Last Updated 28/04/05
Political philosophy is the study of how we can and how we ought to live together. Throughout the history of Western philosophy, those figures whose thought has engaged with ethical problems have been equally concerned with political philosophy and vice versa. Just as the form of ethical theories have varied greatly over the last 2,000 years, so too have the forms taken by questions and answers within political philosophy. Hence it is very important to address the problems of political philosophy within an historical framework and an ethical framework.
Amongst the problems considered throughout history have been: the question of the nature and claims of justice; the existence of natural rights; the status of positive law; the existence of distinctive obligations towards the state or towards each other as co-members of some society; claims of property; claims of liberty; the best understanding of equality and its claim on us.
In Ancient political philosophy we can find concern with the nature of justice and the well-ordered state. In the Early Modern discussion, the authority of the state and questions of right loom large. From this tradition we derive the heuristic use of the state of nature: Hobbes uses this to ask how we can be rationally compelled to obey the sovereign, and to offer an answer; in Locke we can find an influential discussion of property rights and the origin of political obligation; Rousseau, much more radically seeks to explain how we can rationally be bound by law through the concept of the general will. In different ways Hegel and Marx offer critiques of the Enlightenment conception of the citizen and state. In Mill, we can find the radical utilitarianism of the early nineteenth century modulated into a delicate plea for liberty.
In Anglo-American political philosophy over the last thirty years, the work of the Harvard philosopher John Rawls has been central in defining the scope and focus of debate, though of great importance too are the ideas of Isaiah Berlin, G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, Joseph Raz and TM Scanlon. In recent years increasing attention has been paid to the work of Amartya Sen, and topics related to global poverty and injustice have become increasingly discussed.
Three good general commentaries for the history side are
Plamenatz, John. 1962. Man and Society: Political and Social theories from Machiavelli to Marx. 3 Vols. New ed London: Longman, 1992.
Hampsher-Monk, Iain. 1992. A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx. Oxford: Blackwell.
Rosen, Michael, and Jonathan Wolff, eds. 1999. Political Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains many relevant extracts.
Republic
Crito
On which see:
Pappas, N. 1995. Plato and the Republic. London: Routledge.
Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.4 and 7.
Klosko, G. 1986. The Development of Plato's Political Theory. London: Methuen.
Woozley, A. D. 1979. Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's ‘Crito'. London: Duckworth.
Politics
On which see:
Lloyd, G. E. R. 1968. Aristotle, The Growth and Structure of his Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.11.
Mulgan, R. G. 1977. Aristotle's Political Theory: an Introduction for Students of Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Leviathan.
On which see:
Gauthier, David P. 1969. The Logic of Leviathan: the Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tuck, R. 1989. Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hampton, J. 1986. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kavka, Gregory S. 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Two Treatises on Government.
On which see:
Lloyd Thomas, D. A. 1995. Locke on Government. London: Routledge.
Ashcraft, R. 1987. Locke's Two Treatises of Government. London: Allen & Unwin.
Simmons, A. John. 1980. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Chs. 3-4.
—. 1992. The Lockean Theory of Rights. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
—. 1993. On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Cohen, G. A. 1995. ‘Marx and Locke on Land & Labour'. In Self-Ownership, Freedom & Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Social Contract.
Discourse on Inequality.
On which see:
Bertran, C. 2003. Rousseau and the Social Contract. London: Routledge.
Cassirer, E. 1987. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Edited and translated by Peter Gay. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
Charvet, J. 1974. The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jones, W. T. 1987. ‘Rousseau's General Will and the Problem of Consent'. Journal of the History of Philosophy 25: 105-130.
Dent, N. 2005. Rousseau London: Routledge.
Dent, N. 1988. Rousseau: Introduction to his Psychological, Social, and Political Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kateb, G. 1976. ‘Aspects of Rousseau's Political Thought'. Political Science Quarterly.
Philosophy of Right.
On which see:
Knowles, Dudley, 2003. Hegel and the Philosophy of Right. London: Routledge
Taylor, C. 1979. Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waldron, J. 1988. The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon. Ch.10.
Wood, Allen W. 1990. Hegel's Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Selected Writings, Karl Marx. Edited by David McLellan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
On which see:
Cohen, G. A. 1988. History, Labour and Freedom: themes from Marx. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1.
McLellan, D. 1970. Marx before Marxism. 2 nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1980.
Kolakowski, L. 1978. Main Currents of Marxism: its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. Translated by P. S. Falla. 3 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vol.1.
Wolff, Jonathan. 2002. Why Read Marx Today? Oxford: Oxford University Press
Wood, Allen W. 1980. ‘The Marxian Critique of Justice'. In M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon, eds., Marx, Justice and History. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
For further details see the entry for Marxism.
On Liberty.
On which see:
Ten, C. L. 1980. Mill On Liberty. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gray, John. 1983. Mill On Liberty: A Defence. 2 nd ed. London: Routledge, 1996.
Gray, J., and G. W. Smith. eds. 1991. J. S. Mill on Liberty: In Focus. London: Routledge.
Dworkin, Gerald. ed. 1997. Mill's On Liberty: Critical Essays. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Wolff, Jonathan. 1998. ‘Mill, Indecency & the Liberty Principle'. Utilitas 10: 1-16.
Sometimes questions are asked on:
Kant, I. Political Writings. Edited by Hans Reiss. 2 nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Machiavelli, The Discourses.
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, and Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Hume, Treatise, Book III.
It is not worth revising these thinkers unless there have been recent lectures on them, but they are often suitable subjects for pre-submissions.
Excellent general texts of relevance to this side of the paper are
Kymlicka, W. 1990. Contemporary Political Philosophy: an Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Swift, A. 2001 Political Philosophy: A Beginner's Guide for Students and Politicians. Oxford: Polity
Miller, D. 1976. Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Goodin, R. E., and P. Pettit. eds. 1993. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Knowles, Dudley. 2001 Political Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Wolff, J. 1996. An Introduction to Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Relates contemporary problems in political philosophy to the works of some of the great political philosophers of the past.
Goodin, R. E., and P. Pettit. eds. 1997. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. Contains many important and interesting recent papers.
Levine, A. 2001. Engaging Political Philosophy: From Hobbes to Rawls. Oxford: Blackwell
Hampton, J. 1997. Political Philosophy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Rosen, Michael, and Jonathan Wolff, eds. 1999. Political Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains many relevant extracts.
Two journals which include much top quality recent work in political philosophy are Philosophy and Public Affairs, and Ethics. These will be particularly useful as reference points for those preparing pre-submissions or a dissertation. Political Studies, Political Theory, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Economics and Philosophy, Utilitas, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, and Social Philosophy and Policy also publish important work in this area.
Without doubt Rawls is the most important contemporary political philosopher. Central topics include the arguments for his two principles of justice; the acceptability of those principles; the idea of a ‘hypothetical contract'; the libertarian (see Nozick) and communitarian (see below) critiques of Rawls; the new doctrine of Political Liberalism ; the relation between the ‘old' and ‘new' Rawls; and Rawls's late writings on international justice.
Rawls, J. 1972. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
—. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
—. 1999. Collected Papers. S. Freeman, ed. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press
—. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Daniels, N. ed. 1975. Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' ‘A Theory of Justice'. Oxford: Blackwell.
Mulhall, S. and A. Swift. 1996. Liberals and Communitarians. 2 nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs. 1, 5-7.
Freeman, S. 2002. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nozick presents a ‘libertarian' political philosophy, based on what he calls the ‘Entitlement Theory of Justice'. How well does Nozick defend this view, and in particular can he justify initial acquisition of property? A related question concerns his use of the ‘Wilt Chamberlain example' to attempt to establish the claim that ‘liberty upsets patterns'. By this argument Nozick claims to have refuted almost all competing theories of justice. A further topic concerns his success in defending the minimal state against the claims of the anarchist. More recently the possibility of ‘left-libertarianism' has been a major topic of discussion (Steiner, Otsuka).
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.
Paul, J. ed. 1981. Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Totowa, N. J.: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wolff, J. 1991. Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Cohen, G. A. 1995. Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Esp. Chs. 1-4.
Otsuka, M. 1998. ‘Self-Ownership and Equality'. Philosophy & Public Affairs 27: 65-92.
Otsuka, M. 2003. Libertarianism Without Inequality Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Steiner, H. 1994. An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell.
How is the concept of justice best understood? Does justice require impartiality, mutual advantage, fair compromise, or something else again?
Scanlon, T. 1982. ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism'. In Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barry, B. 1995. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gibbard, A. 1991. ‘Constructing Justice'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 20: 264-279
What is democracy, and why is it so revered in the modern world? Can democracy be justified in terms of its consequences, or does it have intrinsic value? These are the primary philosophical questions concerning democracy.
Christiano, T. 1996. The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
Harrison, R. 1993. Democracy. London: Routledge.
Dahl, Robert. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Wollheim, R. 1967. ‘A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy'. In Politics, Philosophy and Society, 3rd Series, edited by Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman. Oxford: Blackwell.
Barry, B. 1991. ‘Is Democracy Special?'. In Democracy and Power: Essays in Political Theory, 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wolff, J. 1994. ‘Democratic Voting and the Mixed-Motivation Problem'. Analysis 54: 193-196
Elster, J. 1987. ‘The Market and the Forum'. In Deliberative Democracy, edited by James Bohman. Cambridge MIT Press. Reprinted in R. E. Goodin, and P. Pettit. eds., Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
Dworkin, R. 1996. Freedom's Law: the Moral Reading of the American Constitution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ‘Introduction'
Jones, Peter. 1983. ‘Political Equality and Majority Rule'. In D. Miller, and L. Siedentop, eds., The Nature of Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon.
It has been claimed that all political philosophies appeal to the idea of equality in one respect or other. Egalitarianism, however, is the view that the just society is the society in which, in some sense or other, all enjoy equality of condition. But can a coherent and plausible notion of equality of condition be defined? Is equality a matter of equal distribution of something, or is the idea of equality a matter of the relations enjoyed between citizens? Finally are there arguments for preferring egalitarianism to other theories of justice? (See also Rawls, Nozick.)
Kymlicka, W. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy: an Introduction. Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Williams, B. A. O. 1962. ‘The Idea of Equality'. Reprinted in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers, 1956-1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Reprinted in R. E. Goodin, and P. Pettit. eds., Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
Nagel, T. 1979. ‘Equality'. In his Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dworkin, R. 1981. ‘What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare', and ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10: 185-246 and 283-345. Reprinted in Sovereign Virtue: the Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
Clayton, M. and Williams, A. (edd.) 2000. The Ideal of Equality. London: Palgrave
Cohen, G. A. 1989. ‘On The Currency of Egalitarian Justice'. Ethics 99: 906-944.
Arneson, R. 1989. ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare'. Philosophical Studies 56, 77-93.
Sen, A. ‘Equality of What?' 1980 reprinted in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit (edd.), Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997: 476-486.
Anderson, E. 1999. ‘What is the Point of Equality?' Ethics 109: 287-337
Wolff, J. 1998. ‘Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos.' Philosophy and Public Affairs 27: 97-122.
Scheffler, S. 2003. ‘What is Egalitarianism? Philosophy and Public Affairs 31: 5-39.
Frankfurt, H. 1987. ‘Equality as a Moral Idea'. Ethics 98: 21-43. Reprinted in his The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Parfit, D. 1998. ‘Equality and Priority'. In A. Mason, ed., Ideals of Equality. Oxford: Blackwell.
Liberals claim that the state should be neutral between competing conceptions of the good. Is this achievable or desirable? Does it pre-suppose moral scepticism? To what extent do contemporary societies achieve this aim? If the law should not enforce popular morality then what should it do? (See also Rawls, Nozick, Liberty, Communitarianism.)
Dworkin, R. 1985. ‘Liberalism'. In A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Devlin, P. 1965. The Enforcement of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hart, H. L. A. 1963. Law, Liberty, and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waldron, J. 1986. ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism'. Philosophical Quarterly 37: 127-150. Reprinted with other relevant papers in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991. Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1993.
Mendus, S. 1989. Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Berlin argues that there are two concepts of liberty: positive and negative. Is there a genuine distinction? Is one concept more ‘authentic' than the other? What is the relation between liberty and other values?
Berlin, I. 1969. ‘Two Concepts of Liberty '. In Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Political Philosophy, ed., Anthony Quinton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
MacCallum, C. G. 1967. ‘Negative and Positive Freedom'. Philosophical Review 76: 312-334.
(These are all reprinted, with other useful readings, in David Miller, ed., Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
Geuss, R. 1995. ‘Freedom as an Ideal'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 69: 87-100.
Cohen, G. A. 1995. Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 53-59, (also in Rosen and Wolff).
By what procedures, if any, can individuals legitimately come to own private property? The starting point for this topic is Locke's discussion of property, in his Second Treatise, Ch. 5. (See also Nozick.)
Becker, Lawrence C. 1977. Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Waldron, J. 1988. The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Carter, A. 1988. The Philosophical Foundations of Property Rights. London: Harvester, Wheatsheaf.
Arguments for the free market are often made in terms of liberty (see Nozick) and efficiency. But arguments for limiting the market have also been mounted on these terms, and also on the basis of equality and justice. Can we conceive of society without the market in some form or other? What role should there be for government intervention?
Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Buchanan, A. 1985. Ethics, Efficiency and the Market. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Miller, D. 1989. Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
O'Neill, J. 1998. The Market, Ethics, Knowledge and Politics. London: Routldge.
Keat, Russell. 2000. Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market. London: Palgrave.
Communitarians argue that we should pursue a politics of the ‘common good' in preference to liberal neutrality. This view is often premised on a metaphysical account of the person: that individuals are ‘partly constituted' by the communities of which they form part. Liberalism is said, by communitarians, to presuppose an implausible metaphysics of the self. In response liberals often claim to be neutral on metaphysical, as well as moral, issues. (See Rawls, Liberalism.) More recently the debate has broadened to include a discussion of ‘perfectionism' (the view that some conceptions of the good are objectively better than others, as urged by J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986)) and whether public institutions should recognise or respect the particular identities of members of minority cultures. See W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
Sandel, M. J. 1982. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kymlicka, W. 1989. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gutman, A. 1985. ‘Communitarian Critics of Liberalism'. Reprinted in Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, which contains many other relevant papers.
Mulhall, S., and A. Swift. 1996. Liberals and Communitarians. 2 nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs. 1, 5-7.
Can we make sense of the idea of ‘natural rights'? If not, how can we understand rights claims? Can rights be given a consequentialist justification? And what rights do (or should) we have? (See also Nozick.)
Dworkin, R. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. 2 nd ed. London: Duckworth, 1979.
Waldron, J. ed. 1984. Theories of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waldron, J. ed. 1987. ‘Nonsense upon stilts': Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man. London: Methuen.
Is there a plausible account of what life could be like without the state? Can this be combined with reasons to prefer such a situation to one in which a coercive state exists? (See also Nozick, Political Obligation.)
Miller, D. 1984. Anarchism. London: Dent.
Wolff, R. P. 1998. In Defence of Anarchism. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
Taylor, M. 1982. Community, Anarchy and Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Should I obey the law just because it is the law? Can political obligations be given any moral foundation? Answers have been given by social contract theorists, as well as by advocates of the ‘theory of fairness', utilitarians and communitarians. (See also Anarchism, Nozick, Rawls.)
Simmons, A. John. 1980. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Horton, J. 1992. Political Obligation. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Green, L. 1988. The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pateman, C. 1979. The Problem of Political Obligation: a Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory. Chichester: John Wiley.
Klosko, G. 1992. The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
Klosko, G. 2005. Political Obligations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wolff, J. 1991. ‘What is the Problem of Political Obligation?'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91: 153-169.
Sanders, John T., and Jan Narveson, eds. 1996. For and Against the State: New Philosophical Readings. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
The problem for the technical subject of social choice theory is to define a formal function that will aggregate individual choices or preferences into a ‘social ordering'. Arrow proved that no such function is consistent with a number of apparently trivial assumptions. The significance of this result is much debated.
Sen, A. K. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Mathematical Economics Texts, No.5. San Fransisco: Holden-Day.
Mackay, A.F. 1980. Arrow's Theorem: the Paradox of Social choice: a Case Study in the Philosophy of Economics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Feminist political philosophy has become a major area of interest and research. One central question is whether there is a distinctive feminist subject matter, or whether feminist concerns can be subsumed under more general demands for justice and equality. Important contributions to the subject include
Baier, A. C. 1994. Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Bubeck, Diemut E. 1995. Care, Gender, and Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender and the Family. New York: Basic Books.
Pateman, Carole. 1989. The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Fricker, M and Hornsby, J., eds. 2000. The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
A legitimate state is thought to possess a ‘monopoly' on the right to punish. Does it possess such a monopoly, and on what grounds? Can a right to punish be derived from a right of self-protection? Assuming that the state possesses a right to punish, what is the purpose of punishment? Is it in order to deter others from committing crimes? To give criminals what they deserve? To reform criminals? Should completed crimes be punished more severely than mere attempts?
Quinn, W. 1985. ‘The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish'. Philosophy and Public Affiars 14: 327-373; Reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Simmons, A. J. 1991. ‘Locke and the Right to Punish'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19: 311-349. Reprinted as ch. 3 of The Lockean Theory of Rights. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Farrell, D. 1985. ‘The Justification of General Deterrence'. The Philosophical Review 94: 367-394.
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 4, part 3.
Hampton, J. 1984. ‘The Moral Education Theory of Punishment'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13: 208-238.
Lewis, D. 1989. ‘The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 53-67.
A topic of increasing concern is whether liberalism is able to accommodate people who have very different moral and religious traditions within a single society, or whether some other response is called for. Important recent works include:
Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Parekh, B. 2000. Rethinking Multiculturalism. London: Palgrave.
Barry, B. 2000. Culture and Equality. Oxford: Polity.
Do our obligations to other human beings stop at national boundaries? On the one hand it seems arbitrary to suppose that they do. On the other hand any other approach would seem to lead to obligation of massive redistribution. How, then, should we understand the demands of global justice?
Rawls. J. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M. 2000. Women and Human Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pogge. T. 2002. World Poverty and Human Rights. Oxford: Polity.