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7-8 June 2013
 |
Organisers: Aureo de Paula and Elie Tamer
Sponsored by UCL and The Breen Family Fund at Northwestern
Location: RCGP, 30 Euston Square, London, NW1 2FB
To register for free, please complete the Conference Registration Form
An exciting conference with a great mix of speakers from the microeconomic theory and applied and theoretical econometrics sides of the spectrum.
When decision makers -- firms, individuals or households -- behave strategically, the simultaneous interdependence of their choices creates challenging problems for the econometric analysis of their interaction from observed data. Some of these problems are unique to these models and require that one carefully examines the economic assumptions that underly these interactions. For example, what a given player knows about the other players' payoffs and her own payoff at the time of making a decision, what the econometrician observes, and what rules of behavior are allowed all shape the kinds of inferences that one is able to conduct. The conference will bring together a set of econometric theorists, applied economists and economic theorists that will share their views on the empirical usefulness of various approaches to learning from data using different models of simultaneous interactions. The research agenda exposited throughout the conference will highlight the open questions faced in this research agenda and the interaction among the participants will hopefully help resolve some of these questions.
| Friday 7th June | |
| 10:30-10:50 |
Registration and coffee |
|
10:50-11:00 |
Opening Remarks |
|
11:00-11:45 |
Matt Shum (Cal Tech) "Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Models using Convex Analysis" (with Khai Chiong and Alfred Galichon) |
|
11:45-12:30 |
Whitney Newey (MIT) “Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Dynamic Games of Imperfect Information” |
|
12:30-13:30 |
Lunch |
|
13:30-14:15 |
Brendan Kline (UT at Austin) “The Accuracy of Nash Equilibrium in Experiments” |
|
14:15-15:00 |
Aureo de Paula (UCL) “Econometrics of Network Formation Games” (with Seth Richards-Shubik and Elie Tamer) |
|
15:00-15:30 |
Coffee Break |
|
15:30-16:15 |
Denis Nekipelov (Berkeley) “Semiparametric Estimation of a Finite Horizon Dynamic Discrete Choice Model with Application to Subprime Mortgage Default” (with Minjung Park and Sean Chu) |
|
16:15-17:00 |
Konrad Menzel (NYU) “Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems” |
|
17:00-18:00 |
Drinks Reception |
| Saturday 8th June | |
|
09:30-10:00 |
Coffee |
| 10:00-10:45 |
Jeremy Fox (Michigan) “Identification of Choice Models for Bundles and Discrete Games” (with Natalia Lazzati) |
|
10:45-11:30 |
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University) “Robust Predictions in Games of Incomplete Information” (with Stephen Morris) Paper 1 Paper 2 |
|
11:30-11:45 |
Coffee Break |
|
11:45-12:30 |
Ariel Pakes (Harvard University) “Descriptive and Behavioral Econometric Models” |
|
12:30-13:30 |
Lunch |
|
13:30-14:15 |
Xun Tang (UPenn) “Inference of Bidders Risk Attitudes in Ascending Auctions with Endogenous Entry” (with Hanming Fang) |
|
14:15-15:00 |
Martin Pesendorfer (LSE) “Testing for Equilibrium Multiplicity in Dynamic Markov Games” (with Yuya Takahashi) |
|
15:00-15:30 |
Coffee Break |
|
15:30-16:15 |
Adam Rosen (UCL) “Inference in Ordered Response Games with Complete Information" (with Andres Aradillas-Lopez) |
|
16:15-17:00 |
Victor Aguirregabiria (Toronto) “Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games When Players’ Beliefs Are Not in Equilibrium” (with Avind Magesan) |
For further queries, please contact Nirusha Vigi on
n.vigi@ucl.ac.uk