Last Updated 21/07/05
Ethics is the study of theories of how we ought to live, and what is of value or concern in life. These theories form a tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle leading up to the (in some ways very different) concerns of recent philosophy. It is important to realise that the general form that these theories have taken has varied greatly over the last 2,000 years, so one cannot approach the general questions posed within ethics without an appreciation of that history.
Amongst the problems considered are the relation between the happiness of the individual and concern for others or the common good; the relation between rationality and the claims of morality; to what extent morality requires impartiality of us, and what form that impartiality should take; what is the nature of the good, and what is the relation between the good and the right; whether there are ethical truths, and whether facts of value obtain independently of us and our feelings.
To what extent do ethical theories do justice to, or provide convincing critiques of, our natural moral thinking? These questions have arisen for ethical theories throughout history, and sometimes past ethical theories may appear to do more justice to common sense practical thinking than any contemporary school of thought.
In this area of philosophy there is a particular concern with its practical application or consequences. In recent years, issues in applied or practical ethics have come more to the fore, including the issues of abortion, euthanasia, concern for other animals and for the environment.
Reading a few introductory texts, particularly towards the beginning of the course, will greatly help you in getting a view of the areas of concern and in orienting yourself in relation to more central material. Here are some suggestions
Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: an introduction to ethics. New York: Oxford University Press .
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Norman, R. 1983. The Moral Philosophers: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Williams, B. 1976. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Singer, P. ed. 1994. Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feinberg, J. ed. 1969. Moral Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foot, P. ed. 1967. Theories of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. ed. 1978. Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, P. W. ed. 1967. Problems of Moral Philosophy: an introduction to ethics. Belmont, California: Dickenson.
Greek philosophy looks at the problems of ethics in terms of how one can lead a happy life, or living well. Questions that arise include, ‘What role do the virtues play in an admirable life?', ‘How far is a good life subject to luck?', ‘What role does reason play in living well?', and particularly in Stoicism, ‘Does living well involve conforming to some form of law?'
Euthyphro, Gorgias, Republic.
Republic , I, II, X. Use the new translation of Republic by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); otherwise Clarendon Plato for canonical edition of Gorgias , translated by Terence Irwin, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato's Republic . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pappas, N. 1995. Plato and the Republic . London: Routledge.
Kraut, R. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Plato . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Includes an exhaustive bibliography.
Irwin, T. 1995. Plato's Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.1.
Price, A. W. 1989. Love & Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Nicomachean Ethics (& Eudaemian Ethics ). N 1, 3, 5, 6; for the Nicomachean translation by Irwin, Hackett with useful glossary; also Ross Oxford translation; for Eudaemian Clarendon Aristotle trans. with commentary Woods.
Rorty, A. O. ed. 1980. Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Broadie, S. 1991. Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kraut, R. 1989. Aristotle on the Human Good . Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Cooper, J. 1986. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle . Indianapolis: Hackett.
Hutchinson, D. S. 1986. The Virtues of Aristotle . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.2.
Long, A. A. 1974. Hellenistic philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. London: Duckworth. (2 nd ed. 1986). See section 1 on Stoic and Epicurean ethics.
Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M. 1994. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Sorabji, R. 1993. Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Inwood, B. 1995. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Price, A. W. 1995. Mental Conflict. London: Routledge.
Striker, Gisela. 1996. Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology & Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bobzien, Susanne. 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Medieval ethics combines elements of Pagan thought from antiquity with the particular concerns of the three monotheistic traditions of the West: Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Central themes in Medieval thought concern: the role of free choice in ethical life; how this individual freedom is best to be understood; the connection between free choice and rationality. Medieval ethics strives to adapt models of ethical life as involving the practice of the virtues, which they derive from Greek thought, to the ideas central to Western monotheism, in particular that we arrive at moral worth and salvation through obedience to the law that comes from God.
Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will . Translated by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993.
Abelard, Ethical writings: his Ethics or ‘Know yourself' and his Dialogue between a philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian . Translated by Paul Vincent Spade. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995.
Aquinas, On law, Morality, and Politics . Edited by William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988.
Aquinas, Treatise on the Virtues . Translated by John A. Oesterle. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
Aquinas, The Treatise of Law , 1a, 2a, Questions 94-97.
Duns Scotus, Scotus on Will and Morality . Selected and translated with an introduction by Allan B. Wolter Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1986.
Rist, J. M. 1994. Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.5.
Marilyn McCord Adams introduction to Hackett edition of Abelard, Ethics.
McInerny, Ralph, M. 1982. Ethica Thomistica: the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Washington, DC.: Catholic University of America Press.
Westberg, D. 1994. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Adams, M. M. 1995. ‘Ockham's Moral Theory'. In James F. Keenan, and Thomas A. Shannon, eds., The Context of Casuistry. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Spade, P. V. 1999. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See the essays by M. M. Adams, P. King and A. S. McGrade.
Scotus, Duns. ca. 1266-1308. On the Will and Morality . Selected and translated with an introduction by Allan B. Wolter Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1986. See Wolter's introduction.
Kent, B. 1995. The Virtues of the Will: the Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century . Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press.
Pink, T. ‘Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory'. In The Will and Human Action: from Antiquity to the Present Day, eds. T. Pink and M. Stone. London: Routledge, 2004.
Pink, T. 'Action, will and law in late scholasticism'. In Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity , eds. J. Kraye and R. Saarinen. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005
Modern moral philosophy has gradually detached ethical thought from specifically religious traditions, giving increasing attention to the role played in ethical life of rationality or, by reaction to this, human sentiments. In this period we see formed, though not always very clearly, the outlines of many of the general positions examined by contemporary moral philosophers, such as: in Hobbes, an ethics developed out of rational self-interest; in the Utilitarian movement, consequentialism; in Hume, non-cognitivism concerning moral judgement; and in Kant, a reason-based non-consequentialist ethics. Despite the continuities in these traditions, it is important to realise, nevertheless, that many of these philosophers had interests very different from those of their self-proclaimed modern disciples.
Raphael, D. D. ed. 1969. The British Moralists from Hobbes to Bentham . 2 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schneewind, J. B. ed. 1990. Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: an Anthology . 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Darwall, S. 1995. The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought”: 1640-1740. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, C. 1989. Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.
Haakonssen, K. 1996. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leviathan . See the Curley edition; or the Tuck edition:
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668. Edited, with introduction and notes by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Hobbes, Thomas. Of Liberty and Necessity. L. Pt.1, Chs.5-16, reprinted in D. D. Raphael, ed., The British Moralists from Hobbes to Bentham . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. Vol.1.
Commentaries
Tuck, R. 1989. Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kavka, G. S. 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Oakeshott, M. 1962. ‘Introduction to Hobbes's Leviathan'. In Rationalism in Politics and other essays . London: Methuen.
Sorrel, T. ed. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pink, T. 1996. The Psychology of Freedom . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chs. 2 & 3.
A Treatise of Human Nature , edited, with an analytical index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2 nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Bk.3 (plus Bk.2).
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals , edited, with an analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge 3 rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Norton, D. F. 1993. ‘Hume, Human Nature and the Foundations of Morality'. In D. F. Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baier, A. 1991. The Progress of the Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Mackie, J. L. 1980. Hume's Moral Theory . London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Livingston, D. 1984. Hume's Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Baillie, J. 2000. Hume on Morality. London: Routledge.
Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy. Translated and edited with an introduction by Lewis White Beck. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.
Critique of Practical Reason. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor; with an introduction by Andrews Reath Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals . In L. W. Beck, ed., and trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.
The Metaphysics of Morals . Translated and edited by Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Roger J. Sullivan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
All three can also to be found in:
Practical philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Lectures on Ethics . Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind; translated by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone . In Allen Wood and George diGiovanni, eds., Religion & Rational Theology . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Guyer, P. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, C. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgement. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univsrsity Press.
Allison, H. 1990. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O'Neill, O. 1989. The Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beck, L. W. 1960. A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Harrison, R. 1983. Bentham. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Skorupski, J. 1989. Mill. London: Routledge.
Berger, F. 1984. Happiness, Justice and Freedom: the Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lyons, D. 1994. Rights, Welfare and Mill's Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crisp, R. 1997. Mill on Utilitarianism. London: Routledge.
In these writers we see the development of a recognisably academic form of ethics—Sidgwick and Moore were both professors in Cambridge, Bradley was a life fellow at Merton College, Oxford, Ross professor in Oxford. Like us, they had an interest in the existence of competing ethical theories, and consequently in the relation between ethical theory and everyday ethical thinking.
Sidgwick, H. 1922. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan.
Bradley, F. H. 1927. Ethical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schneewind, J. B. 1977. Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Nicholson, P. 1990. The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: Selected Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.1.
Baldwin, T. 1990. G. E. Moore. London: Routledge.
Various authors have been inspired, often in a critical frame of mind, to attempt to frame an historical overview of recent developments within ethics.
Hampshire, S. 1949. ‘Fallacies in Moral Philosophy'. Mind 58: 466-482.
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy'. Philosophy 33: 1-19. Reprinted in >From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol.1 . Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.
Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton. 1992. ‘Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends'. Philosophical Review 101: 115-189.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.
Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana.
Can ethical action be justified in terms of the rational pursuit of one's own interests, and does it need to be? Do we have special reason to be concerned with our own interests as opposed to those of others?
Plato, Republic , Bk.II.
Hume, D. Treatise concerning Human Nature . Bk.III, Pt.2.
—. An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals . Sec. 3, Appendices 2 & 3.
Williams, B. A. O. 1973. ‘Egoism & Altruism'. In Problems of Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.II.
Gauthier, D. 1967. ‘Morality & Advantage'. Philosophical Review 76: 460-475. Reprinted in J. Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.8.
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1, secs.1-9, 20; Ch.2, secs. 32-5.
Paul, E. F., Fred Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul. eds. 1993. Altruism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
‘Do unto others only what you would have them do unto you.' In this form the principle is closely associated with Christian ethics, although equivalent formulations of the principle can be found in Confucius. What does this principle really involve? Can it be used to provide a rational basis for ethics?
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals . In L. W. Beck, ed., and trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. Also to be found in Practical philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right & Wrong . Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ch.4.
Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Universalizability, Impartiality, Truth'. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3 rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.)
—. 1987. ‘Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgements'. In Needs, Values, Truth.
Kolnai, A. 1970. ‘Moral Consensus', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 93-120 Reprinted in Ethics, Value & Reality: Selected Papers of Aurel Kolnai. London: Athlone Press, 1977.
Winch, P. 1965. ‘The Universalizability of Moral Judgements'. Monist 49: 196-214. Reprinted in Ethics and Action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972.
Korsgaard, C. 1993. ‘The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values'. Social Philosophy and Policy 10: 24-51. Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
—. 1985. ‘Kant's Formula of Universal Law'. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66: 24-47. Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom of Ends.
Hare, R. 1981. Moral Thinking: its Levels, Method, and Point . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.4.
Gibbard, A. 1988. ‘Hare's Analysis of Ought and its Implications'. In D. Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics.
It is often claimed that morality involves impartiality. There are two main competing conceptions of impartiality. One says that impartiality involves showing all persons the same respect, treating them, in some sense, as ends in themselves. The other tradition says that impartiality involves maximising good—whether conceived of as happiness or in other terms—over a whole population, the happiness of each person to count equally with the happiness of any other.
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , in L. W. Beck, ed., and trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other writings in moral philosophy , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. Also to be found in Practical philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Scanlon, T. 1982. ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism'. In A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism & Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Kamm, F. M. 1993. Morality, Mortality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume 2, part 3.
Darwall, S. L. 1983. Impartial Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Railton, P. 1984. ‘Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13: 134-171. Reprinted in S. Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Korsgaard, C. 1992. ‘Creating the Kingdom of Ends'. Reprinted in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism , Chs.4 & 5.
Sidgwick, H. 1922. The Methods of Ethics . London: Macmillan. Bk.IV.
Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge University Press.
Foot, P. 1985. ‘Utilitarianism & the Virtues'. Mind 94: 196-209. Reprinted in S. Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism & its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Sen, A., and B. Williams. eds. 1982. Utilitarianism & Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Introduction.
Scheffler, S. ed. 1988. Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
If impartiality does involve maximising good, how do we maximise it? In the performance of particular actions, as act-utilitarians recommend? Or, as rule-utilitarians claim, in the moral rules or principles that we adopt or seek to follow?
Glover, J. ed. 1990. Utilitarianism & its Critics . London: Collier Macmillan.
Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge University Press. See the section by Smart.
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ch.6, secs.1-4.
Rawls, J. 1955. ‘Two Concepts of Rules'. Philosophical Review 64: 3-32. Reprinted in P. Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
The demand to maximise good, or similarly impersonal moral demands can conflict with the projects and principles and feelings to which individuals are deeply committed. What are the implications of such conflict?
Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge University Press. See the section by Williams.
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Persons, Character and Morality'. In Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. A. O. 1995. ‘Moral Incapacity'. In his The Making Sense of Humanity: and other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scheffler, S. 1982. The Rejection of Consequentialism: a Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wolf, S. 1997. ‘Meaning & Morality'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 299-315.
The nature of goodness is a central concern in most ethical theories, but such theories differ both in what they conceive goodness to be, and how they take goodness to be related to notions such as duty and right. Is goodness to be explained prior to the notions of duty and virtue, and then to be used in their explanation; or is its explanation to be derived from an account of them? Is goodness an irreducible and ‘non-natural' property; or is it to be identified with properties naturally possessed by good things? Can we explain goodness by reference to the desires of people? Is there an irreducible variety of kinds of good, or is there only one kind of good?
Kant, Foundations of Morals.
Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism , Chs.1 & 2.
Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, C. 1983. ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness'. Philosophical Review 2: 169-196. Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Geach, P. 1956. ‘Good and Evil'. Analysis 17: 33-42. Reprinted in P. Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Paul, E. F., F. Miller Jr., and J. Paul, eds. 1992. The Good Life and the Human Good. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.2.
Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.4.
Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.2.
Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-3.
Foot, P. 2002. Natural Goodness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Is morality a matter of belief or feeling? If it is a matter of belief, are there moral properties in the world entirely independent of our sentiments; or do values depend on the feelings and responses of particular individuals or groups. Subjectivists claim that there is such a dependency, while moral objectivists deny this.
How does this issue connect with questions about the nature and function of moral judgement and moral language? Cognitivists claim that such judgements are apt for assessment as true or false, non-cognitivists deny this. Ethical nihilists or ‘error theorists' are cognitivists who claim that because there are no moral properties, all moral claims are false. Some theorists maintain cognitivism by endorsing only a minimal conception of truth or truth-aptness. (For further reading about issues concerning truth and realism in general see the relevant sections under Logic & Metaphysics.)
How far does morality involve obeying laws and fulfilling duties? And what is the source of these laws and duties?
Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals , Pt. II, The Doctrine of Virtue.
Wiggins, D. 1991. ‘Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty'. The Monist 83-106.
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy'. Philosophy 33: 1-19. Reprinted in From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol.1 . Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.
Wolf, S. 1982. ‘Moral Saints'. Journal of Philosophy 79: 419-439.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.
Is the point of a worthwhile life that the individual achieves virtue or moral goodness?
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Bks.8 & 9.
Hume, D. An Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals . Appendix 4.
Hutchinson, D. 1986. The Virtues of Aristotle . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Chs.1 & 2.
Crisp, R., and M. Slote. eds. 1997. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foot, P. 1978. ‘Virtues and Vices'. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Crisp, R. ed. 1996. How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Slote, M. 1992. From Morality to Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.
McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason'. The Monist 62: 331-350. Reprinted in Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.I.
Hurka, T. 1993. Perfectionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Does participating in ethical life involve a special moral responsibility for one's actions and if it does what does this responsibility come to: does it involve a capacity for rationality; for self-determination; or an independence from external determination?
Nagel, T. 1976. ‘Moral Luck'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50: 137-152. Reprinted in Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Williams, B. A. O. 1976. ‘Moral Luck'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50: 115-136. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strawson, P. F. 1962. ‘Freedom and Resentment'. Proceedings of the British Academy 48. Reprinted in Freedom and Resentement and Other Essays . London: Methuen, 1974; and in G. Watson, ed., Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Frankfurt, H. 1969. ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility'. Journal of Philosophy 66: 829-839. Reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Fischer, J. M. ed. 1986. Moral Responsibility. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Statman, D. ed. 1993. Moral Luck. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Adams, R. M. 1985. ‘Involuntary Sins'. Philosophical Review 94: 3-31.
Wallace, R. J. 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Schoemann, F. ed. 1987. Responsibility, Character and Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Widerker D. and McKenna M. eds 2003. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities . Aldershot: Ashgate.
Pink T. 2004. Free Will: A Very Short Introduction , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Does the rightness of an action depend solely on its consequences, or on the way those consequences are produced: whether by doing or allowing (killing or letting die); whether as intended or as merely foreseen?
Bennett, J. 1966. ‘Whatever the Consequences'. Analysis 26: 83-102; reprinted in James Rachels, ed., Moral Problems : a Collection of Philosophical Essays. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Foot, P. 1978. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect'. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Quinn, W. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-351; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
—. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing'. Philosophical Review 98: 287-312; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.II.
Kamm, F. 1993. Morality, Mortality . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vol.II, Chs.1-5.
Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Last chapter.
Kenny, A. 1995. ‘Philippa Foot on Double Effect'. In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn, eds., Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bennett, J. 1995. The Act Itself. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Thomson, J. J. 1996. ‘The Trolley Problem'. In Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory , edited by William Parent. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T. 2000. ‘Intention and Permissibility.' Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, 74: 301-317
How, if at all, does reason govern our actions? Are there rational justifications for performing one action rather than another? And, if so, where do these justifications come from? Do they take the form of codifiable rules? Do they depend on our desires and motivations, or are they quite independent of what we might happen to want? What form does deliberation about how to act take? Is it merely concerned with means or also with ends?
Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Practical Necessity'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
——. 1981. ‘Internal and External Reasons'. Reprinted in Moral Luck.
——. 1981. ‘Ought and Moral Obligation'. Reprinted in Moral Luck.
Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason'. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3 rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.)
Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.
Millgram, E. 1997. Practical Induction. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kolnai, A. 1962. ‘Deliberation is of Ends'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62: 195-218; reprinted in Ethics, Value & Reality: Selected Papers of Aurel Kolnai . London: Athlone Press, 1977.
McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason'. The Monist 62: 331-350. Reprinted in Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Richardson, H. S. 1995. Practical Reasoning About Final Ends . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cullity G. and Gaut B. eds. 1997. Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shafer-Landau, R. 1997 Moral Rules. Ethics 107: 584-611
Dancy, J. 2004. Ethics without Principles . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Can there be situations in which one must act, but whichever way in which one acts, one acts wrongly? If so, what is the significance of this—e.g. for the nature of good or for moral truth?
Gowans, C. W. ed. 1995. Moral Dilemmas. New York: Oxford Uiversity Press. Papers by Ross, Williams, Foot, Marcus, Donagan, and Nagel.
Mason, H. E. ed. 1996. Moral Dilemmas & Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gowans, C. W. 1994. Innocence Lost: an Examination of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hurley, S. L. 1989. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.7.
Foot, P. 2002. Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Can our capacity to apply reason in action go wrong because of internal weakness affecting either a.) our capacity to act as we think we ought (in which case we deliberately perform an action despite thinking that we shouldn't) or b.) our capacity to stick to our decisions and carry them out over time (in which case our own desires lead us to abandon deliberately a decision for no good reason).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Bk.7.
Davidson, D. 1980. ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?'. Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Elster, J. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.2.
Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Weakness, Commensurability and Desire'. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3 rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.)
Hare, R. 1963 Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pt.1, Ch.5.
Hurley, S. L. 1989. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.8.
Schelling, T. C. 1984. Choice and Consequence. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
There are moral conflicts about what is valuable and what ought to be done which appear to be irresoluble. These conflicts can occur between whole societies and between individuals within a given society (indeed, even within a single individual, see ‘Moral Dilemmas'). Are such conflicts really irresoluble, and if so what explains this? Moral relativists claim that moral judgements are relative to an individual or society. Note that there are different ways of developing the idea of relativism, both the manner in which judgements may be relative and to what they relate. Value pluralists explain the conflict in terms of there being a variety of incommensurable and conflicting goods that societies or individuals can respond or aspire to.
Williams, B. A. O. 1972. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter on ‘Relativism'.
Meiland, Jack W. and M. Krausz, eds. 1982. Relativism: Cognitive and Moral. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘The Truth in Relativism'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.9.
Harman, G. 1975. ‘Moral Relativism Defended'. Philosophical Review 84: 3-22.
Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: a Theory of Normative Judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.III, Ch.13.
Berlin, I. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction.
Nagel, T. 1979. ‘Fragmentation of Value'. Reprinted in Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stocker, M. 1990. Plural & Conflicting Values . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.3-7.
Further Reading
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Conflicts of Value'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law, Natural Rights . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.1.
Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.3.
Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.7 & 8.
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.5.
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Conflicts of Value'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chang, R. ed. 1997. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Singer, P. ed. 1986. Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Winkler, E., and J. R. Coombs, eds. 1983. Applied Ethics: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Does the rightness of an action ever depend on whether it counts as a doing or as an allowing? What bearing does this question have on the permissibility of various kinds of euthanasia?
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics . Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind; translated by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Lecture on duties towards the body in regard to life.
Foot, P. 1978. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect'. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell .
Bennett, J. 1966. ‘Whatever the Consequences'. Analysis 26: 83-102; reprinted in James Rachels, ed., Moral Problems : a Collection of Philosophical Essays. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Uniacke, S. 1994. Permissible Killing: the Self-defence Justification of Homicide . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McMahan, J. 1993. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid'. Ethics 103: 250-279.
Steinbock, B. ed. 1980. Killing and Letting Die. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
How in general should we conceive of the debate about the rights and wrongs of abortion? Does the issue depend on the moral status of the foetus, and how is that status to be determined? What role do the rights and interests of the woman bearing the foetus have in settling this issue?
Thomson, J. J. 1971. ‘A Defense of Abortion'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 47-66; reprinted in P. Singer, ed., Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Feinberg, J. ed. 1973. The Problem of Abortion. 2 nd ed. Wadsworth: Belmont.
Finnis, J. 1973. ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to J. J. Thomson'. Philosophy & Public Affairs 2: 117-145.
Kamm, F. M. 1992. Creation and Abortion: a Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dworkin, R. 1993. Life's Dominion: an Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia. London: Harper Collins.
Sumner, L. W. 1981. Abortion and Moral Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Do we have duty of care towards other animals? Do non-human animals have rights? Do humans have a special moral status simply as humans?
Singer, P. 1976. Animal Liberation. London: Cape.
Regan, T. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Carruthers, P. 1992. The Animals Issue : Moral Theory in Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
What responsibility do we have to care for the environment? Does the environment have a value independent of human interests and concerns?
Elliot, R. ed. 1995. Environmental Ethics. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.
Winkler, E., and J. R. Coombs, eds. 1983. Applied Ethics: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. Section on Environmental Ethics.
Taylor, P. W. 1986. Respect for Nature: a Theory of Environmental Ethics . Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Attfield, R. 1991. The Ethics of Environmental Concern. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press.
Johnson, L. E. 1991. A Morally Deep World: an Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.