analysis include labour migrants who came to Germany during the 1950s-1970s. Both the migrant and the host countries intended that labour migration during this period would be temporary thus reducing incentives for immigrants to invest in skills (or human capital) specific to the host country labour market.

4 See also Pischke (1993) and Schmidt (1992), who come to similar conclusions.
In another paper (Dustmann, 1999), I explore the effects of return migration on investments into a particular component of host country specific human capital: language capital. Language capital is very important for the host country economy, but usually not transferable to the home country. I use the same data as in the previous study which contains survey information about migrants’ return intentions. As I argue above, immigrants who intend to stay permanently in the host country should have higher incentives to invest in host country specific human capital than immigrants who intend to return. This prediction is consistent with the data in straightforward probit regressions, with permanent migrants having a 10 per cent higher probability to be fluent than migrants who intend to return. Clearly, issues of
simultaneity, measurement error and ability bias, as pointed out above, are present. I therefore estimate the return- and the language equation simultaneously (corresponding to the model in (1.a), (1.b)). As instruments, I use information whether parents are still alive. It is likely that the death of the parents, although not affecting language investments directly, has an impact on the return plans of the migrant. In these simultaneous estimations, migrants who intend to remain permanently abroad have a 49 percentage points higher probability to be fluent in the host country language, and this effect is significant.

7. Summary and discussion

An important parameter in the economic research on migration is an estimate of the assimilation of immigrants to the labour markets of the host countries. The previous literature has emphasised a number of sources of bias when estimating this parameter, being related to non-random immigration, and non-random out-migration. In this paper, I argue that a further serious source of bias is that migration may be temporary. If migrations are temporary rather than permanent, migrants will also be influenced by the expected future economic situations in the host countries, which may lead to variations in assimilation profiles between migrants.

The reason for the return is also important when specifying an appropriate econometric model. If the return time is chosen by the migrant, the economic behaviour which is of interest to the analyst needs to be modelled in conjunction with the process that determines the return decision.

I provide a number of stylised facts, which illustrate that temporary migration is quite common in Europe and in the US. Various types of temporary migrations are discussed. A more structural model is then developed where migrants decide about their investments into human capital which is specific to the host country. I distinguish between three types of migration: permanent, temporary, and return migration. The empirical implications are that straightforward estimation of outcome equations, neglecting the possibly temporary character of migration, may lead to biased estimates. Even if completed durations were observed, the simultaneous character of decision making in the case of return migrations leads to simultaneity bias. Estimations strategies need to take this into account.

Although the model points out certain important features of temporary migrations and their implications for empirical work, it is a
simplistic image of the real world. The model assumes complete cer-
tainty, and that investment- and return plans are made at the begin-
nig of the migration history, and never revised. This is not necessarily
the process that generates the data we use for empirical analysis. It
is likely that return plans are revised when new information is ob-
tained. Therefore, even if we observed completed migration histories,
the final return time may not reflect plans on which previous deci-
sions were based. Accordingly, completed durations are only an ap-
proximate measure for return plans which determine previous in-
vestments.

To conclude, this paper draws attention to the observation that re-
migration propensities affect the economic behaviour of migrants in
the host countries. Much of the empirical work, which estimates out-
come equations for immigrants, tends to neglect this point. New and
extensive data sets, as they become available in many of the Scandi-
navian countries, allow us to explore these issues in more detail. The
implications for policy makers are immediate. If for instance migrants
are kept uncertain about their permanent status in the host country
(which is, and has been the case for many European countries), then
this may prevent them from undertaking investments into human and
social capital. This hinders rapid assimilation, and the development of
their full productivity potential. If assimilation is desired, many migra-
tion policies in Europe will have to be reconsidered in the light of this
aspect.
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Appendix

A.1. Structural model

Consider an individual who maximises the following utility function

\[ U = t\alpha_1 \ln c_1 + (T - t)\alpha_2 \ln c_2 \] (2)

where the individual’s total lifetime is given by \( T \), which is assumed equal to the time the individual is active in the labour force. Furthermore, \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) are consumption flows in the first and second period respectively, and \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are preference parameters. If \( \alpha_2 > \alpha_1 \), the individual prefers to consume in the first period.

In this model, there are two periods of variable length, \( t \) and \( T - t \); the first period is the time the individual spends in the host country, and the second period is the time the individual spends in the home country. Suppose that in the beginning of the first period, the migrant has the opportunity to acquire skills by investing \( s \) units of time into learning activities. Assume that the period over which skills may be acquired is of unit length. Figure 5 illustrates the timing of the model.

**Figure 5. The timing of the model**

\[ \begin{array}{ccc}
\text{P1} & \text{P2} & \text{P3} \\
0 & 1 & t & T \\
\hline
\end{array} \]

Host country Home country

P1: Migrant may invest \( S \) units into country-specific human capital  
P2: Migrant receives benefits from human capital investment  
P3: Migrant works at home

Upon arrival, the migrant has a stock of human capital \( H \), measured in units of productive human capital in the host country. The market wage rate paid for this human capital is \( r^H \), so that earnings
per unit of time without human capital investments are equal to 
\[ w^H = r^H H. \]

In P1, the migrant may invest \( s \) units of time into human capital, where \( s \in [0,1] \). While acquiring skills, the migrant can not work in the labour market, so that the first period earnings are given by 
\[ (1-s)w^H. \] After the first unit in the first period, time devoted to skill accumulation is translated into productivity, according to the function 
\[ f(s; H, A), \] which exhibits the properties \( f_s > 0, f_w < 0, f_A > 0, \]
\[ f_{ss} > 0, f_{wH} < 0, \] and possibly \( f_{wA} > 0 \). Here \( A \) is the individual’s ability. The production technology indicates that skills are self-productive: Individuals with a higher stock of skills \( H \) on arrival acquire further skills more easily. A function with these properties is given by

\[ f(s; H, A) = A \frac{1}{\xi} (sH)^{\xi}. \]

The budget constraint is now given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\kappa_1 + (T-t)\rho &= w^H (1-s) + (t-1)\left[w^H + \rho^H f(s; H, A)\right] + (T-t)\left[w^O + \rho^O f(s; H, A)\right] \\
&= \text{Total earnings host country} - \text{Total earnings home country}.
\end{align*}
\]

(3)

where \( \rho^O f(s; H, A) \) is the wage (per unit of time) the migrant receives at home on human capital acquired in the host country, and \( \rho^H f(s; H, A) \) the wage he receives abroad for human capital acquired in the host country. Accordingly, the parameter \( \rho^O \) measures the transferability of human capital acquired in the host country to the migrant’s home country economy. If \( \rho^O = 0 \), human capital is not transferable at all. The parameter \( \rho \) measures the relative price level in the host country. If \( p < 1 \), the same bundle of goods is less expensive in the migrant’s home country. In the terminology of the trade literature, the purchasing power of the host country economy’s currency is higher in the home country.
If the migration is a contract migration ($t$ is exogenous), the migrant chooses $c_1, c_2$, and the level of investment $s$ so as to maximise (2) subject to (3). If the migration is a return migration, $t$ becomes a further choice variable.

**A.1. Permanent migration**

First assume that migration is permanent by setting $t = T$ (below I show how permanent migration may be an optimal solution to the above problem). Since the choice of the optimal consumption level and the optimal investment level are separable, the optimal investment $s$ is determined by the following first order condition:

$$w^{HI} = (T - 1)\rho^{HI} f_i(s; A, H),$$

where $w^{HI} = r^{HI}H$. This condition says that the migrant chooses $s$ so as to equalise the earnings forgone by human capital investment in the first unit of the first period with the total wage gain, resulting from that investment. The gain is positively related to the remaining time in the labour force $T$ (since it increases the length of the pay-off period for any investment undertaken), the return to skills in the host country $\rho^{HI}$, and, via $f_i$, to the initial skill level, and the ability of the immigrant.

Solving for $s$, using the function for $f$ assumed above, gives the optimal level of investment:

$$s = \left(\frac{r^{HI}}{(T - 1)\rho^{HI}A}\right)^{\frac{1}{T-1}} \frac{1}{H}. \quad (5)$$

Accordingly, the optimal level of investment in human capital decreases with the rate of return on the migrant’s home country human capital, $r^{HI}$. It increases with the return on human capital investments, and with the migrant’s level of ability $A$.

The effect of the initial skill level on investment is ambiguous for the general case. Higher initial skills increase opportunity costs of fur-
ther skill investments, but increase also productivity of each unit of time invested into skill production. For the functional forms chosen here, the first effect overcompensates the second effect, so that the total effect of the initial skill level on further investments is negative. Also, the higher the return to skill investments, \( \rho^H \), the higher first period investment, as well as second period wages. Finally, the larger \( T \), the higher investments. Since \( T \) corresponds to the active time of the immigrant in the host country labour market, this implies that immigrants who come at a later age invest less in their human capital, and therefore have a lower wage growth. The age at entry determines the pay-off period for human capital specific to the host country labour market; migrants who are younger at entry should have steeper subsequent wage profiles.

A.2. Contract migration

Now consider a contract migration. In this case, \( t < T \), and the migrant spends some of his productive period in the home country. The first order condition is given by

\[
\sigma^H = \left[ (t-1)\rho^H + (T-t)\rho^H \right] f(s; A, H). \tag{6}
\]

Again, opportunity costs of investment are equal to forgone earnings. The gain includes not only the return to investment in the host country, but also in the home country after re-migration. It is the weighted return to investments in the host- and the home country, where weights are determined by the contract length. Solving (6) for \( s \) yields

\[
s = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{H} \left( \frac{r^H}{A((t-1)\rho^H + (T-t)\rho^H)} \right)^\frac{1}{\frac{1}{H} - 1}}, \tag{6}
\]

which is equal to equation (5), except that the gain of investments consists now of the weighted return in home- and host country.
The effect of the contract length is ambiguous in general, and it depends on whether returns to skills acquired in the host country are higher at home or not. If \( \rho^H > \rho^O \) (the return to skills acquired abroad is higher in the host country than in the home country), then an increase in the contract length \( t \) clearly increases skill investments. This is likely to be the normal case. If however \( \rho^H > \rho^O \), then the opposite is the case.

Now consider again a native, and an identical immigrant. Even if the skill level of the immigrant is the same than that of the native worker, the immigrant will invest less in human capital, as long as returns to that investment are lower in his home country than in the host country. In this simple model, investments and wage growth between the two individuals vary according to the difference in returns \( \rho^H - \rho^O \), and the length of the contract.

**A.3. Return migration**

In the case of a return migration, the migrant chooses not only the optimal investment level \( s \), but, in addition, the optimal migration duration \( t \). This adds a further first order condition to the model:

\[
\left[ \alpha_2 \ln c_2 - \alpha_1 \ln c_1 \right] = \pi \left[ (w^H + \rho^H f - c_1) - (w^O + \rho^O f - p c_2) \right] \tag{8}
\]

where \( \pi \) is the marginal utility of wealth. This condition says that the return time is determined by equalising the benefits of remaining a further unit of time abroad (right hand side) and the costs (left hand side). The benefits are the difference in wealth accumulation when residing at home, or abroad. The costs are the differences in utility obtained from consuming in home- or host country. Notice that the costs are zero if the price level \( \bar{p} = 1 \) and if \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 \)—in this case, the migrant is indifferent between consumption at home or abroad.

The migrant’s optimal investment \( s \) and the optimal duration \( t \) are now determined by two optimality conditions, defining the optimal return point as a function of the optimally chosen human capital investment, and the optimally chosen investment as a function of the
return point. Consider, for simplicity, the linearised versions of these optimality conditions.

\[ \tilde{x} = \gamma_1 \tilde{t} + \kappa \gamma, \quad (8.a) \]
\[ \tilde{r} = \delta_1 \tilde{t} + \kappa \delta, \quad (8.b) \]

where \( \tilde{x} \) and \( \tilde{t} \) are optimal investment and optimal duration, and \( \kappa \) is a (vector of) variables (like ability, initial skill level, etc.) The parameters \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \delta_1 \) measure the effects of the optimally chosen migration duration on investment, and of the optimal level of investment on the duration of migration.

Within the above model, one can show that \( \gamma_2 \) and \( \delta_2 \) are both positive. Parameters in \( \gamma_2 \) and \( \delta_2 \) measure the effect of other characteristics \( \kappa \) on these two decisions. Notice that both decisions are simultaneously determined; accordingly, changes in any of the variables in \( \kappa \) have a direct effect on human capital investment \( \tilde{x} \), and an indirect effect, by changing the optimal duration \( \tilde{t} \).