INTRODUCTION: THE CITY

A. URBAN CONTEXT

1. Overview of Nigeria: Economic and Social Trends in the 20th Century

During the colonial period (end of the 19th century – 1960), the Nigerian economy depended mainly on agricultural exports and on proceeds from the mining industry. Small-holder peasant farmers were responsible for the production of cocoa, coffee, rubber and timber in the Western Region, palm produce in the Eastern Region and cotton, groundnut, hides and skins in the Northern Region. The major minerals were tin and columbite from the central plateau and from the Eastern Highlands. In the decade after independence, Nigeria pursued a deliberate policy of import-substitution industrialisation, which led to the establishment of many light industries, such as food processing, textiles and fabrication of metal and plastic wares. These were financed by revenue derived from exports of agricultural products. During this period, the Gross National Product grew at a rate of about 3.2 per cent per annum.

In 1973, with the sudden increase in oil prices, the government had a huge cash flow to invest in infrastructure development and to greatly improve social services. The main thrust of development plans in the 1970s was on education, transport, water supply and urban infrastructure on the one hand, and on rapid industrialisation on the other hand. The latter required large investments in vehicle assembly plants and oil refining and petrochemicals. Thus, real wages increased in non-agricultural sectors. The contribution of agriculture to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from 60 percent in the 1960s to 31 percent by the early 1980s. Agricultural production declined because of inexpensive imports and heavy demand for construction labour encouraged the migration of farm workers to towns and cities.

From being a major agricultural net exporter in the 1960s and largely self-sufficient in food, Nigeria became a net importer of agricultural commodities. When oil revenues fell in 1982, the economy was left with an unsustainable import and capital-intensive production structure; and the national budget was drastically reduced by almost 100 per cent between 1980 and 1982. At the same time, the federal government continued borrowing externally, accumulating a huge foreign debt. A sizeable proportion of earnings (about 50 per cent in 1985) was spent on debt servicing. The price of oil fell dramatically in 1986 and the government was forced to abolish import licences, to devalue the naira and to eliminate the marketing boards.

The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) introduced in 1986 advocated an overall cut in government expenditure on social services, including health and education. Devaluation and real inflation reduced real incomes and increased the unemployment rate.
2. Urbanisation Trends in Nigeria

Nigeria is one of the few countries in Africa which had many large pre-industrial cities before the colonial period. The largest concentration of such towns was in the south-western zone, which is by far the most urbanised area of its size in sub-Saharan Africa (NISER 1997: 10). One of the major factors which explain the development of pre-colonial urbanisation in this area was the continuous internecine war among the Yoruba. This forced peasants to find refuge in walled cities. Among the 36 towns in the area, six towns had populations of more than 40,000 people each by the mid 19th century (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1993: 252-255). The administrative structure created by the colonial government at the beginning of the 20th century changed the pattern of distribution of towns in Nigeria. New towns appeared as administrative headquarters (Kaduna and Enugu, for instance) or as industrial settlements (Jos and Enugu). In the southwest, the presence of a railway station and an administrative headquarters reinforced the positions of a few towns (Ibadan, Ilorin and Ogbomosho). However, the rate of urbanisation remained very low. By 1931, less than seven percent of Nigerians lived in urban centres (settlements with populations of 20,000 and above). The proportion rose to ten percent in 1952; 19.2 percent in 1963 and 42 percent in 1991 (see chart 1).

Political instability since independence (1960) and the three-year Civil War (1967-1970) led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people, including many rural dwellers, who ended up settling in urban areas. During the 1970s, the massive injection of money into the construction of urban utilities and infrastructure attracted a flow of rural migrants, and of citizens of other west African countries into the federal capital city of Lagos and into towns selected as state capitals (NISER 1997: 14).

3. The City of Ibadan

3.1 History of the City

In the 19th century, Yorubaland was characterised by insecurity. The intra-Yoruba war (1825-1893) and the military Jihad originating from Sokoto Sultanate, which spread from the north to the south of Nigeria, provoked a huge movement of people from the north to the south of Yorubaland, and from the countryside to the walled cities. Thus, many old cities disappeared (Old-Oyo, Owu) whereas a new generation of fortified towns came into being (New Oyo, Abéokuta, Ibadan).

Ibadan was created in 1829 as a war camp for warriors coming from Oyo, Ife and Ijebu. A forest site and several ranges of hills, varying in elevation from 160 to 275 metres, offered strategic defence opportunities. Moreover, its location at the fringe of the forest promoted its emergence as a marketing centre for traders and goods from both the forest and grassland areas. Ibadan thus began as a military state and remained so until the last decade of the 19th century. The city-state also succeeded in building a large empire from the 1860s to the 1890s and extended over much of northern and eastern Yorubaland. It was appropriately nicknamed idi Ibon, "butt of a gun", because of its unique military character. The warriors constituted the rulers of the city and the most important economic group (Falola, 1984: 192). However, the economy of Ibadan primarily rested on agriculture (yam, maize, vegetables...), manufacture (mainly weapons, smithery, cloth and ceramics industries) and trade (slaves, palm oil, yam, kola for export, shea butter, salt, horses, weapons from outside).

The colonial period reinforced the position of the city in the Yoruba urban network. After a small boom in rubber business (1901-1913), cocoa became the main produce of the region and attracted European and Levantine firms, as well as southern and northern traders from Lagos, Ijebu-Ode and Kano among others. Their activi-
ties covered both the import of manufactured articles and the export of local agriculture produce, notably cocoa, palm oil, palm kernels, rubber, hides and skins (Mabogunje, 1968: 195). The railway to the North reached Ibadan in 1901 and all road traffic from Lagos to the North converged in Ibadan. The city became a major point of bulk trade. Its central location and accessibility from the capital city of Lagos were major considerations in the choice of Ibadan as the headquarters of the Western Provinces (1939), which became the Western Region of Nigeria in 1952. This change involved a substantial transfer of political power from the British Colonial Office to the nationals of the country and began the process of ministerial appointments and the rapid expansion in the number of government workers and buildings in the city (Mabogunje, 1968: 200). The importance of Ibadan was further enhanced in 1948 by the founding of the University College which later became the University of Ibadan. Ibadan also had a well-equipped teaching hospital, at that time the only one in the country. The concentration of qualified people increased purchasing power in the city and stimulated rapid growth in commerce and in employment opportunities. However, Ibadan did not succeed in attracting many big industries: there were only 47 industrial establishments employing over ten people and 2,000 small-scale industries employing fewer than 10 people in 1963 (Mabogunje, 1968: 201).

Although the objectives of the First to the Third National Development Plans (1960-1980) were the acceleration of industrialisation, levels of industrialisation remained low in Ibadan city. By 1979, the industrial landscape was still dominated by small-scale activities (Oketoki, 1998: 294) although a few big companies had been established mainly in the new industrial estates. The SAP introduced in 1986 was intended to encourage both Nigerian and foreign investments and thus limit the amount of imported materials and promote export-oriented industries. Thousands of small-scale and household industries have appeared since then in Ibadan. Consequently, there was an increase in employment in the informal economic sector in the 1980s and 1990s (Akerele, 1997: 39) (see below). The economic crisis and the decrease of public funds radically changed the landscape of the city: a general decay of urban facilities (roads, railway, water and electricity supply) and of social services (education and health) affected Ibadan like other Nigerian towns. Whereas urban poverty became a national problem in the 1980s, the development of corruption and bad government administration increased dramatically during the military era notably during Babangida and Abacha regimes (1984-1998) (Amunu, Bach and Lebeau, 2001, introduction).

3.2 Growth of the City

The exact population of Ibadan is not known because the national census of 1991 undoubtedly underestimated the number of inhabitants. The current estimate today varies from 2 to 5 million inhabitants. (Ayeni, 1994: 75; Olaniran, 1998: 11) Moreover, it is well known that population counts during the colonial period were more like estimates than real counts, and it is difficult to give even an evaluation of the percentage rate of growth. An approximation of the growth of the three main Nigerian cities (Lagos, Ibadan, Kano) in the 20th century reveals some unrealistic figures (Table 1): a very low rate of growth (0.8 percent) for Ibadan between 1931 and 1952, whereas all the other West African cities grew at a higher rate; the population of Kano increased five fold and the population of Ibadan only two-fold between 1960 and 1991; the population of Ibadan increased five-fold in only one decade (1991-2000). In 1981, another calculation based on the average population per housing unit gave an estimate of two million inhabitants (Ayeni, 1994: 77). Nevertheless, without any reliable alternative, we will base our analysis on the 1991 National Census.

Until 1970, Ibadan was the largest city in sub-Saharan Africa (Lloyd et al. 1967). In 1952, it as estimated that the total area of the city was approximately 103.8 km$^2$ (O. Areola, 1994: 99). However, only 36.2 km$^2$ was built up (see Map 1). This meant that the remaining 67 km$^2$ were devoted to non-urban uses, such as farmlands, river floodplains, forest reserves and water bodies. These "non-urban land uses" disappeared in the 1960s: an aerial photograph in 1973 revealed that the urban landscape had completely spread over about 100 km$^2$ The land area increased from 136 km$^2$ in 1981 to 210-240 km$^2$ in 1988-89 (Areola, 1994: 101). By the year 2000, it is estimated that Ibadan covered 400 km$^2$ (Onibokun 1995: 7). The growth of the built-up area during the second half of the 20th century (from 40 km$^2$ in the 1950s to 250 km$^2$ in the 1990s) shows clearly that there has been an understimation of the total growth of the city. In the 1980s, the Ibadan-Lagos expressway generated the greatest urban sprawl (east and north of the city), followed by the Eleiyele expressway (west of the city). Since then, Ibadan city has spread further into the neighbouring local government areas of Akinyele and Egbeda in particular.

### Table 1: Population of the three main cities in Nigeria: 1921 - 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lagos</th>
<th>Ibadan</th>
<th>Kano</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>99,700</td>
<td>238,000</td>
<td>49,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>387,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>276,400</td>
<td>459,000</td>
<td>127,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-63</td>
<td>665,246</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>295,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5,685,781</td>
<td>1,228,663</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 (estimate)</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Social Trends and the Urban Economy in Ibadan

Information on social trends and composition of the city only appear with the 1952 and 1991 national censuses. The following numbers must be considered as rough estimates. The unequal distribution by sex in 1952 (more male than female) has disappeared in 1991 (Table 2). The 1952 census has probably overemphasised the percentage of children under 14 in Ibadan (Table 3). The most important figure of the change in the active population is the drop of the proportion of male activity between 1952 and 1991 (from almost 62 per cent to less than 49 per cent) (Table 4). This drop can be explained in relation to the radical change which occurred in the occupational structure of Ibadan, between 1952 and 1991 (Charts 2 and 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Distribution by sex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Distribution by age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Active population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBADAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By 1952, agricultural activities remained important in Ibadan, like many other African towns, with 37 per cent of the population engaged in agriculture. Trading is, however, the primary activity of the city (almost 40 per cent), especially among women. Craft still employs more people than government administration, despite the promotion of the city to the status of headquarters of the Western Province in 1939. In the middle of the 20th century, Ibadan kept part of its characteristics of the mid 19th century, based mainly on agriculture, trade and craft.

The major change in the second half of the 20th century was the disappearance of agricultural activities within the city, ie within the area of the five local governments. It went with the disappearance of the farm lands and forest reserves within the city during the 1960s (see above). If there was a real diversification in the labour
important in 1980 in urban areas (around 3 per cent), in 1996 it affected a quarter of the urban population (ibid: 26). Simultaneously, there has been a very substantial increase in personal income inequalities. In 1997, 10 per cent of Nigerians concentrated 40.8 per cent of the national income whereas in other rich West African countries the top 10 per cent concentrate only a quarter of national income (26.1 per cent in Ivory Coast, 28.8 per cent in Ghana) (Poverty and Nigeria, Nigerian Tribune, 7 December 2000).

A generally higher price of building materials has also increased the property market in the 1990s. The building of the Ibadan-Lagos expressway has encouraged many Lagosian workers to live in Ibadan where accommodation is cheaper. This new influx has had an important influence on Ibadan’s property market as demand rises, giving estates agents and landlords opportunity to push up rents. The general increase of the property market in the whole city led the urban poor to find rooms in the cheapest areas of Ibadan, the inner city and peripheral slums.

5. Governance System

Urban governance in Nigeria cannot be fully understood without reference to the three principal levels of power created since the 1950s: the local government, the state government and the federal government. Each of these levels intervenes more or less directly in urban management. The federal government intervenes in design and urban planning through the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing. For their part, the states, which were referred to as regions between 1952 and 1976, rapidly reinforced their hold on the local governments. The local governments never really had urban autonomy during the first half of the 20th century. The native authority could not apply adequate measures without reference to the British District Officer. At the commencement of the process of decolonisation (beginning of the 1950s) there was a short period of urban autonomy. This was, however, followed by two decades (1960-1980) of reduction of the powers of local governments. During this period, local governments were treated much like extensions of the state government (Aliyu and Kohen, 1982:2; Bello-Ibrahim 1996:115). Local governments gave the party in control at the regional level the opportunity to remove from power political opponents who controlled cities like Ibadan between 1952 and 1964 (Vaughan, 2000: 82). More generally, the budget of the Ibadan Municipal Government was subdued and controlled by the Western Region Ministry of Local Government and from 1976, by the Oyo State Government.

In 1976, a reform aimed at according a measure of local autonomy was initiated (universal adult suffrage for three quarters of local government members, right to implement by-laws) but the states still maintained
control and weakened the financial gains made by local governments in the areas under their control. From the 1980s, 10 per cent of the federal budget was transferred directly to the local governments. Nevertheless, the ability of the local government to generate internal revenue collapsed simultaneously, increasing their dependence on income from federal sources (Bello-Imam, 1990:272-4). The financial difficulties of the country had some obvious repercussions at the level of states and municipalities. Under these circumstances, most of the governments could not face the challenge of galloping urbanisation. From the beginning of the 1990s, public services administered by the local governments (health centres, primary and secondary schools, water distribution, road repairs) and also the management of public spaces (markets, stations, garages, parks, cemeteries) were, to a large extent, passed to the hands of the private sector (Agbola, 1994:135-149).

The general increase in the number of local governments in Nigeria (from 301 in 1976 to 776 in 1996) corresponds to the strong demands of the urban population. A big city like Lagos, which had 8 local governments in 1988 had 16 by 1991. Ibadan had 5 new local governments within the city and eleven in the metropolitan area by 1991. The lack of timely co-ordination among these local governments increases the difficulties of urban management (see below).

II. SLUMS AND POVERTY

B. TYPES OF SLUMS IN THE CITY

1. Slum Types in Nigeria

According to Agbola, two types of slum exist in Nigerian cities. There are the traditional slums arising in towns from the decay of existing structures and there are spontaneous slums created by squatters on illegally acquired lands (Agbola, 1987: 89). If this pattern represents the majority of the slums in Ibadan, it is necessary to reconsider the use of such terms as “traditional” and “spontaneous”, and to show that some slums can appear outside the inner city on legal land.

In a study on urban decay in 40 Nigerian cities, Sylvester Abumere has concluded that the cities closely identified the phenomenon of overcrowding are large cities (Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Benin, Onitsha), and they are generally ancient (all except Onitsha) (Abumere, 1987: 25-26). Moreover, most of these cities are closely associated with overcrowded and dirty/degraded environments (Lagos, Ibadan, Onitsha). So, urban decay connected with over crowding is almost entirely a big town problem in Nigeria and concerns, first of all, cities like Lagos, Kano, Ibadan and Onitsha.

In 1985, about 68.2 per cent of the slums in Nigerian cities were found within a radius of 1 km from the city centre (Abumere, 1985: 33). If there are no resources for urban renewal, the city centre, which is the oldest by definition, turns into a slum in time. However, slums on the city outskirts can also be found, normally in the largest Nigerian cities (Abumere, 1987: 31). In the large and fairly large cities, such as Enugu, Kano, Ibadan, Lagos, a considerable proportion of slums occur at the city outskirts, more than five km from the centre. The main reason is that accommodation in many of the cities has been priced, beyond what most citizens can afford. Many low-income workers, therefore, live in low-cost shanties or slums at the city outskirts. 15 years later, the situation has not improved in Ibadan: General poverty has spread out in all Nigerian cities and the Ibadan governments have not really addressed the issue of slums in their city.

2. Types of Slum in Ibadan According to Age, Location and Size

Three types of slum have been identified in Ibadan according to their age, location and size (see Map 2).

i) The oldest and largest slum is the core area of the city, which covers the entire pre-colonial town. A large part of the ancient walled city can be seen as a slum, even if the inhabitants do not agree that they live in a slum for historical reasons.

ii) A few small-scale slums, on land occupied illegally by squatters, can be found at the margins of the planned city.

iii) Numerous slums, generally occupied by tenants on legal lands, are found at the outskirts of the city along major roads or close to local labour markets. Their size, history, socio-economic and cultural features differ from one slum to another.

i) The inner city area is the oldest, has the lowest quality residence and the highest population density in the city. In the 19th century, large compounds for extended families and warrior lineages constituted this part of the city. With the development of the town, the core area “growth by fission”, compounds were broken up into a number of separate housing units (Mabogunje, 1962: 56-77). Mabogunje stated that in the 1960s one of the major problems of Ibadan was the pre-European foundation “because of its almost unbelievable density of buildings, their spectacular deterioration, and virtual absence of adequate sanitation. The differences in their wealth, education, acquired skills, social customs, and attitudes emphasise the social distance between the two sections of the city” i.e. the core area and the new colonial town (Mabogunje, 1968: 202). According to the same author, half of the city constituted by this core area was occupied by “slum dwellings characterised by
no identifiable sanitation facilities, housing in mud, physical deterioration and the highest population density area of the town” (Mabogunje, 1968: 233). This statement is still valid today: in 1985, 70 per cent of the derelict houses were found in the inner city, i.e. at less than two km from the centre (Abumere, 1985: 136). Since then no renewal scheme has been implemented in the core area except in one specific ward, Yemetu, in 1995 (see below).

The inner city today has the following characteristics. It is the highest density area of the city because it has a high percentage of the population by households (see below). It has a very high percentage of land devoted to residential land use, as high as 90 per cent in a ward called Elekuro.

The presence of many old markets in the area causes traffic congestion and increases the overcrowded situation of the area (see Photos 1 and 2). Jibola Kumuyi states that a large part of the inner city is an urban commercial slum. The major features are squatting, illegal conversion of residential and other buildings to commercial uses, street trading and the paucity of infrastructure facilities (Kumuyi, 1987: 122).

It has a higher percentage of poor and illiterate people than the city average. However, the inner city is still nowadays a heterogeneous settlement. Some of the richer people of Ibadan who were born in the core area have kept their father’s house for cultural and familial reasons and generally have built one or more villas in the new government estates.

Poor housing conditions and a high concentration of derelict houses arising from the high cost of maintenance of Brazilian style houses (houses with one or two floors and a balcony). These are generally made of mud plastered with cement and have rusted corrugated iron roofs (Photos 3, 4, 5, 6). Because of the poor housing conditions, the prices of rooms to rent are the cheapest in the town. However, in Ibadan, and more generally in Nigeria, the SAP increased the cost of building materials. In Ibadan, the consequences of SAP were not different from the situation in other Nigerian cities: the cost of property maintenance became very high (Olufemi, 1997: 45). The consequences are obvious for poor people: on the one hand it became more difficult to maintain houses, on the other hand landlords increased rents. This accelerated overcrowding in certain areas of the city.

There is a total absence of urban management and urban planning; no waste disposal, no gutters, a limited number of roads (Photos 7 and 8).

There is a near total lack of basic facilities like water and electricity supply. Access to health centres is also limited. For instance, in 1983, “not a single hospital was located in the traditional slums of Ibadan and out of the 21 hospitals only four were located in the periphery of the slums” (Iyun 1983: 601-616).

It has a very high percentage of indigenous people, i.e. Yoruba people: the presence of non-Yorubas in this part of the city is rare. There is a strong cultural identity, characterised notably by a strong attachment to the land of the grandfathers, founders of the city.

ii) The second type of slums comprises squatter settlements found at the margins of the planned town. The planned city has witnessed the decay of some parts of its area in the past twenty years and the development of a few slums at its margins.

Apart from the European reservations, the colonial town was built for the accommodation of immigrants. Layouts were designed and roads were constructed. The newer eastern and western suburbs represent the low and medium quality residential districts set up in the first half of the 20th century (Map 3). Some of the wards which had been established at the beginning of the 20th century have now declined. Mokola, for instance, was renewed in 1995 (Word Bank Project, see below). This is also the case of Sabo, the first Hausa ward created in 1911 by the Colonial Authority to settle the Hausa trader community at the margins of the inner city (Cohen, 1973: 113-119). The development of makeshift structures in Sabo since the 1980s corresponds to the general increase of poverty in the country and the wil-
ingness of the Sabo Sarkin Hausa (head of the Hausa community in Sabo) to welcome poor Hausa people to the area (Interview with El Hadj Bature, Representative of Sarkin Hausawa, Sabo). However, despite this decay, the ward cannot be considered today to be a slum because it hosts rich Hausa traders who are integrated within the city. Moreover, because most of these traders in Sabo are the owners of their houses they have interest in maintaining them. This is in contrast to the Hausa residents at the outskirts of the city who have difficult access to land ownership (see below).

Housing estates are high-quality residential districts in low-density areas. In 1959, the Regional Government, through the Housing Corporation, designed estates for the accommodation of the high-class population. The first planned housing estate (Bodija) was established in 1959 (see Map 3) and was followed during the oil boom period by the creation of several other housing estates (eastern, northern and south-western sectors). As these areas are supposed to be better controlled by the planning authorities, illegal squatting has only developed on a small scale in areas at the margins of the planned city. The Sango slum and the Bodija Market slum are both located adjacent to the Bodija Estate, especially along the railway line. Actually, during the colonial period it was forbidden, for safety reasons, to establish a market or to build a house within 100 hundreds yards (90 metres) on either side of the railway line. The implementation of this rule has created a land reserve which has been “invaded” by migrants probably during the

Photo 2: View of one of the Oja Oba market streets

Photo 3: View of the core area of Bere. The high percentage of derelict houses is noticeable at the back of the photo.

Squatting in the area is highly organised and cannot be considered “spontaneous”. Actually, the land containing Bodija slum, located between the Bodija Railway Station and the Bodija Market, belongs to the Nigerian Railway Company (NRC), which has built illegal houses and rented them to the market traders (see below).

iii) The development of unplanned urbanisation along the major roads of the city from the 1970s to the 1990s has finally given birth to notable slums in the north, the east and the south of the city. According to Abumere, 30 per cent of the derelict houses in Ibadan are found in the outskirts of the city at more than five km from the centre (Abumere, 1985:136). Most of them have been developed because a new labour market gave opportunities for employment: this is particularly the case for Agbowo, close to the university and inhabited by students and junior staff of the university (Map 3). It is also the case of Ojoo, a mixed Hausa-Yoruba settlement founded in the mid 1970s around the main transit market on the Lagos-Kano Road. And it is the case of Sasa, close to the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), another Hausa-Yoruba settlement. This list of peripheral slums cannot be considered as exhaustive and some slums probably exist in other parts of the city.

The peripheral slums can be described as follows:

- Population densities in the outskirts tend to be lower than in the inner city, but there is unfortunately no data available. Densities in peripheral slums depend on their capacity to attract residents. Agbowo, for instance, became extremely populous because of the development of a rental housing market for thousands of students and junior staff who cannot find accommodation on campus. There is an average of 3.16 students per room in Agbowo, and around 40 percent of students occupy rooms which house between four and eight students (Agbola et al., 2001: 91).

- As in the inner city, there is a high percentage of poor and illiterate people, but the percentage varies from slum to slum. Agbowo must be considered as a particular case because it hosts many students, and a high percentage of respondents attended secondary school (60 percent) (Moloye, 1991: 14). In the remote eastern outskirts of the city, 37.5 per cent of the respondents did not go beyond primary school and only 22 per cent had secondary school education (Adeagbo, 1998: 24). In Sasa, the few educated inhabitants (15.3 percent) did not have more than primary school leaving certificates (Afolayan 1987b: 61).

- Housing conditions are quite different from in the inner city. The houses are heterogeneous in pattern. In the same neighbourhood, houses built in cement, makeshift houses of wood, and derelict mud houses plastered with cement can be found (Photos 9 and 10).

- As in the inner city, there is no urban management or planning: no water disposal, no drains for water and a preponderance of paths which are not viable for motor vehicles (photos 11 and 12).
invest money in the area because the political situation is uncertain. Moreover, the frequent occurrence of ethnic riots in Nigerian cities in the past 30 years is often associated with loss of property and quick departure of migrants in emergency situations. So, generally, they prefer to rent houses even for over 30 years. Because, of the presence of a strong Hausa community in certain parts of the area, the rich indigenous landlords usually live in other parts of the city while the poor indigenous people stay in the ward because they can’t afford to pay for accommodation in another ward.

C. OFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF SLUMS

Generally, local government officials recognise the existence of slums in their administrative areas. Some of them can even name them (see table 5).

Table 5: Slums Cited by Local Government Officials in Three Local Government Wards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wards</th>
<th>Part of the city</th>
<th>Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bere, Olorun Sogo, Oje, Oke-Irefin</td>
<td>core area</td>
<td>Ibadan North East Local Government, official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bere, Esu Awolo, Eleka, Agban Oban, Bode part of Oke Ado</td>
<td>core area, colonial town</td>
<td>Ibadan South East Local Government, chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bere, Oja Oba, Orita Merin, part of Ide Arere</td>
<td>core area</td>
<td>Ibadan South West Local Government, senior administrator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While the facilities for electricity supply are sometimes available, lack of potable water is one of the main problems of these areas. Similarly, where private heath centres exist in the outskirts, half of the people interviewed by Demola Adeagbo in 1996 could not afford the cost of the health services (Aleagbo, 1998: 33).

As migrant settlements, the peripheral slums are heterogeneous from an ethnic, professional, social or even religious point of view. If there is a predominance of one type of migrants (Hausa in Ojoo and Sasa, Igbo in Agbowo), these wards are generally mixed with Yoruba people, and with people of other tribes from Nigeria and even West Africa (Ojoo). Churches of different confessions and Islamic brotherhoods co-exist in these wards. Besides the original settlement, there is a high turn-over of people who stay for business or study. This has given birth to a rental housing market. The price of rooms and houses to rent in these outskirts is more or less double or triple the price in the inner city. Socio-economical, cultural and even political reasons explain why immigrants prefer to stay in these parts of the city.

There is a real problem of land availability for migrants. This is particularly the case for the latest wave of Hausa immigrants (probably from the late seventies), for whom access to land is difficult or almost impossible. On the one hand, there is obviously some discriminatory allocation of urban land. For community leaders, this factor is an important determinant in the transformation of the ward into a slum (like Ojoo or Sasa). On the other hand, if Hausa traders become rich, it is unlikely that they will
Most of the wards cited are in the core area because this the major slum of the city. We can even note that Bere, as a central place in the core area, is divided into different local government areas. The Ibadan South East Local Government Chairman stated that about 60 per cent of his local government area is a slum covering a big part of the south inner city. However, if local government chairmen recognise the existence of slums in their city, there is no official definition and apparently no official document informing on the phenomenon of slum in the city. More or less, chairmen agree on a few similar characteristics to describe slums. For instance, the Ibadan North East Local Government councillor states: “Officially, a slum is those areas that are yet to develop in terms of good planning, settlement, and so on. Some of the characteristics of slums are that they lack infrastructural facilities, no layout and planning, the people are predominantly poor and illiterate” (interview, 22/5/2002).

For the Ibadan South East Local Government Chairman:

“Slums are areas which concentrate low income earners, low cost houses, possibly mud houses, no layout and poor inhabitants”. (Interview, 23/5/2002)

Actually this definition concerns mainly the core area where such problems are concentrated. This fact is quite normal. Generally peripheral slums are located within other local government areas. But even if officials have been able to identify the slums in the city. The discussions with the officials did not indicate any targeted policy to eradicate them. Generally, local government chairmen look at the slums as the usual problem of poverty, which cannot be solved at the local level. The problem is viewed with near fatalism, as clearly exemplified by the laconic answer of the Ibadan North East Local Government Chairman: “There is hardly any place in the world or any city, no matter what, that does not have its own slum” (interview, 15/5/2002). For his part, the Ibadan North West Local Government Chairman seems to be far away from a targeted policy: “There is not much more we can do than clean the slums and make the area more comfortable for the inhabitants”. Some chairmen seem to be concerned about the problem but they do not work in the direction of solving it: “We provide wells for the people staying in those areas every year but the policy is not targeted to slum residence” admitted the Ibadan North East Local Government Chairman. Similarly, the South West and South East Local Governments Chairmen acknowledge that they tarred one or two roads in their areas, but these are not specifically targeted to a slum. It would be advantageous if local governments within the Ibadan Municipality could work together on a few projects (like the Ibadan Sustainable Project). But the core area, which is divided among five local governments, has not been a common preoccupation since their creation in 1991.

D. UNOFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF SLUMS

1. Popular Understandings of Slums and Poverty

Most Nigerian newspapers give the same definition of slums in Nigerian cities. Poor areas are almost always associated with high-density, mountains of refuse, lack
or scarcity of electricity and water, deterioration of housing conditions as well as overcrowding ("Nigeria’s deteriorating cities and the sustainable development", The Guardian, 6 November 1996). People interviewed on the definition of slums emphasised one or several criteria related to their own problems. A few people gave a comprehensive definition of slums. Such people are generally involved in poverty alleviation programmes, like this Principal Public Works Officer working at the National Directorate of Employment:

"Slum areas have no house plan, no proper roads, no waste disposal, no drainage. The whole environment generally reflects the elements of poverty. There is no pipe-born water; the areas are also overcrowded, and diseases are rampant within the area because of the poor sanitary state of the environment" (Interview 10/5/2002).

Hadiza Ba Zafara, a businesswoman is the leader of northern women in Ojoo, a peripheral slum north of the city. She works with NGOs to improve the neighbourhood:

"Poverty has to do with a man who can get a revenue or income out of his daily activity. This is also reflected in the way he lives, how he is dressed, how many times he eats a day and the quality of the food and the condition of the environment in which he lives… Slums are places where we find, most of the time, people that are extremely poor. Houses are cheap compared to the other side of town because of the bad state of the houses. And life is expensive because of lack of water, electricity, health centres and other facilities for human welfare. Our slums are in fact characterised by refuse everywhere, old houses and sickly people all around, like here in Ojoo". (Interview, 17/5/2002)

Slums are not often related to crime and delinquency, particularly in the inner city. This specificity was mentioned by Mabogunje in the 1960s and has not really changed since this date. If crime rates and insecurity have increased in Southern Nigerian cities since the 1970s this is actually more related to residential areas than slums (see below). However, slums are related to prostitution, smuggling and drugs in the outskirts of the city, especially and logically in big markets exposed to international flows of products and people.

2. Relevant Local Language Terms

The three main languages spoken in Nigeria are Yoruba (mainly spoken in the south-west), Hausa (mainly spoken in the north) and Igbo (mainly spoken in the south-east). The presence of migrants from different parts of the country and their accommodation in slums makes it imperative to look at the way these three main languages translate the term slum.

In Yoruba, there are many possible terms for slums: Agboole (family compound) is one possible term according to the Personal Assistant to the Director of Personnel of the Ibadan North East Local Government. It referred originally to the lineage compound and, by extension, to the social organisation of the pre-colonial period. Because the pre-colonial compounds have been subdivided into many houses during the 20th century without any layout, the term became a generic term to describe the inner city. However, it is important to note that for people who live in the inner city the term still refers to the lineage or extended family and, more specifically, to the original house. For them, Agboole cannot refer to a slum because people don’t consider they live in a slum. People from the inner city call the area Ipile Ibadan (origin of Ibadan), Adugbo Atiyo (old area) and Inu Igboro Ibadan (inner area of Ibadan) (Interview with M.K. Agbolu, Bere, 8/5/2002. interview with Bashiru Olawoye, Bere, 12/5/2002.; Interview with Motunrayo Satere, Mokola, 13/5/2002). Nobody from this area will call the place a slum because of the social stigma such a term represents.

Hausa people will use the terms Karakara (fallen branches) or bukoki (mud houses), which originally meant areas where the majority of the houses are made of straw and fallen branches. These terms obviously referred to the countryside which, for Hausa urban dwellers, represent the poorest way of life. By exten-
sion, these terms indicate the areas in a city where one can find immigrants and extremely poor people. The terms are also associated with a dwelling place for prostitutes, drug addicts, thieves, drunkards, smokers, etc.

3. Slum Dwellers’ Perception of their Own Status

From the different interviews carried out in the different neighbourhoods of Ibadan, two opposite perceptions of the status of slum dwellers have emerged. The first is given by the indigenous people from the inner city, the second is given by Hausa traders from the outskirts. These two perceptions are associated with the status of the indigenous people or migrants the perception of the slum as opposed to the city, the kind of activities people engage in and the poor amenities of the environment.

As we noted before, the indigenous population from the inner city don’t define the city centre as a slum. It is more or less an attribute given mostly by non-residents or officials. However, most of the people interviewed are very much aware that the area is less well maintained and has more poor people than the rest of the city. This appears clearly in the different interviews held with men and women of various social groups who had lived in Bere for more than 20 years:

“Bere is just a village where there are no social amenities such as potable water, regular electricity, etc.” (interview with K. Oladere, technician in Bere, 10/5/2002).

“In Bere there is no water, no drainage, no toilet, no electricity, bad planning. My main income (taxi driver) cannot be quantified because it depends on what I get from my farm to sell” (Interview with G. Kosamutu, retired taxi driver, Bere; 10/5/2002).

“This area (Bere) is too dirty, too rough while places like Bodija and Mokola are very neat and well organised. I decided to stay here because I cannot afford the house rent of those areas” (interview with M.K. Ogbolu, petty trader in Bere, 10/5/2002).

However, even if Bere is one of the cheapest area in Ibadan many people stay there because of their cultural, social and familial links (family houses, grandfather’s land):

“The majority of people living here were born here and the social affiliation that links them together from childhood to adulthood makes it difficult for them to leave the place” (interview with K. Oladere, technician in Bere, 10/5/2002).

The perception of their own poverty by the indigenous people of Ibadan seems to be more accurate than their perception of slums. This may be related to their desire to preserve the respect accorded to the ancestors of Ibadan.

Hausa people have different perceptions of their status as slum dwellers. This depends on the place where they live in the city. Effectively, the perception of dwellers in the peripheral settlements is very different from the perception of dwellers in the inner Hausa wards of the town. Sabo, created at the beginning of the 20th century as the first Hausa settlement, is considered to be a developed area, well integrated in the city and close to urban facilities. It is not considered by anybody to be a slum, even if the situation there has deteriorated in the last 20 years, as in other parts of Ibadan. Bodija according to a cattle trader is “not worse than the northern villages” where most of the traders and dealers come from; but “it is a slum only if you compare it to other places in Ibadan” (Interview with Sarkin Fulani, leader of Fulani traders, Bodija, 20/5/2002). Ojoo has more international exposure because of the presence of traders from other West African countries and the variety of the products exchanged. However, it is considered by its inhabitants to be a slum because of the lack of facilities, the extensive unplanned areas and the difficulty of building houses in the area. Finally, Sasa is considered by its inhabitants as the worst Hausa settlement in Ibadan for several reasons: its distance from the city, the rural origins of the products exchanged (foodstuffs), the difficulty of acquiring land and building houses. These drawbacks are clear to El Hadj Kazin Mohamed, Vice-Chairman of the market at Sasa:

“If you have been to Sabo and Bodija, you will know that they are better than here. Our slums are the last (i.e. the worst). I acknowledge this” (Interview with El Hadj Kazin Mohamed, Vice-Chairman of the market, Sasa, 15/5/2002).
E. Official Definitions of Poverty

The official definition given by the current federal government is based on reports by international institutions and consultancy services. For instance, the Nigerian Government considers that 60 per cent of Nigerians live below the poverty line, only 50 per cent of the population have access to safe water, and about 38 per cent do not have access to primary health care. These data come mainly from World Bank and UNICEF reports on Nigeria (Canagarajah, Ngwafon and Thomas, 1997; World Bank, 1996; Olomajeye, 1994)
The main cause of poverty is clearly identified:

“The increasing levels of unemployment and poverty were compounded by over two decades of political instability, macro-economic policy inconsistencies, low capacity utilisation in industries and the massive turn out of school leavers and graduates by our educational institutions”

A conscious effort by government to deal with the poverty problem began during the Third National Development Plan (1970-1975). In 1975, poverty was defined as follows: “existing incomes or disposable resources are inadequate to support a minimum standard of decent life”. However, for two decades after independence (1960s-1970s), unemployment and poverty were not really a national concern. Today, poverty is defined in Nigeria as a state of long-term deprivation of well-being, a situation considered inadequate for a decent life. Poverty is synonymous with lack and is also a long-term phenomenon. But beyond this broad definition there are many opinions on how well-being should be measured and what indicators should be used. There are two main approaches. The welfarist approach defines well-being in terms of the level of utility attained by an individual. This approach attaches great importance to the individual’s perception of what is useful. The non-welfarist approach relies on what planners consider desirable from a social point of view. There are selective indicators to distinguish certain goods considered to be socially useful. Since the 1980s, this last approach has been expanded (Aluko, 2000: 17).

Because poverty became a national issue in the 1980s, most people, including officials are of the opinion that local governments cannot do much at the local level. According to the Ibadan North Local Government Chairman:

“Poverty is a disease that is affecting Africa as a whole and Nigeria in particular. When people cannot earn a living or they don’t have a job, it is a social disease that links to many other social problems such as stealing, armed robbery, prostitution, etc. There is a lot of talk about trying to alleviate poverty, but I don’t believe that anybody is doing enough to eradicate poverty. It has to be a policy right from the top that a certain amount of money must budgeted for poverty eradication” (interview 17/5/2002).

F. ORIGINS OF SLUMS IDENTIFIED

This section will focus on three particular case studies, which can help to identify the social, economic and political forces that have formed and maintained the slums since their inception to the present time. The three slums chosen are in three different areas of Ibadan city (the core area, the planned area, and the outskirts). This section is mainly based on interviews with community leaders and inhabitants of the slums.

1. From The Pre-Colonial Town to the Main Slum of the City: the Core Area of Ibadan, Circa 1940s –2002

The deterioration of the inner city and its poor sanitation situation took place over a long period of time and is closely linked with the social and economic changes which occurred within the family compound during the colonial period. The compound was the residential unit for the lineage (idilé) in pre-colonial Yoruba towns. Compounds consisted of several windowless houses oriented towards an internal courtyard, the main place for social, political, economic and religious activities (Lloyd, 1967: 40). With the colonial expansion, the Ibadan compounds, like most in West African cities, were divided up into several housing units (Fourchard, 2003, forthcoming). With the concentration of new buildings in every available space within and outside the compound, the core area achieved the highest population density within the city in the 1950s. In the early 1960s, the average number of inhabitants for a compound in Ojé (a ward in the core area) was 90, whereas the head of the ward could host over 350 people in his own compound (Lloyd, 1967: 67). In the 1950s, old Ibadan could house from 500 to 1,500 inhabitants per hectare (Vennetier, 1991: 126). This state of overcrowding forced the colonial authorities to set up a health committee in 1942. The committee focused attention on the proper disposal of refuse, good ventilation for houses, and the extermination of mosquitoes. However, the limited budget allocated to implement the programme did not allow for much to be achieved. In 1955, an epidemic of smallpox spread out through the whole of the old city, forcing the local government to adopt a “slum clearance scheme” for the ancient city. However, the opposition of the indigenous population of the city who were dominant within the council did not allow the implementation of the scheme (Mabogunje, 1971: 15-26). Thus, the term “traditional slum” refers here to process originating in the colonial period.
effect, the pre-colonial town cannot be considered as a slum. It is the growth of the centre which has transformed it into a slum. In 1963, Mabogunje stated that half of the city constituted by the core area was occupied by slum dwellings. This author gave a comprehensive map of the extension of slums in the core area (see Map 4). This map is still valid today, with a few exceptions:

1) The flood plains have been built-up since the 1960s. Consequently, all the floods of the Ogunpa stream have had dramatic consequences: the floods that occurred in Ibadan between 1955 and 1980 resulted in the loss of more than 230 lives. During the 1980 flood, 50,000 people, mainly in the core area, lost their homes (Egunjobi, 1986: 147-153).

2) In 1984, an empirical study (now lost) commissioned by the Word Bank to the Ministry of Local Government of Oyo State emphasised the need for upgrading the inner city. On the three areas eventually selected by the World Bank in 1995, only one ward (Yemetu) was chosen in the core area (east of the city).

With these few exceptions, the map drawn 40 years ago remains valid today. The main problems facing the upgrading of the inner city arise both from people and authorities. For the past 50 years, people have been opposed to any resettlement of their area. The authorities, both at the local and the state level don't really have the political will or the financial capacity to upgrade such a large area.

2. From Cattle Market to Slum: the Bodija Market Slum, Circa 1975-2002

Bodija Market, located north of Bodija Estate, was established officially in October 1987 to relocate the traders from the foodstuffs market at Gege-Oritamerin (inner city) and the cattle traders who operated earlier in Sango (Olaoba, 1999: 20-22). Hausa cattle traders however used the place long before 1987 because the veterinary department and the central slaughter slab of Ibadan were set up behind the Bodija Railway Station for the cattle coming from the north. Madibo Ma’anshi, who has lived there since 1974 gives a comprehensive view of the birth of the slum:

“At the beginning, few of the dealers slept in the market while most of the others used to go back to Sango for the night. Gradually, people started to build small shanties round the market using the leaves of palm trees... Because the indigenous people started building houses illegally along the railway line near the market, the Railway authority began to rent the land to their workers who, in turn, constructed houses made of wood. Today, the Nigerian Railway Corporation rents the houses but is no longer taking care of the place, nor do the people renting the land...I think that is why the place looks like a slum. The NRC used to come and lock the houses when those that rent the land did not pay the rent”.

Figure 4 and 5: Age and Marital status of the Heads of Household

Sources: fieldwork, 2002.
This story is quite comprehensive and gives an obvious example of organised squatting between the NRC, the NRC workers and some community leaders within the slum. In effect, NRC land has been given to NRC workers who built illegal houses. The reason why they are made of wood, mud and sheet of iron is so that they can be removed at any time (photos 13 and 14). Some of the community leaders became, in their turn, collectors of taxes for the benefit of NRC workers. One of these leaders is in charge of two 10-room sheds, one head of prostitutes is in charge of a 10-room shed. Consequently, the rent can be quite expensive between 400 and 600 naira (4 US$). Rent has to be paid annually in advance. So for one shed, this means between 48,000 naira (300 US$) and 72,000 naira, (480 US$).

3. From Layout Plan to Slum:
Sasa, 1967-2002

Sasa is a new slum in the remote periphery of Ibadan, located along the Oyo Road between Ojoo (a Hausa settlement created around 1975) and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) set up in 1967. The case of Sasa is special because it represents a shift from a layout plan, apparently well organised for relocating displaced people, to a real slum inhabited exclusively by poor people without access to any facilities.

In 1967, 160 acres (about 70 ha) of land were set aside for the resettlement of 2,900 peasants from a rural area now occupied by the IITA (Report to the Resident Representative of the Ford Foundation Project, Ibadan, 1970). A layout plan was designed by the Town Planning Division of the Ministry of Lands and Housing and included roads, a piped water system, a primary school, plots of land for the houses to be built by individual settlers, plots for a mosque, a cemetery, a market-side dispensary and a maternity centre (Afolayan 1987a). The Ford Foundation financed the construction of tarred roads, the primary school, public septic latrines and installation of a water tank and of water pipes. Apparently, the facilities given should have improved the daily life of the displaced people. Actually, the layout turned into a slum for three major reasons:

- The displaced people did not really find other job opportunities. Their daily conditions rarely improved.
- The development of a Hausa community in the area changed the place into a sizeable market place; but most of the Hausa have remained tenants and do not invest any money in the ward.
- The facilities provided in the 1970s deteriorated quickly.

In 1982, twelve years after the inception of the community, less than half of the plots (that is, 142 plots) had residential houses built on them. Actually many people delayed building their own houses mainly because they lost their incomes from agriculture (crop harvest for males and sale of farm products for female). The proportion of males engaged in farming fell from 53 per cent in 1967 to 21 per cent in 1982, and even these farmers do so on a part-time basis in far-away fields or in small plots close by (Afolayan, 1987b: 64). Two-thirds of the respondents interviewed in the area in 1982 were of the view that their economic situation had worsened since their relocation to Sasa.

In the meantime, the area was inhabited in the late 1970s by Hausa traders, who came from the main market in the inner city (Oja Oba) where they were no longer allowed to off-load their foodstuffs. The chairman of Sasa Market states:

“They were nice to us on our arrival. People slept in the market with their goods and then started gradually to rent rooms, houses and some even bought land and built their own houses”.

In 1982, the Hausa resided mostly in the stalls built around the open market but a few of them bought land from some of the settlers, who initially wanted a quick profit (Afolayan 1987 b). Actually, 180 plots were not occupied at this time.
Consequently, in 1983 a committee of experts established by the Oyo State Governor with the help of the Oyo State Ministry of Lands and Housing investigated the question of land in Sasa. It is probably at this time that the sale of land to the Hausa community was officially stopped. Since then and according to Hausa community leaders, the Hausa have not been allowed to own houses in Sasa. This arrangement brought considerable changes to the settlement of the Hausa community in the ward. The insecurity of land tenure and the impossibility of acquiring land in Sasa led the tenants to not maintain the houses in which they live. On the other hand, indigenous landlords appear not to be particularly preoccupied with the quality of housing. Consequently, houses quickly deteriorated. This is the first reason proposed by the malam of the palace of Sarkin Sasa:

"Soon after our settlement was founded, a misunderstanding arose between the Yoruba and the Hausa. The Hausa can only rent houses but not construct houses. I can even say that was the beginning of the slum, because those that could not rent tried to build huts with fallen branches and straw, and the indigenous people allowed it because they believed they could be destroyed at any time"

Despite the poor conditions of the area, house rents remain high because the Hausa traders do not really have a choice:

"The rent here is expensive compared to what people earn. The minimum amount is 300 naira per room (2US$) in those slums you see, and a flat of three bedrooms costs up to 20,000 naira per year (140 US$), that is, about 1,700 naira per month (less than 12 US$)"

3) The facilities provided to the community rapidly deteriorated from the 1970s because some of them were over-utilised by the increasing population, and some of them have not been maintained properly. Not long after initial facilities were installed, the Ford Foundation handed over their maintenance to the then Western Nigeria Government, which did little to maintain the community: the untarred roads were subject to rapid deterioration, the school was not well maintained and the water pipes remained dry (Afolayan 1987 a). The situation has worsened since 1982. The two access roads to the market are covered with lopped-off branches to save the heavy trucks carrying foodstuffs from getting stuck in the mud. The market is just a large untarred open place without any facilities for the hygienic storage of consignments of food (photo 17). The closest sanitary centre is 6 km away and there is no water supply, no waste disposal and no maintenance of public places. The people complain that teachers from the public school are permanently on strike. This happened for two months last year because they were not paid. The major blame goes to the Akinyele Local Government which is said to have done nothing for the community despite the fact that market fees constitute one of its major sources of revenue (EH Kazim Mohamed, Vice Chairman of Sasa Market and Afolayan 1987 b).

III. SLUMS: THE PEOPLE

G. HOUSEHOLD INDICATORS

A questionnaire was undertaken in May 2002 with 50 heads of households in Bere, one of the better known core slum areas in Ibadan. Only 14 women household heads were found. Generally, in this part of the city, heads of households are men, old and married. Few women are heads of households and they generally assume this role after the death of their husbands (Charts 4 and 5). The large percentage of households headed by old men has to be linked with the fact that houses in the inner city are mainly family houses that must be headed by the oldest person of the extended family or lineage.

The income per head of household is very low. 65 per cent of household heads have incomes of less than 5,000 naira a month (35 US$) whereas the minimum wage for staff of state institutions was fixed in May 2000 at 7,500 naira a month ("N 7 500 is new minimum wage", Comet, May 29, 2000). This is related to the occupations of the heads, who are mainly petty traders, craftsmen or farmers without any capital (Chart 6). Most of the women cannot even rent a place at the market but sell three or four items in front of their house. A large minority of the lower group live with less than 3,000 naira a month (20 US$). This income can be the only revenue in small households (below 10 people per house). The average size of the household is higher than the national average and 60 per cent of the households have more than 10 people while households with more than 20 people are not rare (chart 7). The correla-
tion between poverty and household size is obvious in Nigeria. In 1996, households with less than five members showed incidences of poverty below the national average. With more than 10 members, the household is almost certain to be in poverty (88.5 per cent) (FOS, 1999: 31). The main social pattern is still dominated by the extended family and by the cultural links existing among members of lineage.

The type of tenure is largely dominated by family houses, which belong either collectively to the family or to the head of the family. Only a few respondents have bought their land and built their own houses. A few others, generally young, are tenants. Consequently, the percentage of landowners in Bere (85 per cent) is much higher than the average for Nigerian cities which was estimated, in 1993, at 27 per cent only (NISER, 1997: 28). This information gives the two main reasons why people continue to live in the ward:

1) For the large majority, there is no other cultural choice than to keep the house of their grand-fathers. Leaving the place means, among other things, abandoning the graves of their ancestors within the compound. This is not acceptable.

2) For the minority, buying or renting a house in the ward is the only financial alternative. Rent for a room in
the area is one of the lowest within Ibadan: between 100 naira (less than 1US$) and 250 naira (2US$) a month. In the other slums of Ibadan the minimum rent is between 300 and 400 naira (3 US$).

H. COSTS OF LIVING IN SLUMS

Total financial expenditures of households cannot be provided for methodological reasons (too many rough answers), but costs of rent, transportation and water can be approximately calculated. If the rent is one of the cheapest in Ibadan (see above), living in the area presents additional costs due to the necessary charges for transportation and water.

A large majority of the respondents commute between their house and work by public transport (around 80 per cent) and few by foot (16 per cent). Almost nobody uses a private car (only two persons) and a large majority of commuters (87 per cent) go to work at a distance of more than 1 km. Actually, except for “traditional” markets, the inner city is not a labour place. Consequently, most people spend 100 or 150 naira a month on commuting (around 1US$).

Another major problem in the core area is the availability of water and light (Chart 9). Even houses which have the facilities (pipes and taps) cannot get water more than once in month. The Oyo State Water Corporation (OSWC) is still the only public agency responsible for the supply and distribution of piped water in Ibadan. This agency has been criticised several times for its technical and managerial deficiencies. In 1999, only 28 per cent of Ibadan inhabitants used the water facilities provided by the OSWC (interview with Tunde Agbola, Director of Centre for Urban and Regional Planning, Ibadan). The situation seems to be worse in Bere than in other areas. For instance, in three other wards of Ibadan, “only” 50 per cent of the respondents get water supplies from alternative sources of water (Akinoyode, 1998: 121). In Bere, all the respondents fetch water from private or public wells. A few women stated that they waste three hours a day fetching water at the only public well provided by the local government. Moreover, all the inhabitants buy water from private vendors: it costs around 75 naira daily per household (for a majority of households) but the price may climb to 200 naira for the largest households.

The situation is a bit better with respect to the electricity supply. At present the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) is unable to provide electric power for the whole of Ibadan. So the company distributes power in Ibadan on a sharing basis. This is why the majority of respondents indicated that they have light only occasionally. The lack of electric power cannot be regarded as an index of poverty in Bere, because it is a national problem concerning all social groups.

The level of insecurity in Bere reveals some interesting findings. If few heads of household have lost some property or have witnessed a murder, the victimisation survey shows that 78 per cent of respondents have never been victim of a crime or a delinquency act. This result is confirmed by a recent research carried out by Idemudia in three neighbourhoods in the inner city (Mapo, Bere, Oje): prevalence of armed robbery is very low (15 per cent) and very different from low density areas where the prevalence is very high (75 per cent) (Idemudia 2003 forthcoming). Answers from respondents can be roughly divided into two different groups.

A small group (36 per cent) estimates that the level of insecurity is very high and the police really inefficient without specifying the reasons. It seems to me that this answer represents a more general feeling shared by most of Nigerians on the deteriorating crime situation in the country (Fourchard, Albert and Agbola 2003). A larger group (60 per cent) thinks that the level of insecurity is low or very low in the ward and the police control fair or good (58 per cent). The danger for this group of people is clearly identified: as coming from the “area boys” of the main streets but never within the neighbourhood. This is also confirmed by Idemudia who calculated that prevalence of area boys was much higher in the inner city than in residential areas.
(Idemudia 2003 forthcoming). The poverty of the area and its exclusiveness (pathways, no public places, no place of work, good knowledge of his neighbours) protects the neighbourhood from a lot of passing toughs. So, there is more feeling of security in this slum than in residential areas. This fact was early mentioned by Mabogunje who stated that the slum areas are not areas of moral and social deviance, criminality and delinquency (Mabogunje, 1968: 235). However, another survey in peripheral slums of Ibadan, especially the market slums (for instance, Bodija or Ojoo) would probably give us different results.

I. ASSETS AVAILABLE TO SLUM DWELLERS

A quick overview of the assets available in Bere cannot inform us if these are increasing of decreasing. It is only possible to give an estimate of different types of capital available.

The social capital of the respondents is very low. 60 per cent take no part in any kind of association. Few attend regular meetings of religious associations, co-operative societies or political parties. Respondents assert that regular fees represent the main obstacle to their involvement in such activities. Actually, such organisations bring to their members the only outside loans available. 24 per cent of the respondents enjoy a loan from co-operatives, churches, mosques and associations, 34 per cent from their family whereas the majority cannot borrow money. The limited means of the family explain why so many houses are not renovated when it becomes necessary. With a low income and large expenditures, children represent for half of the families a not negligible human capital but a small revenue: a quarter of the children do not attend school to work for the family.

A huge majority of the respondents (80 per cent) consider the government (either local or state government) inactive in their area while 64 per cent of them take into account the NGOs and international organisations’ efforts and especially the immunisation campaigns planned by UNICEF (90 per cent).

IV. SLUMS AND POVERTY: THE POLICIES

J. POLICIES AND ACTIONS

1. Policies and Programmes to Eradicate or Upgrade Slums

Because of the growth of the city, the practice of planning and managing cities in Nigeria has become progressively more demanding in terms of resources, organisation and skill. Although the number and size of agencies responsible for generating policies and exerting powers in Nigerian cities have grown over the years, there has not been a corresponding improvement in the quantity and the quality of urban services rendered. In 1987, Layi Egunjobi counted 16 institutions directly involved in decision-making for the Ibadan Metropolitan Area. Besides local governments, there were state agencies such as the Town Planning Division of Oyo...
State Ministry of Local Government, Oyo State Property Development Corporation, Oyo State Water Corporation and federal agencies such as National Electric Power Authority and Nigerian Telecommunications Limited. An examination of the working of these agencies shows a duplicity of functions and a lack of co-ordination among them (Egunjobi and Oladoja 1987: 87). This mismanagement affects the whole city rather than just the slums.

Since the 1990s, the lack of timely co-ordination among institutions has increased. In 1991, the Ibadan Municipal Government was divided like a cake into five local governments (Map 2). Most authors agree that the conflict of jurisdiction and competence and the absence of effective co-ordinating committees between these levels of government, have generally given rise to delays and confusion in the execution of urban politics. The multiplication of local governments within the city has had a direct effect on the management of slums: any project for the renewal of the inner city, which is the biggest slum in Ibadan requires the agreement of the five local government chairmen. Lack of professional capacity, frequent bureaucratic changes and competition instead of cooperation among the chairmen did not permit the governments to implement co-ordinated policies.

Other reasons should be advanced to explain the very limited impact of government policies on the development of slums in Ibadan. On the one hand, most of the state governments in Nigeria have accorded very low priority to physical planning and most of the states in the Federation have not given the urban centres the priority and the resources they need (Onibokun, 1998: 12). On the other hand, local governments even if they were promoted in the 1970s to govern at the grass root level cannot really assume their duties. A 1995 survey indicates that between 13 and 70 per cent of the local governments in Nigeria did not actually perform their functions (ibid). Not surprisingly, the World Bank states that barriers to the participation of the private sector in different aspects of urban infrastructure and services need to be removed while it is useless to reinforce government finance to improve urban policies (World Bank, 1995: 22). Actually, the lack of funds is one of the main constraints that local governments have to face. In the middle of the 1990s, over 60 per cent of their total revenue was spent on current expenditure and less than 20 per cent was available for capital expenditure (Onibokun, 1998: 14).

Local government finance depends mainly on the allocation given by federal government (20 per cent since 1987) and by state government (10 per cent of the revenue generated within the state). During the 20 first years of independence, development of Nigerian urban centres was mainly based on federal and state grants rather than on true urban economic foundations (Abdu, 1997: 8). Economic pressures since the 1980s have forced various governments to cut back their grants to local governments. The irregular allocation given both by federal and state governments is well emphasised by local government chairmen interviewed:

“There is not much that we are able to do as a result of the zero allocation syndrome. All the promises we gave the electorate have not been fulfilled” (interview with the North West Local Government Chairman)

“I stayed almost 36 months, and I took allocations for only 9 months. This zero allocation has made it difficult to pay workers now and prohibited us to a big extent from the execution of infrastructure projects” (Interview with South East Local Government Chairman).

This institutional and financial framework has to be taken into consideration to understand why policies and programs have generally failed for the improvement of slums in Ibadan city. A more detailed analysis must also be addressed to understanding specific reasons of the failure for each case under consideration.

1) The Oyo State Urban Renewal Scheme, a World Bank Assisted Project

According to Akinyode, the Ibadan Metropolitan Planning Authority in collaboration with the Ministry of Lands and Housing of Oyo State decided in 1988 to embark on the urban renewal of Ibadan (Akinyode, 1998: 38). Actually, the project started earlier with a first pilot study commissioned in 1984 by the World Bank to the Town Planning Division of the Ministry of Local
Government of Oyo State and called Upgrading of Core Areas: A Report on 3 Areas in Ibadan for Word Bank Pilot Project (interview with Tunde Agbola, Director of the Centre for Urban and Regional Planning, Ibadan).

The major focus of the project was to improve various aspects of housing, living and environmental conditions of different slums in Ibadan. For an unknown reason, a new study was started in 1988 by various consultants which selected three neighbourhoods in Ibadan: Mokola, Agugu and Yemetu (Akinyode, 1998: 42). The first area was a layout ward created by the colonial administration, the second one was at that time a peripheral settlement, the last one was the only area selected in the inner city.

We don't know why an initial project focusing on upgrading of core areas in Ibadan shifted to upgrading three different areas, one of which almost cannot be considered a slum (Mokola). Some financial considerations highlight this change. Mokola was selected because “the availability of some infrastructure facilities in this area would, no doubt, reduce the cost of upgrading” (Akinyode, 1998: 41). Yemetu/Adeoyo in the core area was short-listed also because the area has not totally degenerated into a typical slum that will need comprehensive re-development. This gives the area an advantage over Ayeye, Foko, Isale-Osi (three neighbourhoods in the Core area). “Also the area has some infrastructure facilities which can be upgraded at a minimum cost” (Akinyode, 1998: 42). The physical plan consisted mainly in providing street lights, tarred roads, public toilets, drainage, refuse disposal sites and resettlement sites. 62,000 people were supposed to benefit from the project. After the evaluation, the project started in 1989 and was completed in 1995.

2) The Urban Basic Services (UBS) Programme

is a programme of co-operation between the Federal Government of Nigeria and UNICEF to tackle the problems of the urban poor especially women and children who are the mostly deprived of urban basic services such as water, sanitation, health, educational facilities, employment and shelter (FGN-UNICEF 1997: 3). The programme contributes to the alleviation of urban poverty both in terms of income generation and improved access to basic services, thus reducing the incidence of Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances. The UBS programme activities were implemented in 72 slums and squatter communities including Ibadan, Lagos, Kaduna, Onishta and Port Harcourt. In Ibadan, UBS projects are currently going on in four communities in Ayeye and Agebni in Ibadan North West Local Government and Mapo and Eleta in Ibadan South East Local Government (Wahab, 1998: 58).

2. Policies and Programmes to Eradicate or Alleviate Poverty

Federal Programmes

Alex Gboyega (1999) has summarised the federal programmes aimed at alleviating poverty in Nigeria within the twelve past years. Among eleven programmes, six are oriented to the rural areas. The others are the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) whose vocational skills development and small scale enterprises programmes designed to combat mass unemployment; The People’s Bank Programme and the Community Bank Programme designed to make bank services more accessible and extend credit services to the poor; The Mass Mobilisation for Social and Economic Recovery; The National Urban Mass Transit Programme to provide a cheap modes of transport to the urban poor; and The Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission that provides special development aid to the juvenile delinquents. Among these programmes, the first one plays the role of an agency giving micro-credit loans to candidates who have successfully completed the training programme of the agency. The NDE is supposed to have offices in all the states and training centres located in local governments and wards. At the end of the training programme a micro-credit loan is given to participants to establish the trade for which they have been trained (Interview with the Programme Officer of the Federal Secretariat, Ibadan, 9th of May, 2002).

Multilateral Aid Programmes

The Sustainable Cities Programme (SCP) is a joint initiative of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). It was launched in August 1990, as part of the Urban Management Programme, in order to provide municipal authorities and their partners in the public, private and community/popular sectors with improved abilities and capacities for environmental planning and management (UNCHS 1996: 413). The Sustainable Ibadan Project (SIP) is a component of the SCP. Its creation was preceded by a request from the Oyo State Government to the UNCHS in February 1991 to include Ibadan in its SCP. The SIP was approved and signed in April 1994 making Ibadan city one of the 12 cities in the world to be selected for the demonstration of the SCP. The first consultation in October 1996 gathered more than 500 people including the eleven local governments of the Ibadan Metropolitan Area, federal agencies and Oyo State agencies. Three priorities were identified: waste management, water supply and the Institutionalisation of the Environmental Planning and Management (EPM). Various parts of the city were selected, mainly at the outskirts. The objective of SIP was not to target specifi-
cally the slums of the city, but few parts of the city included in the project could be regarded as slums (Bodija Market and its immediate residential neighbourhoods and the southern outskirts of the city) (Adesanya, 2000: 32-3).

3. Non-Governmental Interventions: Community-Based and NGO-Based Programmes

A recent study of community based organisations (CBOs) in the Ibadan metropolitan area shows that the level of activity of these associations is highest in the high density area (ie the core area) (Ogbuozobe, 2000: 46-8). The study indicates especially the development during the last 15 years of Community Development Associations (CDA). 90 per cent of the members of CDAs in Ibadan are based in the high density area (12,794 members of a total of 14,004) whereas the medium and low density areas are more concerned with social clubs and religious based organisations (ibid: 22). The major objective of the CDAs is the development of the communities of origin (usually outside Ibadan). This finding is important and demonstrates that people from the core area still have strong links with the countryside and that CDAs contribute by way of payments of levies, contributions and donations to the provision of infrastructure such as roads, schools, electricity and health facilities in their towns and villages of origin (ibid: 19). The next most important CBOs in Ibadan are the co-operatives which have funds for lending to members with a view to assisting members in their businesses or ventures, purchasing goods in bulk and reselling to members.

K. IMPACTS OF THESE EFFORTS

Federal Programmes

There has been a massive failure of the programmes for alleviating poverty in Nigeria. One crucial area that remained unaddressed is the weakened capacity of the municipal governments to formulate strategies, programmes and projects that address the peculiar dimension of poverty in the cities. Moreover, the institutionalisation of corruption, conflicts between various levels of government and the proliferation of institutions to handle the same or closely related projects “wasted the resources which would have been judiciously used to combat urban poverty” (Akinola and Olowu1995: 37).

The Oyo State Urban Renewal Schemes and the UBS Project

The Oyo State Urban Renewal Schemes allowed the renewal of the three selected areas (Mokola, Yemetu, Agugu) between 1988 and 1995. The results for the three mentioned areas are as follows: though residential land use still takes the lion’s share of the total land area, it has reduced in coverage to give room for the provision of new road construction, drainage, infrastructural facilities and open space for recreation. Moreover, a majority of the people of the selected areas estimated that the solid waste situation has improved during the past two years (Akinyode, 1998: 157-160). Four years later, the results seem to be less optimistic. The OSWC (quoted p. 19) is unable, like in other parts of Ibadan to supply and distribute water effectively to the three areas. The streetlights have been gradually stolen in
Mokola. A more important failure is the very long delay between the period of its first initiation (1983) and the final implementation (1997), due partly to the change of ten state civil and military governors during the period. If these three areas in Ibadan cannot be regarded as slums today, the core area that was supposed to benefit initially from this project is still the biggest slum in Ibadan.

The role of community heads and opinion leaders in the implementation of the UBS projects in Ibadan does not appear clearly (Wahab, 1998). However, from the interviews carried out in Bere, it appears that immunisation campaigns from UNICEF constitute the most important interventions mentioned by the respondents in this area. A more general overview is still needed to determine if this programme has been implemented in all parts scheduled in the initial project for Ibadan.

**Multilateral Aid Programmes**

The Sustainable Ibadan Project. Although there is a resource centre for environmental data/information, the implementation of the projects after five years seems to be limited to few operations (fertiliser plant, bore holes, mini-water supply work, a few toilets, a few road rehabilitations) scattered through the city and slums, especially the core area (SIP, 2001). Moreover, there has been a sharp decline in interest on the part of the relevant stakeholders and a drop in attendance at meetings by Working Group and Sub Working Group (SWG) members (Adesanya, 2000: 34). The initial interest shown by state and local governments has waned considerably. In fact government officials were disappointed since community members monitor the project and fund disbursement. For instance, the North Local Government leadership from 1995 to 1998 refused to participate in the improvement activities in Bodija Market (Wahab, 1998: 51). The more the dearth of funds has been a major impediment to plans. For instance, in spite of the preparation and submission of project proposals by the Bodija Market Toilet Improvement SWG (quoted below) and the Bodija Market Waste Management SWG, among others, the proposals had to be reasonably delayed due to unavailability of funds (Adesanya, 2000: 34). The immediate neighbourhood of the market which was targeted in the project has been totally neglected for reasons it remains to explain. Another relevant failure is due to the lack of co-ordination between the stakeholders and the different levels of government and even among local governments.

**CBOs**

Of 162 projects completed by CBOs in Ibadan, half of them (83) have been carried out in high density areas and 80 per cent of these projects were social services projects (health, education and social welfare) (Ogbuozobe, 2000: 38-42). It is a significant result but these CBOs face specific problems like inadequacy of funds for the execution of the planned projects, lack of managerial capacity, financial indiscipline and lack of accountability (ibid: 42-43). Actually, it is very doubtful that CBOs can really improve the living conditions of the people in slums. As an officer of the SIP emphasised, “CBOs don’t have enough money to carry out projects that will have meaningful impact on the lives of the people” (interview with S.P. Adamu, SIP officer). Moreover, CBOs in Ibadan are not really targeted to poor people. While Francis wrote that Nigerian CBOs provide support for the indigents of the community (Francis and al. 1996: 29) Ogbuozobe stated that CBOs in Ibadan provide mainly support for the members of the association (Ogbuozobe, 2000: 41). We agree with this last statement. Effectively questionnaires as well as interviews conducted in Bere indicated that either the people participated in associations for their own benefit, or they were too poor to afford the membership of such associations.

**L. A STRONGER PARTNERSHIP TO ERADICATE SLUMS IN IBADAN**

From the various examples examined above we can consider that most of the projects have failed even if some of them have been locally successful. We need also to consider that since the 1950s, the inhabitants of the inner city have been opposed to any resettlement, and that a renewal of the urban centre cannot be implemented without the consent of the dwellers. This factor is not peculiar to Ibadan. Okolocha has shown for Benin city an opposition to relocation for identical reasons: most of the dwellers are owners of their house; the presence of siblings in the slum environment is contributory to attachment to the slum, most of the people interviewed have lived in the area for more than ten years, low rentals attracted the poorest people in the city (Okolocha, 1987: 33-42). Slum dwellers may actually oppose any resettlement due to certain social constraints even if slum dwelling is detestable to the committed slum dwellers.

So a resettlement of the people of the inner city is not probably the solution for the eradication of the slum. One operation could be mentioned as a possible way to develop appropriate partnership between states, international agencies and CBOs to change the landscape in the inner city in Ibadan. We noticed earlier that Yemetu was the only neighbourhood in the core area that has been renewed in the mid 1990s (see above). After asking the people about their fundamental needs, SIP decided to tap the Agbadagbue spring located at Yemetu to provide clear and cheap water to the inhabitants of the ward. Then SIP convinced donors to
While the inhabitants gathered 60,000 naira (428 US$), Unicef gave 100 bags of cement, the State Government 600,000 naira (4280 US$) and the Local Government 650,000 (4640 US$) (Interview with S.P. Adamu, SIP officer).

The involvement of the people is the major reason for the success of this operation according to this SIP officer. People decided on the priority for their neighbourhood; they contributed money before taking over the management of the project. The whole participation process has been done under the guidance of the community elders who have decided on the time to fetch water and the cost of the water for the sustainability of the project. Finally, any other project to be carried out within the core area cannot be implemented without the contribution of the community elders and the CBOs. A stronger partnership between these local associations, states and international agencies remains one of the main ways to improve the living conditions in the core area which remains today the major slum of Ibadan.

ENDNOTES

1 From 1960 to 1991 47 states were created in Nigeria.
2 The Sokoto Sultanate was founded in 1804 by Ousmane Dan Fodio.
3 National Census in Nigeria is a sensitive political issue because the federal allocation to the States is based on the population of the State.
5 National Archives of Nigeria, Ibadan, Ibadan division, letter of the 19/2/1934 from the district Officer Ibadan to Bale and Council
7 National Archives, Ibadan, Ibadan Division, 1978, Minutes of the Ibadan Health Committee Meeting held at the Mapo Hall on the 12th of May 1943.

ACRONYMS

GDP Gross Domestic Product
SAP Structural Adjustment Programmes
NRC Nigerian Railway Corporation
NEPA National Electric Power Authority
UBS Urban Basic Services Programme
NDE National Directorate of Employment
SCP The Sustainable Cities Programme
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme
SIP The Sustainable Ibadan Project
EPM Environmental Planning and Management
CDA Community Development Associations
CBO Community Based Organisation

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Agbola, T, C O Olatubara and M Alabi (2001) Student on-campus housing at bursting point. A case study of the University of Ibadan. IFRA, Ibadan.


Sustainable Ibadan Project (2001), Brief on the Sustainable Ibadan Project, Brochure, Ibadan.


List of Interviews

Of the 40 in depth interviews carried out in May 2002, the following were used in the preparation of the current report.

Interviews with Officials
Ibadan North Local Government Chairman, 23/5/2002
Ibadan North East Local Government Chairman, 15/5/2002
Ibadan North West Local Government Chairman, 7/5/2002
Principal Public Works Officer at the National Directorate of Employment, 10/5/2002
Ibadan North East Local Government Official, 23/5/2002
Ibadan South West Local Government, Senior Administrator, 16/5/2002

Interviews with Community Leaders
El Hadj Kazin Mohamed, Vice-Chairman of the market at Sasa, 15/2/2002
Malam Maman Sami, Malam of the palace of Sarkin Sasa, 10/2/2002

Interviews with People from Different Places and Social Groups
Madibo Ma’anshi, security man in the Bodija cattle market, 22/5/2002
G. Kosamutu, retired taxi driver, Bere, 10/5/2002.