Causal Reasoning with Causal Models

Date:   Wednesday, October 06, 2004
Time:   2:00-3:00 pm
Location:   Room 102, Dept of Statistical Science, UCL
Contact Name:   Philip Dawid
Contact Phone:   020 7679 1861

The causal interpretation of Bayesian networks has been, and remains, controversial. I shall here present such an interpretation. I present a criterion of type causality which depends upon an indeterministic understanding of Bayesian networks as opposed to the deterministic views of Pearl and Hausman. Nancy Cartwright has influentially denounced "Bayes net methods" on the grounds that they fail under unfaithfulness, which has led to a variety of demonstrations of how widespread unfaithfulness is. I shall argue that this is a red-herring, ignoring the nature of causal reasoning with causal models. Jon Williamson has suggested that the failure of the Common Cause Principle makes causal discovery a doubtful enterprise; I argue rather that it is a problematic enterprise, which requires the invention and development of reliable model-building rules. I offer some plausible model-building rules, which appear to offer promise for using Bayesian networks to develop a unified account of type and token causality.

Speaker

Name:    Kevin  Korb
Affiliation:   Monash University
Homepage:   http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/~korb/
Biography  

My research is in artificial intelligence and the philosophy of science and the interrelation between the two. Of particular interest to me is the nature of cognition and learning. From the philosophy side this manifests itself in the study of confirmation theory and, in particular, Bayesian methods of learning and theory evaluation. The artificial intelligence side includes all varieties of machine learning projects, and particularly their analysis in Bayesian terms. I am also co-founder of Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness. 

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