




**UCL**

## **Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) Good Practice Guide**

**UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science  
November 2006**



**Contact**

Lucia Summers  
2<sup>nd</sup> Floor, Brook House  
2-16 Torrington Place  
London WC1E 7HN  
t. 020 7679 0826  
e. [l.summers@ucl.ac.uk](mailto:l.summers@ucl.ac.uk)

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction .....	1
2 Core Initiatives .....	3
2.1 Night Time Economy .....	3
2.1.1 Early Intervention.....	3
2.1.2 Targeting Problematic Premises.....	4
2.1.3 Test Purchase Operations.....	6
2.2 Domestic Violence.....	7
2.2.1 Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC).....	7
3 Additional Initiatives .....	9
3.1 Night Time Economy .....	9
3.1.1 Best Bar None .....	9
3.1.2 Safer Glasses.....	11
3.1.3 Triage .....	12
3.1.4 Late Night Time Transport Initiatives.....	13
3.1.5 Other Initiatives.....	15
3.2 Domestic violence .....	16
3.2.1 Domestic Violence Victims Visits.....	16
3.2.2 Encouraging Reporting of Domestic Violence .....	17
3.2.3 Other Initiatives.....	18
4 Case Study One: Triages in Cardiff .....	20
4.1 Background .....	20
4.2 Violent Crime Prior to TVCP .....	20
4.3 Description of TVCP Implementation, Aims and Initiatives .....	21

4.4	Overall TVCP Findings .....	23
4.5	The Triage .....	24
4.6	Case Study Results .....	26
4.7	Key Lessons Learned and Good Practice .....	27
5	Case Study Two: Safer Glasses in Swansea.....	29
5.1	Background .....	29
5.2	Violent Crime Prior to TVCP .....	29
5.3	Description of TVCP Implementation, Aims and Initiatives .....	29
5.4	Overall TVCP Findings .....	31
5.5	The Safer Glasses Initiative.....	32
5.6	Case Study Results .....	34
5.7	Key Lessons Learned and Good Practice .....	36
6	Case Study Three: The Wirral Family Safety Unit.....	38
6.1	Background .....	38
6.2	Violent Crime Prior to TVCP .....	38
6.3	Description of TVCP Implementation, Aims and Initiatives .....	39
6.4	Overall TVCP Findings .....	40
6.5	The Family Safety Unit .....	40
6.6	Case Study Results .....	43
6.7	Key Lessons Learned and Good Practice .....	45
7	Key elements of good practice.....	46
	APPENDIX A: CONTACT DETAILS OF SPOCs .....	48

# 1 INTRODUCTION

1. Since November 2004 the Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) has been rolled out in 32 of the 373 CDRPs in England and Wales in an effort to reduce the national levels of serious violent crime (see Table 1). The programme provides these CDRPs – all of which have high levels of violent crime – with the support and resources required to implement local initiatives specifically aimed at reducing alcohol related and domestic violence specifically.
2. To gauge the efficacy of the TVCP, the UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science was commissioned to evaluate the initiative. The project produced two documents: an evaluation report which sought to establish the extent to which the programme had met its stated goals and included both outcome and process assessments; and a good practice guide which highlights examples of good practice encountered throughout the course of the research. This document is the good practice guide.
3. The Guide, describes various initiatives that have been implemented as part of the TVCP. For each of these, a brief description is provided with pointers to facilitating and inhibiting factors. A list of CDRPs where these initiatives have been tried out – only those CDRPs that were interviewed are included here<sup>1</sup> (see Table 1) – is also provided, giving a valuable source of advice for other CDRPs, TVCP or not, wishing to establish similar schemes in their area (contact details of all TVCP leads are given in the appendix). Three of these initiatives are covered in more detail and presented in a case study format. These are the triages in Cardiff, the safer glasses in Swansea and the Family Safety Unit in Wirral. Finally, the key elements of good practice that have been found across the initiatives and are applicable to all crime reduction initiatives on a general level are presented.

---

<sup>1</sup> The findings presented here are based on interviews with four TVCP field workers and 15 single points of contact (SPOCs) from tranches 1 and 2. Tranche 3 SPOCs were not included as it was felt their experience of the TVCP was too limited for them to be expected to answer all the set questions.

**Table 1. Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) where the Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) has been introduced. Single Points of Contact (SPOCs) in CDRPs marked with an asterisk were interviewed as part of the research.**

	<b>CDRP</b>	<b>Police Force</b>	<b>GO Region</b>
TRANCHE 1 (November 2004)	Brent *	Met	LONDON
	Hackney	Met	LONDON
	Islington	Met	LONDON
	Lambeth	Met	LONDON
	Southwark *	Met	LONDON
	Westminster *	Met	LONDON
	Bolton *	GMP	NORTH WEST
	Liverpool *	Merseyside	NORTH WEST
	Wirral *	Merseyside	NORTH WEST
	Cardiff *	S Wales	WALES
	Kingston Upon Hull	Humberside	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
	Wakefield *	W Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
TRANCHE 2 (May 2005)	Nottingham *	Nottinghamshire	EAST MIDS
	Manchester	GMP	NORTH WEST
	Salford *	GMP	NORTH WEST
	Coventry *	W Mids	W MIDLANDS
	Wolverhampton *	W Mids	W MIDLANDS
	Rhonda Cynon Taff *	S Wales	WALES
	Swansea *	S Wales	WALES
TRANCHE 3 (April 2006)	Leicester	Leicestershire	EAST MIDS
	Camden	Met	LONDON
	Ealing	Met	LONDON
	Haringey	Met	LONDON
	Lewisham	Met	LONDON
	Newham	Met	LONDON
	Waltham Forest	Met	LONDON
	Bristol	Avon & Somerset	SOUTH WEST
	Birmingham (D1, D3 only)	W Mids	W MIDLANDS
	Doncaster	S Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
	Sheffield Central	S Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
	Leeds (City & Holbeck only)	W Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER
	Kirklees	W Yorks	YSHIRE AND HUMBER

## 2 CORE INITIATIVES

4. There are a number of initiatives which all TVCP areas are expected to include in their programmes. These initiatives are described in this section, starting with those aimed at reducing violence associated with the night time economy (early intervention, targeting problematic premises and test purchase operations). After this, the multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) is described, this being a core initiative aimed at reducing domestic violence.

### 2.1 *Night Time Economy*

#### 2.1.1 Early Intervention

##### *Synopsis*

5. Early intervention schemes are targeted at those people who are deemed to be drunk or disorderly early in the evening. It aims to avoid them committing, or being the victim of, more serious offences later in the night.
6. Tools used by the police include alcohol seizures in dedicated zones and the issue of Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs) for being drunk and disorderly, or Section 5 (harassment) offences. Potential victims are given crime prevention and personal safety advice.

##### *Why does it work?*

7. Potential offenders are given warnings or taken off the streets early in the evening, which reduces the likelihood of their escalating drunkenness and/or rowdy behaviour contributing to more serious incidents later in the night.

##### *Local variations to the theme*

8. In Bolton, all copies of the PNDs go to the night time economy manager. This person then writes to the concerned individuals telling them that if they get another

PND, they may be subject to an Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) which could ban them from the town centre. Over three years they have only had 15 repeat offenders.

9. In this CDRP, however, the PNDs are seen as second to engagement. The strategy is more about having officers on foot at different strategic points around the city to meet and greet people, rather than simply arresting or prosecuting a large number of people. This is felt to be a less antagonistic approach that fosters feelings of safety and supervision rather than suspicion and control.
10. Liverpool is another area where ASBOs have been successfully employed to exclude problematic individuals from the city centre and/or licensed premises.

### *Evaluation*

11. We have so far been unable to identify any systematic evaluations of early intervention schemes. However, those who run these programmes strongly believe that they work.

## **2.1.2 Targeting Problematic Premises**

### *Synopsis*

12. This involves taking a situational approach to violent crime and considering what it is about particular premises that gives rise to unusually high numbers of violent incidents. Action often involves promoting better management in licensed premises by using the threat of having their licences reviewed or being prosecuted as leverage for better standards.
13. The CDRP identifies through analysis the premises which are the most problematic in terms of violent crime. The CDRP licensing team (typically made up of representatives from the police, council licensing department, fire brigade, trading standards and NTE manager) then visits the premises and talks to the licensee about these crime problems. In addition to this, they check that the establishment is compliant with all safety and licensing legislation, and that door staff are Security

Industry Authority (SIA) registered. The licensing team will help the licensee develop an action plan to improve standards in their premise. However, if no improvements are made over a specified time period, then the licensing team may seek to prosecute or review the licence.

*Why does it work?*

14. This is a typical 'carrot and stick' approach where the licensing team encourage and support positive behaviour and self-management to improve safety standards. However if the licensee is not compliant, the licensing team have the will and determination to use all other enforcement options and powers which could lead to imposing conditions or even closure.

*Local variations on the theme*

15. Bolton has a checklist which they go through with the licensee. They then come back a month later to check that any faults they found have been rectified. If not, they first agree an Acceptable Behaviour Contract (ABC) with the licensee, and if this fails, they will consider reviewing the licence.
16. Cardiff operates a 'traffic light system' in terms of identifying which licensees are becoming problematic. A code is assigned based on a point system, which green indicating a well managed premise, amber one that needs monitoring, and red one that needs immediate attention.
17. Southwark involve customs staff in their visits to off- and on-licensed premises in order to confiscate various stocks of alcohol for which VAT has not been paid.

*Evaluation*

18. No formal evaluations have been conducted on this type of project. However, Nottingham has been chosen as an example of good practice because of its robust and swift response to problematic premises. This, together with other work in the area aimed at reducing violent crime, has contributed to a reduction in recorded more serious violence in Nottingham of 22.5% in the year to September 2006 compared to the previous 12 months. Nottingham have contributed to the

production of guidance for tackling problem premises, which will shortly be available to all CDRPs.

### **2.1.3 Test Purchase Operations**

#### *Synopsis*

19. Test purchase operations often go hand-in-hand with promoting better management in licensed premises. These operations can be conducted at off-licensed as well as on-licensed premises.
20. A standard test purchase operation will involve sending a trained person aged under 18 into a licensed premise to buy alcohol. If that person is sold alcohol without any ID check, then the licensee is fined. Multiple underage sales by a licensed premise can lead to prosecution or the licence being reviewed.
21. Test purchase operations are normally conducted with trading standards officers, who undertake to train and recruit the young test purchase operatives.

#### *Why does it work?*

22. It reminds licensees of their legal responsibilities with regard to selling alcohol to underage persons. It thus removes *one* of the ways in which young people get access to alcohol.

#### *Local variations on the theme*

23. Salford has been doing test purchase operations for a very long time, and has also extended it to the sale of knives to under-18s.
24. Nottingham operates monthly test purchase operations. If a premise fails three months running, they will look to review their licence.

### *Evaluation*

25. Test purchase operations performed as part of the Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaigns have shown that overall underage sales rates have gone down from 40% in the summer of 2005 to 22% in early 2006.<sup>2</sup> This drop can be attributed, at least in part, to increased enforcement through these operations.

## **2.2 Domestic Violence**

### **2.2.1 Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC)**

#### *Synopsis*

26. A Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference brings together professionals from various agencies to identify high risk cases of domestic violence and devise interventions for both victims and offenders. The group will typically consist of representatives from the police, social services, housing, primary care trust, women's aid, education and other concerned parties or statutory agencies. These high risk cases are identified by either a high number of repeat victimisations, a high level of physical violence, or significant recent escalation in the level of violence.

#### *Why does it work?*

27. The MARAC ensures that everyone knows what every other agency is doing, thus providing an avenue for multi-agency discourse. In this context, each agency can prepare for their part in any planned victim or offender interventions.

---

<sup>2</sup> See: Home Office (2004). *Lessons from the Summer 2004 Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaign*. London: Home Office; and Home Office (2006). *Lessons from the Christmas 2005 Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaign*. London: Home Office.

*Local variations on the theme*

28. The regularity of the meetings sets the MARACs apart. Some meet monthly (e.g. Wirral), others fortnightly (e.g. Southwark), and others daily (e.g. Wakefield). This is really dependent on whether the individuals involved in the MARAC work in close proximity to each other and how extensive their caseload is.

*Evaluation*

29. The MARAC has been recently evaluated in Wales,<sup>3</sup> with very positive results. Relevant staff felt the initiative enabled them to work with other agencies more effectively. This was achieved by improved communication, better data sharing practices and raised awareness of the impact of domestic violence on children. The number of domestic violence related police complaints and/or call-outs were examined to determine the effect of the MARAC on the safety of the victims. These showed most of the high risk victims targeted by the initiative (66%) had not been re-victimised.

---

<sup>3</sup> Robinson, A.L. (2004). *Domestic Violence MARACs (Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences) for Very High-Risk Victims in Cardiff, Wales: A process and outcome evaluation*. Available online from [www.cardiff.ac.uk/schoolsanddivisions/academicschools/socsi/staff/acad/robinson.html](http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/schoolsanddivisions/academicschools/socsi/staff/acad/robinson.html) (last accessed 27th October 2006).

## 3 ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES

30. In this section, a number of initiatives which TVCP areas may want to implement (in addition to the core initiatives presented earlier) are presented. Again, those aimed at reducing violence associated with the night time economy are described first, followed by those initiatives aimed at reducing domestic violence. A list of the CDRPs which have tried each of these initiatives is also presented, although this only includes those areas where the SPOC was interviewed and is thus not an exhaustive list.

### 3.1 *Night Time Economy*

#### 3.1.1 **Best Bar None**

##### *Synopsis*

31. Best Bar None (BBN) was developed in Manchester by the Manchester City Centre Safe programme and has been around for a number of years prior to the introduction of the TVCP. However, BBN provides a good example of how TVCP funds can help to establish and/or improve relationships with licensed premises in order to make sustainable reductions in alcohol related violent crime.
32. Licensed premises apply for accreditation under the scheme by completing a form requesting an assessment by the BBN team. If the premises are thought to be up to the standards of BBN they are accredited. All premises that are accredited are entered into a competition to find the best bar, the best club, (along with a number of other categories), as well as the overall winner in the area. Awards are presented at an awards evening and the winning premises get prizes including plaques to put up in their premises as well as free advertising in their local paper.
33. Although not officially a core initiative, all TVCP areas are highly encouraged to participate in BBN by the Home Office.

*Why does it work?*

34. This initiative helps licensed premises to raise their safety standards, for which they are then rewarded. This leads them to engage in healthy competition to become safer premises.
35. However, it only works for those premises which join the scheme and they are more likely to have higher standards in the first place. Therefore, there will still be troublesome pubs that simply choose not to be part of BBN.

*Who has tried it?*

36. Wakefield, Rhonda Cynon Taff (not currently), Salford, Liverpool, Bolton, Hull, Swansea (not currently), and Wirral.

*Local variations to the theme*

37. In one CDRP, BBN is driven regionally rather than locally. A lack of communication between the regional and local leads led to an embarrassing situation where the licensing team warned a licensee about problems at their bar, which then went on to win a BBN award over the same time period. This situation materialised due to different criteria being used by the two teams to judge standards at licensed premises.
38. Rhonda Cynon Taff does not have a single town centre in which to run BBN, so they instead picked three locations where licensed premises tend to congregate and ran the programme distinctly in each of the areas, before bringing them together to choose an overall winner. Southwark are planning a similar action for their BBN, but focusing on two locations.

*Evaluation*

39. BBN has a systematic evaluation pending, and thus at the time of writing it is unknown whether it truly works. Anecdotal evidence from SPOCs is split between those who love the programme and those who loathe it.

40. Some of the positive points are that the programme rewards good management, it can influence the drinking culture, and it shows that the police and council take licensing very seriously. However, it doesn't allow for any analysis of violent crime around the premises as part of the accreditation.
41. On the issue of the awards dinner, one interviewee noted that it needs to be emphasised that the 'glossy awards' dinner is not the outcome of BBN, the outcome should be raising standards, increasing actual safety as well as feelings of safety, and reducing crime. Currently there is too much emphasis on the dinner.

### **3.1.2 Safer Glasses**

#### *Synopsis*

42. This involves purchasing good quality polycarbonate plastic glasses and distributing them around licensed premises. Sometimes the new plastic glasses are exchanged for the licensee's old glasses. The safer glasses have been imposed as a condition on some licensed premises, and as part of temporary event notices. The council and police also encourage the safer glasses to be used around the Christmas festive season and other key events (e.g. festivals, sport events).

#### *Why does it work?*

43. It reduces the availability of glass to be used as a weapon, and thus reduces the likelihood of more serious injuries. However, there are still glass bottles present which can also be used as weapons. Changing these to plastic might be more problematic as the licensees will have to pay brewers more if they want their alcohol in plastic bottles. Also, at the disposal end, it costs a licensee more to recycle plastic bottles than it does glass bottles.

#### *Who has tried it?*

44. Rhonda Cynon Taff, Westminster, Cardiff and Swansea.

### *Evaluation*

45. Warburton and Shepherd (2000)<sup>4</sup> carried out a study on 57 bars in South Wales, West Midlands and the West of England, and found that staff injury rates were higher in bars where lower impact resistance glasses were used.
46. The Swansea case study presented in this report also aimed to evaluate this initiative (see p. 29).

### **3.1.3 Triage**

#### *Synopsis*

47. An ambulance staffed with a paramedic and a police officer is positioned in the city centre to treat individuals who are not in a serious enough condition to warrant a hospital visit. This aims to take the strain off ambulance services and accident and emergency (A&E) departments. Triage units are often run at specific times only, such as weekends, or key festive and sporting occasions.

#### *Why does it work?*

48. It takes the pressure off other ambulances in the city and means A&E departments have fewer people to treat. This helps reduce waiting times within these departments and consequently the number of people creating a nuisance or being violent while waiting for treatment.
49. The scheme has the added advantage that police do not have to spend so much time waiting for ambulances with people who need treatment or are drunk – they can now take people to the triage unit and get back on the street quickly.

#### *Who has tried it?*

50. Hull, Swansea, Cardiff (see case study on p. 20) and Coventry.

---

<sup>4</sup> Warburton, A.L. & Shepherd, J.P. (2000). Effectiveness of toughened glassware in terms of reducing injury in bars: A randomised controlled trial. *Injury Prevention*, **6**, 36-40.

*Local variations on the theme*

51. In addition to the city centre ambulance, Cardiff also opens up the medical room in the Millennium Stadium on nights following major events at the stadium. This extra room allows for greater capacity and more people to be treated.

*Evaluation*

52. In the first weekend of running a triage unit in the city centre, Cardiff ambulance service hit their response targets for the first time ever – not just for the city centre – but for the whole of Cardiff. The A&E waiting times Key Performance Indicator (KPI) was also achieved over the same period.

**3.1.4 Late Night Time Transport Initiatives***Synopsis*

53. Transport nodes are locations where groups of (mostly intoxicated) individuals congregate, all trying to get home after a night out. If they are not dispersed from the area quickly then the concentration of people builds up and violence often breaks out. Two types of late night transport initiatives have been undertaken in TVCP areas in order to facilitate this dispersion and/or prevent violence: late night bus services; and taxi marshalling.
54. Late night buses: A lack of means with which people could travel home after a night out meant that the demand placed on taxis outstripped the supply resulting in overcrowding and hostile competition occurring at taxi ranks. Three CDRPs (Bolton, Swansea and Westminster) invested in late night buses in order to try to reduce this problem. These were set up with local bus companies and were sometimes part funded by the CDRP or local licensed premises. These buses provide transportation services hourly until the early morning.
55. Taxi Marshalling: In order to promote calm and civility when people were trying to get home after a night out, a number of CDRPs have employed taxi marshals (e.g. Coventry, Bolton and Swansea). The marshals operate around clubs and pubs

closing times when demand for transportation peaks. Marshalling involves Security Industry Authority (SIA) accredited security staff operating at taxi ranks to ensure that people behave and queue for taxis appropriately. In Swansea, permanent barriers have been erected to facilitate queuing in order to discourage conflicts caused by people 'jumping in'.

*Why does it work?*

56. In most areas late night buses work very well, although this depends on the demand. For example, Bolton found that demand for the buses dropped following the introduction of the 2005 Licensing Act. They believed that the staggered closing times meant there was no peak flow of people anymore.
57. Taxi marshalling stops people becoming frustrated when waiting for a taxi – due to queue jumping and jostling. Such frustration can lead to violence. Because people are being observed by security staff they tend to become less frustrated and more compliant.
58. Ensuring individuals have safe and affordable access to transportation after a night out also helps reduce the number of potential victims who might otherwise decide to walk home, often alone, and often in an intoxicated and therefore vulnerable state.

*Who has tried it?*

59. Rhonda Cynon Taff, Coventry, Bolton, Swansea, Cardiff, Nottingham and Wirral.

*Evaluation*

60. There has been no formal evaluation of either of these initiatives, however, the CDRP in Wirral claim that taxi marshalling has had a positive impact on violent crime.

### 3.1.5 Other Initiatives

61. Both Bolton and Nottingham have made structural changes to policing shifts which have allowed them to maximise the number of staff they have available on Friday and Saturday nights, which has meant not only a reassuring high police presence on the streets, but more officers interacting with the public.
62. Trying to keep drugs out of licensed premises has been a challenge for some CDRPs. This has resulted in two CDRPs (Swansea and Wolverhampton) buying 'drugs itemisers' which can be brushed over the hands of those queuing to get into a bar. The itemiser can detect whether that person has recently handled drugs, and if the test shows positive they are refused entry to the bar. Similarly, Brent uses wipes on surfaces in licensed premises toilets to prove to licensees they have a drugs problem (the wipe changes colour when it comes in contact with certain substances).
63. Body worn video cameras (often referred to as "headcams") have been used by several BCUs (e.g. Coventry, Brent and Salford) for recording violent crimes in the night time economy, as well as domestic violence incidents – as they give an accurate record of what happened and provide valuable supporting evidence to police officers and door staff. The cameras are mounted on the side of the police officers' head and are about the size of a small torch. An evaluation of the use of headcams is currently being carried out by Devon and Cornwall Police. A full report will be available in April-May 2007, but a good practice guide will be published in January 2007.
64. In five CDRPs (Hull, Swansea, Rhonda Cynon Taff, Salford and Liverpool) CCTV has been enhanced, monitored at peak times, or been linked by radio to police and security staff on the ground. This allows CCTV monitoring staff to tell police when and where trouble might be starting, and allows police to get incidents recorded on CCTV for evidence. Two CDRPs (Bolton and Swansea) have tried to persuade door staff to wear high visibility jackets – as they show up better on CCTV and help differentiate between staff and trouble makers. This can be made a condition of a licence, although to date it has only had limited success.

65. New devices are being trialled in some areas. In Liverpool some licensed premises have ID card readers, which are linked by computer. Under this system showing your ID at one bar means you get entry to the others without re-showing your ID. However this does rely on door staff checking for ID in the first instance.
66. Liverpool is also trialling metal detecting gloves – which vibrate when run over metal objects (rather than *beep* like airport metal detectors) – eventually these could be worn by door staff to check people for weapons. Nottingham uses hand held metal detectors.

## **3.2 Domestic violence**

### **3.2.1 Domestic Violence Victims Visits**

#### *Synopsis*

67. Through analysis of domestic violence data, the police determine when particular victims are most likely to be at risk. They then visit these potential victims just before this high risk time to check they are safe.

#### *Why does it work?*

68. It aims to prevent domestic violence happening by letting the victim and offender know that the police are there to support the victim. It also breaks the offender's pattern of behaviour by targeting visits around the times the victim is typically abused.

#### *Who has tried it?*

69. Coventry, Bolton and Cardiff (through their Women's Safety Unit).

#### *Local variations on the theme*

70. Coventry focuses on their top ten domestic violence cases, while Bolton focuses on any repeat victims of domestic abuse.

### *Evaluation*

71. Coventry claim that repeat victimisation for domestic violence in their area has dropped dramatically.

## **3.2.2 Encouraging Reporting of Domestic Violence**

### *Synopsis*

72. These programmes target potential domestic violence victims, and are normally conducted during routine visits from female medical professionals. If a woman seems potentially vulnerable to domestic violence then she will be approached and given the chance to talk about her problems in confidence. The medical professional can then refer the woman to support agencies where she can access help and advocacy.
73. The medical professionals also gather data so that they have a better understanding of the prevalence of domestic violence. These data can then be shared with other agencies.

### *Why does it work?*

74. It gives the victim an opportunity to talk about domestic violence outside of a police setting, and while the victim may be encouraged to report the incident to the police pressure is not placed on her to do so (she will still be entitled to access to the support available regardless). This is particularly important considering the potential number of domestic violence cases that go unreported.

### *Who has tried it?*

75. Rhonda Cynon Taff (trying it this year), Bolton, Liverpool and Cardiff (through their Women's Safety Unit).

*Local variations on the theme*

76. Rhonda Cynon Taff is training a qualified nurse to recognise that people presenting at casualty may be victims of domestic abuse. Cardiff also has a dedicated nurse.
77. In Bolton, midwives are used as part of domestic violence outreach. The midwife speaks to pre- and post-natal women about domestic violence. Bolton CDRP believes women will be more receptive at this stage because of the child's safety, and that the midwife is a friendly face to speak to about domestic violence.

*Evaluation*

78. Cardiff has had this initiative recently evaluated as part of an evaluation of their Women's Safety Unit.<sup>5</sup> Results showed that "health care settings are an important place where women should feel safe disclosing domestic violence" and that "while some progress is being made to improve the reporting of responding to domestic violence by health care providers, more work needs to be done to more fully close these gaps" (Robinson, 2005: 34). In other words, the initiative is seen as beneficial but, in order to maximize its effectiveness, *all* health care professionals need to make sure they routinely enquire about domestic violence.

**3.2.3 Other Initiatives**

79. A number of CDRPs are either involved in the Home Office 'Specialist Domestic Violence Courts' programme (e.g. TVCP areas in the West-Midlands), or are hoping to create a similar court through local partnership working in their areas (e.g. Brent and Bolton). These are expected to lead to a rise in reported domestic violence (because of increased trust in the system and greater support), as well as more convictions for domestic violence (because of a more confident victim, and a well informed magistrate and court system).

---

<sup>5</sup> See Robinson, A.L. (2005). *The Cardiff Women's Safety Unit: Understanding the costs and consequences of domestic violence*. Available online from [www.cardiff.ac.uk/schoolsanddivisions/academicschools/socsi/staff/acad/robinson.html](http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/schoolsanddivisions/academicschools/socsi/staff/acad/robinson.html) (last accessed 27th October 2006).

80. A number of ways are being used to try and get the message across to women who might not be reporting domestic violence. For instance, Liverpool has involved the local Imam in their domestic violence programme in order to reach out to the Muslim community. Another example comes from Salford, where advertisements are placed on the back of till receipts and bus tickets, which look innocuous in a woman's handbag.
81. Simply placing all the partner organisations dealing with domestic violence in the same office helped Wirral to improve the efficiency of their team. This can also be beneficial to clients, who may find it easier to access services if such a one-stop shop exists.
82. Some CDRPs are using the 'sanctuary' (e.g. Salford) or 'safe haven' (e.g. Bolton) schemes to target-harden victims' homes. These schemes can differ, but essentially involve a victim of domestic violence having their locks changed, doors strengthened, and other target hardening measures installed, in order to increase their feeling of safety. The cost of this is often borne by the council or the CDRP.

## 4 CASE STUDY ONE: TRIAGES IN CARDIFF

### 4.1 Background

83. Cardiff is Wales' largest city with just over 327,000 inhabitants. It is the most culturally diverse area in Wales, and is home to both the most deprived and affluent areas in the country. Historically, Cardiff's economy focused around a thriving coal export industry through its ports. However with the decline in the coal industry Cardiff had to re-invent itself. The area has changed radically over last few years and has been drawing a lot of investment, especially in the city centre. In particular the city has increased development in the information technology industry, leisure and tourism, and retail markets. It is currently one of the top five retail cities in UK. The city's Millennium Stadium opened in 1999 and has since hosted many major sporting events. Following the opening of the millennium stadium, the city experienced a boom in the number of licensed premises opening in the city centre.

### 4.2 Violent Crime Prior to TVCP

84. At present, there is capacity within Cardiff's licensed premises for well over 120,000 people, excluding the millennium stadium which is licensed (for certain events) to serve alcohol to an additional 75,000 individuals. As the number of licensed premises increased, so has the number of alcohol related violent crime incidents. This is especially pronounced when there are events at the millennium stadium, as the stadium is situated right in the heart of the city. Visitors are able to walk from their seat in the stadium to a licensed premise within minutes. This means that following an event, 70,000 people come straight out of the stadium into Cardiff's bars and clubs. Fortunately the high concentration of people in a limited amount of space means the situation is more contained and thus somewhat more manageable. The city centre can deal with upwards of 200,000 individuals on celebratory occasions.

### **4.3 Description of TVCP Implementation, Aims and Initiatives**


85. Following the opening of the millennium stadium, the initial response to the increase in violent crime in the city centre, was to draft in extra officers to cope with the increase in demand. But it was soon realised that a partnership approach – sharing and exchanging information – was better.
86. This resulted in a strong partnership with a number of initiatives already in place prior to the start of TVCP. Many recent violent crime reduction strategies in Cardiff derive from this initial investment in tackling night time economy (NTE) problems ultimately caused by the opening of millennium stadium and the subsequent increase in licensed premises. Although some of this practice is not strictly ‘TVCP’ generated, it provides excellent examples of what other partnerships could achieve with their TVCP funding.
87. Cardiff TVCP key objectives were to:
- run an enforcement campaign to address alcohol related violence arising from the NTE;
  - reduce alcohol fuelled violent crime in Cardiff, including domestic violence;
  - improve police and CDRP partnership working; and
  - focus on areas with the largest proportion of more serious violent crime.
88. TVCP helped to contribute toward the following interventions:
- the enhancement of service provision for users of the NTE, such as providing extra late night public transport, additional public toilets and a mobile search facility for City Centre events;
  - the payment of overtime for local authority activities to improve the NTE, such as additional street cleaning, trading standards officers to accompany police on test purchase operations, and an enforcement exercise on unlicensed taxi cabs;

- the purchase of a high visibility enforcement team vehicle, used by police patrolling the city centre (running costs met by the BCU fund);
- a marketing campaign and promotional literature to launch a 'pubwatch' and taxi marshalling scheme and highlight partnership activities tackling underage drinking and general crime reduction information;
- a multi-agency enforcement initiative to ensure that Cardiff is an attractive location particularly concentrating on major events;
- proactive use of CCTV cameras located on a pre-identified violent crime hotspots;
- a dedicated multi-agency AMEC team;
- a dedicated, proactive CCTV/positive action team initiative intending to make smarter use of CCTV;
- a domestic violence branding initiative, encouraging victims to come forward and stop the abuse;
- a project to actively encourage male victims of domestic violence to report their abuse, thus improving incident recording, tracking and reporting;
- a domestic violence enforcement campaigns to provide 'gold model' service to very high and high risk victims of domestic violence; and
- Cardiff 'After Dark' programme – an early intervention strategy targeting certain areas on Friday and Saturday nights; this involves issuing PNDs for, in particular, public order offences.

### 4.4 Overall TVCP Findings

- 89. As can be seen in Figure 1, serious violent crime in Cardiff has been falling for some time and has continued to fall following the inception of the TVCP. To put this in context, the trend within other TVCP tranche 1 areas and Cardiff's 'most similar' CDRPs<sup>6</sup> has remained fairly stable over this period.
- 90. In contrast, less serious violent crime has risen since the start of the programme. This is to be expected, considering that many of the TVCP initiatives would lead to incidents being more likely to come to police attention. Examples of these would include increased police presence in the city centre and campaigns to encourage reporting of domestic violence (especially less serious violence, such as harassment, common assault and less serious wounding).

**Figure 1: Serious and less serious violence in Cardiff, as compared to other tranche 1 areas and those in the same CDRP family (i.e. Most Similar).**



<sup>6</sup>This average is generated from the 14 CDRPs considered by the Home Office to be the most similar to Cardiff but which are not themselves TVCP tranche 1 or 2 areas. Areas with insufficient violent crime data were also excluded. This left: Lincoln City, Plymouth, Leeds, Bristol, Preston, Northampton, Sheffield, Derby, Stoke-on-Trent, Leicester, and Reading as Cardiff's most similar areas.

91. A closer look at individual point-level violent crime data provided by South Wales Police adds support to these conclusions. As shown in Table 2, reduction in serious violent crime in Cardiff is strongly linked to reductions in the city centre and to the city's night time economy. In contrast, common assault, less serious wounding and harassment have all increased, as has domestic violence.

**Table 2: Percentage change in police recorded crime since the introduction of the TVCP in November 2004.**

	Location		Timing		Total
	City Centre	Other Areas	NTE*	Not NTE	
Serious wounding	-55.4	-5.5	-31.5	-19.1	-25.6
Domestic violence related**	50.0	42.6	54.4	38.2	43.1
Assault on a police constable	-36.6	-32.7	-22.1	-40.5	-33.9
Common assault	80.9	30.6	44.3	35.4	37.6
Harassment	13.1	1.5	25.1	-6.1	6.7
Less serious wounding	4.3	16.9	16.7	11.7	13.7
Possession of offensive weapon	-21.2	-16.2	-22.8	-15.4	-17.5
Racially aggravated violence	-51.0	-11.9	-16.3	-25.4	-23.2
Sex offences	-11.4	9.3	-19.4	16.4	4.3
Total	0.6	9.3	11.5	3.8	6.7

(\*) Night time Economy violence refers in this case to all crime committed between 8pm and 6am Friday to Sunday.

(\*\*) Domestic violence related incidents are not specifically flagged and encompass a variety of offences. This indicator is calculated by looking for key words in the free text descriptions of the offence. Due to the volume of data, this is done automatically so errors are inevitable. Quality checking the coding scheme, however, suggested that over 90% of both non-domestic and domestic crimes were captured accurately.

## 4.5 The Triage

92. The city centre triage unit was developed due to demand placed on the ambulance service and the hospital's accident and emergency (A&E) department. Alcohol related violence occurring during weekends and evenings had led to pressures on the service's capacity, particularly when there was an event on at the stadium.
93. The triage service, inspired by a similar scheme trialled in Swansea during December 2003, began operating in Cardiff in December 2004. Initially it comprised

a small ambulance parked up in the city centre staffed by a driver and a paramedic, although more recent versions have involved police officers on site. The unit is supported by patient transportation vehicles provided by St. John's Ambulance and the Welsh Ambulance Services Trust. In keeping with the partnership approach, medical staff at the triage unit are provided with a police radio to report any problems that may occur and to be able to respond directly to 999 calls if necessary.

94. On regular weekends, the ambulance unit operates between 8pm and 6am on Friday and Saturday nights and deals with individuals in need of minor treatment who might otherwise call 999. This may include individuals who are victims of minor assaults or those who have become heavily intoxicated – virtually all treatment provided by the service is due to alcohol related incidents.
95. In its first year of operation, the unit treated an average of nine patients per night ranging from a minimum of three to as many as 19.<sup>7</sup> Of those treated, 36% were discharged, 50% were conveyed to hospital by the triage ambulance leaving only 15% requiring a regular ambulance. This clearly represents a significant easing of the burden Cardiff's night time economy places on health departments, particularly the ambulance service.
96. Following major events at Cardiff's millennium stadium, the triage unit now takes advantage of the stadium's first aid room, now called the Cardiff Medical Treatment Centre (CMTC). This is provided free of charge by the Welsh Rugby Union to act as an alternative destination for treatment of minor injuries thus taking even more burden off the city's A&E department during particularly busy periods. In order to prevent the CMTC from becoming a 'drop-in centre' and consequently increasing demand on the health service, the unit is not advertised or signposted. Instead it receives referrals from police officers who come across injured or intoxicated individuals during their shift.

---

<sup>7</sup> These statistics are taken from an unpublished (at time of writing) evaluation of Cardiff's Mobile Medical Response Unit and Medical Treatment Centre. The authors are grateful to Tim John for allowing access to the draft report.


97. On average, during dates where the Cardiff Medical Treatment Centre operates with the rest of the triage unit, 17 patients are treated per night (8pm-6am), ranging between 10 and 26 patients. Eighty-five percent of these are conveyed from the triage units to either the main treatment centre or to hospital. However just 6% have required transportation from the ambulance service. The local SPCO has estimated that, on average, the CMTC prevents approximately 13 patients (per night of operation) from being transferred to the city's A&E department.
98. In addition to reducing demand on the health service, the triage unit frees up police officer time by allowing them to quickly pass on individuals in need of medical attention when previously they may themselves have had to administer first aid and/or wait with the individual until an ambulance arrived. Such a wait can take an officer 'off the street' for as much as 90 minutes. Consequently, the triage unit allows the officer to get back to where he or she is needed more quickly.

#### **4.6 Case Study Results**

99. Anecdotally, the unit is said to be very effective. On its first weekend, freed from the city centre burden, the ambulance service (which covers the whole of Cardiff, not just the city centre) met its targets of responding to over 90% of calls within a certain time. Overall, during the first twelve months of the scheme, the ambulance service responded to 97.8% of calls within eight minutes. The A&E department waiting times Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were also met.
100. As can be seen from
101. Figure 2, assault related admissions in Cardiff A&E have decreased by 30% over three years from an average of over 300 admissions per month to around 200. It is important to note that this downward trend begins two years prior to the opening of the city centre triage unit (i.e. December 2004). However, it does reflect the maturation of the collaboration between Cardiff's community safety team and the city's health departments.

102. The scheme has been considered so successful that this year the partnership plan to kit out a purpose built trailer to use as a triage every weekend to add more capacity and better facilities for the paramedics on the ground.

**Figure 2. Number of monthly assault related admissions in Cardiff A&E (sourced from the Violence & Society Research Group, Cardiff University).**



#### 4.7 Key Lessons Learned and Good Practice

- In order to engage health departments with the violent crime agenda, it can be useful to show how the burden on ambulance services and emergency departments can be reduced, particularly late on weekend nights. In addition, it is useful to remind them of their duty under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act to collaborate with the police and local authorities to perform local crime audits and to develop crime reduction strategies and practice. There are also many misconceptions about patient confidentiality; data protection and crime prevention legislation as well as General Medical Council guidance makes

specific provision for data sharing to detect, investigate and prevent community violence.

- Every agency in the partnership should have ownership of the problems and every agency should have a say in the strategies.
- Good partnership working helps to tackle issues besides violence. The successful triage initiative described here provides an example of what is possible with the help of a strong partnership and a holistic, coordinated approach.
- Intelligently focusing interventions to hot times and hot places can help make a little go a long way.
- Using TVCP funds to trial innovative interventions can help build on existing strategy.

## **5 CASE STUDY TWO: SAFER GLASSES IN SWANSEA**

### **5.1 Background**

103. Swansea is situated on the south coast of Wales approximately 34 miles from Cardiff. It is the second largest city in Wales after Cardiff with nearly a quarter of a million residents. Historically, Swansea was an important port and had significant metal working and coal mining industries. The modern Swansea has a highly concentrated entertainment district in the city centre, with a large number of licensed premises, and an international sports stadium for football and rugby matches. Swansea's Community Safety Partnership (CSP) covers an area of approximately 200 square miles.

### **5.2 Violent Crime Prior to TVCP**

104. The main violent crime problems in Swansea stem from its vibrant night time economy. The city has many licensed pubs and clubs, both in the city centre and in the suburbs. Within the city centre is the heart of Swansea's night time economy with a licensing capacity of more than 23,000. These are mostly concentrated into just two streets which are hotspots for violent crime.
105. A large proportion of violent crime in the city is alcohol related. Violent crime extends from lesser offences through to the most serious crimes.

### **5.3 Description of TVCP Implementation, Aims and Initiatives**

106. Swansea entered the TVCP in tranche 2, which began in May 2005 (although Swansea reports its TVCP started a couple of months after this, in July).
107. The TVCP takes a three-pronged attack on violent crime: enforcement, prevention and education. Specifically, TVCP funding in Swansea has been used to employ a more proactive approach which includes the following initiatives:


- multi-agency visits to licensed premises to check for Security Industry Authority (SIA) accreditation of door staff and health and safety compliance amongst other things;
  - a taxi marshalling scheme to bring order to problem taxi ranks where a lack of control (people pushing in, and so forth) often results in violent exchanges; permanent barriers have also been installed at some ranks;
  - the running of a mobile triage centre in the city centre during the festive period to take the pressure off A&E departments and ambulance services and to reduce crime by treating and sending home individuals who are excessively drunk and thus vulnerable to victimisation (somewhat similar to that described above in Cardiff);
  - enhancing CCTV in the city centre and, in some cases, relocating it to more problematic areas;
  - running a 'Christmas Court' to deal with the increase in violent offences experienced during the festive period (36 people were processed by the court over four days); a special court was also set up to process those committing violence against health service workers to get the message across that this is unacceptable; and
  - a safer glass scheme whereby the partnership has supplied and encouraged the use of safer glasses in the city's pubs, bars and clubs in order to reduce glass related injury and violence. This initiative is described in more detail below.
108. In addition to interventions aimed at alcohol related crime in the night time economy, Swansea has also addressed issues of domestic violence and has set up a dedicated domestic violence unit and plan to create a Specialist Domestic Violence Court.

### 5.4 Overall TVCP Findings

As can be seen in

- 109. Figure 3, serious violent crime has remained relatively stable in the two years prior and following the introduction of the TVCP. Serious violence in Swansea, although greater than in its ‘most similar’ areas,<sup>8</sup> remains relatively low compared to other tranche 2 TVCP areas. The reduction in other tranche 2 CDRPs seems higher in comparison to that recorded in Swansea, although the decreasing trend seems to have commenced at least 12 months before the TVCP was introduced in these areas.
- 110. Less serious violence has also remained relatively stable before and following the introduction of the TVCP, whereas rates in other TVCP tranche 2 areas and Swansea’s most similar CDRPs show a gradual upward trend. Rates of less serious violence in Swansea are low compared to both these comparators.

**Figure 3: Serious and less serious violence in Swansea CDRP compared to other CDRPs in TVCP tranche 2 and its most similar CDRPs.**




<sup>8</sup> This average is generated from the 14 CDRPs considered by the Home Office to be the most similar to Swansea but which are not themselves TVCP tranche 1 or 2 areas. Areas with insufficient violent crime data were also excluded. This left: Preston, Kirklees, Stockton-on-Tees, Leeds, Peterborough, Telford and Wrekin, Bradford, Sheffield, Newport, Welwyn-Hatfield, Swindon, York, Wrexham and Sunderland as Swansea’s most similar areas.

Source: Home Office.

## 5.5 The Safer Glasses Initiative

111. One of the most successful interventions undertaken in Swansea concerns its work with the city's licensed premises to promote the use of plastic glasses and bottles to reduce the risk of serious wounding. Facial glass related injuries are horrific and can leave a victim scarred and traumatised for life. The Home Office estimates the economic and social cost of a serious wounding to be £130,000 on average.<sup>9</sup>
112. To reduce the opportunity of this type of injury occurring, the partnership invested in nearly 11,000 polycarbonate glasses, called *safer glasses* as opposed to plastic glasses because of the negative perception of the term 'plastic'. Polycarbonate is extremely strong meaning the 'safer glasses' can go through a dishwasher at least 500 times and be dropped with little likelihood of them chipping or cracking.
113. The glasses were issued free to twelve pubs around a particularly busy street in the city centre. All premises agreed to trial them for six weeks over the festive period in 2004/2005. The trial was restricted to this one area for two reasons:
- the concentration of safer glasses in one area would convey a positive message from the partnership and its associates; and
  - it would also prevent disgruntled patrons from moving on to an establishment providing traditional glassware as the establishment next door also had safer glasses.
114. The trial was deemed a success by Swansea. There were no glass related violent incidents in the pubs using safer glasses over the six week trial period. In fact, no



<sup>9</sup> See Brand, S. & Price, R. (2000). The economic and social costs of crime. Home Office Research Study 217. London: Home Office

incidents where a glass was used were reported to police for six months from the start of the initiative (as compared to seven incidents the previous year over the same time period). Very few complaints were made by the general public in the bars themselves; when customers did complain they became supportive when informed of why the scheme was being run. Other benefits of the scheme include:

- any glass related injuries, whether accidental or mischievous, would be significantly less serious than with glass; and
- fewer glass related injuries would ease the burden on hospitals and their staff, and thus reduce waiting times.

115. The quality of the 'glass' was also very well received by the licensed trade. Nine premises said they would support *legislative change* to enforce the use of safer glasses, two premises changed to safer glasses and have not gone back, more premises / licensees are seeing the benefits and more and more are purchasing the safer glasses of their own accord. Interviews with the publicans using the safer glasses, highlighted the following benefits of using the safer glasses:

- premises were easier and quicker to clean at the end of the night;
- less room was required for storage at premises, as safer glasses can be stacked floor to ceiling with no damage being caused to the material;
- less damage to floors – wooden floors would not require refurbishing or polishing so often;
- less chance of broken glass injuries to staff; and
- less chance of accidental injuries to customers (many glass injuries seen at A&E departments involved women cutting themselves on glass fragments after having removed their shoes on dance floors - this injury would typically take at least four hours to treat).

116. Swansea has also taken advantage of the new licensing laws that came into effect in October 2005. They made it a condition of new licenses that the premises had to

use safer glasses on certain dates – such as the two weekends over Christmas and New Year. They also put conditions on the licenses of problematic premises to use the safer glasses.


117. Complementing the safer glasses initiative was a marketing campaign to highlight the consequences of glass related violence. This was in the form of a number of high impact posters showing the damage caused by glass attacks – an image many people, both potential assailants and victims, are unlikely to have first hand experience of. In addition, a message was put across that such incidents put a strain on the health service which results in increased delays for treatment and surgery for others.
118. The safer glasses scheme was part of a wider “Call Time on Violent Crime” programme, which included the following other elements:
  - a zero-tolerance exclusion zone within the city centre, banning offenders from participating pubs and clubs (36 participated);
  - posters;
  - t-shirts;
  - high visibility police presence and security within premises;
  - triage;
  - radio advertising; and
  - taxi marshalling.

## **5.6 Case Study Results**

119. As can be seen from Figure 4, most (83%) glass related incidents are actually associated with the use of glass bottles rather than actual glasses. This means that although the use of safer glasses is recommended, its effect would be maximised if plastic or polycarbonate bottles could also be introduced. Because the use of non-

glass bottles is costly (both to obtain and recycle after use), licensed premises may be unwilling to adopt them unless they are subsidised. An alternative would be to enforce their use locally, regionally or nationally so as not to create a disadvantage for those who wish to adopt the scheme.

**Figure 4: Glass related violent offences in Swansea CDRP.**




120. Although the number of glass related incidents is small, they tend to result in more serious outcomes and should, thus, be prioritised. Of the 278 glass related incidents recorded from April 2002 to August 2006 (inclusive) in Swansea CDRP, 31% were serious violent offences, compared to just 4% of non-glass related incidents recorded over the same time period. When only incidents involving actual glasses are considered (as opposed to glasses and bottles), this percentage increases from 31% to 47%. Consequently, if just two glass related incidents are saved by this scheme, this is likely to have saved at least one serious wounding.<sup>10</sup>
121. Due to the small number of cases, it is difficult to determine the effect of the safer glasses initiative. Another difficulty is that detailed information on the intensity and/or timing of the intervention is not available. However, the most salient input is

<sup>10</sup> It is of course likely that many 'serious woundings' go unreported. Therefore a better estimate of the number of injuries saved would come from an analysis Accident and Emergency admission data for glass-related injuries.

a six-week period starting on the third week of December 2004. During that period, and for nearly a year after, no violent offences where a glass was used were recorded in Swansea city centre (see Figure 5; the two incidents in the December 2004 – January 2005 period took place before 21<sup>st</sup> December).

**Figure 5: Number of violent incidents where a glass was used in Swansea CDRP.**



122. Swansea is aiming for more safer glasses in circulation by encouraging licensees within both the city centre and the surrounding areas to purchase them instead of glass. Also a change is needed from alcoholic drinks served in glass bottles to plastic bottles, as it is glass bottles that are used in most glass related incidents. Swansea is lobbying the government to require breweries to change to plastic bottles as problems still exist with glass. At the moment there are disincentives as brewers charge licensees more for plastic bottles and plastic bottles also cost more to recycle. A possible alternative would be to require staff not to hand over glass bottles and instead pour the contents into a safer glass.

### **5.7 Key Lessons Learned and Good Practice**

123. Ensure the licensed premises are on board. Many tend not to like the cheap flimsy plastic cups and will be reluctant to participate, but these same premises may be willing to use the safer glasses, which are higher quality.

124. Make it a condition of licence that high risk premises use safer glasses on certain dates or during certain events (such as a football match, or music concerts).
125. To encourage voluntary take up of safer glasses, target whole areas or streets rather than individual premises as some feel using them may result in a loss of customers to competitors. The fear is that the plastic is not able to keep the beer as cold as traditional beer glasses.
126. Although more expensive, good quality polycarbonate glasses are more likely to be used and being harder to break can actually be a cost-effective replacement to glass on a permanent basis.
127. Inform customers of the purposes of the initiative to ensure community engagement and cooperation.

## 6 CASE STUDY THREE: THE WIRRAL FAMILY SAFETY UNIT

### 6.1 Background

128. Wirral is a peninsula of around 60 square miles on the north west coast of England, bounded by the River Mersey and River Dee. The major urban areas are to the east of Wirral around its docklands, these include Wirral's largest town of Birkenhead and second largest Wallasey. The west region of Wirral is predominantly rural. According to the 2001 census the Metropolitan Borough of Wirral had a population of 312,293 of which 98% defined themselves as white (the national average for England is 90%).
129. Wirral originally developed as an engineering and manufacturing region on the Mersey side of the peninsula. Given its geographic location Wirral also has a long history as a major maritime location in particular through the Mersey Ferries which date back hundreds of years. Indeed the docklands play a major role in Wirral's economy with international links establishing Birkenhead as an important shipping centre. However gradual decline in the demand for such traditional industries has seen a rise in the average unemployment figures in Wirral (3.2% as opposed to the national average of 2.4%), leading to high social deprivation within Wirral for those areas most affected.

### 6.2 Violent Crime Prior to TVCP

130. According to recorded crime statistics Wirral is in line with other tranche 1 TVCP areas in terms of being above national levels for serious violent crime. However, for other violent crime Wirral is in fact less than the average across its 'most similar' CDRP areas.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> This average is generated from the 14 CDRPs considered by the Home Office to be the most similar to Wirral but which are not themselves TVCP tranche 1 or 2 areas. Areas with insufficient violent crime data were also excluded. This left: Sefton, Mansfield, Tameside, Bury, Darlington, North East Lincolnshire, St Helens, Wigan, Chesterfield, Thanet, Rochdale, and Gateshead as Wirral's most similar areas.

131. A significant problem in Wirral, however, which is not well represented by recorded crime statistics, is that of domestic violence. Wirral's Community Safety Unit estimate that domestic violence accounts for nearly a third of all violent crime in the area. To put this in context, the 2005/2006 British Crime Survey (BCS)<sup>12</sup> suggests that domestic violence accounts for 15% of all violent crime, and has fallen by 64% over the last 10 years.

### **6.3 Description of TVCP Implementation, Aims and Initiatives**

132. Although a tranche 1 TVCP area, Wirral had teething problems with its TVCP, which resulted in most projects commencing in early summer 2005 – commensurate with tranche 2 TVCP funding.
133. Initially, the focus of Wirral's TVCP bid was to tackle its domestic violence problem with £30k TVCP funding to improve information systems relating to domestic violence, to target harden victims' residences and to distribute 999-only mobile phones to at-risk individuals. However, for various reasons these projects failed to take off, and the funds were instead redirected, at short notice, to interventions aimed at tackling night time economy related violence. In particular, the purchasing of mobile CCTV cameras (head-cams) to improve the quality of evidence gathered on, and subsequently the chances of securing convictions against, violent offenders.
134. Due to the short notice of this project, the cameras were not actually installed until April/May 2005 – six months after the start of the TVCP. This coincided with Wirral's tranche 2 funded programme, which included a Pubwatch scheme to monitor violence in and around public houses, and a night bus service to disperse large concentrations of people who gather outside pubs and clubs at closing time.
135. Since tranche 2 of the TVCP began, however, the main focus for TVCP in Wirral has returned to domestic violence related issues. Many TVCP areas are using 2006/07 funding to concentrate on domestic violence.


---

<sup>12</sup>See Walker, Kershaw & Nicholas (2006): <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/hosb1206.pdf>

### 6.4 Overall TVCP Findings

136. Figure 6 shows the trend in serious and less serious violence in Wirral compared to other tranche 1 TVCP areas and the average across its ‘most similar’ areas.

**Figure 6: Trends in serious and less serious violence in Wirral as compared to other TVCP tranche 1 areas and its most similar CDRPs.**



137. As shown in Figure 6, serious crime has been decreasing in Wirral since June 2004, several months before the TVCP started. However, a similar decrease was seen amongst Wirral’s matched areas, which has since levelled out whereas the decrease in Wirral continues. In terms of less serious violence, Wirral’s rate has remained relatively stable since September 2004. It is therefore difficult to say with any degree of certainty that the TVCP in Wirral has had a noticeable effect on its recorded crime rates.

### 6.5 The Family Safety Unit

138. Domestic violence is defined in the BCS as “all violent incidents, except mugging, which involve partners, ex-partners or other relatives”. The key principle behind Wirral’s strategy to target domestic violence was to improve interagency collaboration and information sharing. Although, to some extent, multi-agency working was taking place prior to TVCP, there was little coordination of services

and no accountability unless a serious incident occurred. Wirral's tranche 2 TVCP grant therefore helped to set up a multi-agency Family Safety Unit (FSU) that sat within the area's Community Safety Team (funds were also received from GONW for this purpose). The aim of the unit was to ensure co-ordination of services to survivors of domestic violence by:

- signposting survivors to available services;
- early identification of survivors that are most at risk of serious physical harm, through close liaison with partners;
- providing assistance to survivors involved in the Criminal Justice System; and
- providing practical support to survivors to allow them to remain in their home.

139. Importantly, one objective of the FSU was to set-up and maintain an inter-agency online information system to provide a comprehensive centralised information resource and to facilitate information sharing across a wide range of stakeholder agencies that include:

- the police;
- the local authority;
- the health service;
- maternity department;
- housing department;
- social services;
- probation services;
- Community Safety Team (CST) case workers;
- victim support;

- Primary Care Trusts (PCTs);
  - Crown Prosecution Service; and
  - education services.
140. A Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) was also established in September 2005, which meets once a month to discuss high-risk cases. Cases to be discussed are highlighted in advance on the multi-agency information system so that each agency can prepare appropriately. The MARAC conference itself then ensures that each agency knows what every other agency is doing.
141. The FSU went live in August 2005. Its projected aims included an increase in the reporting of domestic violence and in the long term to reduce repeat offences by 25% by 2008.
142. Another aim is to provide support and advice for victims. Possibly one of the most imaginative outputs of the FSU is its link to housing associations in order to provide 'Safe Havens'. This involves accommodation being found at very short notice for victims who want to move out of their existing homes. Target hardening victims' houses has also been introduced to assist victims of domestic violence, as has the provision of legal advocacy services to provide legal advice, and facilitate rapid injunctions where necessary. The aim of this is to reduce the number of domestic violence victims withdrawing from the Criminal Justice Process.
143. The campaigns have been supported by a moderate level of media attention. When the FSU first opened, a full day conference was held for all partners to discuss current issue and future plans. In terms of appealing to the victims of domestic violence, each agency has its own responsibility to get the message across. However, they also work together to promote the services on offer from the Family Safety Unit on the sides of buses, and to particularly hard to reach communities.

## 6.6 Case Study Results


144. The multi-agency approach to tackling domestic violence has been well received amongst those parties partaking in the scheme. Initial findings suggest reporting of DV has increased which is a major first-step given crime of this type is plagued with under-reporting. This increase may be a result of the increased awareness amongst DV victims in Wirral of the services available to them.
145. In order to assess the effect of the scheme on domestic violence related incidents, an analysis was carried out on police recorded crime data. Domestic violence is not a specific crime category and although a domestic violence 'flag' has been added to the reports since July 2004, this flag is thought not to be consistently applied. In any case, in order to compare domestic violence rates from before this time, it was necessary to conduct a content analysis of the 'free text' fields describing the offence. In line with the Home Office's definition of domestic violence, Table 3 shows the coding scheme used to determine whether an offence was to be considered 'domestic' or not.

**Table 3: Key words identified in free text reports indicator domestic or non-domestic offence.**

Words indicating a 'domestic' incident	Words indicating a 'non-domestic' incident
Partner	Not related
Boyfriend	Stranger
Relative	Acquaintance (and Acquaintance)
Girlfriend	
Son	
Daughter	
Father	
Mother	
Domestic	


146. Figure 7 shows the trend in the proportion of violent incidents that are determined to be 'domestic' related. As can be seen, there is a considerable increase around July 2004 which is commensurate with changes in recording practices across Merseyside Police. However, since a high in January 2005 of nearly 30% the proportion of domestic violence incidents appears to be steadily decreasing, to around 20% in 2006.

**Figure 7: Proportion of violent incidents that are 'domestic'.**



147. A look at the actual domestic violence flags recorded by the police supports this analysis with domestic violence decreasing from 140 incidents in January 2005 to around 80 in 2006. The trend line shown in Figure 8 highlights this decrease.

**Figure 8: Violent incidents 'flagged' as 'domestic'.**



148. Despite the claim of an initial increase in reports of domestic violent offences, data suggest that the proportion of incidents that are domestic related is actually slowly decreasing in the Wirral. However, it is too early to determine the longevity of this trend and therefore the reliability of this conclusion, although the early signs are encouraging.
149. Although the initiative was specifically aimed at repeat offending/victimisation, data had not been systematically recorded so an evaluation of the impact of this initiative on repeat domestic violence specifically was not possible.

### ***6.7 Key Lessons Learned and Good Practice***

150. The following points were stressed as being critical to the success of the scheme:
- the passion, drive and determination amongst lead staff;
  - a coordinated partnership approach;
  - effective information sharing;
  - accountability; and
  - the FSU's coordination role (the FSU's role is to signpost and coordinate other agencies, in order to ensure they are communicating with each other).

## 7 KEY ELEMENTS OF GOOD PRACTICE

151. Partnership – Get as many partners on board as you believe add value to a particular project. If you have trouble engaging potential partners, make a point of presenting them with reasons why they should be involved – perhaps showing them projects where they could make a significant impact and highlighting where this impact is relevant to their goals.
152. Identify your problems – Take time to identify what your particular and specific crime problems are in the first instance, a clearer definition of the problem allows for better targeted and consequently more effective solutions. If your partnership does not have an analyst, make use of analysts employed by the police, council, or other partner agencies.
153. Be realistic – While innovation is a great thing, practicability goes a long way. Assess whether your project and targets are achievable, and can be applied within an operational setting.
154. Sustainability – Ultimately, the aim of the TVCP is to make a sustainable impact on violent crime. Make sure each project is not too resource intensive, since you may want to carry it on after TVCP funding has ended. However, initial capacity building may be a good thing.
155. Copy with care – If you plan to copy an intervention identified as good practice in another area, remember to transfer the *rationale* and *ideas* behind the project to your area, *not* just the implementation of it. Your area will differ in many respects from the place you would like to emulate, thus you may have to be prepared to customise the project to fit your area's particular features and nuances or risk it failing.
156. Targeted interventions – Avoid trying to kill two birds with one stone, if your project does do that then consider it a bonus. Instead, target your project specifically to a particular and specific crime problem (see 'identify your problem' above). Starting small and getting it right is what is important.

157. Be flexible – if the project does not seem to be working, be flexible enough to stop it, find out why it is not working, then modify it or plan something new. Continuing with a failing project is a waste of time, money and resources.
158. Evaluate – too often projects that have been planned and executed well are let down by a lack of evaluation. Evaluation is not just about reporting crime figures back to the Home Office via data returns. It is about setting up a systematic way of measuring data before, during and after an intervention in order to assess whether the project has: a) operated as planned; and b) had the level of impact expected. This will help to plan even better interventions in future.
159. Disseminate – If you have done something that you think (or your evaluation shows) works really well, then tell others – do not let them re-invent the wheel! Present your findings in regional and national meetings, or write your project up for a police magazine, such as 'Police Professional', or community safety journal, enter it for a Tilley Award and tell others what you have done.

## APPENDIX A: CONTACT DETAILS OF SPOCS

<b>CDRP</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Single Point of Contact</b>	<b>Email Address</b>
Birmingham (D1)	West Midlands	Insp Darren Walsh	d.walsh@west-midlands.pnn.police.uk
Birmingham (D3)	West Midlands	DCI Steve Graham	s.graham@west-midlands.pnn.police.uk
Bolton	North West	Martin Greenhalgh	martin.greenhalgh@gmp.police.uk
Brent	London	Neil Wilson	neil.wilson@met.police.uk
Bristol	South West	CI Paul Mogg	paul.mogg@avonandsomerset.police.uk
Camden	London	Martin Richards	martin.richards@met.police.uk
Cardiff	Wales	CI Steve Furnham	steve.furnham@south-wales.pnn.police.uk
Coventry	West Midlands	Sgt Lee Burns	l.burns@west-midlands.pnn.police.uk
Doncaster	Yorkshire and The Humber	Richard Tweed	richard.tweed@southyorks.pnn.police.uk
Ealing	London	Mark Wolski	mark.wolski@met.police.uk
Hackney	London	Alun Goode	alun.goode@met.police.uk
Haringey	London	Richard Wood	richard.wood@met.police.uk
Hull	Yorkshire and The Humber	Mick Stevenson	john.stevenson@humberside.pnn.police.uk
Islington	London	DCI Lorraine Dillon	lorraine.dillon@met.police.uk
Kirklees	Yorkshire and The Humber	Roddy Minogue	roddy.minogue@kirklees.gov.uk
Lambeth	London	John Corrigan	john.corrigan2@met.police.uk

<b>CDRP</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Single Point of Contact</b>	<b>Email Address</b>
Leeds	Yorkshire and The Humber	Jim Willson	jim.willson@leeds.gov.uk
Leicester	East Midlands	Ken Kelly	kenneth.kelly@leicestershire.pnn.police.uk
Lewisham	London	Richard Martin	richard.martin4@met.police.uk
Liverpool	North West	CI Jon Roy	jonathan.r.roy@merseyside.pnn.police.uk
Manchester	North West	Joanne Davies	j.davies6@manchester.gov.uk
Newham	London	Andy McKechnie	andy.mckechnie@met.police.uk
Nottingham	East Midlands	Insp Paul Winter	paul.winter@nottinghamshire.pnn.police.uk
Rhonda Cynon Taff	Wales	CSupt Jeff Farrar	jeff.farrar@south-wales.pnn.police.uk
Salford	North West	Don Brown	don.brown@salford.gov.uk
Sheffield	Yorkshire and The Humber	Paul Broadbent	paul.broadbent@southyorks.pnn.police.uk
Southwark	London	Dave Chinchin	david.chinchen@met.police.uk
Swansea	Wales	CI Ray Bignall	ray.bignall@south-wales.pnn.police.uk
Wakefield	Yorkshire and The Humber	Chris Thompson	ct76@westyorkshire.pnn.police.uk
Waltham Forest	London	Paul Rickett	paul.rickett@met.police.uk
Westminster	London	Alaric Bonthron	alaric.bonthron@met.police.uk
Wirral	North West	Simon Fitzpatrick	simon.d.fitzpatrick@merseyside.pnn.police.uk
Wolverhampton	West Midlands	Supt Keith Baldwin	k.baldwin@west-midlands.police.uk