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John Watling's published papers
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John Watling's published papers are available here to view and download in PDF format. Right-click on the links below and select 'save as...' to store a copy on your local hard disk.
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    Published Papers:
Amending the Verification Principle (with Robert Brown).
    Suggests an amended version of Ayer's "verification principle"
    First published in Analysis 11, No.2 (1951), pp.87-9.
Are Causes Events or Facts?.
    Argues that causes are neither events nor facts; in fact causes are "not individuals of any type".
    First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1973-4), pp.57-74.
Ayer on Other Minds.
    Criticism of Ayer's account of the meaning of statements about other minds.
    First published in Theoria 20 (1954), pp.1-3.
Ayer's The Problem of Knowledge.
    Critical discussion of Ayer's book, The Problem of Knowledge.
    First published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 37, no.3 (1956), pp.340-6.
Chance.
    Discusses and raises objections to Mellor's "dispositional" account of probability.
    First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society SV xxxii (1958), pp.143-56.
Confirmation Discomforted.
    Uses the inconsistency of the principle of induction to argue that there is no logical relation of confirmation, merely a scientific relation of "evidential support".
    First published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 44, No. 64 (1963), pp.1-16.
Counterfactual Conditionals (with Robert Brown).
    Argues that an eliminative analysis of counterfactual statements is neither possible nor desirable.
    First published in Mind 66, No. 242 (1952), pp.222-33.
Doubt, Knowledge and the Cogito in Descartes' Meditations.
    Exposes some logical flaws in Descartes' attempt to achieve certainty.
    First published in Philosophers Ancient and Modern. (Royal Institute of Philosophy lecture series; 20), ed. G.N.A. Vesey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp.57-72.
Entailment.
    Proposes a resolution to a difficulty with transitive entailment proposed by Lewy.
    First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society SV xxxii (1958), pp.143-56.
Hampshire on Freedom.
    Discusses and criticizes an argument of Stuart Hampshire's against determinism.
    First published in Essays on Freedom of Action, ed. Ted Honderich. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, pp.15-29.
Hypothetical Statements in Phenomenalism (with Robert Brown).
    Claims that two common objections to phenomenalism are "inadequate to their task".
    First published in Synthese 8, Issue 4, Nos. 8 & 9 (1952), pp.355-66.
Inference from the Known to the Unknown.
    Responds to the attempt to establish either phenomenalism or scepticism using Humean worries about induction and the Verification Principle .
    First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 29 (1955), pp.83-108.
Kant's Explanation of the Necessity of Geometrical Truths.
    Proposes an explanation of how Kant reconciled his idealism with the necessity of geometrical truth.
    First published in Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures V (1970-1): Reason and Reality, ed. G.N.A. Vesey. London: MacMillan, 1972. pp.131-44.
Phenomenalism Flawed.
    Claims that phenomenalism does not satisfactorily accomodate illusory perceptions.
    First published in Inquiry 6 (1963), pp.196-9.
Propositions Asserting Causal Connection.
    Proposes a counterfactual analysis of singular causation.
    First published in Analysis 13, No.2 (1953), pp.31-7.
The Causal Theory of Perception.
    The causal theory of perception cannot be stated either in a sense-datum language or any other kind of language.
    First published in Mind 59, No. 236 (1950), pp.539-40.
The Problem of Contrary-to-Fact Conditionals.
    Responds to an argument that it is impossible to verify a counterfactual conditional.
    First published in Analysis 17, No. 4 (1957), pp.73-80.
The Sum of An Infinite Series.
    Argues that it is not contradictory to suppose that an infinite sequence of events could be performed.
    First published in Analysis 13, No. 2 (1952), pp.39-46.
    Book reviews and critical notices:
Goodman, N. 1954. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    First published in Mind 65, No. 258 (1956), pp.267-73.
Urmson, J. O. 1956. Philosophical Analysis: its Development between the two World Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    First published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 37, No. 3 (1956), pp.340-6.
R. Borger and F. Cioffi (Eds.) 1970. Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences: Confrontations
London: Cambridge University Press.
    First published in Inquiry 16, (1973), pp.101-11.
G. N. Cantor and M. J. S. Hodge (Eds.) 1981. Conceptions of Ether: Studies in the History of Ether Theories 1740-1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    First published in Mind 92 (1983), pp.467-470.
Aune, B. 1977. Reason and Action. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
    First published in Mind 88 (1979), pp.617-21.
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This page last modified
6th November 2007
by Howard Peacock
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