ECONG106 - Microeconomics

Aims:

This course introduces students to advanced topics in microeconomic theory. The topics offered will depend on the faculty teaching the course.

Objectives:

On completing this course students should:

  • Understand dynamic and static contracting models with hidden information
  • Understand the career concern’s model and the relational contracting model.
  • Have a good understanding of the equilibrium concepts used in static and dynamic games.
  • Understand the canonical multistage games and their equilibrium sets.
  • Have a good understanding decision theory.
  • Understand something of the recent developments in this theory such as choice from menus and ambiguity aversion.
  • Understand the major results on mechanisms design.
  • Be able to apply these results.
Taught by:
Martin Cripps, V Bhaskar, Suehyun Kwon
Assessment:
2 Hour examination in January and a 2 Hour examination in the summer term.
Suitable for:
 
Prerequisites: Useful introductory texts are: Fudenberg &Tirole “Game Theory”; and MasColell, Whinston and Green “Microeconomic Theory”. It is assumed you have taken a graduate level course in microeconomics.
Moodle page:
ECONG106 – Microeconomics