### Fall 2012, No. 150

#### IN THIS ISSUE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job Opening</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editor’s Comments</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announcements</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles: How Long Does it Take to Have Impact?</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Richard Rose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review Article: Bill Jones on Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class by Owen Jones</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstracts</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book Reviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltman on What’s Wrong with the British Constitution?</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By McLean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freyman on The Legacy of the Crash edited by T. Casey</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf on Losing Small Wars by Ledwidge;</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Elections, Representation and the Law by Morris;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Tobacco Control by Cairney, Studlar &amp; Mamudu;</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Politics of Coalition by Hazel &amp; Yong; &amp; Land Based Air Power or Air Craft Carriers? by Dyndal</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pot Pourri</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership News</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Officers

**President**
Justin Fisher 2010-2012
Brunel University

**Executive Committee**

- Tim Bale 2012-2014
  University of Sussex

- Karen Beckwith 2012-2014
  Case Western Reserve University

- Philip Cowley 2012-2014
  University of Nottingham

- Justin Fisher 2012-2014
  Brunel University

- Andrew Gamble 2010-2012
  University of Cambridge

- Rachel Gibson 2012-2014
  University of Manchester

- Jane Green 2010-2012
  University of Manchester

- Janet Laible 2010-2012
  Leigh University

- Mark Shephard 2010-2012
  University of Strathclyde

- Donley Studlar 2010-2012

**Executive Director**
Terrence Casey
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology

---

Thomas P. Wolf, Quarterly Editor
School of Social Sciences
Indiana University Southeast
New Albany, IN 47150
Fax: (812-941-2591
Email: tpwolf@ius.edu

Terrence Casey, Executive Director
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology
5500 Wabash Avenue
Terre Haute, IN 47803
Email: casey1@rose-hulman.edu

Website:
www.uc.edu/bpg
Publication note: The British Politics Group Quarterly is the official publication of the British Politics Group (BPG), an organization formed in the mid-1970s to promote the teaching, study and research of British politics. Inquiries about the Quarterly should be communicated to the Editor – contact points listed on the front cover. BPG dues (as of January 2009) are: One year - $25 or £17; two years -$35 or £25; three years $50 or £35; graduate student dues are ½ of these rates. Life membership: $500 or £300. Dues and inquiries about membership should be directed to the Executive Director (address on front cover). The organization offers three scholarly prizes each year: 1) The Samuel H. Beer Prize for the best dissertation by a North American scholar working on a British politics topic; 2) The Donald E. Stokes Dissertation Fellowship for dissertation research in the UK by a North American working on a British politics topic; and 3) The James B. Christoph Prize for the best paper by a junior (untenured) faculty member presented at a professional conference. For these awards, see the Awards Section below. Inquiries about each should be directed to the Executive Director. The BPG organizes panels on British topics at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Inquiries about participating in these panels should be communicated to the Executive Director.

BPPG Electronic Communications – The website for the British Politics Group, complete with our own domain name: http://www.britishpoliticsgroup.org. This site was developed by Alistair Howard at Temple University.

Listserv - Joel Wolfe, University of Cincinnati, has created a Discussion List for the BPG at listserv@listserv.uc.edu with this message: subscribe the BPG-L, followed by your first name, middle initial and last name. If you have inquiries about the Discussion List, contact Joel at Joel.Wolf@uc.edu.

Job Opening – Editor – NEW BRITISH POLITICS GROUP BLOG -

The BPG has long published a widely read and admired Quarterly. This is the last edition of this publication. Noting the success of the LSE and University of Nottingham blogs, the Group plans to create and expand a new British politics blog in order to more effectively engage and inform our members. This will replace the Quarterly. We seek an editor to develop and manage this important and high-profile position. We foresee this as our key source for organizational information, the dissemination of scholarship, informed opinion, and lively debate within the BPG, as well as a conduit for contributing our expertise to wider political debates in both the US and UK. The editor’s job will mainly be to solicit and manage contributions from other members. Our vision is that we would have new content (and discussion) about once a week, preferably with a structure that provides members notification of new postings. These contributions would be provided by a stable of BPG and invited contributors. To this end, members of the Executive Committee have all agreed to provide at least two contributions in the first 12 months. Whether the blog will be hosted within the existing BPG website or elsewhere has yet to be determined, as is the exactly level of technical and auxiliary support. The initial appointment will be for three years with potential for renewal.

This is an exciting opportunity, especially for an up-and-coming young scholar. The successful candidate will play a major role in determining the format and content of the new blog. Prior experience managing a blog or website is desirable but not necessary. Good organizational abilities are a must as well as a passion for advancing debate and discussion on British politics. Our goal is to have the new blog up and running by the end of the academic year. Our ambition would be that this is not only a useful tool for our members, but that it might develop into one of the premier websites on British politics. Those interested should send a statement of interest noting any relevant prior experience and a current CV no later than October 10, 2012 to Terrence Casey, Executive Director at caseyl@rose-hulman.edu or Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, 5500 Wabash Avenue, Terre Haute, IN 47803. Tel.- 812-877-8281.
EDITOR’S COMMENTS

As the saying goes, everything must end. This is the end for me as Editor of the BPGQ. As some of you know, I have been in this role for nearly two decades. It has generally been an enjoyable task, but time consuming. The best part has been working with a group of folks that share my longstanding interest in British politics.

It was never in my career plans to edit the British Politics Group Newsletter, as it was initially entitled. The advent of the Newsletter came soon after the Group was created in the mid-1970s. The duo of Jorgen Rasmussen at Iowa State University and Gerald Dorfman at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution were responsible for its early years.

The offer for me to be editor of the Newsletter came out of the blue from my perspective. As I recall, Donley Studlar stopped me in a hallway at the 1993 APSA Annual Meeting in Washington and asked me to be editor. This was a complete surprise to me. Don said he had agreed to succeed Jorgen Rasmussen as Executive Director if I would agree to edit the BPG publication. I didn’t make a commitment at that time but told Don, I would get back in touch with him.

At that time, I was Dean of Social Sciences at Indiana University Southeast, and Executive Director of the Indiana Consortium for International Programs (ICIP). In the latter role, I organized twice yearly conferences on international topics, managed the finances of the organization, and sought to recruit new member institutions to ICIP.

Without a doubt, my decision to accept Don’s offer was influenced by Jim Christoph. We came back on the same plane from Washington. Jim, for whom I had great respect from our first meeting, lobbied me at both ends of the flight. It was Jim who recommended that we discontinue printing the Newsletter on gray paper stock. He found that to be unattractive. So we used a much lighter color thereafter.

I also had and continue to have a great admiration for Donley. Even after he finished his term as Executive Director, we have continued to be in touch often.

Before I responded to Studlar’s offer, I talked with our Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, whom I had hired some 15 years before to be a member of our Psychology faculty. I agreed not to take release time from teaching if the university would pay the mailing costs for the newsletter, as the quarterly then was titled. That agreement has continued to this time.

My decision to depart the editorship at this time was heavily influenced by the macular degeneration in my right eye. Reading, something I have enjoyed for three-quarters of a century, has become increasingly difficult.

I want to thank some folks who have been particularly helpful in my duties as Editor: Wyn Grant, Richard Rose, and Bill Jones who have offered articles or review-articles over the years. And I have been able to call upon, often at short notice, Don Studlar, Jerry Waltman, and Jeff Freyman to write book reviews. Bill Muller compiled and edited the Membership Directory that we put out, off and on. Those aren’t the only folks that have provided assistance but these come to mind.

What will I do now after I complete my editorial duties? I am at the point, that I want to use what eyesight remains in reading the numerous books that are on my “to do” list, some of them for many years.

AWARDS

Samuel H. Beer Prize of the British Politics Group – The Samuel H. Beer Dissertation Prize honors the late Samuel Hutchinson Beer, a distinguished American scholar of British politics. It seeks to encourage the study of British politics by graduate students in North America, and to reward exceptional work in that area of study. The principle criterion for awarding the Prize is the dissertation’s contribution to the understanding of British politics, regardless of whether the study is exclusively British or comparative research with a British component.

We invite nominations for the 2012 award of $300 (£200) for the best doctoral dissertation in British politics completed during the calendar years of 2010, 2011, or 2012. All nominees must have received their Ph.D. from a department in the U.S. or Canada. Either the supervising professor of a department’s director of graduate studies may nominate a dissertation. Either of those two officials must be a BPG member. (Nominators can join at the time of submitting nomination.) Three (3) loose copies of
the nominated dissertation, along with a brief letter of nomination should be postmarked by March 1, 2013 and sent to: Dr. Terrence Casey, Executive Director, British Politics Group, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, 5500 Wabash Avenue, Terre Haute, IN 47803 Email: casey1@rose-hulman.edu Telephone: (812) 877-8281 Fax: (812) 877-8909

**Donald E. Stokes Dissertation Research Fellowship of the British Politics Group** – This Fellowship honors the late Donald E. Stokes, a founding member of the British Politics Group, and co-author of the seminal book *Political Change in Britain*. The award, in the amount of $500 (US) is to be used for Ph.D. dissertation research on British politics, broadly defined as including comparative and historical as well as approaches more specifically focused on contemporary politics, to be conducted in the United Kingdom. **Application for the 2012 award is March 15, 2013.** Applications should be sent to: Dr. Terrence Casey, Executive Director, British Politics Group, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, 5500 Wabash Avenue, Terre Haute, IN 47803 Email: casey1@rose-hulman.edu Telephone: (812) 877-8281 Fax: (812) 877-8909

**James B. Christoph Prize for the Best Conference Paper on British Politics by a Junior Faculty Member**– (Notice that eligibility for this award is not for a graduate student but for a fresh Ph.D. or non-tenured faculty.) This award honors the late James B. Christoph, a founding member of the BPG and former BPG President. For the 2012 award, the paper (or poster) must be presented at a conference in calendar year 2012. All conference papers on British politics, whether solely on Britain or comparative, are eligible. The author/presenter must have (A) already received the Ph.D. at the time the paper is presented; and (B) have been a non-tenured, full-time (tenure track or visiting) or part-time faculty member at an institution of higher education in North America at the time of the presentation. The award is $300. The decision for the award will be made by a three-person committee of established scholars who are BPG members. Four loose copies of the presentation should be sent to the BPG Executive Director. The deadline for the 2012 competition is April 1, 2013. Applications should be sent to: Dr. Terrence Casey, Executive Director, British Politics Group, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, 5500 Wabash Avenue, Terre Haute, IN 47803 Email: casey1@rose-hulman.edu Telephone: (812) 877-8281 Fax: (812) 877-8909

### JOBS

1. **Wyn Grant** suggested this site for job-seekers www.jobs.ac.uk. Something called Euroresearch does a useful weekly jobs bulletin.


3. **The Department of History at Trinity College, Hartford, Ct**, invites applications for a full-time, tenure-track faculty position beginning August, 2013, at the rank of assistant professor in the history of Great Britain and the Empire since 1760. Applicants should hold a doctorate or anticipate its completion by the time of appointment. The successful candidate will offer a two-semester survey of British history as well as more specialized courses on imperial and post-colonial history. The ability to offer a course on gender is highly desirable as is a willingness to collaborate in the classroom with colleagues working on transnational topics. Urban and environmental sub-specialties also welcome. Teaching load is five courses per year. Please send letter of application, cv., writing samples (chapter or article), transcripts, and three letters of recommendation to Search Committee Chair, British Hist-
4. The North American Conference on British Studies is seeking a new editorial team for the *Journal of British Studies*, including a new general editor or co-editors, and a new book review editor or co-editors. The current editors’ term ends in summer 2014, and the Association hopes to select new editors a year earlier to facilitate the transition process. Editors are appointed to a five-year term. Those interested in applying should contact Professor Cynthia Herrup of the University of Southern California History Department (herrup@usc.edu). The application deadline for both positions is November 30, 2012.

The *Journal of British Studies*, published four times a year, is the premier journal in the field, with a very high ISI citation impact rating. Starting in January 2013, the journal will be published by Cambridge University Press.

Interested parties should be aware that the editorship and the book review editorship (both open to a team) are not related. Applicants should specify which of these positions interests them. Editorial subventions provide funding for editorial assistants for each of the two positions, but applicants will require a commitment of support from their home institutions. The current editorial teams are happy to answer questions about their duties. You can contact Brian Cowan (brian.cowan2@mcgill.ca) or Elizabeth Elbourne (elizabeth.elbourne@mcgill.ca) about the journal editors’ responsibilities and Amy Froide (froide@umbc.edu) or Gail Savage (glsavage@smcm.edu) about the book review editors’ responsibilities. Questions and inquiries can also be directed to the NACBS president, Dane Kennedy (dkennedy@gwu.edu), or vice president/president-elect, Keith Wrightson (keith.wrightson@yale.edu).

ANNOUNCEMENTS

1. PBS stations across the country are looking for speakers as they hold December events to promote the third season of *Downton Abbey* on MASTERPIECE.

*Downton Abbey* won last year’s Primetime Emmy award for “Outstanding Miniseries” and just received another 16 Emmy nominations for its second season. New episodes begin January 6, 2013 and, as this third season opens, the characters are in 1920 and the context has moved from the Edwardian Era to the Interwar years.

**Are you able to speak to this time in British history?** Would you be interested in educating an audience about the lifestyles and social changes occurring in the worlds of both the British aristocracy as well as the mainstream population?

If so, please contact gay_mohrbacher@wgbh.org who is coordinating a centralized speakers bureau for PBS stations across the country to access. You may also reach Gay at #617/300-5308. Please send along your CV and a photo of yourself and indicate topics(s) you would enjoy sharing. Please know there is no guarantee that individual PBS stations can do more than provide an honorarium. **Dane Kennedy, NACBS President**

2. A message from Andrew Baker, Editor of the *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*:

As the editor of the Political studies Association of the United Kingdom (an APSA sister association) Journal – *The British Journal of Politics and International* (BJPIR), I would like to take this opportunity to draw the journal to the attention of APSA BPG members as a possible outlet for their work and to encourage BPG members to submit their best work to BJPIR. Obviously we are known as a journal that publishes a great deal of work on British politics, although we are not exclusively a British politics journal. We carry articles on IR, Political Theory/Philosophy and Comparative politics/political economy.

In particular, we’re interested in attracting more submissions from North American scholars (US and Canada). Themes that would be of particular interest to us that might fit with the work of BPG scholars include:

- Comparative work on US and UK politics/political economy/public policy;
the notion and concept of Anglo America; culture, politics, ideology and political economy;
- US-UK relations particularly, British and American foreign policy – and the notion of an Anglo-American coalition in various areas of international relations/ global governance;
- Notions of learning, policy transfer, norm diffusion between the US and UK;
- Reflections on differences and similarities between British and American scholarship in political science, political theory and international relations.

We were ranked 34 in TR citation index in 2010 (political science category), 54 in 2011. We were 19 in the IR list in 2011, currently 34, in the most recent ranking. Other reasons to consider publishing with us, is that we are one of the PSA’s specialist house journals and a hard copy goes to every PSA member -1600 individual subscriptions and 3000 institutional subscriptions – so an extremely effective way of disseminating your work.

Generally our review process is efficient. Everything goes out to three reviewers, but we aim, where possible, to have the initial round of responses back with authors within two months, and it is extremely rare that first review round would extend beyond three months.


Best regards,
Dr Andrew Baker, Reader Political Economy, Editor- British Journal of Politics and International Relations, School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen's University of Belfast, Belfast, BT7 1NN
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/Staff/Baker 0044(0)
2890973732 a.baker@qub.ac.uk

3 Duncan Tanner Essay Prize - Twentieth Century British History (TCBH) is pleased to sponsor an annual Essay Prize to encourage a high standard of scholarship amongst postgraduate research students in Britain and abroad. The deadline for submission is 1 November 2012. For more information visit: http://www.oxfordjournals.org/page/3127/8

PUBLICATIONS

(See also Membership News below.)

1. Hart Publishing is announcing a new journal to be launched in spring 2013 COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY - An international and comparative review of law and history. It is the official journal of the European Society for Comparative Legal History (http://esclh.blogspot.co.uk/)

EDITOR - Seán Patrick Donlan, University of Limerick, Email: sean.donlan@ul.ie

Articles will explore both 'internal' legal history (doctrinal and disciplinary developments in the law) and 'external' legal history (legal ideas and institutions in wider contexts). Rooted in the complexity of the various Western legal traditions worldwide, the journal will also investigate other laws and customs from around the globe. Comparisons may be either temporal or geographical and both legal and other law-like normative traditions will be considered. Scholarship on comparative and trans-national historiography, including trans-disciplinary approaches, is particularly welcome.

The Editors welcome scholarly submissions in the English language.

To submit an article please contact Seán Donlan (sean.donlan@ul.ie) or Heikki Pihlajamäki (heikki.pihlajamaki@helsinki.fi). The optimal length for articles is between 7500 to 15000 words, including footnotes. Shorter submissions will be considered for our 'Short Articles' section. All articles are submitted to double blind peer review. Information for contributors can be viewed through the following link: http://www.hartjournals.co.uk/clh/contrib.html

To propose a review, please contact Agustin Parise (agustin.parise@maastrichtuniversity.nl). Book reviews will generally range from 1500 to 2500 words. Review articles will also be considered.

The journal is published, both online and in print, twice a year, appearing in the spring and the autumn.

To subscribe please visit: www.hartjournals.co.uk/clh

SIGN UP TO RECEIVE CLH TABLE OF CONTENTS ALERTS - To receive the contents of each issue published by e-mail please register through the Hart Publishing website: http://www.hartpub.co.uk/mailing.html.

ARTICLES EDITOR - Heikki Pihlajamäki, Email: Heikki.pihlajamaki@helsinki.fi

REVIEWS EDITOR - Agustin Parise, Email: agustin.parise@maastrichtuniversity.nl
2. The July, 2012 Edition of the Journal of British Studies is devoted to articles on homosexuality in Great Britain. Eight articles plus the “introduction” address various facets of this topic.

---

CONFERENCES

The Pacific Coast Conference on British Studies (PCCBS) invites paper and panel proposals for its fortieth annual meeting, to be held at the Faculty Club at the University of California, Berkeley, March 8-10, 2013.

The PCCBS invites papers representing all fields of British Studies – broadly defined to include those who study the United Kingdom, its component parts and nationalities, as well as Britain's imperial cultures.

We welcome proposals from scholars and doctoral candidates in a wide range of disciplines across the humanities, social sciences, and the arts, including History, Literature, Political Science, Philosophy, Religion, Gender Studies, Cultural Studies, Theater Studies, and Art History.

Proposals for individual papers, partial panels, or complete panels are all welcome, although complete panel proposals are preferred. We encourage the submission of proposals dealing with interdisciplinary topics, as well as panels on new pedagogies and technologies associated with British Studies.

The deadline for submission of proposals/panels is NOVEMBER 15, 2012. Proposals should include a 200-words abstract for each paper plus a 1-page cv for each participant. Those submitting full or partial panel proposals should include a brief description of the panel plus a 1-page c.v. for the panel chair as well as for its commentator. Please place the panel proposal, its constituent paper proposals, and all vitae in one file, making certain that your contact information, especially e-mail addresses, are correct and current. Proposals should be submitted via e-mail attachment by Nov. 15, 2012, to:

Professor Michelle Tusan, PCCBS Program Chair, Department of History, University of Nevada-Las Vegas michelle.tusan@unlv.edu

---

ARTICLES

How long does it take to have impact?
Richard Rose, University of Strathclyde
(Reprinted from Political Studies Association News, v. 231, no. 2, June 2012, p. 14 with the author’s permission.)

In an era of 24/7 news, politicians emulate hedge fund managers in measuring things in mili-seconds although not milibands. By these standards, the ESRC is being generous in giving its grantees twelve months after the end of their research before filing an impact statement. However, this is insufficient for sleeper effects to be recognised.

Practically Resistant

Maynard Keynes said that the economists who had the biggest impact on contemporary politicians are those who are long dead. This was because practical men who believe themselves exempt from any intellectual influences are resistant to fresh ideas. It took a decade and a world war before Keynes’ ideas began to be applied. Many who deal with the world financial crisis are slow to wake up to the distinction between risk and uncertainty that Frank Knight published in 1921.

I am in the fortunate position of having had an impact on two British prime ministers and not being dead. However, I can’t claim credit for this with the ESRC, because it had not been founded when I co-authored two big impact books, The British General Election of 1959 and Must Labour Lose?

You’ve Never Had It

Labour’s third straight defeat in 1959 was a shock to the Labour Party and to class-conscious sociologists who theorised that Labour ought to win elections because of its class basis. It was not a shock to the Conservative Party, whose Etonian campaign director approved posters captioned, ‘You’ve never had it so good’ and photos of happy car owners. I wrote the chapters in the Nuffield study documenting how and why this was done.

Must Labour Lose? contained the results of the survey by Mark Abrams that was paid for by supporters of Hugh Gaitskell. Aneurin Bevan had vetoed the party sponsoring the survey. He placed his
hand on the working-class heart that beat beneath his well-tailored suit and proclaimed, ‘I know what the working class thinks’. The key point of the title was the question mark. The text explained that Labour did not have to lose if it would make an effort to understand a changing electorate, for example, workers preferring to shop at Marks & Spencers rather than the Co-op.

Unnatural Acts

To find out why so many of Labour’s natural voters were committing the “unnatural” act of voting Tory, I turned to market researchers, Mark Abrams and Henry Durant. Both were Labour voters but their message made them unwelcome in party headquarters. Ascetic Fabians thought that cars and home ownership were upper class luxury goods that the working class ought not to want.

The youthful Philip Gould found my Nuffield study opened his eyes to the need to listen to ordinary people if Labour was to win enough of their votes. It took three successive Labour defeats and the death of John Smith before Tony Blair could offer a willing ear to Gould’s message.

Indirect Impact

My impact on the Conservative Party was indirect. When William Hague took over the leadership of the Tory Party he distributed copies of Gould’s How I did it book to every shadow Cabinet member with the inscription: ‘Know thine enemy’. Like Labour predecessors in Opposition, uber-Thatcherites resisted the message that elections are won by listening to the electorate. It took the Conservatives three successive election defeats before they started addressing the concerns of voters better described as middle-of-the-road than middle class.

Only after time has passed do many ideas that were initially suppressed have an impact on behaviour. Sixty years ago delayed impact was dubbed ‘the sleeper effect’ by social psychologists. Like climate change, changing the intellectual climate does not normally occur within the time span of a single electoral cycle.

Wake Up

As a democrat, I have never claimed that social scientists have the right to dictate to popularly elected governors. As a political animal, I regret that elected governors take so long to wake up to conclusions that those outside government can see. For examples, interning and killing people is not the way to resolve the problem of Governing without Consensus (1971) and the answer to the question Can Government Go Bankrupt? (1977) is: ‘No, they only get re-financed’. I am still waiting for whoever is elected president of the United States to apply what I told a predecessor (2007): ‘You can’t defend a state that isn’t there’. Richard Rose is director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.

Review Article


Class War or No Class War? ‘Working class people have become objects of ridicule, disapproval, and, yes, hatred. ’(p.134)

‘The demonization of the working class is the ridiculing of the conquered by the conqueror.’ (p. 247)

When John Major came rather surprisingly to power in 1992 he claimed to be committed to a ‘genuinely classless society’; I doubt whether this relatively honest politician would in retrospect claim he made much progress towards this objective. His colleagues, however, further to the right on the spectrum might beg to differ; they indulge what Owen Jones calls ‘class denial’.

They would argue that we have already enjoyed such a (classless) state for quite some time. Whereas it was once a matter of birth and contacts, they would now maintain that the various restricted elevators of professional success- medicine, law, business- are an open highway up which everyone can advance given the requisite ability and energy, whatever their starting points in life. [Incidentally, recent studies have revealed that the media is also dominated by public school alumni and top sports men and woman drawn disproportionately from the 7% who attend such elite secondary schools.]
Owen Jones’s well researched, hard hitting book makes an unashamedly left of centre examination of class in Britain and works hard to demolish right-wing stereotypical thinking. His argument is that society has evolved into much more sharply defined groups of rich and poor. An immensely rich, property owning elite has evolved which dominates, through successive generations of its privately educated progeny, most of the key positions in politics, business and wider society. This group, says Jones, has used its power to propagate the narrative that the old traditional ‘salt of the earth’ aspirational working class has melted away. (‘upwards’, maybe, into the middle class), leaving an ‘underclass' rump of the feckless undeserving poor.

By demonizing this partially invented grouping, says Jones, the right wing hope to undermine attempts by the left to organise any widespread political opposition. If we choose not to see class differences, there can be no consequent class conflicts; the conclusion follows that: ‘We are all middle class now’. Rather as racism—the belief in the inferiority of other races—was used to justify imperialism—‘they are unable to look after themselves’ - then so demonising the working class as lazy, feckless and philistine can be used to justify cuts in benefits and public services and, importantly, the shrinking of the state.

Crucially though, such targeted attributions of laziness and lack of concern for themselves and their dependents, serves a hugely important purpose: it explains disadvantage and poverty as a consequence of the actions and attitudes of those groups themselves. So it’s their fault they are poor and disadvantaged, not, because of, for example, the random effects of business failure, public expenditure cuts, government mis-management of the economy or world recession. Moreover, by convincing themselves that working class people are feckless, lazy and so forth, the social order is somehow validated: middle-class people can feel their favoured position in the hierarchy is fully justified and not eligible for anything remotely resembling ‘bourgeois guilt’.

Such an explanation is also pure gold to those who want to impose further cuts, to avoid any extra spending and, through disseminating this analysis as widely and persuasively as possible, to escape any electoral consequences. Moreover, it legitimizes the vast inequalities which characterize modern western societies. ‘Demonisation’, says Jones, ‘is the ideological backbone of an unequal society.’ (p. xiii)

He quotes from a survey by polling organization, Britain Thinks, led by Gordon Brown’s former pollster, Deborah Mattinson:

‘There was a strong feeling in the focus groups that the noble tradition of a respectably diligent working class was over. For the first time I saw the ‘working class’ tag used as a slur, equated with other class based insults such as ‘chavs’.

Because of this new sentiment, Mattinson felt the working class label was no longer something that could be worn with pride. Jones’s book is concerned to establish that the pejorative ‘chav’ has indeed come to be synonymous with a recalcitrant working class, and also to discover why.

[Why ‘Chavs’? It is said to be an acronym for ‘Council Housed and Violent’]

Jones lists a number of examples where working class people have been targeted by what can only be categorized as ‘class hate’. I’ll pick out a few to illustrate his argument.

Gymbox

The first relates to a fitness company called Gymbox. In the spring of 2009 it offered a class in ‘chav fighting’. Its website urged potential recruits as follows: ‘Don’t give moody grunting chavs an ASBO, give them a good kicking’. Jones quotes the company’s CEO to add some depth to his argument:

‘They have trouble articulating themselves and have little ability to spell or write. They love their pit bull dogs as well as their blades. They tend to breed by the age of fifteen and spend most of their days trying to score ‘super-skunk’ or whatever ‘gear’ they can get their sweaty teenage hands on. ’ (p. 5)

Jones’ point is that for any company to offer let alone recruit a class such as this- and they proved very popular apparently- requires the existence of very negative social attitudes towards young working class males.
**Daily Mail**

This extract adds more substance to Jones’s case: ‘Look around the supermarket, the bus and increasingly now on the road and you will encounter an ever-growing number of tattooed, loud, foul mouthed proles, with scummy brats trailing in their wake, who are incapable of acknowledging or even recognizing a common courtesy and who in their own minds can never, ever, be in the wrong about anything. ..They have no values, no morality and are so thick they are beyond redemption.’ (p. 6)

**Heffer**

This stereo-typing of a wretched, irredeemable lumpen proletariat is constructed out of a series of images established elsewhere in society. Simon Heffer, celebrated *Daily Telegraph* columnist, explained the evolution of modern society to Jones in terms of: the aspirational elements of the traditional working class merging with the middle class, leaving a residue who ‘become clients of the welfare state and become the underclass.’ (p. 7)

**Karen Mathews**

Another example of the popular ‘tarring and feathering’ of the poor was Karen Mathews, the Dewsbury mother of several children by different fathers. She naively arranged for her daughter to be ‘kidnapped’ so that she could reap a financial reward. The plot was hopelessly bungled, she was found out, exposed and extensively analysed in the media.

Jones argues that her appearances on television released a wave of class hatred, which, while focusing on the very poor living in Dewsbury Moor, sought to project Mathews’ behaviour as typical of her social class. One journalist, Carole Malone is quoted, saying that Mathews’ estate was very much like the one close by where she lived:

“It was full of people like Karen Mathews. People who'd never had jobs, never wanted one, people who expected the state to fund every illegitimate child they had - not to mention their drink, drug and smoking habits. Their houses looked like pigsties-dog crap on the floor, piles of clothes and unwashed dishes everywhere.” (pp. 21-2)

David Cameron cleverly exploited her in his political rhetoric; one broken woman used to demonise a whole class of the British poor ‘The verdict on Karen Mathews and her vile accomplice is also a verdict on our broken society’ (p. 25)

**Jade Goody**

A final example is Jade Goody, famous for being on the reality show, Big Brother in 2002. This clearly uneducated woman was ridiculed for being overweight and ignorant, for example not knowing what asparagus was and asking if ‘East Angular’ was abroad (she also thought Rio de Janeiro was a person and that Portugal was part of Spain). The tabloid labeled her a ‘pig’; *The Sun* demanded that ‘the pig’ be voted out, calling her an ‘oinker’. (p123).

Astonishingly, given this assault, Goody managed to transform herself in the eyes of the media and the public, simply by revealing how simple, honest and endearing she actually could be. Typically fickle, the tabloids decided she was not a pig but a celebrity and that is what she became, appearing in several television shows, launching her own perfume and making herself relatively rich.

Then in 2007 Goody was invited onto Celebrity Big Brother and became engaged in a personality clash with the upper class Indian Bollywood star, Shilpa Shetty; her foolish jibe ‘Shilpa Poppadom’ being construed as a racist insult. This unleashed that element in British culture which Jones would describe as ‘class hatred’. Suddenly *The Daily Express* was calling her ‘trash’ and ‘porcine’ and Simon Heffer harrumphing: why channel 4 had broadcast the ‘repulsive aspects’ of society ‘when we can see them so easily for ourselves, if we wish, by wandering to the nearest council estate for half an hour.’ (p. 124) *The Telegraph* journalist, whose sons attend Eton, is unlikely ever, in reality, to have made such a journey himself.

When Goody was eventually diagnosed with cancer, journalist Rod Liddle suggested the illness was an invention of her publicist, Max Clifford, to make her more ‘interesting: A stroke would have made for more dramatic television, but cancer, you have to say, has a certain cachet.’ (p. 125)
Jones also identifies other sources of ‘chav’ ridicule, especially in the media. The sketch show, Little Britain, starring two privately educated actors, Matt Lucas and David Walliams, was not untypical. ‘Vicky Pollard’ was a Lucas character ‘presented as a grotesque working class teenage single mother who is presented as ‘sexually promiscuous, unable to string two words together and has a very bad attitude problem’. In one sketch when she is reminded to take her baby home, she replies: ‘Oh, it’s OK, you can keep it. I’ve got loads more at home anyway.’ (p. 127) Jones argues that this is yet another example of middle-class ridicule of working class stereotypes. He quotes James Delingpole’s damning views on the character:

‘The reason why Vicky Pollard caught the public imagination is that she embodies with such fearful accuracy several of the great scourges of contemporary Britain: aggressive all-female gangs of embittered, hormonal drunken teenagers; gym-slip mums who choose to get pregnant as a career option; pasty faced, lard gutted slappers who’ll drop their knickers in the blink of an eye, dismal ineducables who may not know much English or History, but can damn well argue their rights with a devious fluency that would shame a barrister from Matrix Chambers.’ (p. 128)

Discussion

This raises an interesting question: should we disapprove of such humour in the media, (also purveyed in the popular depiction of the ‘chaotic Gallagher family’ on Channel 4’s Shameless)? Is such middle-class ridicule right and proper? Is it justified? I have to confess, I have laughed at both these programmes and others of similar ilk. I join in the middle-class ridicule and have never felt any guilt. ‘Funny’, after all, is, well, just ‘funny’. Should I feel guilty? Jones makes me feel that, yes, I should, though I’d not wish to restrict any comic’s material to exclude making fun of any social class. This is a central problem which Jones does not really discuss. He points the finger, says ‘shame’ but often does not argue for any prescriptive action. This lack of morally legitimate alternative weakens his case.

Do I accept Jones’s central argument that the ‘chav’ phenomenon of deriding working class people and their culture or lack of it, is demeaning and unfair? Yes, I do- I’m sure the ‘safe’ middle-classes enjoy making fun of people less fortunate than themselves and have realized that probably I, and many of my friends, am among them too. But I do have a few concerns about the central thesis of the book.

Firstly, is Jones right to claim people like Karen Mathews are rare examples among a not substantially changed working class? We can understand how the right-wing press and politicians have an incentive to use such people as political weapons. But how atypical are they? I recall the case of unemployed, (but clearly perfectly healthy) Lizzy and Mark Bardsley, and their houseful of children drawing an income of some £37,500 a year purely from benefits of various kinds. OK, so that’s just two cases- are they typical? Jones argues that benefit fraud costs some £1bn a year while the figure for unclaimed benefits runs to several times that figure and tax evasion by the rich costs the Treasury a whopping £70bn a year. Jones has a fair point when he claims targeting the poor transgressors helps the rich to carry on with-holding tax under the radar of public awareness. Rich evaders are surely more culpable than poor benefit frauds, yet it is the poor who are vilified and whose lives can be ruined by media exposure. The precise extent of benefit fraud must be unknown as so much of it is undetected but it would help a great deal to find out more of how much of it goes on, otherwise the debate is conducted in terms of generalized bar-room prejudices.

Secondly, even if we allow the ‘benefit scrounger’ label is often applied unfairly, can we deny that some basic social values have changed as in consequence of welfare assistance? In October 2010 current affairs presenter John Humphries made a programme for the BBC in which he examined this question. He returned to his own part of Cardiff, Splott, and talked to people who lived in his old working class street. His Dad was a French polisher and his Mum a hairdresser so they were not rich and worked very hard to achieve a basic standard of living. Most of men in
his street did the same apart from one man who chose to live on dole. He was despised for it.

However, this man would not be so criticized today; unemployment does not bear that stigma when so many either are unemployed or have been. This is understandable of course but significantly, in terms of social values, a bastion of self reliance has been removed. Humphries found that other values had changed too. Among the unemployed Humphries interviewed, a general reaction was that they would not consider any employment which did not deliver more than they were receiving on benefits.

One interviewee felt no shame about being unemployed and said if he were to work he’d have to ‘sit down and work out if it were acceptable or not’. Getting an extra 20 or 30 quid for a 40 hour week was not worth it to him when he could be home ‘watching my kids growing up’. Such an attitude would have been unthinkable three or four decades ago. Certainly, the idea that one had a duty to go out and look for work seemed to have faded away but also that one might have to offer something in return for state assistance.

Thirdly, Jones’s book seems to neglect the fact that bad behaviour is… well… bad. Personal experience here: I have stopped going into Manchester city centre at weekends because of the regular proliferation of young lads, hopelessly drunk, careering around the centre of the city in a manner which both repels and alarms. And this is not just a few unrepresentative youths: it’s several hundred of them. I know this is the complaint of a middle-aged, middle-class man but surely it’s still valid and I didn’t feel Jones’s book addresses the fact that this really is a problem. Just because such youths come from poor backgrounds, may well be unemployed and on benefits, does not acquit them of some blame. It is surely understandable that people are angered by such behaviour and inevitable that the media should reflect some of this anger.

Jones’ answer for much of the social problems associated with young white working class males is that good, secure and well paid jobs should be available for them. The problem is that economic reality cannot be so accommodating. As we live in a capitalist economy, we have to accept its requirements and vicissitudes. Now it could be there is a better model available out there but so far it’s not surfaced and that is, in any case, a wholly different discussion.

I should say that Chavs is much more than a book about the demonization of the working classes. It broadens out into a fundamental critique of the way in which the economy is run, rewards distributed disproportionately to the already well-off and opportunities ‘rigged’ to favour their children as well. Jones charts how, in his opinion, the fight was knocked out of the labour movement by Thatcher and was compounded by New Labour which merely accepted her fait accompli as an acceptable settlement.

Blair and Brown then succeeded in alienating the very people for whose advantage their party was originally set up while the Coalition is intent upon advancing the work of their hallowed heroine of the 1980s. The working class had suffered huge depredations in terms of their well being when the manufacturing jobs were destroyed during Thatcher’s era, argues Jones. The defeat of the miners 1984-5 was a catastrophe for working class political power- the unions have never recovered from it. The impoverished communities, mostly in the north, suffered greatly. Some new jobs did eventually arrive but they were often poorly paid and insecure in retail or call centres, lacking the same standards of pay, security of employment and status in the community.

Do we have a class war? Certainly we have class differences, more accentuated than ever before, with a tiny elite of very rich people, a substantial number of ‘middle income’ people and a great swath of people on very low wages, lacking the political muscle to improve their economic framework within which they live and work. Whatever political initiatives taken on behalf of the working class has been easily dealt with by governments- Tory and New Labour- hostile to any threats to status quo levels of business prosperity.

Jones makes an excellent case and that the demonization of the working class is just one aspect of ongoing class conflict.

Jones interviewed a wide range of practising politicians, political aides, journalists academics as well as many working class people all over the country. This is an impressively researched and important piece of contemporary journalism in an area long neglected. Serious critiques and arguments about future directions for the left have not been abundantly available in recent years: this is one worthy of the late Paul Foot at his best. Bill Jones, Liverpool Hope University

See also John Humphries, ‘Shameless Britain’, Sun-
day Times, 23rd October, 2010
ABSTRACTS


This article assesses party effects on the performance of public services. A policy-seeking model, hypothesizing that left and right party control affects performance, and an instrumental model, where all parties strive to raise performance, are presented. The framework also suggests a mixed model in which party effects are contingent on party competition, with parties raising performance as increasing party competition places their control of government at increasing risk. These models are tested against panel data on English local governments’ party control and public service performance. The results question the traditional account of right and left parties, showing a positive relationship between right-wing party control and performance that is contingent on a sufficiently high level of party competition. The findings suggest left-right models should be reformed for the contemporary context.

Robert Johns, Lyn Bennie, & James Mitchell, “Gendered Nationalism: The Gender Gap in support for the Scottish National Party,” Party Politics (Vol. 18, No. 4, July 2012), pp. 581-601. Recent major surveys of the Scottish electorate and of the Scottish National Party (SNP) members have revealed a distinct gender gap in support for the party. Men are markedly more likely than women to vote for the SNP and they comprise more than two-thirds of its membership. In this article, we use data from those surveys to test various possible explanations for the disproportionately male support for the SNP. While popular accounts have focused on the gendered appeal of recent leaders and on the party’s fluctuating efforts at achieving gender equality in its parliamentary representation, we find much stronger for a different explanation. Women are less inclined to support and join the SNP because they are markedly less supportive of its central objective of independence for Scotland. Since men and women barely differ in their reported national identities, the origins of this gender gap in support for independence presents a puzzle for further research.


Parties often have to campaign for two or more levels of office at the same time. However, declining levels of organization means that the demands of concurrent elections can potentially increase the demands on voluntary party organizations considerably. These demands are multiplied by the concurrent use of different electoral systems which provide party organizations with different incentives. The article examines how party organizations deal with such circumstances through a study of constituency party organizations in the 2007 Scottish parliamentary and local government elections. Parties were forced to campaign concurrently at three levels—local council, Scottish Parliament and regional list—under two different electoral systems, STV (single-transferable vote) and MMP (mixed-member proportional). I argue that there may be economies of scale for party organizations in fighting concurrent elections; while there may be evidence of vote-maximization activity at each level, local organizations are likely to give priority to their efforts toward higher level institutions and those on which their efforts potentially have a direct effect; and that the degree of local campaign effort is mediated by the extent of party organization and previous success in the area concerned.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ian McLean, What’s Wrong with the British Constitution? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.), x & 384 pp., Cl. $95.00.

At one time about the only books on the British constitution were written by people in public law, and following that tradition they tended to be highly technical. Over the last two decades, though, political scientists have broadened their interest to include the constitution, and the result has been a number of informative books on the subject. Ian McLean’s new contribution is one of the, if not the,
best of the lot. It combines enlightening history, careful empirical analysis, and provocative prescriptions. He utilizes public choice theory’s framework of veto players and win sets alongside Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments” to organize much of the material, but this is done judiciously rather than slavishly.

Two central theses drive most of the book. One is that the Treaty of Union of 1707 did not absorb Scotland into an expanded English political system, but rather created a new political entity. Viewing the British constitution in this way sheds important light on how the terms of the treaty have been altered, and how any future changes should proceed.

Equally important, McLean argues that the philosophical base of the British political order is popular sovereignty. This means that we must largely discard Dicey’s version of parliamentary sovereignty. In fact, four important chapters discuss the constitutional crisis of 1909-1914 regarding Home Rule, and Dicey’s role in it, demonstrating the inadequacies and contradictions of the whole concept. Many modern versions of constitutional theory (of the left and right, but most prominently the former) have married Dicey to democracy by arguing that Parliament is elected. McLean points out with some force that only one of the three elements of Parliament is elected and that that fact has not been inconsequential. It was decidedly not inconsequential during the Home Rule crisis. Then, the Opposition in the House of Commons, the majority in the House of Lords, the king, and certain rebellious elements in the army combined to effectively block the Government’s policy. Dicey, in fact, allied himself with this faction and argued that the Government should not proceed with Home Rule without either another election (even after that of 1910) fought exclusively on Home Rule or a national referendum. Either proposition, of course, undermines his purported theory of parliamentary sovereignty. Even today, with all the modifications due to the Parliament Acts and the erosion of the permanent Conservative majority in the House of Lords, during the waning days of a Parliament especially votes in the Lords are not inconsequential.

Subsequent chapters take up devolution, the EU, human rights, the proper makeup and role of an upper house, the monarchy, and the established church. Throughout, a number of intriguing comparisons are drawn to other countries, especially the United States and Australia. As long as the UK has asymmetrical devolution, he contends that an answer to the West Lothian Question is not to reduce the voting powers of Scottish or Welsh MPs but to reduce their number. He believes that Britain should remain in the EU, but that the constitutional consequences of this be given much more attention. On human rights, he advocates that the country adopt the wording of the US first amendment accompanied by weak judicial review, that is, along the lines of the current Human Rights Act 1998 and its certificates of incompatibility. A mostly if not entirely elected upper house should complement the House of Commons, as he believes that a unicameral legislature chosen by FPTP would pose too much danger since it could fall into the hands of an ideologically driven majority supported by only a minority of the electorate. The election system for this revised upper house should be some version of PR. The monarchy should be replaced by an elected head of state, the election to be accomplished by some system which would allow the Condorcet result (the winner to prevail in any pairwise contest). Usefully too, abolition of the monarchy would serve to place the royal prerogative under better parliamentary control. Finally, an established church cannot be justified, especially as the current established church is only established in one component of the country.

In an ideal world, he would like to see a constitutional convention called, following US and Australian precedents; however, he realizes this is not in the cards. Therefore, he proposes that certain statutes be designated “constitutional statutes” and entrenched. The courts have already taken it upon themselves to label certain statutes in this fashion (and not subject therefore to implied repeal), but he finds the process needs to be much more democratic. This is where he follows Ackerman, who has argued that the US has faced three “constitutional moments” and that during those periods constitutional change can be accomplished outside the formal amending process, as in the New Deal. The UK is now in the midst of such a constitutional moment and should use it to set certain constitutional ground rules. This can best be done by Parliament itself compiling a list of constitutional statutes.

Here I have only been able to scratch the surface of this wise and thoughtful book that deserves careful attention from students of both British politics and comparative constitutions. Jerold Waltman, Baylor University
I recall being in Chicago in the mid 1980s to deliver a paper to a BPG panel at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. The central question of my paper was why British union members had abandoned the Labour Party for Mrs. Thatcher’s Tories, thereby ushering in a period of neoliberal and anti-union rule. Killing time between panels by window shopping along Michigan Avenue, I saw a t-shirt which to this day I deeply regret not buying. On it was a picture of a youthful and radiantly beaming Elvis Presley. Beneath the King, displayed in all his resplendent glory, was the caption: “I’m still dead.” The book under review here is a bit like that t-shirt. It reminds me that almost 30 years later, as a political force in both Britain and America, the left is still dead too. It seems that nothing, not even a severe capitalist crisis, has revived it. This paradox lies at the center of the meaning of the 2008 crash.

The Legacy of the Crash is a compilation of 12 original essays on various aspects of the financial crisis of 2008 in Britain and America. Its editor, Terrence Casey, who contributed an essay as well as writing an introduction and a conclusion that nicely frame the volume’s theoretical issues, is well known to the readers of this Quarterly as the Executive Director of the British Politics Group. The essays are informed by two major sets of questions. The first addresses the causes, policy responses, and political impact of the 2008 financial crisis. The second concerns the status of a distinctively Anglo-American model of neoliberal capitalism. These two sets of questions are interrelated. Thus, for instance, several of the contributions, those by Wyn Grant, by David Coates and Kara Dickstein, and by Edward Ashbee, offer analyses of the similarities and differences between British and American policy responses to the crisis. These questions point each of the essays to an important area of ongoing academic research and scholarly debate. Again using the comparison of British and American policy responses as an example, contributors assess the relative weight of factors such as institutional differences between parliamentary and presidential systems, or between unitary and federal ones, or the importance of historically rooted policy cultures pertaining to the role of the state in economic management, or the impact of the ideological positions of governing parties in the two nations. Solidly situated within the mainstream theoretical concerns of the discipline of political science, and representative of various perspectives within the discipline, the essays uniformly offer sound analyses of the crisis and its implications. The resulting volume is a thorough, illuminating, and thoughtful exposition of the crash—one which succeeds in providing both an empirically well-informed and a theoretically rich account of the most important development in contemporary democratic capitalism for generations.

Another question repeatedly posed by The Legacy of the Crash is why, in the face of the most significant capitalist crisis since the Great Depression, there has been virtually no significant political movement offering an alternative to the reigning neoliberal model of Anglo-American capitalism. Like the curious incident in the Sherlock Holmes story of the dog that did not bark in the night, the absence of a viable anti-neoliberal voice in the face of the apparent failure of neoliberalism is quite mysterious indeed. (The volume went to press in the summer of 2011, just a few months before the emergence of the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States. This phenomenon, like the financial crisis of 2008 to which it is a populist reaction, subsequently spread to the United Kingdom. As of the summer of 2012 when this review is being written, it appears that the impact of the movement on the political debate within both countries does not pose a significant challenge to neoliberal dominance.) At the risk of unfairly slighting many excellent contributions to the volume, I would like to spend the remainder of this review concentrating on the enigma of the absconded left. I believe that it lies at the heart of understanding contemporary politics and political science in Britain and America.

The essays in the volume offer four different solutions to the paradox. The first focuses on the prevailing neoliberal orientations of the mass public in both countries. Casey emphasizes the hegemony of neoliberal attitudes in the popular mind, in which the “‘post-war consensus’ was effectively replaced with a ‘neoliberal con-
sensus” (p. 276). Graham Wilson similarly writes of the dominant “individualistic and materialist culture” (p. 136) in both countries, and he goes on to note that the decomposition of the social base of the traditional left has eroded support for programmatic alternatives to neoliberalism. A related explanation, also offered by Casey, lies in the current bankruptcy of Keynesianism because of its past failures to ensure continuous economic growth (pp. 57, 270-72). Third are the constraints that market forces impose upon government economic policy, regardless of the interest or desires of the mass public. This perspective informs the analysis of Coates and Dickstein, and Wilson raises it in his invocation of Lindblom’s discussion of the privileged position of business resulting from politicians’ dependence upon the successful operation of the economy. This forces center-left politicians, writes Wilson, “into an unpopular obligation to prop up capitalism” (p. 127), however personally “distasteful” (p. 129) such pro-business policies are to them. He extends Lindblom’s 1970s analysis by adding globalization to those obdurate realities which place market constraints on Democratic or Labour Party policy makers. And fourth, the “most likely explanation” according to Wilson, is the rhetorical baggage with which both British and American center-left politicians found themselves saddled during the financial crisis. Having dedicated themselves to their respective brands of consensus politics, both Obama and Brown were trapped by past campaign promises into maintaining neoliberal economic programs despite their unpopularity with the electorate.

Needless to say, these explanations can’t all be correct. The first and (perhaps) second hypotheses proceed from the popular embrace of neoliberalism by the mass public, or at least their widespread rejection of any alternative to it. The third and fourth hypotheses, on the other hand, suggest that center-left politicians have bucked the popular mood because of other political calculations. And while there is undoubtedly some truth to each of them, they are all only partly satisfactory. For instance, identifying the popularity of neoliberalism as the determining factor fails to comport with survey evidence showing widespread and continuing mass support for public services (especially those currently or expected to be utilized by respondents personally), progressive taxation, and government regulation of corporate activity deemed to be unfair or dangerous.

The inadequacies of Keynesianism might well account for its rejection by responsible policy makers, but discreditable economic programs have rarely been disqualified as instruments in partisan politics or in the mobilization of popular movements. And the fact is that British and American policy makers did resort to massive government stimulus packages in response to the economic slowdown attendant to the financial crisis. The important point is not that Keynesian techniques of economic management were not adopted (they were), but that the commitment to Keynesianism was not especially “thick.” By this I mean two things. First, policy makers in Britain’s Labour government (until 2010) and America’s Democratic administration (after 2009) were willing to adopt only a temporary fiscal stimulus in response to the emergency situation posed by the economic panic, but not as a long-term growth strategy. And second, the Keynesianism to which they returned was conceived narrowly in terms of fiscal and monetary policy techniques, rather than as a broader political-economic regime that links sustained economic growth with income expansion deriving from rising employment wages and the social wage.

The third explanation for the paradox – that center-left politicians, like all politicians, are constrained by business expectations and market forces – for my money comes closest to getting it right. But it overlooks the fact that the policy preferences of businesses often change over time due to changing circumstances arising inter alia from developments within capitalism itself. For instance, how should we explain the shift in the 1970s from a political-economic regime characterized by the Keynesian Welfare State (as well as state ownership and planning in Britain) in the decades following World War II to the neoliberal regime of today? The occurrence of the former model suggests either that public policy is not necessarily constrained by capitalist imperatives or, more likely, that those imperatives do not always necessitate a neoliberal regime. In addition, Wilson’s addendum that center-left politicians acquiesced to business interests only reluctantly strains credulity: were Bill Clinton and Tony Blair really closet socialists? At
the very least, such a proposition is exceedingly difficult to establish empirically. And the personal preferences of politicians are actually beside the point anyway in the context of the obdurate structural realities faced by the democratic capitalist state.

The final explanation, in which the Brown and Obama administrations were hoisted on their own petard of a prior commitment to the neoliberal consensus politics, ignores that fact that political history is rife with stories of politicians and political parties who have performed dramatic U-turns. In the case of Labour, for instance, Ed Balls who became the shadow chancellor following the party’s defeat in 2010, has advocated a robust “classic Keynesian response” to the crisis and has been highly critical of the cautious approach to economic recovery taken by Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling while they were in office. (Of course, what policy he would pursue in government is another matter.) More to the point, this explanation begs the crucial question: How can one explain the embrace of neoliberal political economy by Democratic and Labour politicians in the first place?

That shift occurred well before the coming of Brown (and even Blair) or Obama (and even Clinton). The transformation of the center-left in both countries—the eclipse of social democracy in Britain and reform liberalism in America, and the acceptance of neoliberalism, even in its less aggressive “Third Way” version—has been going on since the 1970s. The absence of a viable leftist alternative to neoliberalism after 2008 is thus merely a specific instance of a more general and long-term phenomenon. So the reasons for the current vacuum on the left must be sought in the evolution of the Democratic and Labour Parties for a very long time. That story would relate the history of the two parties as they progressively distanced themselves from labor’s struggles and marginalized their leftwing factions. (This, by the way, was the theme of my BPG paper that brought me to Chicago in the mid 1980s.)

To understand this historical trajectory of the center-left in Britain and America requires that we grasp the true nature of neoliberalism. One should not confuse neoliberalism with the Anglo-American model of capitalism generally. It is instead a historically-specific modality of liberal market economics, adopted by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in the 1980s and subsequently promoted, indeed sometimes imposed, throughout the world. And neoliberalism is not merely an economic program—whether conceived narrowly as monetarism, or more broadly as supply-side economics, or more broadly still as the rollback of the state from markets—which replaced Keynesianism. Although it uses economic policy as an instrument, it is rather a political strategy which aims at rebalancing class power within capitalism following the economic crises and social conflicts that marked the exhaustion of the Fordist model of accumulation in the 1970s. That strategy entails the direct and indirect assault on the working class, especially organized labor, and its political allies. As a regime of class power, neoliberalism involves not only governmental economic policies, but also wider processes such as globalization, financialization, deindustrialization, and the structural transformations of corporations. This story has already been told by numerous observers, and its full exposition is beyond the scope of my review. It must suffice here merely to mention the decline in union membership, stagnant real wages despite economic expansion and productivity growth, and dramatic increases in income and wealth inequality over the past 30 years as some of the most obvious outcomes of changing class relations brought about by neoliberalism.

Viewing neoliberalism as a form of class politics helps us to provide more complete answers to the questions which animate The Legacy of the Crash. For instance, as to the causes of the 2008 crash, many of the volume’s contributors correctly see that the financial meltdown was indicative of a systemic crisis in contemporary capitalism based upon the central role of debt. But it is also important to understand why debt has become so crucial to neoliberal capitalist accumulation—as a necessary substitute for declining purchasing power due to stagnant wages and reduced welfare benefits in the neoliberal regime. In addition to maintaining aggregate demand, growing indebtedness both provides an expanding source of profitability to financial corporations and ensures workers’ increased dependence upon market forces. Or as to the responses to the crash, contributors point to the massive bailout of financial capital despite the policy’s widespread unpopularity. But what is missed is that the nature of the capitalist state makes
this intervention inevitable, even in a neoliberal regime. For in many important ways, neoliberalism is not really even liberal, in the sense of diminishing the state. Neoliberalism is a political strategy for constraining the power of labor in both economic and political spheres of social life. To be sure, this has been done largely through the promotion of the discipline of the market and the hollowing out of protections provided by the state. But neoliberalism needs the state to promote the marketization of social activity, and it will rely upon state coercion to do so if necessary. As Andrew Gamble has described Thatcherism’s neoliberalism, it is characterized by both “a free economy and a strong state.” And as to the impact of the crash, contributors correctly note the curious absence of a leftist alternative to neoliberalism. What is important to realize is that this quiescence has been both the intention and the consequence of neoliberalism’s 30 year rule to undermine labor and the left. Only if neoliberalism is seen in conventionally economic terms as a “growth model” can the 2008 crisis be viewed as a failure. As a political strategy in the conduct of class conflict, however, the 2008 crisis has actually furthered the objectives of neoliberalism, in terms of enhancing the power of capital over labor in the distributive struggle. Witness the intensified political pressure for greater austerity (including cuts in public, and largely unionized, employment) and reductions in taxation for the wealthy. Even the bailouts to financial institutions should be seen as a form of upward redistribution.

Understanding the true nature of neoliberalism allows us to better appreciate the book’s central puzzle in a new light. As a political project, neoliberalism did not fail with the 2008 crash, insofar as the crisis has been useful in extending capital’s subsumption of labor under its totalizing discipline. Its economic failure as a “growth model” marked by financial panic and economic contraction has only been an apparent one from the point of view of the neoliberal project, as redistribution upward has continued apace. It should be remembered that the economic downturn of the early 1980s, when the neoliberal regime first gained hegemony in Britain and America, was similarly functional to restructuring class relations and thereby reviving capital accumulation. Even its apparent economic failure has not elicited a significant leftist response precisely because of neoliberalism’s success as a political project. Put differently, the center-left has been quiet after the crash because, having accommodated itself to the hegemonic neoliberal regime, it is no longer a center left. Both the Democratic and Labour Parties now relate to labor as merely one of many special interests rather than as their principal social base.

While providing the key to unlocking the puzzle of the legacy of the crash, little of the book’s analysis employs the conception of neoliberalism as class politics outlined here. This is probably because of the centrality of class conflict in such a conception. Class power is something of a blind spot for much of the discipline of political science. So, ironically, one of the volume’s major strengths, namely its solid grounding in the theoretical concerns of the discipline, may have actually been an obstacle to its successfully dealing with one of its core questions. It is curious that the discipline of political science, which is predicated upon the analytical utility of the concept of “power,” somehow has difficulty in seeing power relations within the economic sphere. This has not always been the case. It is as though the transformation in class relations wrought by the neoliberal regime for the past 30 years in the economic and political realms, has its intellectual counterpart in the academic realm. Like virtually every other field of social and cultural activity in the neoliberal era, institutions of higher education are being penetrated by the ineluctable logic of commodification. Just as the material force of the working class has weakened within neoliberal society, so too has the theoretical force of the concept of “class conflict” weakened within the discourse of the neoliberal university. I suspect that the two phenomena are related to one another. By simultaneously reflecting and furthering the invisibility of class conflict, contemporary political science assumes an ideological cast. It is the nature of ideology that things are hidden in plain sight. For today’s mainstream political science scholarship, the answers to the most important questions about neoliberalism will always be just out of reach. Jeff Freyman, Transylvania University
Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven & London: Yale University, 2012), viii & 308 pp., Index, Bibliography, Abbreviations & Acronyms, Pb., $27.50.

One expects this book will have an extensive readership on both sides of the Atlantic. There are many critics of military intervention in the United Kingdom and even more – both in absolute and proportional numbers in the United States. Ledwidge has an extensive background in security and military matters. Thus, he has the credentials to offer an expert evaluation of the matters he presents in this book.

The empirical details he offers are about the British military’s performance in its operations in Basra, Iraq and Helmond Province in Afghanistan. As for the former, he refutes the generally positive view of British operations in Basra as presented, at least in the American media, when those operations ended. Instead of being successful, he finds that the British, forgetting the experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, did not create a social environment in which law and order were established and sectarian violence was substantially diminished. In Afghanistan, Ledwidge questions whether British forces should have been sent to the sparsely populated Helmond instead of a more populous area.

An implicit and often explicit assumption of some observers was that given the British experience and success in quelling subversive forces in Malaya (now Malaysia) and Northern Ireland, the U.K.’s military would be particularly effective in confronting the challenges posed by Iraq and Afghanistan. American followers of the Vietnam War will recall that the British operations in Malaya were cited as an example that American forces should follow in Vietnam. The difficulty with that suggestion, as was the case for the British in Iraq and Afghanistan is that the main components in Malaya were not on hand in any of the other three nations. Moreover, the British military and civilian leaders from those days were no longer available in the early 21st century.

It is not only the Malaya example that was flawed as a guide to addressing issues in Iraq and Afghanistan, the comparison with Northern Ireland was also defective. There, whatever the differences between the opponents, they spoke the same language and shared many cultural practices. Both of those factors were missing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Helmond, the British practice was to send in a regiment for six months and then replace it with another regiment for six months. This reviewer, who served in Korea during the early 1950s, was surprised to read that since the customary tour of duty in Korea was approximately a year, a tenure that Ledwidge cites approvingly as the American practice in Afghanistan. How troops could become acclimatized to the social and physical environment in six months is puzzling. To prove its competence, the British units customarily waged a major battle with the Taliban during the half-year tour. This served to alienate the civilian population, a consequence that is further aggravated by the failure of British military to learn and accommodate local customs.

Ledwidge finds this British approach relies overwhelmingly on conventional military practices when the goal of British forces should be to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Afghan population. Actually, he finds little recognition that the ultimate goal of NATO efforts should be to leave an Afghan population friendly to the West, or at least not at odds with it.

Chapter 5, “Dereliction of Duty,” details fundamental flaws in British military practices: too many high ranking officers, failure to properly assess training for the top ranks of the British military. One may initially be put off by the physical description of the United Kingdom Defence Academy at Shrivenhan, but that serves as a prelude to describing the indoctrination of the mindset that Ledwidge finds dominates the top ranks of British officers. American readers may be flattered by the comparison Ledwidge makes between the British and American military operations. He finds the British ranks over-heavy in its top ranks – too many officers at the rank of general, compared to earlier times and with current American practice. One result is the difficulty to assign blame when so many share responsibility.

As Ledwidge reports it, the posture of the British top brass in Afghanistan reminds this reviewer of the
attitude of many high ranking British military officers at the outset of World War I, as reported in The War to End All Wars. In other words, in both instances, the perspective of officers in the field may have been appropriate for a previous war, but not the one at hand. This situation is compounded by the fact, that Afghansis, most of whom are illiterate, are well aware of previous British military interventions in Afghanistan, while most British soldiers are unaware of those. Details on this are found in Chapter 3, “Where’s Helmond,” which briefly reviews British military ventures in Afghanistan as far back as 1839, including what Ledwidge calls “the greatest of all British military disasters in the nineteenth century…” (p. 61)

He also criticizes the failure of the UK military to utilize journalistic and academic sources more often and effectively. He finds that often these persons have information and contacts among the indigenous population that are generally more useful than those derived from military intelligence operatives.

In his “Conclusion,” Ledwidge offers three suggestions for improving the British military: First, cut the number of ‘one star’ officers from 500 to 150 across all services. That would still leave them about twice the size of their American equivalent. At the same time, require a more diverse preparation for these ranks: They “should be required to complete a course in basic strategic thought as part of the selection process.” (p. 263) Second, the savings from reducing the number of top grade officers should be used to create “a UK equivalent to the US Advanced Civil Schooling programme. This would allow officers and warrant officers with the potential and the will to do so to get out of their social and intellectual comfort zones and explore new thought in graduate research study in civilian institutions.” (p. 264) As the author notes, this practice has a lengthy history in the United States, as this reviewer can attest, having done doctoral work in the early 1960s with two American Air Force officers. Third, Ledwidge recommends a complete review of the operation of the British military in civil and military contexts.

Ledwidge quotes von Clausewitz often to introduce subtopics, but does not examine the justification for using the military in either theater, especially Iraq. Nor does he address the issue of the cost of these ventures, which, on the American side had grown to 800 billion dollars in Iraq when American forces departed or the 400 billion dollars (and growing) thus far in Afghanistan. No monetary figures are provided for British military costs in either theater.

Readers may want to see an analysis of the Afghan situation from the American perspective. For that this reviewer suggests Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan (New York: Random House, 2011). Like Ledwidge, West has both military and civilian service in defense matters.

Ledwidge’s book is not an easy read and it may be more approving of American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan than one would find through a more comprehensive assessment, such as that of NATO forces in Afghanistan, but Ledwidge raises fundamental issues as to what Western nations can do successfully when intervening with military force in non-Western nations.

[Anthony King is cited often and his publications are in the Bibliography. This is not the BPG’s Tony King of the University of Essex, but another scholar at the University of Exeter.]

T.P. Wolf, Indiana University Southeast

Caroline Morris, Parliamentary Elections, Representation and the Law (Oxford & Portland, OR, 2012), xviii & 177 pp., Table of Cases, Index & Bibliography, Cl. £40.00

This is a primer (pronounced as in ‘prim,’ not ‘prime’) on British parliamentary elections. Emanating from a doctoral thesis, this book is primarily about elections to the British House of Commons, but touches upon several examples from practices in other nations with representative governments.

After setting out the organization of the book, Morris traces the origin of the term, ‘representation,’ going back to its Latin root. She summarizes various views about representation, including those by contemporary scholars such as Anthony Birch, Hannah Pitkin, and Heinz Eulau, as well as the historical icons: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Edmund
Burke. Morris comments on the more recent interpretations of representations, e.g., trustee vs. delegate. She concludes her review of these theories by noting that no one theory is operative at all times today.

Section III of Chapter 2, “The Jurisprudence of Representation,” moves to Britain exclusively, looking at medieval pronouncements and then briefly those of Sir Edward Coke, William Blackstone, and A.V. Dicey before summarizing contemporary rulings by judicial bodies, including the European Court of Justice, and parliament.

Chapter 3, “Candidate Eligibility Laws” reviews the historical and contemporary status of who may serve in elective office in the United Kingdom. As Morris demonstrates these matters are not as simple as generally presented in textbooks on British politics. But, of course in those textbooks, there is no need to set out the arcane facets of these matters.

Chapter 4, “Controverted Elections,” addresses electoral fraud. Non-British readers, especially Americans, are likely to be surprised by the sharp limitations upon British governmental entities to address questions of electoral fraud. At the same time, this issue is current in over two dozen American states in which recent legislation imposes checks on voter identity.

Chapter 5, “Challenging Candidate Selection in the Courts,” moves the issue of fraud a step back, questioning not who won an election but should a particular individual have been permitted to seek the elective offices. Perhaps, ironically, political parties are largely outside the purview of electoral fraud. Morris presents three models of candidate selection, (pp. 109-120) either one of which might be employed to revoke the extra-legal status of political parties. This chapter may well be the most significant in the book since it addresses the shortcomings of British electoral law as it pertains to political parties; an institution that is obviously central to contemporary British politics.

Chapter 6, “Removal from Parliament,” reports the traditional ways of removal, under which Morris includes the Parliamentary Standards Act that grew from the 2009 revelations of misconduct of MPs in financial matters, and closes with other means of responding to undesirable conduct of members, such as blocking or discouraging their re-nomination.

The final chapter, a brief one, suggests changes that might be made to reform electoral law in the United Kingdom. This is a book that scholars of British politics shall want to have at hand at election time in the U. K. T.P. Wolf, Indiana University Southeast

Paul Cairney, Donley T. Studlar & Hadi M. Mamudu, Global Tobacco Control: Power, Policy, Governance and Transfer (New York: Palgrave, 2012), xiii & 284 pp., List of Abbreviations, Index, Bibliography, Cl. $95.00.

As this review is being written, an American Legion post in Indiana has filed a law suit to oppose the recently enacted state law that puts restrictions on smoking. Nearly a half century after the U.S. Surgeon General’s report on the health hazards of smoking, that warning has not proved totally persuasive, at least in parts of the United States,

Unlike what one might anticipate, despite three authors, this book is seamless with none of its chapters attributed to a particular author. They are well qualified to write this volume; the Bibliography lists more than 30 publications written or co-written by them.

Initially, the book demonstrates that tobacco politics belongs within the purview of political science and then its place within public policy, as that domain has evolved. Veteran students of public policy with find some familiar figures, such as E.E. Schattschneider, and Charles Lindblom.

As the text progresses, the key variables are introduced: economically developed nations vs. developing nations, changes in the makeup of policy cliques, strength of tobacco producers vs. health entities, and strength of national health groups compared with international ones.

Popular culture, at least in the western democracies changed during the twentieth century: During the first half, smoking – at least cigarettes – in motion pictures, where male smoking was often seen as manly and eventually, for females as being sophisticated. In the second half of the century, as reports
on the health consequences of smoking were available, attitudes about smoking changed. Restrictions on tobacco use were impeded by misleading ‘research’ reports sponsored by tobacco firms, addiction to tobacco by many citizens, and governmental desire for income from taxes on tobacco – which for some nations was significant.

One might expect that the European Union would provide a uniform policy on this issue. That is only partially true. Data show that restrictions on tobacco use among European nations are most severe in the United Kingdom, followed by Scandinavian countries (non-EU). Germany has consistently been reluctant to restrict tobacco use. The impact of EU regulations in this policy area is seen clearly with the former Iron Curtain nations that have joined the EU. Those nations trail the rest of the EU in imposing controls on tobacco, but those controls are expanding because of EU rules. As in other policy areas, for tobacco usage, the EU has multiple decision-making points.

For members of the British Politics Group the most important part of the book is Chapter 5, “The UK: A Case Study.” This separate treatment is warranted since Great Britain leads the tables in most categories of restricting tobacco use, having first enacted a law in 1908 barring tobacco sales to persons under sixteen. The list of measures that have been imposed on tobacco use runs a full page, containing over 40 measures, all but one enacted since World War Two. Devolution created a complication for application of restrictions in Scotland. That situation is briefly treated (pp. 109-110).

The next chapter addresses the situation in the United States, where, as in the U.K., medical research on the health consequences of smoking, including the impact of second hand smoke, have been instrumental in changing attitudes and creating legal constraints. For this reviewer, there was the long time practice in which a cigarette ration was provided American troops in combat areas. During his tour of duty with the ‘Police Action’ in Korea, members of his unit regularly received several packages of cigarettes, a practice that went back at least to World War Two. This enabled him to be popular since, as a non-smoker, he gave his ration to his buddies. In that situation, no one raised the matter of whether tobacco companies were gaining customers who became addicted from this free smoking experience. Given what has subsequently learned about tobacco firms’ research, one might presume their generosity was not entirely altruistic.

Chapter 7 focuses on tobacco policy in Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand. Of these, Japan has been the slowest to impose restrictions on tobacco usage. This reviewer can attest to the drag on tobacco control in Japan. In his last trip there in 1989, his faculty group was warned beforehand not to be offended or remonstrate if their Japanese hosts smoked readily since non-smoking restrictions in Japan were then far behind those in the United States.

Chapter 8 addresses the developing countries. This is where the impact of tobacco interests, and thus tobacco usage, continues to be most influential. Two African nations, Malawi and Zimbabwe, lead the list of these nations in income from tobacco. This reviewer, who has been to both of those nations, can attest to the prominence of tobacco usage there.

The penultimate chapter is devoted to the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in tobacco control and how that role has evolved, expanding over the decades. It has become much more influential in this policy area.

The concluding chapter reviews the analytic approach used in the book and reviews some alternatives to that. Thus, the authors, as they have throughout the book, remind the reader of the possible flaws in their approach. Given the volume of information in this book, one finds few mechanical flaws. At least one does occur: “Indeed, it is a little over 20 years ago that Baggott’s (1988) study of UK and Norwegian policy sought to explain why the former was such a laggard compared to the former.” (p. 99) [Italics added.]

Although the text is less than 240 pages, the book’s theme is tightly argued with a mountain of parenthetic references as the central thesis is developed. This is not a book for introductory college students. Graduate students and perhaps advanced un-
ndergraduates could handle it. Certainly, for the foreseeable future, this book will be the unquestioned fundamental source to understand or commence new research on global tobacco control and policies that are pertinent to that subject.

The impact of tobacco firms offering misleading information continues as noted in the August 15, 2012 issue of The Times Higher Education whose feature article by Matthew Reisz begins, “Smoke and Mirrors – ‘Agnotology,’ the art of spreading doubt (as pioneered by Big Tobacco) distorts the scepticism of research to obscure the truth.” (p. 30)

Despite the general acceptance of smoking in the early twentieth century, even then there was an indication that smoking could be fatal, as reflected in this World War One ditty, that the reviewer’s father, a WWI veteran used to sing, “Good morning Mr. Zip, Zip, Zip, with your hair cut just as short as mine, Good morning Mr. Zip, Zip, Zip. Say you’re surely looking fine. Oh, it’s ashes to ashes, and it’s dust to dust. If the Camels don’t get you, the Fatimas must.” [For readers too young to recall them, ‘Camels’ and ‘Fatimas’ were cigarette brands of that time.] T.P. Wolf, Indiana University Southeast


One expects that, at least for the short term, courses in contemporary British politics will lean heavily on this book to introduce students to what happened after the Gordon Brown Government left office. Again, in the short run, fresh research on the British government and parliament will likely find this book to be a starting point.

The authorship, as indicated on the cover of this book is a bit misleading: in addition to Hazell and Yong, chapters are written by Eimear O’Casey, Peter Waller, and Brian Walker. The last also co-wrote a chapter with Yong. These three additional persons were each associated with the Constitution Unit in one fashion or another.

This is a remarkable piece of research in that it is based to a considerable degree on interviews with nearly 150 people, including Members of Parliament, Cabinet Members, and civil servants who were serving in or with the new coalition government. Anonymity was assured to all that were interviewed. The research purpose was to discover how the coalition was created and how it operated in its initial 18 months.

Early on, key differences between the customary one-party government and the coalition types found in most parliamentary systems of governance are noted. The text demonstrates that the Conservative-Liberal Democratic Coalition is clearly a ‘special case.’

One chapter is devoted to examining the three documents upon which the Coalition was instituted, noting which elements of those were common to the elections manifestoes of each party and which were not. The Appendix contains the three documents.

That chapter is followed by one that addresses the creation of the Coalition, which notes among other things, that the Liberal Democrats had not prepared ahead of time to be part of a government.

Parts of this book’s content can be found in the media and scholarly publications, but there is no comparable source for the commentary from the extensive interviews. This source fleshes out and in some instances corrects how the media reported the creation and Coalition was created and gives an inside perspective on how it operated in its initial year-and-a-half.

While one might presume in an ideal coalition that Cabinet Offices and other posts would be apportioned somewhat equally between, in this case, the two parties that division of labor was not feasible since the number of Liberal Democrats was so much fewer than that of the Tories. This, clearly, put the Liberal Democrats at a disadvantage.

In a set of case studies, Robert Hazzell examines the fates of Coalition’s constitutional reforms, particularly the Alternative Vote, Reducing the Size of the Commons, Fixed Term Parliaments, The Euro-
pean Union Bill, and British Bill of Rights. The referendum on the first was a disaster for Liberal Democrats.

Peter Waller and Ben Yong offer three case studies: Tuition Fees, National Health Service Reform, and Nuclear Policy. As with the AV issue, tuition fees became a severe setback for the Liberal Democrats. Looking at the issue from the west side of the Atlantic, this reviewer notices that higher education in both the United Kingdom and the United States is confronted with increasingly larger financial costs.

The concluding chapter speculates on the status of the Coalition as when 2015 General Election nears, particularly how each of the two partners will have to adjust their postures to present independent faces to the electorate. This is notably problematic for the Liberal Democrats, which has lost seats in the Commons at by-elections and endured declining support in public opinion polls. Hazell notes the different problems for the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. He also suggests matters that parliament in general should address, as well as those that civil service might (should?) consider.

Following the text are 40 pages of Appendices, which will be helpful to subsequent scholars and perhaps political activists.

Serious follower of British politics will turn to this book frequently. It offers much structure and process about the operation of the British parliament that is not available in any other single source. T.P. Wolf, Indiana University Southeast

Gjert Lage Dyndal, Land Based Air Power or Aircraft Carriers? The Debate about Maritime Air Power in the 1960s (Farnham & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series, 2012), xvii & 212 pp. Appendices, Index & Bibliography, Cl. $114.95

The author is a Lt. Colonel in the Norwegian Air Force and Dean of Academics at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy. He formerly was head of the Maritime Air Power Section at the Royal Norwegian Naval Warfare Centre. He has a Ph. D. from the University of Glasgow. Thus, he is eminently qualified to write about military air force matters.

One could contend that this book is particularly timely since the Chinese have reportedly recently launched an aircraft carrier for which they have, at least at the moment, no airplanes that can use a carrier.

Many studies have been written about postwar British military matters, including inter-service rivalry and the costs of that. This issue was compounded by Britain’s retreat from its empire, accompanied by the Cold War. What is notable about this book is that it is derived largely from materials that were previously classified and thus unavailable to scholars researching this topic.

Dyndal dissects the arguments, including costs, of whether Britain should have a land-based air force or one that relied primarily on aircraft carriers. The argument has been often stated as ‘Carrier Task Force’ vs. ‘Island Strategy’ that occurred during the early 1960s. Initially, the ‘carrier’ forces prevailed under the Conservatives. After the Labour Party was in office, Denis Healy was successful in reversing that decision. But, two new carriers were authorized in 2008.

As noted above, astronomical defense costs are not limited to the United Kingdom. Americans have witnessed similar expensive inter-service rivalries. Even with the end of the Cold War, American defense costs continue to rise, given the unpaid costs of its recent military escapades in the Middle East – the Iraq War costing one trillion dollars and growing while the ongoing Afghanistan War has reached one-half trillion dollars and growing. Not a penny of taxes has been levied for either war. T.P. Wolf, Indiana University Southeast
POT POURRI

Prophetic advice–“The number one rule of politics–don’t invade Afghanistan.” Harold Macmillan

The Prime Minister–“The high belief in the perfection of man is appropriate in a man of the cloth but not in a prime minister.” [James C. Humes, ed., The Wit and Wisdom of Winston Churchill (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994), 76.]

Politics–“Politics is almost as exciting as war and quite as dangerous. In war, you can only be killed once, but in politics many times” [Ibid, p.74.]

When Maggie was young–“She spent evenings on firewatch with her fellow student Margaret Thatcher (then Margaret Roberts), whom she remembered as ‘a plump, neat solemn girl with rosy cheeks, who spoke as if she’d just emerged from an elocution lesson.’ Nina Bawden, politicized by her time as an evacuee in working class Wales, had just joined the University Labour Club, and was shocked that Margaret Roberts had joined the Conservatives. “I told her she and I, with our lower middle-class backgrounds, had been lucky to get to Oxford, and it would be despicable to use our good fortune simply to join the ranks of the privileged. Also, Labour was more fun. And she said, of course at the moment the Labour Club was more fashionable, but that suited her purposes. Unlike me, she said, she wasn’t ‘playing’ at politics. She meant to get into Parliament and there was more chance of being noticed in the Conservative Club just because the other members were dull and stodgy.” [Obituary for Nina Bawden, The Telegraph, August 22, 2012.]

Moon landing and intellectual evaluation–The recent death of Neil Armstrong, the first man on the moon, reminds me of the day that occurred. I was in the U. K. with my family and at 3:00 o’clock that morning, I got our five year old daughter up to watch the landing. She forgot that years ago. What remains in my mind was the manner in which BBC-TV handled the event that evening. The program featured two guests who commented on the event. They were Sammy Davis, Jr., who happened to be in the U. K., and A. J. P. Taylor - hardly of comparable competency in assessing the significance of such an historical happening!

Comparative crime–Social scientists in the U. K. find that the return on bank robberies is about $19,000 per theft. In the U. S., the amount is about $4,000. In the U. K. most robbers are caught by their fourth attempt. The lower ‘compensation’ may explain the declining number of bank robberies in the U. S.

Politicians I–[Carole McKenzie, Quotable Politicians [Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1995], pp. 100-102] 1. “Every politician is emphatically a promising politician.” G.K. Chesterton, The Red Moon of Mars. 2. “When you are abroad you’re a statesman, when you are at home, you’re just a politician.” Harold Macmillan, 1939. 3. “I’ve met Margaret Thatcher and, unfortunately she has a trait of not being able to listen and a trait of being prepared to keep on talking.” Joe Gormley, then president, National Union of Mineworkers, 1980 4. Re the House of Lords –“Five hundred men, ordinary men, chosen accidentally from the unemployed,” David Lloyd George [Ibid, p. 67.]

Resignations - [Carole McKenzie, op. cit. pp. 143-144] 1. “I thought the best thing to do was to settle up these little local difficulties, and then turn to wider vision of the Commonwealth.” Harold Macmillan

2. “As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see the River Tiber, foaming with much blood.” Enoch Powell, speaking of immigration in Birmingham, 1968

Scandal - [Carole McKenzie, op. cit. pp. 148-149] 1. “There is something utterly nauseating about a system of society which pays a harlot 25 times as much as it pays its Prime Ministers, 250 times as much as it pays its Members of Parliament, and 580 times as much as it pays some of its ministers of religion,” Harold Wilson, referring to Christine Keeler, 1963.
2. “The members of our secret service have apparently spent so much time looking under the beds for Communists, they haven’t had time to look in the bed.” Michael Foot, referring to the Profumo scandal

3. “What have you done, cried Christine”
“You’ve wrecked the whole party machine.
“To lie in the bed may be rude,
“But to lie in the House is obscene.”
Doggerel, quoted during the Profumo Affair

Self-knowledge - [Carole McKenzie, op. cit. p. 151]
1. “I am the kind of woman I would run away from.”
Margot Asquith.


Politicians II-

Family ties–David Lloyd George, “(Churchill) would make a drum out of the skin of his mother in order to sound his own praise.” [Ibid, p. 247.]

Around the Celtic Fringe–
Did you know?–Most bagpipes, the instrument most closely associated with Scotland, are made in Pakistan.
Sure plastic!–“Number of plastic spoons Northern Ireland stockpiled as part of a recently declassified plan to prepare for nuclear war: 58,292.” [“Harper’s Index,” Harper’s, (September 2012, p. 13]

Oops!– “I was in a pub last Saturday night, and drank a few and noticed two very large women at the bar. They both had pretty strong accents. So I asked "Hey, are you two ladies from Ireland?"
One of them responded saying, "It's WALES, you fooking idiot!" So, I immediately apologized and said, "I'm sorry, are you two whales from Ireland?" That's pretty much the last thing I remember....

Around the Commonwealth–
Once again unanticipated consequences–In the last 18 months, sex workers in New Zealand have damaged more than 40 street signs that they used as ‘dance poles.’ New Zealand made prostitution legal in 2003.

On the modern Olympics–“The place where most modern sports were standardized was nineteenth century Britain. The Duke of Wellington probably did not really say, ‘The Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton’ (for one thing, he hated Eton) but athletic competition was a prominent feature of British public-school life…. Soon, men were not simply competing with their classmates. …they were training themselves in a sport that was transportable.

“And the great means of transportation was the British Navy. Everywhere Englishmen went, they took their games along and taught them to the locals. The British brought modern tennis to the French. Table tennis, a sport now completely associated with East Asia, is supposed to have started when British officials shaved the corks from their champagne bottles into balls and played the game on the dinner table. It is because of the British that West Indians play cricket, South Africans play rugby and Pakistanis play squash….

“It was from Victorian Britain that the founder of the modern Olympics, Pierre de Coubertin, took his inspiration….

“Around 1890, he heard about the annual event in the town of Much Wenlock, in Shropshire, called the Wenlock Olympian Games. These had been established, in 1850, by a physician named William Penney Brookes, as a means of fortifying British manhood. Coubertin arranged a visit and Brookes mounted a special Wenlock Games for his guest.

“Brookes died in 1895, at the age of eighty-six, less than a year later, Coubertin was finally able to launch, in Athens, the modern Games. He rarely referred to Brookes and his Olympic Games again, but the mascot for this year’s London Games is named Wenlock.

“The modern Games could be international from the start because the /British had spread standardized versions of most of the Olympic sports around the world….. These first Olympic marathons were essen-
tially ‘I’ll race you to the tree’ events. But, at the 1908 Games, held in London, the course was designed to start at Queen Victoria’s statue at Windsor Castle and to finish at the Royal Box in the Olympic stadium. This turned out to be a distance of twenty-six miles, three hundred and eighty-five yards. In 1921, that became the official length of the marathon.”


-----

MEMBERSHIP NEWS

Richard Rose tells all in his forthcoming memoir, Learning about Politics in Time and Space, to be published by ECPR Press.


This high school guy is the only person to be a member of the first two state cross-country championship teams Kansas. At that time, he intended to be a high school coach.
Fall 2012, No. 150

IN THIS ISSUE

Job Opening  Page 2
Editor’s Comments  Page 3
Awards  Page 3
Jobs  Page 4
Announcements  Page 5
Publications  Page 6
Conferences  Page 7
Articles: How Long Does it Take to Have Impact?  Page 7
   By Richard Rose
Review Article: Bill Jones on Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class by Owen Jones  Page 8
Abstracts  Page 13
Book Reviews
   Waltman on What’s Wrong with the British Constitution?  Page 13
   By McLean
   Freyman on The Legacy of the Crash edited by T. Casey  Page 15
   Wolf on Losing Small Wars by Ledwidge;
   Parliamentary Elections, Representation and the Law by Morris;
   Global Tobacco Control by Cairney, Studlar & Mamudu;
   The Politics of Coalition by Hazel & Yong;
   Land Based Air Power or Air Craft Carriers?  Page 21
   By Dyndal
Pot Pourri  Page 25
Membership News  Page 27