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So the British people have voted with a margin of around 4%, a little
more than 1 million votes, to leave the European Union (EU). Where this
will lead lies somewhere between two absolutely contrasting scenarios.
29 June 2016
Paul Ekins More...
Starts: Jun 29, 2016 12:00:00 AM
A first round of reactions from UCL staff to the EU referendum results.
24 June 2016 More...
Starts: Jun 27, 2016 12:00:00 AM
Both Leave and Remain have appealed to voters’ guts
to the extent that reason itself has become suspicious. Emotions will
rule the day on 23 June, but at what cost?
23 June 2016
Starts: Jun 23, 2016 12:00:00 AM
Bulgarian PM’s resignation & Public Disorder in Europe
Publication date: Feb 20, 2013 05:28 PM
Start: Feb 20, 2013 12:00 AM
Dr Eric Gordy
The main difference between public disorder in Bulgaria and everywhere else in Europe is that in Bulgaria the government responded. Although the immediate catalyst for protests was the state’s failure to control growth in the price of electricity, the core causes are shared in every European state: dissatisfaction resulting from the forced dismantling of social support services brought on by the European debt crisis, and a sense that policymakers are orienting their activity not to the needs of the public but to the service of large European banks.
These forces are accompanied by the perception that national governments have neither the capacity nor the will to address the consequences of a fiscal and social policy that are widely seen as imbalanced against the public interest. In Greece, Hungary and Italy the contribution of public dissatisfaction to the rise of antidemocratic movements of the extreme right is already apparent.
While conservative political leaders in the EU, particularly from Germany and the UK (and until last year, France) have largely been successful in pushing for a shift of priorities to debt service and “austerity,” the consequences of this should concern everybody in Europe. In the period after the end of the First World War, there was a similar euphoric and triumphalist announcement that liberal democracy could declare its inevitable victory across the continent.
Inattention to the responsibilities of states to their publics on the part of that generation of liberal democratic elites led to a rapid and general decay of constitutional systems and an accelerating tendency of governments to neglect of social responsibilities.
If we take one lesson from the failures of democratic order in the 1920s and 1930s, it should be that governments that fail to address social needs will be challenged by forces, some of them extremist ones, that promise to do so.