ECONG106 - Microeconomics
Aims:
This course introduces students to advanced topics in microeconomic theory. The topics offered will depend on the faculty teaching the course.
Objectives:
On completing this course students should:
- Understand dynamic and static contracting models with hidden information
- Understand the career concern’s model and the relational contracting model.
- Have a good understanding of the equilibrium concepts used in static and dynamic games.
- Understand the canonical multistage games and their equilibrium sets.
- Have a good understanding decision theory.
- Understand something of the recent developments in this theory such as choice from menus and ambiguity aversion.
- Understand the major results on mechanisms design.
- Be able to apply these results.
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Taught by: |
Martin Cripps, V Bhaskar |
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Assessment: |
2 Hour examination in January and a 2 Hour examination in the summer term. |
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Suitable for: |
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| Prerequisites: |
Useful introductory texts are: Fudenberg &Tirole “Game Theory”; and MasColell, Whinston and Green “Microeconomic Theory”. It is assumed you have taken a graduate level course in microeconomics. |
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Moodle page: |
ECONG106 – Microeconomics |
