Welcome to the UCL European Institute, UCL's hub for research, collaboration and information on Europe and the European Union.
In this commentary, Lucy Shacketon outlines why UK universities have both the right and the responsibility to inform and influence the referendum debate.
3 August 2015
Lucy Shackleton More...
Starts: Aug 3, 2015 12:00:00 AM
In their relationship to Europe, both Britain and Romania are situated at the continent’s edge, but that is where any list of comparisons between the two countries usually ends. Certainly, both countries are members of the European Union, but their respective responses to the European Union differ markedly. Polls conducted by Eurobarometer consistently put Romanians among the most enthusiastic supporters of the European Union, and the British (along with the Greeks) among the least. But what are the historical roots of Romanian and British attitudes towards Europe and the European idea?
27 July 2015
Prof. Martyn Rady More...
Starts: Jul 27, 2015 12:00:00 AM
Young people in the UK today who are attracted to extremism are typically well educated. Given the weaknesses of this ideology in terms of its use of history, internal coherence of arguments and moral standards, its success with many educated young people requires explanation. The explanation, according to Dr. Farid, is multifaceted but education has a big role to play in curbing the trend.
2 June 2015
Dr. Farid Panjwani More...
Starts: Jun 2, 2015 12:00:00 AM
When anger masks apathy
Publication date: Jun 02, 2014 04:31 PM
Start: Jun 02, 2014 12:00 AM
As a closer look at the European
Parliament Elections in Central and Eastern Europe suggests, it may be
non-voting, rather than populist protest voting, which could prove the
long-term threat to sustainability of the EU’s troubled democratic
Dr Sean Hanley
2 June 2014
The results of the elections to the European Parliament which took place across the EU’s 28 member states in May were very much as predicted – at least in the ‘old’ pre-2004 member states: driven by frustration with austerity, economic stagnation, diminished opportunities and a yawning sense of disconnect with established parties and politicians, a variety of outsider parties made sweeping gains and unignorably stamped themselves on the electoral map.
Europe, where socio-economic malaise and disconnect were often refracted
through the politics of anti-immigration, this tended to benefit right
wing, Eurosceptic parties. In Southern Europe anti-austerity parties of
the radical left such as Greece’s Syriza or Podemos in Spain gained
The most spectacular gains have been
made by parties of varying political complexions which had a long-time
presence at the political margins: UKIP in the UK, the Front National in
France, Sinn Féin in Ireland. Whatever their coloration, the scale of
their political success underlines the potential fragility of mainstream
parties in Western Europe - even in states with well-established party
systems previously considered immune to populist surges such as Spain or
Many commentators have lumped in the newer EU member states of Central and Eastern with the unfolding (if exaggerated) story of a populist backlash in the EU’s West European heartlands. Anticipating the strong showing of the radical right in Denmark, Holland and Austria The Observer’s Julian Coman, for example, causally assured readers that ‘across much of eastern Europe, it is a similar story’.
But, in fact, it was not: outsider and anti-establishment parties, perhaps surprisingly, did not perform well in Central and Eastern Europe. The extreme right, with the marked exception of Hungary, has long been weak in the region and flopped badly even in countries like Slovenia, Slovakia and Croatia, where polls had suggested it might pick up some MEPs.
Hungary’s powerful extreme right-wing party
Jobbik secured a widely reported second place (and 14.8% vote share).
But this success was more an optical illusion caused by the disunity of
the mainstream Hungarian liberal left. The radical right party’s vote
share in fact fell sharply compared to the parliamentary elections in
The only appreciable success in Central Eastern Europe enjoyed by a new party of the radical right was chalked up by the Congress of the New Right (KNP) in Poland, a political vehicle for the long-time enfant terrible of Polish politics Janusz Korwin Mikke whose eccentric libertarian views variously embrace the restoration of the monarchy; doubts over Hitler’s responsibility for the Holocaust; and suggestions that the European Parliament building be redeveloped as a brothel. The KNP’s modest 7.2% vote gives it four MEPs, including the redoubtable Korwin Mikke.
New anti-political parties of a more centrist persuasion which have been so much a feature of politics in Central and Eastern Europe
in recent years also failed to make much of an impact: the ANO movement
of billionaire Andrej Babiš narrowly topped the poll in the Czech
Republic, but had weaker (16%) support than some polls had predicted. In
Slovenia, the hastily formed ‘I Believe’ list created by the former
head of the country’s Court of Auditors Igor Šoltés – whose entire
campaign reportedly amounted to an intermittently functioning Twitter
account – gained a more creditable 10.5%, while in Bulgaria the more
controversial anti-corruption party Bulgaria Without Censorship polled
The real story of Central and Eastern Europe was, however, one of non-voters: ten of the twelve lowest turnouts across the EU in generally low turnout elections were recorded in post-communist member states. The Czech Republic and Slovakia recorded the lowest levels of participation on 19.5% and 13% turnouts respectively – levels of abstention which arguably begin to drain those elected of legitimacy. (Only in Lithuania - where the EU poll coincided with second round of voting in presidential elections - did turnout match the 43% EU average.)
Since their inception in 1979, turnout in European elections has been low (and declining) and turnout has generally been lower than average in Central and Eastern Europe, where European integration has always been a technocratic, top-down project with limited societal engagement. Voters in the region may sense small, poorer post-communist states have a limited real influence on the direction of EU affairs, but few realistic exit options.
However, it is perhaps is worth reflecting
that Central and East Europeans have already turned to new
anti-establishment protest parties in large numbers in recent national
elections: they have not needed the opportunity of the European
elections to cast mass protest votes triggering electoral earthquake of
the kind UKIP celebrated last week. Having now used up this option,
many voters in the region have moved on to the next stage and simply
switched off and disengaged from the electoral process altogether.
Given this prior history, it is tempting to wonder that in some ways Central and Eastern European voters may be ahead of the game. If the various victorious protest parties of 2014 disappoint, in 2019 will we see the spread of near-critical rates of abstention seen in Slovakia or the Czech Republic? Non-voting, rather than populist protest voting could prove the real long-term threat to sustainability of the EU’s troubled democratic institutions.
- Dr Sean Hanley, Senior Lecturer in Comparative Central and East European Politics, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies