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COMMENTS 

'Highly problematic, to put it mildly'

Deciphering the Conservative Party’s proposals for a new ‘British Bill of Rights’ is not an easy task, as the eight-page policy document is riddled with errors, distortions and imprecise language. What is more, their two main policy aims are highly problematic, argues
Colm O'Cinneide
9 October 2014
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Starts: Oct 9, 2014 12:00:00 AM

UK & EU: New Faces, Old Problems?

The row between Britain and its allies that accompanied the nomination of Jean-Claude Juncker as the new Commission President was seen by some as an effective short-term tactic from David Cameron. But the ‘Juncker bounce’ was short-lived and left Cameron in a long-term strategic pickle.
Paola Buonadonna
6 October 2014
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Starts: Oct 6, 2014 12:00:00 AM

Five lessons of the Juncker Affair

It is now three months since Jean-Claude Juncker was elected President of the Commission, against the express wishes of the British and Hungarian governments.  What lessons can we draw from this episode about British attitudes to the European Union?
6 October 2014
Prof Michael Shackleton
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Starts: Oct 6, 2014 12:00:00 AM

Bulgarian PM’s resignation & Public Disorder in Europe

Publication date: Feb 20, 2013 5:28:41 PM

Start: Feb 20, 2013 12:00:00 AM

Eric Gordy

Dr Eric Gordy
February 2013

The main difference between public disorder in Bulgaria and everywhere else in Europe is that in Bulgaria the government responded. Although the immediate catalyst for protests was the state’s failure to control growth in the price of electricity, the core causes are shared in every European state: dissatisfaction resulting from the forced dismantling of social support services brought on by the European debt crisis, and a sense that policymakers are orienting their activity not to the needs of the public but to the service of large European banks.

These forces are accompanied by the perception that national governments have neither the capacity nor the will to address the consequences of a fiscal and social policy that are widely seen as imbalanced against the public interest. In Greece, Hungary and Italy the contribution of public dissatisfaction to the rise of antidemocratic movements of the extreme right is already apparent.

While conservative political leaders in the EU, particularly from Germany and the UK (and until last year, France) have largely been successful in pushing for a shift of priorities to debt service and “austerity,” the consequences of this should concern everybody in Europe. In the period after the end of the First World War, there was a similar euphoric and triumphalist announcement that liberal democracy could declare its inevitable victory across the continent.

Inattention to the responsibilities of states to their publics on the part of that generation of liberal democratic elites led to a rapid and general decay of constitutional systems and an accelerating tendency of governments to neglect of social responsibilities.

If we take one lesson from the failures of democratic order in the 1920s and 1930s, it should be that governments that fail to address social needs will be challenged by forces, some of them extremist ones, that promise to do so.