

*Optional pragmatic processes or optional covert linguistic structure?**

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Abstract

The starting point for this paper is an asymmetry between overt linguistic indexicals and (alleged) covert indexicals. It has been proposed that the problem can be solved by making covert indexicals optional (Martí 2006) and that this provides a much better (linguistically respectable) account of the key phenomena than one that advocates an optional process of free (not linguistically mandated) pragmatic enrichment. I outline the debate and try to make the case that, at least for a theory of utterance comprehension, the pragmatic account is far preferable.

1 Introduction

Consider the exchange in (1), focussing on Sue's response to Bob's question:

- (1) Bob: How is Jane feeling after her first year at university?
Sue: She didn't get enough units and can't continue.

It's reasonable to suppose that the propositions that Sue communicated (meant) are the following:

- (2) a. [JANE_i DIDN'T PASS ENOUGH UNIVERSITY COURSE UNITS TO QUALIFY FOR ADMISSION TO SECOND YEAR STUDY]_p & AS A RESULT OF P JANE_i CANNOT CONTINUE WITH UNIVERSITY STUDY
b. JANE_i IS NOT FEELING HAPPY

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(2b) is pretty clearly a conversational implicature of Sue's utterance, an indirect answer to Bob's question, while (2a) is what we call in relevance theory an 'explicature', that is, a proposition explicitly communicated (or meant-*nn*, in Grice's terms) by the speaker, sometimes referred to as the truth-conditional content of *the utterance* (clearly, not of the sentence). It's built on the encoded linguistic content, which has undergone a range of pragmatic processes, including disambiguation, assigning of a specific referent to the pronoun 'she', and various completions and enrichments. The relevance-theoretic view of linguistic input (which is also held by some theorists working in other frameworks) is that it is a template or set of clues or constraints, which is sufficient to ensure that swift and effort-minimal pragmatic processes recover the intended content, but which seldom, if ever, provides all of the content itself.

We can make a distinction among the pragmatic processes involved in fleshing out the linguistic meaning in order to arrive at the explicature, depending on whether they are **obligatory or optional**, a distinction which has been emphasised and clarified by Francois Recanati (1993, 2004). Disambiguation and saturation (i.e. giving a specific value to a variable, such as a pronoun) are obligatory, that is, they must take place across all contexts. They are linguistically mandated or 'bottom-up', that is, the linguistic system indicates when and where the pragmatic process of saturation is required. 'Free' pragmatic enrichment, on the other hand, is not linguistically mandated (that's what it means to be 'free'); it's a top-down process driven purely by pragmatic considerations, so it need not occur across all contexts, that is, it's optional. The resultative reading of the 'and'-conjunction in example (1) is an instance of free enrichment; on some occasions of use of an 'and'-conjunction, there may be no such enrichment. This kind of pragmatic effect is controversial - some folk think there just aren't any linguistically free processes contributing to explicitly communicated content and that the only free pragmatic processes are those that eventuate in an implicature (Grice, for instance, appears to have taken this stance).

Advocates of 'free' enrichment generally distinguish two kinds. One is modulations or adjustments of linguistically encoded meanings. For instance, a hearer might pragmatically infer a narrower concept than the one lexically encoded, e.g. in an utterance of 'Boris is a *man*', the concept expressed by 'man' might be understood as 'ideal man' or 'typical man'; or the opposite might be the case, that is, the speaker might have used a lexically encoded concept loosely, so that the concept inferred involves a pragmatic broadening, e.g. 'My children are *bankrupting* me' meaning they are making me substantially poorer than I'd like to be. For extensive discussion of the process of *ad hoc* concept formation, as this is known, see Wilson and Carston (2007). The second kind of free enrichment that contributes to explicature is the recovery of components of content which are *not linguistically indicated* at all. Such contributions (or intrusions) are what are

known as ‘unarticulated constituents’ of utterance content; these are elements that are not only not phonologically realised, as is the case for various empty syntactic categories (traces, PRO, etc.), but are not marked out in the linguistic logical form in any way at all. It is these that are the subject of this paper.

2 The issue: optional syntactic structure or optional pragmatics?

Among the cases of possible unarticulated constituents of explicature that have been discussed in the literature are the following, where the bracketed constituent has not been overtly expressed:

- (3)
- a. It is raining. {in Paris}
 - b. I have eaten. {supper}
 - c. Every bottle is empty. {in the fridge}
 - d. You won’t die. {from your minor injury}
 - e. Jill reported Jack for misconduct and he was fired. {as a result}

Certain semanticists have taken the view that either there *is* in fact some linguistic articulation of the pragmatically contributed element or, if not and there is a free pragmatic process involved, the result must be a conversational implicature, so a non-truth-conditional aspect of utterance meaning (see, in particular, Stanley 2000, King and Stanley 2005). With regard to the first three cases, the view would be that there is a covert indexical element in the linguistic logical form: a location variable in (3a), an object argument in (3b), and a domain variable in (3c), while the cause-consequence relation in (3e) would be an implicature. I don’t intend to review the, by now fairly extensively discussed, arguments for and against this sort of proposal. However, one respect in which the analysis in terms of hidden elements has been found wanting, by people on both sides of the debate, is that these alleged covert indexicals seem to behave differently from overt indexicals (see Carston 2000, Recanati 2002, Martí 2006).

In order to fully grasp the proposition explicitly communicated by an utterance containing an overt indexical, a hearer has to find the intended occasion-specific value for the variable. In other words, linguistic forms like ‘she’, ‘it’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘here’, ‘there’, etc. must be assigned a specific value rather than be merely existentially closed.

- (4)
- a. She’s happy.
 - b. SOME FEMALE PERSON IS HAPPY
 - c. canta [SING (3rd person-singular-present tense)]
 - d. SOMEONE SINGS

So an addressee of an utterance of (4a) who can't, for whatever reason, assign a specific value to 'she' and retrieves just the indefinite 'some female person' has failed to grasp the proposition expressed (or, alternatively, we could say that it is the speaker who has failed if she produces such an utterance in the absence of a referent which is readily accessible to her addressee). The pragmatic process of assigning a referent to 'she' is obligatory. And the same goes for uncontroversial cases of covert pronouns: so, in Spanish, which is a pro-drop language, an utterance of (4c) will not have been understood if the hearer only recovers SOMEONE SINGS or THERE IS SINGING. However, this does not seem to be the case for at least some of the alleged covert indexicals. For instance, there are some occurrences of (3b) for which there is no need to supply a particular object value (e.g. 'These days, after *I've eaten* I feel unwell') and, arguably, so also for some utterances of (3a) (e.g. 'What's happens in the atmosphere when *it rains*?') and Recanati's (2002) well-known 'weatherman' example¹). In other words, it is not always the case that correctly grasping the proposition explicitly communicated requires saturation of the (alleged) linguistic variable; an existentially closed interpretation is quite sufficient in some contexts. This upsets the idea that the elements proposed by Stanley are simply covert counterparts of overt indexicals; rather, they appear to be a new and unknown category of linguistic element (for which there is scant evidence). Many theorists see this as an unattractive feature of Stanley's account, including Luisa Martí (2006), who is otherwise totally at one with his dictum that all and any extralinguistic contextual effects on truth-conditional content (explicature) can be traced to linguistic logical form.

Martí's idea is to save the 'semanticist' enterprise by making the covert indexicals *optional*: 'We need to give them [Stanley's variables] the freedom to be or not to be generated in the syntax/present at logical form, ... a kind of optionality that has nothing to do with the pragmatics-related optionality of free enrichment' (Martí 2006, 135). So the surface form 'It is raining' has one logical form with a covert location variable and another logical form without any such variable (in fact, there is also the possibility of a logical form with a more complex variable for quantifier-binding purposes, but I set that aside here). When the sentence uttered has the first kind of logical form, the variable (indexical) is always saturated by a

¹ 'Imagine a situation in which rain has become extremely rare and important, and rain detectors have been disposed all over the territory (whatever the territory — possibly the whole Earth). In the imagined scenario, each detector triggers an alarm bell in the Monitoring Room when it detects rain. There is a single bell; the location of the triggering detector is indicated by a light on a board in the Monitoring Room. After weeks of total drought, the bell eventually rings in the Monitoring Room. Hearing it, the weatherman on duty in the adjacent room shouts: 'It's raining!' His utterance is true iff it is raining (at the time of utterance) *in some place or other*.'

(Recanati 2002, 317)

specific value for the location, just as for overt indexicals. When we get a location-indefinite interpretation, as for the weatherman example (see footnote 1), the logical form has no variable in it. So there is no ‘free’ pragmatic enrichment – either there is no pragmatic process at all (in the case where there’s no variable) or there is a standard process of obligatory variable-saturation, entirely familiar to us from the behaviour of overt pronouns.² Saturation is a well-established, semantically respectable process, which more or less straightforwardly maintains semantic compositionality. So, for the case of an utterance of ‘It is raining’, which is the primary focus of Martí’s discussion, there are several possible logical forms, including one with a covert location variable and one without, and when the sentence uttered has the first kind of logical form, the variable is always saturated by a specific value for the location (or it is bound by a quantifier), just as for overt indexicals.

She sees this proposal as a possible working out of an idea I briefly considered while discussing the problem posed by the existential closure interpretation of some of Stanley’s hidden indexicals (Martí 2006, 151, n.7):

Another way out might be to propose that the sentence ‘I have eaten’ (and innumerable others) has a variety of logical forms, each with an array of variables, differing in number and type (including one with none), marking possible contextual completions. In the case of a sentence with four variables for different constituents, that means sixteen linguistically provided logical forms.

Carston (2002, 204)

At the time, I dismissed this as a non-starter, since the massive proliferation of logical forms for a single surface form seemed to me both wildly counter-intuitive and excessively computationally burdensome. Martí explicitly accepts the latter point but maintains that this is a general problem for all standard semantic

² In the last sections of her paper, Martí appears to reject the need for optional covert variables, at least for the two examples she discusses: ‘it is raining’ and ‘I have eaten’. She concludes that the covert location variable in the former case is obligatory and that intransitive ‘eats’ always gets the existentially closed interpretation, so there is no variable. In my view, although a location of raining is recovered in most contexts because of its generally high relevance, there are cases (such as those mentioned above) where it is not obligatory. A possible case where there is an unarticulated object constituent for intransitive ‘eat’ is the following: a frustrated mother has just placed a plate of food in front of her fussy child and says to him ‘Eat!’. Whatever the final decision on these particular cases, Martí has presented and defended a novel position on the unarticulated constituent issue, one which I assume she would seek to apply to any case which the pragmatist presents as involving free pragmatic enrichment (e.g. quantifier domain restriction), so it is worth considering the arguments for it and its consequences.

treatments of indexicals, such as overt pronouns, and that it is anyway far less pernicious than positing the non-standard and mysterious process of free pragmatic enrichment, whose defendants don't have a leg to stand on since they haven't 'provided a coherent and detailed algorithm that explicates the operation of the process of free enrichment' (Martí 2006, 151-2).

Francois Recanati, one of the great advocates of free pragmatic enrichment, sees Martí account as simply 'another – admittedly deflationary – syntactic construal of free pragmatic processes' (Recanati forthcoming). He seems to be taking the view that there may be no significant difference between an approach in terms of optional covert linguistic variables and one such as that pursued within relevance theory in which free pragmatic enrichment is a matter of augmenting or adjusting conceptual representations in the process of inferential comprehension, a 'syntactic' process in his terms³. He says that the only possibly substantive difference between the optional covert linguistic structure account and the optional pragmatic enrichment account 'is that the level of syntactic representation to which the additional elements belong remains within the confines of the language system (rather than involving a shift to the conceptual system)' (Recanati forthcoming). In what follows, I will suggest that this *is* a consequential difference, at least if what we are interested in is an account of utterance comprehension, and that the processing consequences weigh against the optional covert indexical view.

According to Martí's account, on any occasion of utterance comprehension, any number, possibly all, of the various logical forms that could underlie the surface structure are derived and the correct one is selected pragmatically. For instance, for any utterance of 'It is raining', including those on which the proposition the speaker expresses does not incorporate either a specific location of raining nor any binding of a location variable by a quantifier, a structure containing a location variable may nevertheless be derived. As she puts it: 'the system tries out different derivations, and only those that comply with all the principles of grammar, including Gricean principles, are successful' (Martí 2006, 150). She gives five possible derivations for an occurrence of 'it is raining', three involving covert

³ There are broadly two construals (or varieties) of free enrichment, a semantic one and a 'syntactic' one (see Recanati 2002, 339-42). On the semantic construal, the output of free pragmatic processes is a proposition or truth condition or state of affairs, that is, a semantic object, rather than a representation. On the 'syntactic' construal, the output is a mental representation, a structured string of symbols. For relevance theorists, importantly, it is a conceptual representation, a sentence of Mentalese, the representational medium in which we think and store our beliefs, as distinct from those syntactic representations which are specific to our linguistic systems (our I-languages, in Chomsky's terms). If we suppose, surely quite reasonably, that hearers process utterances so as to recover the speaker's meaning (her explicatures and implicatures), which they go on to integrate with their existing assumptions (representations) about the world, then the so-called 'syntactic' (or representational) construal seems inescapable.

location variables. What the optionality claim seems to amount to is that the variable-containing structures generated may be eliminated as the derivation process proceeds. It's not totally clear to me whether she assumes all possible derivations are tried out in every instance (perhaps in parallel) or envisages a sequential trying out which could terminate before all possible derivations are constructed. Since this 'derivation' process includes pragmatics (conformity with Gricean principles), it should be that, in cases of satisfactory communication, at most one of the possibilities is ultimately successful for any given utterance of the overt form. So, if derivations are tried out one by one (there being some basis, presumably, for the order in which they are tried out?), it may well be that, at least on some occasions, the successful solution is found before all possibilities are generated. Either way, though, the computational burden is heavy, as she acknowledges, and it frequently involves the generation of logical forms which turn out to be wrong for the utterance being interpreted.

Free pragmatic enrichment, on the other hand, is truly optional: it occurs only when pragmatically motivated, that is, only when it is required for the interpretation of the utterance to meet the usual standards of rational communicative behaviour (e.g. the Gricean maxims or the criterion of optimal relevance). So for any given utterance of the unembedded string 'It is raining', a single logical form (without a location variable) is derived - the same in every instance - and, only if pragmatically warranted, the relevant location of raining is inferred. Martí's claim (*ibid*, 151) that the two accounts are equally costly in terms of the number of different representations required to be generated is simply wrong. On any occasion of utterance, the free enrichment account involves a single logical form and, assuming successful communication, a single (pragmatically enriched) explicature. The optional covert structure account, on the other hand, can involve the generation of multiple logical forms and, even on the most minimal derivation possible in her system, an interpretation of 'it is raining' as including a specific location requires a mediating logical form containing a location variable.

Setting aside now considerations of computational/representational economy and going along for the moment with the idea that multiple logical forms are generated for 'It is raining' or 'I have eaten', let's consider how the interpretation process works. There are clearly two obligatory pragmatic tasks involved: selection of the correct logical form (a kind of structural disambiguation) and, in the case where the chosen form includes a covert indexical, provision of a context-specific value (saturation). Both processes require the accessing of information from wide extra-linguistic context, constrained by pragmatic principles, (so are bound to be defeasible and heuristic, rather than algorithmic). Consider the following example, focussing on the interpretation of 'it's raining' in Ann's utterance:

- (5) Ann and Ben are in their London flat and Ann has just got off the phone after talking to her parents in Christchurch, New Zealand.

Ben: How are they?

Ann: Mum's a bit fed up. It's raining so she can't get out into her garden.

I take it that the explicitly communicated (truth-conditional) content of Ann's utterance of 'it's raining' is: IT IS RAINING IN CHRISTCHURCH, NEW ZEALAND. On Martí's account, this has to be a case of saturation of a location variable occurring in the logical form of the utterance. In comprehending Ann's utterance (grasping her meaning), Ben's linguistic system may derive (access or construct) two (at least) logical forms, one with a covert location constituent, one without. On what basis is the choice made in favour of the first of these? The answer seems obvious: the location constituent CHRISTCHURCH NEW ZEALAND, made available by the contextual assumption that that is where Ann's mother lives, is necessary in order to provide a plausible reason for why she can't get out into her garden, which in turn provides an explanation for why she is fed up. In other words, it is required in order to derive an interpretation which is adequately relevant and informative. So the logical form with the covert indexical is chosen, which then requires the further pragmatic process of giving a specific contextual value to the location variable (saturation). But it seems that there is no such distinct process: the relevant value (CHRISTCHURCH N.Z.) is already in place – it was this that provided the basis for selecting the logical form. That is, it looks very much as if the process of finding the right logical form relies on having (already) identified the correct propositional content. But the only point in deriving the logical form of an utterance is for the role it plays as input to the pragmatic processes responsible for recovering the propositional content. If we already have the propositional content (derived pragmatically on the basis of the simplest logical form, which is the common core of all the alleged logical forms, i.e. IT'S RAINING), no purpose is served by recovering any other logical form. In other words, on the optional covert indexical account, the processes appear to be back to front and constructing a variable-containing logical form is unnecessary and computationally wasteful. The basis on which the choice of a covert (and as yet unsaturated) indexical is made is identical to the basis on which a process of free enrichment would directly supply the pragmatically required constituent.⁴

⁴ The arguments here apply, *a fortiori*, to a position on which metaphorical or metonymic interpretations, also viewed by many nowadays as contributing to the propositional content of utterances, are claimed to be underpinned by an optional covert operator in the linguistic form (e.g. Stern 2000). Furthermore, such covert operators are in an even worse evidential position

Contrary to Recanati (forthcoming), Martí rejects any suggestion that her account amounts to a version of free enrichment and is adamant that she stands alongside Stanley and against any position that allows strong pragmatic effects on truth-conditional content. I think Recanati is right about the similarity of the optionality positions if one takes an abstract, god's-eye view of the various component pieces required in the jump from overt linguistic form to truth-conditional content or explicature (one way or another, you optionally wind up with more constituents than are visibly or audibly present in the entity you start with). However, what I've tried to show above is that, when we look at the actual on-line processes of comprehension, there are important differences between the two positions. There can be no saturation without a variable to saturate, but uncovering the evidence needed to establish the presence of the variable-containing logical form seems to involve a prior process which is indistinguishable from free pragmatic enrichment, thus pre-empting any process of variable saturation and rendering the logical form superfluous. In short, it seems that making the variable/indexical optional divests it of any role in the actual process of understanding the utterance.⁵

3 Broader concerns: semantic orthodoxy versus pragmatic 'magic'

Martí repeatedly emphasises that her approach uses only well-established syntactic and semantic machinery (unlike the free enrichment account) and rests on standard linguistic assumptions. However, I would question the semantic assumption that seems to underlie her whole approach, namely that the grammar, specifically the semantic component of the grammar, delivers the truth-conditional content of an utterance, where this truth-conditional content is non-minimal and seems to equate

than Martí's optional covert indexicals in that they do not have overt counterparts in the linguistic system.

⁵ In the discussion of Martí's account, I have assumed that natural language and the language of thought (conceptual representation) are distinct systems. In his survey of positions, Recanati (forthcoming) considers the possibility that they are not distinct, that thought is nothing but 'inner speech'. I very much doubt this, but won't review the arguments (many given by Jerry Fodor in his original work on the language of thought), and Martí herself (p.c.) believes that, while the linguistic system and the conceptual system interface, they are distinct representational domains. However, even on the view that our thinking *is* conducted in natural language sentences, the redundancy argument given above against optional covert variables seems to hold: the mapping would proceed via pragmatic processes from the natural-language sentence uttered, say, 'It is raining' to another natural-language sentence, say, 'It is raining in Paris', without the need for any mediating linguistic form containing a covert location variable. For more detailed discussion, see Hall (2008b).

with what the speaker has said (explicature). By non-minimal, I mean that it is considerably richer than the minimal propositional semantics of, say, Borg (2004), who excludes all pragmatic processes (defeasible inferences) from semantics, or even of Cappelen & Lepore (2005), who confine the role of pragmatics in semantics to the fixing of values for the small set of overt indexicals. Unlike their approaches (or that of relevance theorists, or Bach (1994), for whom semantics need not deliver anything fully propositional), Martí takes the domain of semantics to be *intuitive truth-conditional content*. That this is intended to be identical with what is explicitly communicated (said and meant by the speaker) is backed up by statements such as the following: ‘the derivation for a sentence with an overt pronoun crashes if there is no referent for the pronoun in the context ...’ (ibid, 143); ‘the system tries out different derivations, and only those that comply with all the principles of grammar, including Gricean principles, are successful’ (ibid, 150); ‘a simple string such as *He left* has an infinite number of derivations in the system’ (ibid, 151). So it seems that the job of the semantics is taken to be not simply to generate a logical form with a free variable (and some sort of constraint on the value it can take), but to deliver a specific value for this variable. And, of course, this applies as much to covert indexicals/variables, when the logical form contains them, as to overt indexicals/variables.

Although this view of the nature of semantics certainly has a history, it is far from well-established and uncontroversial nowadays – it has, for instance, been dubbed ‘the MA’ (mistaken assumption) by Cappelen & Lepore (1997, 2005), who have mounted an array of tests designed to show that much of what we intuitively take to contribute to what the speaker has said does not fall within semantics. For those who take a modular view of language, such as Chomsky, Fodor, Borg and relevant theorists (e.g. Sperber, Wilson, Carston, Hall), the output of linguistic processing falls well short of answering to ordinary speaker-hearer intuitions about the truth-conditional content of utterances. In criticising Recanati’s ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’, Martí strongly implies that she herself sees semantics as a module separate from pragmatics (ibid, 139). I don’t know what to make of this since, on any characterisation of modularity that I know of, the essence of a modular system is that it operates in accordance with its own dedicated (domain-specific) system of rules and/or procedures, and, on the widely accepted Fodorian definition, the language system is encapsulated from extralinguistic context, including perceptually available information and beliefs about speaker intentions. But Martí’s semantic module includes Gricean principles, which perform tasks such as disambiguation and the assigning of contextually relevant referents to pronouns, both of which require penetration of the system by a non-pre-specified range of contextual information. So these tasks are not algorithmic, not syntactically-driven, hence not formally tractable, as Borg (2007) says in forcefully arguing against reference assignment as a semantic process. And the pragmatic

principles or heuristics which guide these tasks must also be at work in a distinct system responsible for deriving conversational implicatures, so there is certainly no clearcut semantics/pragmatics distinction here. In short, the assumptions on which Martí's account is founded are far from being standard or widely accepted and need their own defence.

In a recent paper, Stephen Neale makes some interesting observations about those he describes as 'heavy-handed semanticists' (e.g. Stanley, Martí): they claim that 'heavy-handed pragmatics invokes magic [while they] invoke only well-understood semantic mechanisms' (Neale 2007, 79), but, contrary to this rhetoric, every semanticist, no matter how much syntactic/semantic complexity he or she goes in for, appeals to 'pragmatic magic' in determining the propositions speakers express. As he puts it:

The mechanisms of compositional semantics do not give hearers the means even to assign referents to all singular terms or to resolve lexical, structural or anaphoric ambiguities, let alone to identify the full contents of utterances replete with metaphor, irony, anacoluthon, ... or to identify the contents of any conversational implicatures. The hearer will have to *pragmatically infer* such content. In short, everyone in the business of explaining how we use language to communicate is, by virtue of his or her job description, already up to his or her neck in the magic of pragmatics.

(Neale *ibid*, 80)

As far as I can see, this IS the business that all the parties to the debate I've been addressing here are in, and we are, therefore, all up to our necks in pragmatics. Positing an array of optionally present covert variables does nothing to reduce the role played by pragmatics, so we might as well press on with our attempts to find an account of how it works.⁶

4 Coda: free pragmatic enrichment is here to stay

The primary motivation for the positing of hidden variables (whether obligatory or optional) is the worries about the apparently unsystematic nature of free pragmatic enrichment. The key objection has been made most explicitly by Stanley (2002,

⁶ For relevance-theoretic accounts of how this pragmatic magic might work, see Sperber & Wilson 1986/95, Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004, Carston 2002, Hall 2008b, and, for a different sort of account, see Recanati 2004.

2005), with whom Martí would, doubtless, agree. His charge is that the process is not sufficiently constrained, so that it allows for enrichments which plainly do not occur. Two examples of the kind of overgeneration he presents are given in (6) and (7). According to the pragmatist, an utterance of the sentence in (6a) could communicate the explicature in (6b) in an appropriate context, the quantifier domain having been supplied by a process of free pragmatic enrichment. Stanley's question, then, is what prevents that same pragmatic process from supplying the constituent [OR DUTCHMEN] so that the utterance is predicted (wrongly) to communicate the proposition in (6c) in a context in which it would be relevant. Similarly, free enrichment should enable, he says, an utterance of the sentence in (7a), in a context in which it is common ground that John likes his mother, to communicate the explicature in (7b), which, however, it clearly does not:

- (6) a. Every Frenchman is seated.
 b. EVERY FRENCHMAN IN THE CLASS IS SEATED.
 c. EVERY FRENCHMAN OR DUTCHMAN IN THE CLASS IS SEATED.
- (7) a. John likes Sally.
 b. JOHN_i LIKES SALLY AND HIS_i MOTHER.

This overgeneration objection is potentially serious and it has been addressed in some detail by Alison Hall (2008a, 2008b), who sets out to show that a relevance-theoretic account of free pragmatic enrichment would not make the alleged predictions. I won't review her arguments here, but what emerges clearly from her discussion is that when proper attention is given to the nature of the principles and processes at work in pragmatics, 'free' enrichment is in fact quite tightly constrained, although it is, like all pragmatic processes, a matter of non-demonstrative inference, so should not be expected to be algorithmic (*pace* Martí).

Furthermore, Hall provides a range of cases that meet Stanley's criterion for being semantic data (i.e. they are intuitively truth-conditional) but which cannot be accounted for by his standard solution of positing some element of hidden linguistic structure. These include cases of deferred reference or metonymy, such as (8a) and (8b), referential uses of definite descriptions, as in (8c), the cause-consequence relation in certain cases of 'and'-conjunction, as in (8d), and various cases where the minimal (unintuitive) proposition, derivable on the basis of the encoded linguistic content and reference assignment, is either trivially true or patently false, as in (8e):

- (8) a. The ham sandwich wants his bill.
 b. I'm parked out back.
 c. The woman standing in the doorway is our new editor.

- d. Hanna reported James for misconduct and he was fired.
- e. That guy has/doesn't have a brain.

She concludes that Stanley (and anyone who respects truth-conditional intuitions) has no option but to appeal to a process of free pragmatic enrichment for these cases. As far as I can see, the point carries over directly to Martí's account too, since there is no case for a covert variable or operator (even of the optional sort) licensing the pragmatic move to a metonymic interpretation in (8a) or a referential interpretation in (8c), etc. Like it or not, in accounting for the full range of truth-conditional contents that utterances can have, free pragmatic enrichment is not only a live option, but appears to be indispensable.⁷

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⁷ A very interesting question, yet to be explored in detail, is whether we need this kind of free enrichment which supplies unarticulated constituents as well as the other kind mentioned in section 1, that is, adjustments of linguistically encoded (articulated) meanings which result in *ad hoc* concepts. Perhaps the one can be recast in terms of the other and, even if this is not generally the case, there is a question about the right analysis of specific cases (for instance, it might be that some of the examples discussed as unarticulated constituents in this paper are better understood as cases of lexical modulation).

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