Last Updated 20/04/05
This paper covers the metaphysical and epistemological thought of the great philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries. The paper is divided by a traditional classification into the Rationalists and Empiricists, with a separate final section for Kant.
In all cases it is important first to look at primary sources, and to try and work out for yourself what a thinker is saying or trying to say. In almost every case, the authors in question were systematic thinkers, and what we now consider to be their philosophical writings are only part of their general intellectual interests and works. Although it is tempting to extract from one author or another a particular view on an issue of contemporary interest, one should remember that these thinkers are responding to their own philosophical concerns and interests in the intellectual context of their own age and not of ours. While there may be some perennial philosophical problems, the form they take and the plausibility of one solution rather than another can alter from epoch to epoch. The authors highlighted in this guide are not the only philosophers of the period, and while some of them had contact with each other, it is misleading to think of their work as a conversation across the decades over these philosophical problems. A fuller picture of each of them can be obtained only by attending also to some of the ‘lesser' figures of the period (for example, Bacon, Hobbes, Gassendi, Mersenne, Arnauld, Boyle, Malebranche and Bayle).
Secondary material can be useful as an aid, but cannot replace first-hand knowledge of the texts. Where the author did not write in English there are normally good translations available, indicated below. There is no requirement of reading texts in written in languages other than English in the original languages, but students who do possess the relevant linguistic skills are encouraged to make use of them
Barber, Kenneth F. and Gracia, Jorge J. E. 1994. Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Bennett, J. 2001. Learning from Six Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Clarke, D. 1989. Occult Powers and Hypotheses: Cartesian Natural Philosophy under Louis XIV. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cottingham, J. 1988. The Rationalists. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cover, J. A. and M. Kulstad. eds. 1990. Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy: essays presented to Jonathan Bennett. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Dear, P. 1988. Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Outlines the institutional context of the relations between natural science and philosophy.
Des Chennes, D. Physiologia Cartesiana. Gives the late Scholastic context in which Cartesian natural philosophy developed.
Funkenstein, A. 1986. Theology and the Scientific Imagination: from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. This gives a good background to the shift in the intellectual context of the period from a theological and scientific points of view.
Garber, D. and Ayers M., eds. 1998. The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. An exhaustive survey of the main philosophical themes and concerns of the period, organised thematically rather than by author.
Hacking, I. 1975. The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lennon, Thomas M. 1993. The Battle of the Gods and Giants: the Legacies of Descartes and Gassendi, 1655–1715. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. A thorough yet provocative treatment of the Cartesian legacy in epistemology.
Loeb, Louis E. 1981. From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press.
Matthews, Michael R. ed. 1989. The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy: Selected Readings. Indianapolis: Hackett. An useful selection of scientific writings from the period.
Nadler, S. 1993. ed. Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Pre-established Harmony. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Osler, Margaret J. 1994. Divine Will and Mechanical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Popkin, R. 1979. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Rev. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Prev. ed.: The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes.)
Shapiro, Barbara J. 1983. Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-century England. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Wilson, Margaret D. 1999. Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Woolhouse, R. 1988. The Empiricists. Oxford: Oxford University Press. These two volumes are a good introduction as a whole to the period, and will give you some sense of how the different thinkers fit into a wider scheme.
Woolhouse, R. S. 1993. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-century Metaphysics. London: Routledge.
The best current translation of Descartes into English is The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (and Anthony Kenny, for Vol. 3), 3 Vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985; hereafter CSM for vols. 1 and 2; CSMK for vol. 3). From this there are two abridgements also available, J. Cottingham, Descartes: Selected Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and J. Cottingham, Meditations on First Philosophy: with Selections from the Objections and Replies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). From these you should look at Meditations on First Philosophy, including the Objections and Replies; Discourse on Method, Parts I–IV; The Principles of Philosophy, esp. Part I. You should also look at some of the selected letters to Mersenne, Princess Elizabeth, and Henry More, all collected in CSMK.
Cottingham, J. 1986. Descartes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
—. 1993. A Descartes Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell. The book is good on the history, less useful on philosophical criticism; the dictionary is a very helpful work of reference.
Curley, E. M. 1978. Descartes Against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. A useful introduction, but now out of print.
Dicker, G. 1993. Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. Based closely on the Meditations.
Hatfield, G. 2003. Descartes and the Meditations. London: Routledge. A very good introduction.
Ariew, R. 1999. Descartes and the Last Scholastics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Garber, D. 1992. Descartes's Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. An excellent account of how Descartes' philosophical concerns relate his interests in physics.
—. 2001. Descartes Embodied. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gueroult, Martial. 1968. Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons. Translated by Robert Ariew. 2 Vols. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.
Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Hassocks: Harvester Press. An excellent book, but very demanding and not concerned with the historical context.
Wilson, M. D. 1978. Descartes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Another excellent but demanding work.
Ariew, R. and Grene. M. eds. 1995. Descartes and his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections and Replies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cottingham, J. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cottingham, J. ed. 1994. Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartes's Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Doney, W. ed. 1968. Descartes: a Collection of Critical Essays. London: Macmillan.
Hooker, M. ed. 1978. Descartes, Critical and Interpretative Essays. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Moyal, Georges. ed. 1991. Descartes: Critical Assessments. 4 Vols. London: Routledge.
Rorty, A. O. ed. 1986. Essays on Descartes' Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Voss, S. ed. 1993. Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes. New York: Oxford University Press.
Descartes' principal intellectual concerns were with the natural sciences. His conception of the physical world was mechanistic and corpuscularian (though rejecting atoms and the vacuum), and he sought to overthrow the Aristotelian natural philosophy that had dominated sixteenth-century Europe. It is useful to compare Descartes' views to Galileo's The Assayer (see Matthews, The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy for relevant selections). For Descartes' own account of those of his scientific views of most direct interest to philosophers see in particular Parts II, III and IV of The Principles of Philosophy, and The World, all in CSM, Vol. 1.
Clarke, Desmond M. 1982. Descartes' Philosophy of Science. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Garber, D. 1986. ‘ Semel in vita: The Scientific Background to Descartes' Meditations '. In A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Descartes' Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press and in D. Garber, Descartes Embodied. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garber, D. 1992. Descartes's Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gaukroger, S., Schuster, J. and Sutton J. eds. 2000. Descartes' Natural Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Westfall, R. S. 1971. Force in Newton's Physics. London: Macdonald. Ch. 2.
Wilson, M. D. 1978. Descartes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs. 2, 6.
See the assorted papers in Part III of S. Voss, ed., Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
On Descartes' attitude towards the qualities of physical objects, see
Garber, D. 2001. Descartes Embodied. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 12.
Menn, S. 1995. ‘The Greatest Stumbling: Descartes' Denial of Real Qualities'. In R. Ariew, and M. Grene. eds., Descartes and his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections and Replies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Ch. 8, in part. pp. 236–52.
Thomas Reid saw Descartes as the founder of the ‘theory of ideas', associated with ‘representationalism' as an account of how the mind relates to the world and to God. For Descartes' own description of the nature of ideas see Meditations 3 and 5, plus his responses to Arnauld's criticism (the Fourth Set of Objections and Replies); also look at Principles, Part I, 60–4.
Ariew, R. and M. Grene. 1995. ‘Ideas, in and before Descartes'. Journal of History of Ideas 56: 87–106.
Ayers, M. 1998. ‘Ideas and Objective Being.' In D. Garber and M. Ayers, eds., The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cottingham, J. 1993. A Descartes Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell. Consult the entry on ideas.
Wilson, M. D. 1978. Descartes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. 3.
—. 1990. ‘Descartes in the Representationality of Sensation'. In J. A. Cover and M. Kulstad. eds., Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy: essays presented to Jonathan Bennett. Indianapolis: Hackett. Also in Margaret D. Wilson, Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Yolton, John W. 1984. Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid. Oxford: Blackwell. This is a general critique of the view that early modern philosophers accepted some form of representationalism.
Descartes claimed that the mind was distinct from the body—the arguments for this are presented in part in Meditation 2 and completed in Meditations 5 and 6. But Descartes was also keenly aware of the intimate relation between the two, and echoed a famous phrase of Aquinas' that the mind is not lodged in the body as a sailor in a ship. His attitude towards the union of mind and body has been the subject of much discussion both among his contemporaries and among recent commentators. For Descartes' own attempts to explain his position see his letters to Elizabeth, 21 May 1643, 28 June 1643, and Principles, i. 53, 54, 60–4; also see Passions of the Soul.
On the Distinction between Mind and Body
Carriero, J. P. 1986. ‘The Second Meditation and the Essence of the Mind'. In A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Descartes' Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Curley, E. M. 1979. Descartes against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs. 7, 8.
Rozemond, M. 1993. ‘The Role of Intellect in Descartes's Case for the Incorporeity of Mind'. In S. Voss, ed., Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, M. D. 1978. Descartes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs. 2, 6.
On the Union of Mind and Body
Cottingham, J. 1986. Descartes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch. 6.
Garber, D. 1992. Descartes's Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ch. 4.
Rorty, A. O. 1986. ‘Cartesian Passions and the Union of Mind and Body'. In A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Descartes' Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wilson, M. D. 1991. ‘Descartes on the Origin of Sensation'. Philosophical Topics 19: 293–323. Also in Wilson, M. D. 1999. Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Although the Meditations begins with the ‘hyperbolic' doubt of the malign genie, it is not solely, or even primarily a work on epistemology—it is as concerned with outlining Descartes' metaphysical views as establishing epistemological doctrines. Descartes' own attitude to scepticism is not clear-cut—see Popkin, The History of Skepticism ; cf. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, ch. 1. Nevertheless, Descartes' distinctive positive epistemological views are developed throughout the Meditations, starting with the cogito in Meditation 2, the nature of judgement and occasion for error in Meditation 4, the role of God against doubt in Meditations 3 and 5, the final resolution of sceptical doubts in Meditation 6.
Burnyeat, M. 1982. ‘Greek Philosophy and Idealism: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed'. Philosophical Review 91: 3–40. Also in G. Vesey. ed., Idealism Past and Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Cottingham, J. 1986. Descartes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch. 2.
Curley, E. M. 1979. Descartes against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chs. 1–3.
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1970. Demons, Dreamers and Madmen: the Defense of Reason in Descartes's Meditations. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Pt. 1.
Stroud, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 1.
Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Appendix 3.
Curley, E. M. 1979. Descartes against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ch. 4.
Hintikka, J. 1968. ‘Cogito Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?'. In W. Doney, ed., Descartes: a Collection of Critical Essays. London: Macmillan.
Kenny, A. 1968. Descartes: a Study of his Philosophy. New York: Random House. Ch. 3.
Markie, P. 1992. ‘The Cogito and its Importance'. In J. Cottingham, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cottingham, J. 1986. Descartes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch. 3.
Curley, E. M. 1979. Descartes against the Skeptics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ch. 5.
Loeb, L. 1992. ‘The Cartesian Circle'. In J. Cottingham, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Cleve, J. 1979. ‘Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles and the Cartesian Circle'. Philosophical Review 88: 55–91.
Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Ch. 7.
The best current translation of Spinoza's works is The Collected Works of Spinoza, edited and translated by Edwin Curley, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), but affordable selections from this translation can now be obtained in A Spinoza reader: the Ethics and other Works, trans. and ed. by E. Curley, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Curley's translation of The Ethics alone is also available as a Penguin Classic. Another useful translation and selection is The Ethics; Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect; and Selected Letters, trans. by Samuel Shirley, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992). For this paper you should look mainly at the Ethics, in particular Parts I and II, though Spinoza's letters are of great interest and often very valuable for helping understand his system.
Allison, Henry E. 1987. Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Curley, E. M. 1969. Spinoza's Metaphysics: an Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
—. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Donagan, A. 1988. Spinoza. Brighton: Harvester.
Hampshire, S. 1951. Spinoza. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Lloyd, G. 1996. Spinoza and the Ethics. London: Routledge.
Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Delahunty, R. J. 1985. Spinoza. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Della Rocca, M. 1996 Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mason, R. 1997. The God of Spinoza: a Philosophical Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nadler, S. 1999. Spinoza: A Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parkinson, G. H. R. 1954. Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Walker, Ralph C. S. 1989. The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-realism, Idealism. London: Routledge. Ch. 3.
Wolfson, H. A. 1934 The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of his Reasoning. 2 vols. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. Valuable especially on the background in Jewish medieval philosophy.
Garrett, D. ed. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grene, M. ed. 1973. Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books.
Kennington, R. ed. 1980. The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
Segal G. and Y. Yovel eds. 2002. Spinoza. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Shahan, Robert W. and J. I. Biro. eds. 1978. Spinoza: New Perspectives. Norman: University of Oklahoma.
Descartes' philosophy occupies a central place in understanding Spinoza: his first philosophical work was a rendition of Descartes' system into analytic form, Descartes' Principles of Philosophy. Spinoza's distinctive theory of substance may appear at first sight rather odd, but you should find it helpful to place it in the context of an attempt to draw out the consequences implicit in the Cartesian distinctions of substance, mode and attribute. See Ethics, Part I, props. 1–14, for the bald statement of his substance monism.
Bennett, J. 1996. ‘Spinoza's Metaphysics'. In D. Garrett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—. 1984. A Study of Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 4.
Charlton, W. 1981. ‘Spinoza's Monism'. Philosophical Review 90: 503–30.
Curley, E. M. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Ch. 1. This is probably the best guide in to making sense of the first fourteen propositions.
Woolhouse, R. S. 1993. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz. London: Routledge. Ch. 3.
Other aspects of Spinoza's thought develop out of his monistic metaphysics. This is true of his psychology and physics. For his account of mind and its relation to the physical world look at Ethics Parts II and III.
Allison, Henry E. 1987. Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Ch. 4.
Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 6 and 7.
Curley, E. M. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Chs. 2, 3; again this is a good place from which to start.
Della Rocca, M. 1996. ‘Spinoza's Metaphysical Psychology'. In D. Garrett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Donagan, A. 1980. ‘Spinoza's Dualism'. In R. Kennington, ed., The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
Wilson, M. D. 1980. ‘Objects, Ideas and “Minds”: Comments on Spinoza's Theory of Mind'. In R. Kennington, ed., The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Washington: Catholic University of America Press; reprinted in Wilson, M. D. Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Spinoza's universe is a totally mechanistic one, apparently removing any place for contingency in the world of nature. His attitude towards human action and freedom of the will is strongly influenced by his general metaphysics, and it remains a matter of controversy what his account exactly is. Start with Ethics, Part I, props. 16–33, then look at Part IV.
Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 5.
Donagan, A. 1988. Spinoza. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Ch. 6.
Garrett, D. 1996. ‘Spinoza's Ethical Theory'. In D. Garrett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—. 1991. ‘Spinoza's Necessitarianism'. In Y. Yovel, ed., God and Nature: Spinoza's Metaphysics. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Hampshire, S. 1971. ‘Spinoza's Theory of Human Freedom'. The Monist 55: 554–66.
Parkinson, G. H. R. 1971. ‘Spinoza on the Power and Freedom of Man'. The Monist 55: 527–53.
One of the central themes in Spinoza's account of the nature of man and his place in the world is the possibility and means of overcoming the passions. See Ethics, Part IV. Again, one can understand his particular account of human psychology only in the context of his general metaphysics (contrast his account of the passions with Descartes' own theory in his The Passions of the Soul.
Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 14.
Cottingham, J. 1988. ‘The Intellect, the Will and the Passions: Spinoza's Critique of Descartes'. Journal of the History of Philosophy 26: 239–57.
Curley, E. M. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Ch. 3.
James, S. 1993. ‘Spinoza the Stoic'. In T. Sorell, ed., The Rise of Modern Philosophy: the Tension Between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Leibniz presents the unusual, almost unique, example of a great philosopher who never wrote a great book on philosophy, and his system needs to be constructed from the partial, incomplete or highly compressed presentations of it in various of his writings.
Discourse on Metaphysics, together with the correspondence with Arnauld.
The Monadology.
Selections of Leibniz's writings in English translation can be found in
Philosophical Papers and Letters. Translated and edited by Leroy E. Loemker 2nd ed. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969. The fullest selection.
Philosophical Essays. Translated by Roger Ariew, and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. Another very useful collection.
Philosophical Writings. Translated by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson. London: J. M. Dent, 1973.
G. W. Leibniz's Monadology: An Edition for Students. Translated and edited by N. Rescher. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. Contains French text, English Translation and commentary, with an anthology of parallel passages in other works.
Leibniz's ‘New System' and Associated Contemporary Texts. Translated and edited by R. S. Woolhouse and R. Francks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
New Essays on Human Understanding. Translated by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
The Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. Edited by Austin Farrer. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1985.
Broad, C. D. 1975. Leibniz: an Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, S. 1984. Leibniz. Brighton: Harvester.
Rescher, N. 1967. The Philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.
Adams, R. M. 1994. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mates, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ishiguro, H. 1990. Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kulstad, M. 1991. Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection. München: Philosophia.
Mercer, C. 2001. Leibniz's Metaphysics: its Origins and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Russell, B. A. W. 1937. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. London: George Allen and Unwin. Russell's first major book, originally published in 1900. Now showing its age, but still thought-provoking, and immensely influential on the way that the history of philosophy was practised in the English-speaking world in the twentieth century.
Rutherford, D. A. 1995. Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sleigh, R. C. 1990. Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Wilson, C. 1989. Leibniz's Metaphysics: a Historical and Comparative Study. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Woolhouse, R. S. 1993. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-century Metaphysics. London: Routledge.
Frankfurt, Harry G. ed. 1976 Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Hooker, M. 1982. ed. Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Jolley, N. ed. 1995. The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lodge, P. ed. 2004. Leibniz and his Correspondents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, C. ed. 2001. Leibniz. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Woolhouse, R. S. ed. 1981. Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 1994. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Critical Assessments. 4 Vols. London: Routledge.
Leibniz's distinctive remarks on substance are best examined in the context of Descartes' and Spinoza's metaphysical views. There is a sense in which Leibniz developed his theory of substance in order to address well-known problems in the Cartesian account of substance. The starting point for his view of substance and monads are Monadology and Discourse on Metaphysics.
Adams, R. M. 1994. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pt. 3.
Brown, S. 1984. Leibniz. Brighton: Harvester. Ch. 10.
Furth, M. 1967. ‘Monadology'. Philosophical Review 76: 169–200; reprinted in H. G. Frankfurt, ed. Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976.
Ishiguro, H. 1990. Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 6.
Mates, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 2.
Rescher, N. 1967. The Philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Chs. 1, 5.
Sleigh, R. C. 1990. Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Ch. 5.
Woolhouse, R. S. 1993. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz. London: Routledge. Chs. 4, 8.
Leibniz's views of truth, the nature or real definition of things, and contingency are regulated by his principle of sufficient reason. On this see ‘On Contingency', ‘On Primary Truths', ‘On the Ultimate Origination of All Things', ‘Principles of Nature and Grace', Monadology, secs. 30–40, all in G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).
Adams, R. M. 1994. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 2.
Curley, E. M. 1976. ‘The Root of Contingency'. In H. G. Frankfurt, ed. Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Ishiguro, H. 1990. Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 7.
Mates, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs. 5, 6.
Rescher, N. 1967. The Philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Ch. 2.
Parkinson, G. H. R. 1965. Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 3.
Sleigh, R. C. 1982. ‘Truth and Sufficient Reason in the Philosophy of Leibniz'. In M. Hooker, ed., Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
—. 1990. Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Ch. 4.
Walker, R. C. S. 1997. ‘Sufficient Reason'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 109–123.
Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘“The Concept of the Subject contains the Concept of the Predicate”'. In Judith Jarvis Thomson, ed., On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
We owe to Leibniz formulations of the laws of identity. First, that identicals are indiscernible, " x " y ( x = y ¨ ( Fx Ç Fy )), but also the converse, that indiscernibles are identical " x " y (( Fx Ç Fy ) ¨ x = y ): the latter is controversial if any restriction is placed on the substitution for F. For Leibniz's discussion of identity see ‘On Primary Truths', ‘The Source of Contingent Truths', Monadology.
Adams, R. M. 1979. ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity'. Journal of Philosophy 76: 5–26.
Cartwright, R. 1987. ‘Indiscernibility Principles'. In Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Ishiguro, H. 1990. Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mates, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 6.
Parkinson, G. H. R. 1995. ‘Philosophy and Logic'. In N. Jolley, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wiggins, D. 1980. Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 1.
Leibniz's determinism issues from his commitment to two principles about necessity and possibility: the first is that any predicate true of any substance is contained in the individual concept of that substance; the second is his denial of the possibility of a substance having had attributes other that it actually has—given that Leibniz was a diplomat, on his view, he could not have been the same individual if he had not been a diplomat. Leibniz's fullest expression of his view is in The Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. Edited by Austin Farrer. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1985. You could also look at, ‘On Freedom and Possibility', ‘On Freedom', ‘The Principles of Nature and Grace', ‘The Dialogue on Human Freedom and the Origin of Evil', all in Ariew and Garber.
Adams, R. M. 1994. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 8.
—. 1972. ‘Must God Create the Best'. Philosophical Review 81: 317–32.
Blumenfeld, D. 1995. ‘Perfection and Happiness in the Best Possible World'. In N. Jolley, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rutherford, D. A. 1995. Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 1–4.
Walker, R. C. S. 1997. ‘Sufficient Reason'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 109–23.
Locke's most important philosophical work is the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The best modern edition is John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); the textual apparatus of this provides details of how Locke revised his work for successive editions, and is indispensable for serious study of Locke's philosophical thought. For ordinary student use there are other less expensive editions, including one edited by Roger Woolhouse (London: Penguin, 1997). Locke's other writings have mostly be consulted in old collected editions of his works, of which the 1823 edition (reprinted 1963) is the most widely used. The most important of these other writings are the three very long letters that Locke wrote to defend the Essay against criticisms by Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester.
Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jolley, N. 1999. Locke Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, E. J. 1995. Locke on Human Understanding. London: Routledge.
Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Woolhouse, R. S. 1983. Locke. Brighton: Harvester.
Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. Vol. 1. Epistemology, Vol. 2. Ontology. London: Routledge.
Alexander, P. 1985. Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the External World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ott, W. R. 2004. Locke's Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wolterstorff, N. 1996. John Locke and the Ethics of Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Woolhouse, R. S. 1971. Locke's Philosophy of Science and Knowledge. Oxford: Blackwell.
Yolton, J. 1970. Locke and the Compass of the Human Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ashcraft, R. ed. 1991. John Locke: Critical Assessments. 4 Vols. London: Routledge.
Chappell, V. ed. 1994. The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chappell, V. ed. 1998. Locke Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martin, C. B., and D. M. Armstrong. eds. 1968. Locke and Berkeley: a Collection of Critical Essays. London: Macmillan.
Rogers, G. A. J. ed. 1994. Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Thiel, U. ed. 2002. Locke: Epistemology and Metaphysics. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Tipton, I. C. ed. 1977. Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Locke's empiricism is properly so called through his opposition to the innateness of any ideas, in which view he engaged Leibniz's opposition. For Locke's attack see Essay, I. ii–iv; for Leibniz's response see New Essays, Introduction, Bk. I, Chs. 1–3.
Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Vol. 1, Epistemology, chs. 4–8.
—. 1986. ‘Are Locke's “Ideas” Images, Intentional Objects or Natural Signs?'. Locke Newsletter 17: 3–36.
—. 1998. ‘Ideas and Objective Being.' In D. Garber and M. Ayers, eds., The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chappell, V. 1994. ‘Locke's Theory of Ideas'. In V. Chappell, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jolley, N. 1984. Leibniz and Locke: a Study of the New Essays on Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 1–4.
Lowe, E. J. 1995. Locke on Human Understanding. London: Routledge. Ch. 2.
Matthews, H. E. 1977. ‘Locke, Malebranche and the Representative Theory'. Reprinted in I. C. Tipton, ed., Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wall, G. 1977. ‘Locke's Attack on Innateness'. Reprinted in I. C. Tipton, ed., Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Woolhouse, R. S. 1983. Locke. Brighton: Harvester. Ch. 1.
Yolton, J. 1956. John Locke and the Way of Ideas. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 2. A good account of the target's of Locke's polemic against innate notions.
Locke provided the classic statement of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, though earlier versions of the distinction can be found in writers such as Galileo, Descartes and Boyle, and in some form it can be traced back to Democritus. For Locke's discussion of the distinction see Essay, II, iv, viii.
Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Vol. 1, Epistemology, chs. 22–3.
Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 4.
Brandt Bolton, M. 1983. ‘Locke and Pyrrhonism: The Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Qualities'. In M. Burnyeat ed., The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lowe, E. J. 1995. Locke on Human Understanding. London: Routledge. Ch. 3.
Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 1.
McCann, E. 1994. ‘Locke's Philosophy of Body'. In V. Chappell, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, A. D. 1990. ‘Of Primary and Secondary Qualities'. Philosophical Review 99: 221–54.
Locke is often credited with an attack on the notion of substance or substratum. However, close reading of the Essay (II. xiii. 17–20, II. xxiii) suggests that his views may be more complex than this. How exactly his account of substance in Book II is related to the theory of real and nominal essences in book III (chs. iii, iv, vi, ix) is also controversial.
Atherton, M. 1984. ‘The Inessentiality of Lockean Essences'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14: 277–94.
Ayers, M. R. 1977. ‘Locke's Ideas of Power and Substance'. Reprinted in I. C. Tipton, ed., Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 1981. ‘Locke vs. Aristotle on Natural Kinds'. Journal of Philosophy 78: 247–72.
—. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Vol. 2, Ontology, part I.
Bennett, J. 1987. ‘Substratum', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 4: 197–215; reprinted in V. Chappell ed., Locke Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 3.
Woolhouse, R. S. 1971. Locke's Philosophy of Science and Knowledge. Oxford: Blackwell. Chs. 4–8.
—. 1983. Locke. Brighton: Harvester. Ch. 3.
For Locke, ‘person' is a forensic term, associated with the attribution of responsibility. His novel account of personal identity is closely related to his remarks on substance and individuation; and it prefigures in many ways Kant's critique of rational psychology. This chapter, which appeared only from the second edition on is Essay, II. xxvii.
Allison, H. E. 1977. ‘Locke's Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-examination'. Reprinted in I. C. Tipton, ed., Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Alston, W. P. and J. Bennett. 1988. ‘Locke on People and Substances'. Philosophical Review 97: 25–46.
Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Vol. 2, Ontology, chs. 18–24.
Flew, A. 1951. ‘Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity', Philosophy 26:53–68; reprinted with revisions in C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong. eds. Locke and Berkeley: a Collection of Critical Essays. London: Macmillan, 1968. A classic article, still worth reading.
Jolley, N. 1999. Locke Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 6.
Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 5, 6.
Noonan, H. 1989. Personal Identity. London: Routledge. Ch. 2.
Parfit, D. 1971. ‘Personal Identity'. Philosophical Review 80: 3–27; reprinted in J. Perry ed. Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. A useful anthology which also contains the criticisms of Locke's theory made by Butler and Reid.
Winkler, K. 1991. Locke on Personal Identity' Journal of the History of Philosophy 29: 201–26; reprinted in V. Chappell ed., Locke Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
The standard edition of Berkeley's works was edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, London: Nelson, 1948–57. His most important philosophical works are the Principles of Human Knowledge. and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. Student editions of these two include:
A Treatise Concerning Human Knowledge, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
A fuller selection of Berkeley's works can be found in
Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Stimulating, but to be treated with the same circumspection as his account of Locke.
Dancy, J. 1987. Berkeley: an Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Fogelin, R. J. 2001. Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge. London: Routledge.
Urmson, J. O. 1982. Berkeley. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Warnock, G. J. 1969. Berkeley. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Rather out of date now.
Atherton, M. 1990. Berkeley's Revolution in Vision. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Although this focuses on Berkeley's theories of perception, it is illuminating on the main areas of his thought.
Berman, D. 1994. George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Links Berkeley's thought with aspects of his life.
Grayling, A. C. 1986. Berkeley: The Central Arguments. London: Duckworth. A difficult but rewarding book, unusually sympathetic to Berkeley.
Pitcher, G. 1977. Berkeley. and Kegan Paul. This discusses most aspects of Berkeley's philosophy, including a chapter on the work on vision.
Stoneham, T. 2002. Berkeley's World: an Examination of the Three Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tipton, I. 1974. Berkeley: the Philosophy of Immaterialism. London: Methuen.
Creery, Walter E. ed. 1991. George Berkeley: Critical Assessments. 4 Vols. London: Routledge.
Foster, J. and H. Robinson, eds. 1985. Essays on Berkeley: a Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Martin, C. B. and D. M. Armstrong. eds. 1968. Locke and Berkeley: a Collection of Critical Essays. London: Macmillan.
Sosa, E. ed. 1987. Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Turbayne, C. M. ed. 1982. Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
The Introduction to Berkeley's principles contains his notorious attack on Locke's theory of abstract general ideas. Many commentators have sought for the significance apparently accorded this disagreement in the role Berkeley's anti-abstractionism plays in his arguments against matter though this neat interpretation is certainly questionable. For Locke's own account of abstract ideas see his Essay, III i–iii.
Ayers, M. R. 1991. Locke. London: Routledge. Vol. 1, Epistemology, chs. 26–8.
Dancy, J. 1987. Berkeley: an Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch. 3.
Grayling, A. C. 1986. Berkeley: The Central Arguments. London: Duckworth, pp. 29–42, 89–92.
Mackie, J. L. 1976. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 4.
Pitcher, G. 1977. Berkeley. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. 5.
Winkler, K. 1989. Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 1, 2.
Already by sec. 7 of the Principles, Berkeley seems to have in play the main elements of his idealism and his critique of materialism which are then played out further in the first part of the Principles (no second part was ever published: part was drafted but it was apparently lost during a tour of Italy). In the mid-twentieth century a form of anti-materialism called phenomenalism had some popularity, and that has led some commentators to find phenomenalism in Berkeley. This is controversial, for there are forms of idealism which are not phenomenalist.
Ayers, M. R. 1975. ‘Introduction' to Philosophical Works.
Burnyeat, M. 1982. ‘Greek Philosophy and Idealism: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed'. Philosophical Review 90: 3–40. Also in G. Vesey. ed., Idealism Past and Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Foster, J. 1985. ‘Berkeley on the Physical World'. In J. Foster, and H. Robinson, eds., Essays on Berkeley: a Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Grayling, A. C. 1986. Berkeley: The Central Arguments. London: Duckworth. Chs. 2.5-2.6, 3.4.
Smith, A. D. 1985. ‘Berkeley's Central Argument against Material Substance'. In J. Foster, and H. Robinson, eds., Essays on Berkeley: a Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Winkler, K. 1989. Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 6, 7.
According to Berkeley we can have no idea of any spirit, either finite or infinite. He therefore broke with the empiricist principle maintained by Locke (and subsequently taken over by Hume) that words have their meaning by being made signs of ideas. Instead he sketched (but never fully developed) a theory of ‘notions': we have notions of our own mind, of other minds, and of God. Both how Berkeley establishes the existence of God, and the role of God within his general metaphysics are matters of much dispute. Berkeley offers us a rare example of an anti-realist ‘proof' of the existence of God. See Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 135ff, and the second of the Three Dialogues. Berkeley's fullest account of these matters is in his work of Christian apologetics, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, in vol. 3 of the Luce and Jessop edition of the collected works. There is a useful abridgement and commentary on this in Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher in Focus, edited by David Berman, London: Routledge, 1993.
Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 7.
Dancy, J. 1987. Berkeley: an Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ch. 4.
Grayling, A. C. 1986. Berkeley: The Central Arguments. London: Duckworth. Ch. 3.4.
Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 4.
Pitcher, G. 1977. Berkeley. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Tipton, I. 1974. Berkeley: the Philosophy of Immaterialism. London: Methuen. Ch. 8.
Winkler, K. 1989. Berkeley: An Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 9.
Berkeley's fullest exposition of his instrumentalist account of scientific theories is in De Motu, in Works, ed. Luce and Jessop, vol. 4, but also in the collection edited by Michael Ayers. See also Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 101ff.
Jesseph, D. M. 1993. Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Moked, G. 1988. Particles and Ideas. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wilson, M. D. 1985. ‘Berkeley and the Essences of the Corpuscularians'. In J. Foster, and H. Robinson, eds., Essays on Berkeley: a Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford: Clarendon Press; reprinted in Wilson, M. D. Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
The earliest and fullest account of Hume's philosophy is in A Treatise of Human Nature ; the material relevant to this examination paper being in Book I. A later, clearer but considerably less detailed account is in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. The following are the most widely used editions:
A Treatise of Human Nature, edited, with an analytical index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. This revised edition also includes the important Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, which Hume published anonymously in the (vain) hope of stimulating sales of the main book.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited, with an analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge 3rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
There are also editions published by Penguin Classics, and new editions from Oxford University Press:
A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton, and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Ayer, A. J. 1980. Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A defiantly ahistorical interpretation, as with the other two British Empiricists.
Flew, A. 1961. Hume's Philosophy of Belief: a Study of his First ‘Inquiry'. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rather old-fashioned, but still worth looking at.
Fogelin, R. J. 1985. Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Emphasises his scepticism.
Noonan, H. 1999. Hume on Knowledge. London: Routledge.
Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Something of a standard introduction, emphasising Hume's naturalism.
Baier, A. 1991. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Beauchamp, T. L, and Rosenberg, A. 1981. Hume and the Problem of Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craig, E. 1987. The Mind of God and the Works of Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 2. This has a revisionary attitude to Hume similar to that of Galen Strawson.
Earman, J. 2000. Hume's Abject Failure: the Argument against Miracles. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fate Norton, D. 1982. David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Frasca-Spada, M. 1998. Space and the Self in Hume's Treatise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garrett, D. 1997. Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gaskin, J. C. A. 1988 Hume's Philosophy of Religion. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Kemp Smith, N. 1941. The Philosophy of David Hume: a Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines. London: Macmillan. A classic, offering a controversial interpretation of Hume as naturalist rather than a sceptic.
Passmore, J. 1968. Hume's Intentions. Rev. ed. London: Duckworth.
Pears, D. 1990. Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Intended as an introductory text, this book is really quite difficult, but it is also excellent and rewards attention.
Owen, D. 1999. Hume's Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stove, D. 1973. Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Strawson, G. 1989. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism and David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A very thorough challenge to the ‘orthodox' view of Hume's account of causation.
Wright, J. P. 1983. The Sceptical Realism of David Hume. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Chappell, V. C. ed. 1968. Hume. London: Macmillan.
Fate Norton, D. ed. 1993. The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Millican, P. ed. 2002. Reading Hume on Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press. An excellent collection of essays on the themes in Hume's first Enquiry. It also contains a very thorough critical survey of recent work on Hume.
In one sense the distinction between impression and idea is the fulcrum of Hume's whole philosophy of mind; but on the other hand, it is both difficult to see exactly what the content of the distinction amounts to, and secondly on what grounds Hume holds to it. For his (rather unhelpful) exposition of perceptions and their classification into impressions and ideas, see Treatise, I. i. 1–4 and Enquiry, secs. i–iii.
Biro, J. 1993. ‘Hume's New Science of the Mind'. In D. Fate Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Craig, E. 1986. ‘Hume on Thought and Belief' in G. Vesey ed. Philosophers Ancient and Modern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Foster, J. 1985. Ayer. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 38–44.
Owen, D. 1999. Hume's Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 4.
Pears, D. 1990. Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs. 1, 2.
Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. 2.
Hume is famous for his scepticism concerning inductive reasoning and the existence of causation. Such fame rests on controversy as to his real attitude towards causation and reasoning about probability. Hume was certainly wary of the role of ‘reason' in the explanation or justification of our beliefs about the future and the powers at work in the world around us. Whether he believed that causation could be reduced o regularity is a matter for discussion. For his own words on the matter see Treatise I. iii. 2–16, the Abstract (pp. 649–54 of the revised Selby-Bigge edition of the Treatise ), and the first Enquiry, secs. iv–vii.
Craig, E. 1987. The Mind of God and the Works of Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 2 secs. 1–4.
Fogelin, R. J. 1985. Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. 4, and appendices A and B.
Millican, P. 2002. ‘Hume's Sceptical Doubts concerning Induction'. In P. Millican ed., Reading Hume on Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pears, D. 1990. Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs. 5–7.
Rosenberg, A. 1993. ‘Hume and the Philosophy of Science'. In D. Fate Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strawson, G. 1989. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism and David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs. 3, 4.
Winkler, K. 1991. ‘The New Hume'. Philosophical Review 100: 541–79.
Hume denied that he could find any impression of his own self within the mind. In place of this, he appears to have offered a ‘bundle theory' of the self. Although, as with his views on causation, there is some dispute as to Hume's attitudes towards what there actually is, as opposed to what we have justification to believe. In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume despaired of rendering his account of personal identity consistent, but was less than forthcoming about the problems he found there. Look at Treatise, I. iv. 6, plus the relevant part of the Appendix (pp. 633–6 in Selby-Bigge's edition).
Craig, E. 1987. The Mind of God and the Works of Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 2, sec. 5.
Frasca-Spada, M. 1998. Space and the Self in Hume's Treatise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garrett, D. 1981. ‘Hume's Self Doubts about Personal Identity'. Philosophical Review 90: 337–58.
Noonan, H. 1989. Personal Identity. London: Routledge. Ch. 4.
Pears, D. 1990. Hume's System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs. 8 and 9.
Pitson, A. E. 2002. Hume's Philosophy of the Self. London: Routledge. Chs 2, 4.
Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. 6.
In his chapter on scepticism with regard to the senses in the Treatise (I. iv. 2) Hume set out to investigate the causes that induce us to believe in the existence of bodies. According to what he says there, the idea cannot be derived from either the senses or from reason, but must be the result of imagination. In the later presentation of the Enquiry, the positive aspects of the Treatise account have been removed, and Hume presents us solely with his sceptical argument (which he is concerned to claim as original to him) against vulgar beliefs in the existence of a world independent of our senses: Enquiry, sec. xii, part. I.
Burnyeat, M. 1980. ‘Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?'. In M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat and J. Barnes, eds., Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press; reprinted in M. Burnyeat ed., The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
Cook, J. 1968. ‘Hume's Scepticism with Regard to the Senses'. American Philosophical Quarterly 5: 1–17.
Fogelin, R. J. 1985. Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Chs. 6, 7.
—. 1993. ‘Hume's Scepticism'. In D. Fate Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hookway, C. 1990. Scepticism. London: Routledge. Ch. 5.
Pears, D. 1990. Hume's System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs. 10, 11.
Strawson, P. F. 1974. ‘Imagination and Perception'. Reprinted in Freedom and Resentment. London: Methuen.
Stroud, B. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. 5.
Wright, J. P. 1983. The Sceptical Realism of David Hume. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Ch. 2.
For a detailed bibliography and guidance on specific topics see the section on the Kant paper.