



Together  
Foundation

# Best Practices Database

Subscriber: Vervoorn, IHS  
Subscription Expires: 31-DEC-09



## Urban Infrastructure and Local Finance Development (MDP), Quezon City *Philippines*

Good Practice

New for 2002

### Categories:

#### Poverty Eradication:

- access to credit
- income generation
- job creation

#### Economic Development:

- capital formation
- enterprise development (formal and informal sectors)
- entrepreneurialship
- investment development
- training

#### Urban Governance:

- decentralization
- human resources and leadership development
- legislation
- partnership development
- public administration and management
- public policy

**Level of Activity:** City/Town

**Ecosystem:** Tropical/Sub-Tropical

### Summary

The series of Municipal Development Projects (MDPs) in the Philippines showcase a number of "success and best practice initiatives" in different fields, notably: urban infrastructure, local finance, central-local partnership, local autonomy/decentralization, economic development, integrated approach to project development and capacity building. Furthermore, its project design and results also best exemplify the significant feature of accountability: Fiscal accountability; accountability for outputs; accountability with respect to objectives; and accountability in terms of improving the quality of life.

Post assessment studies on the implementation results of the MDPs revealed that the projects substantially met both its physical and institutional objectives, project sustainability was likely and project outcome was very satisfactory. Calculations on the rates of returns of selected revenue-generating projects showed that MDP projects are economically and financially viable investments.

The MDPs successfully achieved the principal objectives of assisting Philippine cities and municipalities in expanding and upgrading their infrastructure, services and facilities by: (i) strengthening the National Government's institutional framework for assisting local governments; (ii)

strengthening the local government's investment planning, financing and implementation capacity; (iii) strengthening the local government's maintenance capacity; and (iv) improving local fiscal performance.

Under the MDPs, the Municipal Development Fund (MDF) was created by law in 1984 (Presidential Decree No. 1914) as a special revolving fund and eventually became the sole long-term financing mechanism for LGU access to credit. The MDPs encouraged competition among LGUs in term of their creditworthiness, implementation capacity and the quality of subproject proposals submitted. At present, the MDF has established itself as the financial conduit for more than 20 Official Development Assistance (ODA) assisted projects in the Philippines.

A total of 151 cities and municipalities nationwide directly benefited from the MDPs. As of March 2002, LGU loan amortization payments have been reported to have 100% collection efficiency. The MDF second-generation fund has now an accumulated collection of about PHP2.219 Billion.

Among the most notable successful MDP projects are the public market projects in the municipalities of Bauan, Batangas and Pulilan, Bulacan; the cities of Marikina, Metro Manila; Tagum, Davao, Bogo, Cebu and Palawan; the integrated bus and jeepney terminal projects in the cities of Tacloban, Naga; Surigao and Butuan; the school building projects in the municipalities of Bauan and Mabini, Batangas and San Pablo City, Laguna; the health center projects in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija and the municipality of Balanga, Bataan.

Some of the documented significant achievements of the MDPs were the following:

- i) improved living conditions and productivity of residents
- ii) significant improvements in local infrastructure and local revenue generation
- iii) institutionalized a bottom-up demand-driven, project approach
- iv) enhanced capacity building performance of LGUs
- v) increased participation of People's Organizations (POs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in local development
- vi) improved profitability of revenue generating projects
- vii) improved profitability of revenue generating projects
- viii) helped facilitate municipal reforms

## **Narrative**

### **a. Situation before the Initiative Begun**

In 1980, the Philippines was already emerging as one of the rapidly urbanizing countries in East Asia. From 1960 to 1980, the urban population more than doubled and reported to be about 31% of the total population. Around 32% of the urban population had incomes below the absolute poverty threshold estimated at PHP 3,431 (US \$245) per capita in 1983. Rapid urban growth brought about problems of traffic, insufficient water supply, sanitation and deterioration of other basic infrastructure and services. Investments in infrastructure and services lagged mainly due to lack of funds. Although local government units (LGUs) were expected to provide a variety of urban services, their finances were generally weak and inadequate.

### **b. Establishment of priorities**

Pursuant to the policies on decentralization and urban poverty alleviation, the Government with World Bank assistance initiated the First Municipal Development Project (MDP 1) also known as Program for Essential, Municipal Infrastructure Utilities, Maintenance and Engineering Development (PREMIUMED I) in early 1981. The MDP project was also an offshoot of previous Bank assisted urban development projects in the Philippines (Urban 1 in 1976; Urban II in 1979; Urban III in 1980 and Urban IV in 1983) but better designed based on lessons learned from past implementation. Greater

emphasis was placed on increased LGU participation, improving urban management, institution building, increased resource mobilization and on supporting cost recovery measures.

The then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) organized a Central Project Office (CPO) in 1981 to mobilize and assist LGUs to prepare their project proposals and later to evaluate their investment programs and prepare an initial package for Bank assistance. The CPO organized several workshops participated in by various levels of national and local officials. It was in those workshops that local need and priorities were discussed and project concepts evolved. The LGU officials became so involved with the planning prioritization process because of the opportunities to expand their local operations and were willing to be pro-active to raise local revenues if financing could be made available.

### c. Formulation of Objectives and Strategies

Thus, the objectives of the first MDP were formulated to assist local governments outside Metro Manila to provide infrastructure and improve municipal services by:

- a) establishing a mechanism to provide local governments with direct access to long-term development finance on reasonable terms (thru the Municipal Development Fund or MDF);
- b) establishing a permanent national-level technical intermediary (building on the existing CPO) to (i) assist local governments in identifying infrastructure investment priorities; (ii) evaluate project proposal for financing (iii) monitor and control the program; and (iv) act as a principal liaison with the World Bank and other external funding agencies in promoting urban service improvements throughout the urban hierarchy;
- c) Strengthening local technical and financial capacity for project implementation and service management through implementation of a broad based Municipal Training Program (MTP) and through organizational and fiscal reforms; and,
- d) Improving local government fiscal performance, through the Real Property Tax Administration program (RPTA).

As part of the project design and strategies for sound project management, the following were undertaken:

- a) enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1914 in 1984 creating the Municipal Development Fund (MDF) as a special revolving fund specially meant to finance priority development projects of LGUs;
- b) approval of Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for the organization of the inter-agency Project Steering Committee (PSC) that served as the policy making and approving body for LGU investment proposals and the Technical Sub-Committee (TSC) that carried out the routine coordination between various agencies and the review of subproject appraisal investment proposals and lending agreements prior to their submission to the PSC for approval;
- c) issuance of a DPWH Department Order designating the CPO to serve as the technical intermediary to assist LGUs in project development, evaluate their project proposals for financing and monitor and control the program, among others;
- d) regular Annual Appropriation of budgetary allocation;
- e) establishment of Criteria for selection of eligible LGUs including manuals of operational guidelines in processing of LGU applications, project appraisal criteria, project management systems and procedures including procurement, project monitoring and financial management aspects; and
- f) establishment of routinely inter-agency linkages with various levels of government.

### d. Mobilization of Resources

As technical lead agency, the DPWH had allocated in its regular annual appropriations the necessary funds needed for the operations of the CPO including corresponding amount for project implementation. The CPO was fully staffed with qualified and competent engineers, financial analysts, urban planners, accountants, architects, economists and other administrative support personnel.

The Department of Finance (DOF) through its Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) was designated to be the overall administrator of the Municipal Development Fund (MDF) and at the same time implemented the Real Property Tax Administration (RPTA).

The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) through its Local Government Academy (LGA) implemented the Municipal Training Program (MTP) to complement the capacity building requirements.

At the local levels, the LGUs Sangguniang (Legislative) Councils also passed the necessary resolutions appropriating the required LGU equity funds including designation of LGU personnel for project management activities.

#### e. Processes

MDP I implementation start-up was slowed down primarily due to the political transition after the "People's Revolution in 1986" which also led to changes in national and local leadership. In addition, the recession in the country also brought about to serious budget constraints at all levels of government. Project implementation picked up momentum after the local elections in 1988 and was finally completed in 1993.

MDP II had the same project objectives as MDP I but project area coverage was concentrated in Metro Manila and in the fringe provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Rizal and Laguna which were outside of MDP I area coverage. MDP II was implemented from 1990 to 1996. The project was completed as scheduled but it also suffered initial implementation delays due to factors beyond control such as delays in loan disbursements, provision of local equity in some LGUs and enactment of local ordinances specifying tariff rates for revenue generating projects. Natural calamities also greatly hampered implementation such as the Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1990 and the major earthquake in 1991.

The experiences gained and the solid institutional framework developed under the MDP I benefited MDP II. Project supervision was relatively easier than in MDP I, because of the accessibility of MDP II project centers. Project staff were also trained and competent in providing technical assistance to LGUs. The simpler demand driven, bottom-up project design approach was widely accepted by LGU project beneficiaries as they were given positive incentives to select priority subprojects and to manage their implementation effectively. The project had built-in public consultation mechanisms to secure positive support by affected beneficiaries (e.g. vendors) and consumer patronage for most of the facilities. Project execution was simplified giving more direct LGU responsibilities in detailed plan preparation, tendering and project supervision including operations and maintenance. Subproject components were also limited to small-scale municipal infrastructures, which were manageable even with limited capacities.

MDP III start up in 1992 was basically affected by delays in the approval of revised pro-forma contract documents and similar to MDP I and II, the changes in political leaderships due to the 1995 and 1998 local and national elections, several natural calamities and the Asian Financial Crises in 1998. The project was also beset with cash shortage and other budgetary controls instituted at the national level, thereby affecting overall fund disbursements.

Aware of these implementation bottlenecks, government employed several proactive measures to facilitate and accelerate project implementation and disbursement by creating a separate appropriation item in the Government budget for foreign assisted projects such as the MDPs. Other measures included (a) the tapping of bridge financing from the accumulated funds of the MDF which were not subjected to budgetary appropriations; (b) conduct of regular monthly meetings of the MDF Policy

Governing Board; (c) strengthening technical capacities within the CPO ranks to supervise subproject implementation and assisting LGUs in streamlined operations; (d) establishing a contract review committee within CPO; (e) monitoring and assisting LGUs in tendering; and, (f) continuously streamlining the subproject preparation process.

In addition, in 1998, the Municipal Development Fund Office (MDFO) was created as separate office in the DOF to assume administration of the MDF and strengthen the MDFO as a government development institution.

Due to the success generated from the first three MDPs resulting to the increased demand of LGUs for access to the MDF credit, the Local Government Finance and Development (LOGOFIND) project which was approved by the World Bank in 1999 eventually became the fourth follow-up project to the MDPs under a more rationalized LGU Financing Framework. With lots of lessons learned from the MDPs, the LOGOFIND was designed to serve the larger portion of low-income LGUs nationwide under a more streamlined project design and with more focus on social and environmental projects.

Under the DOF administration, both the technical and financial functions of the CPO and the then BLGF were housed under the MDFO to facilitate project supervision and disbursement under one office. Capability building modules continued to be supported by the LGA of the DILG.

#### f. Results Achieved

Overall project implementation results for the three completed MDPs had been rated as having had very satisfactory results. Both the physical and institutional objectives were met. Under MDP I and II, the MDF has established itself as a long term credit window for LGUs. Under MDP III, the MDF started to operate as a revolving fund because a sufficient amount of the "second generation fund" from payments of amortization from MDP I and II project LGUs was starting to build up. As of March 2002, total loan amortization payments have already accumulated to a total of PH P2.219 Billion. Annual Collection efficiency for the past years was placed at 100%.

The MDPs benefited a total of 151 LGUs with subprojects located in strategic urban centers nationwide. Total investments for civil works alone amounted to PH P4.133 Billion (US \$174.5 Million).

? Actual improvement achieved in people's living condition

Physical accomplishments consisted of the following major construction works:

- a. over 29 kms. of local roads and 283 kms. of national roads were constructed, thereby improving mobility and traffic flows within the project centers and increasing property values;
- b. over 57 kms. of local and 174 kms. of national drainage systems helped to minimize flooding and soil erosion and reduced damage to property and public infrastructure, and resulted in the reduction of the incidence of water-borne diseases due to increased exposure to stagnant storm water;
- c. the 130 public market projects resulted in permanent stalls for transient vendors, safer and more properly-arranged facilities, reduction in congestion and traffic problems within the market vicinity, more efficient distribution of goods and services, and overall heightened business activity in the markets;
- d. twenty two slaughterhouses were constructed, thereby helping to minimize illegal and unhygienic backyard slaughtering and reducing health risks due to unhygienic handling and processing of meat;
- e. the construction of eight bus terminals reduced traffic congestion on city roads, provided convenient transfer facilities, improved commuter mobility and improved the revenue base of LGUs;

f. two solid waste subprojects expanded the area covered by improved garbage collection and disposal systems, thereby reducing health risks to local residents;

g. over 51 kms. of shore protection was constructed to reduce damage to properties and infrastructure by preventing soil erosion along the shoreline;

h. seven water supply project rehabilitated and improved water distribution to a satisfactory degree; and

i. Four units of school building facilities were constructed thereby providing not only better free education opportunities for secondary standards but also better and more spacious school building facilities including computers.

Revenue generating projects such as public markets triggered the process of economic and social development in localities where they were constructed. Post assessment studies had validated the varied impact of these projects on LGU governance (increased local revenue generation, improved LGU creditworthiness, strengthened municipal capabilities, impact upon financial autonomy, upon own revenue mobilization and upon municipal budget surplus/deficit); on local entrepreneurs (job creation and income generation, increase in land and real property values, efficient commuting and better access to services and positive changes in the quality of life for basic services); on households or consumers (sustained patronage due to proximity to residence availability of variety of goods, accessibility to transportation, availability of clean market facilities).

? Better coordination and integration between various actors, organization or institutions

The MDPs employed a demand driven, bottom-up approach, which stirred strong LGU interest and project ownership. The projects had built in public consultation mechanisms, which facilitated social acceptability. As an inter-agency project, it was able to sustain the support of all involved national government agencies such as NEDA, DOF, DBM, DILG, through proper representations in the Policy Governing Boards. Through close coordination with these agencies there was also better interaction between various levels of governments and had actually strengthened the central and local partnerships in local development. There was also close interaction with World Bank supervision missions which helped develop a collaborative working relationship which ensured the completion of the projects and achieving most of the stated objectives.

? Changes in local economic and environmental policies and strategies

The MDPs had been noted to have resulted to significant local economic development in the participating LGUs, most especially in regard to the benefits derived from the operations of their revenue generating projects such as public markets, slaughterhouse, bus terminals, among others. LGUs were able to maintain clean and more sanitary market facilities through proper waste collection and disposal measures. Development and implementation of policies on tariff/fees and environmental concerns were duly constituted through proper consultations and widely accepted local resolutions and ordinances. Local zoning regulations were made consistent with their local development plans primarily to ensure the balance between economic and environmental sustainability.

? Improved Institutional Capacity at the local levels and national level

One significant contribution of the MDPs was the complementary capacity building program built-in into its project design. The LGU officials and project staff participated in various mandatory training modules on Feasibility Study (FS) preparation, detailed engineering preparation, procurement, project management, financial management, among others. LGU beneficiaries had noted the strong technical assistance provided by CPO in strengthening their municipal capacities in these areas of concerns.

The results of post training effectiveness surveys showed the positive contributions of MTP training to successful project implementation through managerial and technical skills enhancement resulting in

tangible results such as (a) improvement in project implementation procedures especially procurement and contract management and supervision; (b) adoption of effective and efficient financial management procedures resulting in increased local revenues; (c) institutionalization of team work within the LGUs; (d) improved inter-LGU cooperation and sharing of project experiences especially on compliance to project conditions; (e) efficient LGU project implementation, modeling and sustainability. The MTP modules were cited by LGU respondents as very useful and effective in improving their local governance capacities.

At the national level, the CPO was cited as having established itself as a strong technical intermediary in providing technical assistance to LGUs in both project preparation and project management activities.

On the other hand, the further evolution of the MDF under the MDPs is also noteworthy as it became an effective financial mechanism for LGUs' ready access to credit financing.

? Changes to local or national decision-making including the institutionalization of partnerships

One important offshoot of the MDPs was the promotion of local government autonomy. The revised Local Government Code of 1991 became effective at the midstream of MDP I implementation. Under the MDPs re-lending mechanism for credit financing from the MDF, a national financial intermediary, LGUs were encouraged to mobilize financial resources through sub-loan, LGU equity and national grant financing mix. During the early 80s and 90s, Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) were reluctant to on-lend to LGUs for fear of the non-creditworthiness of LGUs.

Only rich cities had become clients of GFIs while the MDF served the medium and low income LGUs. Sooner than later, other national government agencies implemented various foreign assisted projects meant for LGUs, also utilizing the MDF financial conduit. Other GFIs with foreign financing also started re-lending to LGUs. In 1996, the government implemented the LGU Financing Framework, which aimed to support the policy of devolution by outlining an approach for LGU borrowing that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the GFIs and the MDF and also aimed to harmonize various ongoing credit and grant programs. The underlying premise of the framework was that LGUs had varying degrees of creditworthiness and that the LGU credit needs could best be served by a policy of market segmentation along with a policy of "graduation" of creditworthy LGUs to the private sector.

? Recognizing and addressing specific opportunities and constraints

Under the LGU Financing Framework policy, higher income, more creditworthy LGUs are expected to be served by the private commercial banks except for environmental and social projects; the middle tier LGUs would be the clientele of GFIs and the lower income LGUs would be served by the MDFO including all other LGUs with social and environmental projects. Under this graduation policy, LGUs were expected to move up the ladder over time.

Thus, the fourth series of MDPs under the LOGOFIND project which was approved in 1999, is now being implemented within the LGU Financing Framework.

? Changes in the use and allocation of human, technical and financial resources at the local/national level

As a result of the MTP training modules, participant LGUs became better equipped with maximizing their staff participation in project management activities and in rationalizing their LGU financial resources.

At the CPO level, only LGUs that had strong interest to participate in the MDPs and who complied with project conditions were prioritized in terms of fund allocation.

For the training components, only LGUs with advanced stage in project compliance were similarly

prioritized for participation under the various MTP modules.

#### ? Changes in people's attitudes and behaviour

The most significant change could be tangibly demonstrated in the very strong political and social acceptability's of the MDP projects, notably the revenue generating projects that resulted to strong patronage of the completed facilities which further led to the financial viability's of the projects. LGUs also became more conscious of their borrowing capacities and creditworthiness.

#### g. Sustainability

##### ? Financial and Economic Viability

Calculations on the financial and economic rates of return after project completion (FIRRs, EIRRs, NPVs) showed that MDP projects especially the revenue generating projects are viable and sustainable projects.

The collection efficiency of loan amortization payments of participant LGUs was reported to reach 100%. It was reported that about 93% comes from timely payments while the remaining 7% comes from automatic internal revenue allotment intercept mechanism by the DOF from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). As of March, 2002 data from the MDFO, the so-called "Second Generation Fund" has already accumulated PH P2.219 Billion.

##### ? Social and Cultural Concerns

The strong political and social acceptabilities were considered as major factors of MDP success. The MDPs basically had built-in mechanisms for full public participation and consultative processes from project identification, project preparation, implementation and operations. Participant LGUs had very strong project ownership so it was not difficult for them to comply with project conditionalities or requirements. LGUs were given a hand in prioritizing their projects and had clear and definite project responsibilities over project execution.

During Sanggunian deliberations, affected beneficiaries were given chance and opportunities to air their positive and even negative views. In the process of clarifications made especially during the series of public hearings, the affected beneficiaries were given clearer picture on the positive merits and project benefits.

##### ? Environmental Concerns

Specifically, environmental aspects were properly considered in the detailed designs of projects such as proper waste collection and disposal points, sewerage facilities, water supply provision, among other things. During operations, market sweepers are assigned to take charge of cleanliness in the public market area. Health inspectors are also designated to ensure that meat and other fish products are within the health standards. For water supply projects, regular potability tests are also conducted to ensure that supply of water are within environmental standards.

#### h. Lessons Learned

The project experiences of the MDPs had provided many lessons that may be applied to future urban projects in the Philippines as indicated in the project completion reports.

First, the demand-driven, "bottom-up" project structure proved to be a most effective and efficient means of encouraging LGU support, and commitment.

Through this process, LGUs were able to select the size and complexity of projects that were most suited to their technical and fiscal capacities. Smaller sub-projects and shorter time frames reduce the

financial burden on LGUs and the risk that they will not meet their revenue targets. The project structure not only encourages competition among LGUs for limited funds, but more importantly, it fosters a greater sense of ownership of the project and of commitment to achieve higher performance. As part of LGU overall improvement, technical assistance provided through MDP operations helped municipalities become more entrepreneurial, think more about fiscal adjustment, value their staff more highly, interact more closely with private companies and the local communities, and be more environmentally conscious.

Second, the presence of national support mechanisms is instrumental to achieving project success. The intermediary roles of CPO, BLGF and MDFO were instrumental in the smooth vertical implementation of the project. Given the substantial role that national institutions play in project implementation, it is very important that they remain continually responsive to the needs of LGUs. The MDFO, as the key financial intermediary for LGUs, should play a key role in the overall LGU development program. As such, it must be given a corporate institutional identity and culture; institutional autonomy and decentralized decision making; and sufficient resources to operate as an efficient and effective LGU financing and development institution.

Third, local political commitment is essential to ensuring project success and sustainability. The substantial impact of MDP III was largely based on strong local commitment exhibited by the LGUs, such as adhering to their obligations and imposing required institutional and fiscal reforms. Through the bottom-up, demand driven approach, the commitment to the project was inculcated as LGU participants were given the responsibility for project identification, preparation, financing and implementation and thus ensuring the project's sustainability.

Fourth, small projects lead to bigger ones. In light of the conservative nature of LGUs, the participants opted to undertake rather simple, low risk, revenue-generating projects such as public markets. After these are successfully implemented, they tend to enhance their creditworthiness with a stronger financial base, and expand their investments to non-revenue generating public-goods type infrastructure projects (e.g. drainage and sanitation). By starting small, participating LGUs gain more confidence and experience and move towards more challenging projects.

Fifth, need for development strategies to coordinate national level investments in inter-municipal infrastructure. Due to the lack of technical expertise and limited financial resources, municipal investment in infrastructure has been limited to minor projects. At the same time, the contribution of national government agencies, such as the DPWH, have been limited to ad-hoc projects that fail to maximize potential benefits to the LGU and surrounding municipalities. The presence of development strategies are effective in identifying large-scale infrastructure projects that individual LGUs cannot undertake on their own. In this respect, national agencies are better able to coordinate inter-municipal investments that support the development initiatives of a larger number of municipalities as a whole.

#### i. Transferability

The MDPs, through the years, had been replicated in other government projects utilizing the MDF financial mechanism. To date, the MDF has been the financial conduit for about 20 foreign assisted projects in the Philippines.

The project success of the MDPs had been acknowledged and meritoriously recognized in several post assessment studies and in several local and international citations, notably the following:

? Best Practice in Urban Infrastructure Development in Asia and the Pacific (UNCRD and UMP-ASIA, December 8-9, 1997, Bangkok, Thailand)

? Rated as one of the most successful World Bank assisted projects in the Philippines for the past ten years (World Bank Country Assistance Review, 1997)

? Noted Significant Improvements in Local Infrastructure and Local Revenue Generation (CBDARM-

LGU Decentralization Study, NEDA and World Bank, 1998)

? Global Best Practice 100 List in Improving the Living Environment (1998 Dubai International Awards)

? Project Success Stories on Municipal Finance Projects (List of World Bank Urban Project Successes 1998)

? Nominated to the World Bank Awards for Excellence Program: Philippines Local Government Finance and Development Support (Keshav Varma, Sector Manager, EASUR, World Bank, 1999)

Similarly, the revenue generating projects, notably the public market projects, gave opportunities to many participant LGUs to receive citations and awards for Model Public Markets in first prize categories due to sustained orderliness and cleanliness in the market premises. To mention a few are the public markets in Pulilan, Bulacan, Bogo City in Cebu, Marikina City in Metro Manila, among others.

## Key Dates

a. June 5, 1984 - signing date of the First Municipal Development Project

Loan Agreement between World Bank and Government of the Philippines  
(US \$40M - Loan 2435-PH)

b. December 14, 1989 - signing date of the Second Municipal Development Project

Loan Agreement between World Bank and Government of the Philippines  
(US \$40 M - Loan 3146-PH)

c. April 15, 1992 - signing date of the Third Municipal Development Project

Loan Agreement between World Bank and Government of the Philippines

d. November 3, 1995 - Date of Project Completion Report for MDP I

e. June 9, 1997 - Date of Implementation Completion Report for MDP II

f. June 2001 - Date of Implementation Completion Report for MDP III

## References

1. Implementation Completion Report, Third Municipal Development Project, World Bank, 2001

2. Lee, Kyu Sik and Roy Gilbert, "Developing Towns and Cities: Lessons from Brazil and the Philippines" World Bank, Washington, D.C., July 1999
3. Villar, Maria Mildred Ambrosio-Villar, "Impact Evaluation Study on the Pulilan Public Market under the Municipal Development Project", Masteral Thesis for the Masters Degree in Urban and Regional Planning, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, July 1999
4. Performance Audit Report, Philippines Municipal Development Project (Loan 2435-PH) and Second Municipal Development Project (Loan 3146-PH), Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1997
5. Implementation Completion Report, Second Municipal Development Project, World Bank, 1997

## Contact

Ms. Maria Mildred Ambrosio-Villar  
PREMIUMED-Project Management Office  
Department of Public Works and Highways  
3/F SURP Bldg., E. Jacinto Street  
U.P. Diliman, Quezon City  
Philippines

Tel. No. (632) 926-5384/9206930/920-6934  
Fax. No. (632) 926-5319  
E-Mail: PREMIUM@I-next.net  
**Type of Organization:** Central Government

## Nominating Organization

Department of Public Works and Highways  
3F SURP Bldg., E. Jacinto Street  
U.P. Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines  
Tel. No. (632)926-5384/920-6931/920-6934  
Fax No. (632)926-5319  
E-Mail: PREMIUM@I-next.net

## Partners

Department of Finance  
Dir. Helena Habulan, MDFO Executive Director  
Central Bank Complex  
Roxas Blvd., Manila  
Tel. No. (632) 523-9936-39  
Fax. No. (632) 523-9937

**Type of Organization:** Central Government  
**Type of Partner Support:** Financial Support

Department of Interior and Local Government  
Myrna C. Razon, Program Manager  
MTP-LGA, Agustin I Bldg.  
Emerald Ave., Pasig City

Tel. No. (632) 634-6568  
Fax. No. (632) 634-1908  
E Mail: Mtpmo@Pacific.Net.Ph

**Type of Organization:** Central Government  
**Type of Partner Support:** Capability support

The World Bank  
Mr. Thomas Zearley, Operations Officer, EASUR Division  
Washington, D.C.  
Tel. No. (202) 473-8758  
Fax. No. (202) 522-1787  
E Mail: Tzearley@Worldbank.org

**Type of Organization:** International Agency (Multilateral)  
**Type of Partner Support:** Financial Support

## Financial Profile

US\$ Mio	World Bank	DPWH	DOF (MDF)	LGU	TOTAL
MDP I	1,310 (35.9)	248	45	77	1,680 (68.8)
MDP II	1,019 (39.2)	216	11	174	1,420 (54.9)
MDP III	2,199 (63.6)	331	508	442	3,480 (99.6)

[Main Menu](#)

[Search Database](#)

[Sponsors](#)

[To Order](#)

Email questions or problems to [help@bestpractices.org](mailto:help@bestpractices.org).

Copyright © 1996-2002 [The Together Foundation](#) and [UNCHS](#). All Rights Reserved.