A Logical Theory of Coordination and Joint Ability

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Abstract
A team of agents is jointly able to achieve a goal if despite any incomplete knowledge they may have about the world or each other, they still know enough to be able to get to a goal state. Unlike in the single-agent case, the mere existence of a working plan is not enough as there may be several incompatible working plans and the agents may not be able to choose a share that coordinates with the others’. Some formalizations of joint ability ignore this issue of coordination within a coalition. Others, including those based on game theory, deal with coordination, but require a complete specification of agents’ beliefs. Such a complete specification is often not available. Here we present a new formalization of joint ability based on logical entailment in the situation calculus that avoids both of these pitfalls.

Introduction
The coordination of teams of cooperating but autonomous agents is a core problem in multiagent systems research. A team of agents is jointly able to achieve a goal if despite any incomplete knowledge or even false beliefs that they may have about the world or each other, they still know enough to be able to get to a goal state, should they choose to do so. Unlike in the single-agent case, the mere existence of a working plan is not sufficient since there may be several incompatible working plans and the agents may not be able to choose a share that coordinates with the others’.

There is a large body of work in game theory (Osborne & Rubinstein 1999) dealing with coordination and strategic reasoning for agents. The classical game theory framework has been very successful in dealing with many problems in this area. However, a major limitation of the framework is that it assumes there is a complete specification of the structure of the game including the agents’ beliefs. It is also often assumed that this structure is common knowledge among agents. These assumptions often do not hold for team members, let alone for a third party attempting to reason about what the team members can do. Much of the work in the area also assumes that the set of states is finite and the running time of algorithms used to compute optimal strategies generally depends on the size of the state space.

In recent years, there has been a lot of work aimed at developing symbolic logics of games (Pauly 2002; van der Hoek & Wooldridge 2003) so that more incomplete and qualitative specifications can be dealt with. This can also lead to faster algorithms as sets of states that satisfy a property can be abstracted over in reasoning. However, this work has often incorporated very strong assumptions. Many logics of games like Coalition logic (Pauly 2002) and ATEL (van der Hoek & Wooldridge 2003) ignore the issue of coordination within a coalition and assume that the coalition can achieve a goal if there exists a strategy profile that achieves the goal. This is only sufficient if we assume that the agents can communicate arbitrarily to agree on a joint plan/strategy profile. As well, most logics of games are propositional, which limits expressiveness.

In this paper, we develop a new first-order (with some higher-order features) logic framework to model the coordination of coalitions of agents based on the situation calculus (Reiter 2001). Our formalization of joint ability avoids both of the pitfalls mentioned above: it supports reasoning on the basis of very incomplete specifications about the belief states of the team members and it ensures that team members do not have incompatible strategies. The formalization involves iterated elimination of dominated strategies (Osborne & Rubinstein 1999; Brandenburger & Keisler 2001). Each agent compares her strategies based on her private beliefs. Initially, they consider all available strategies possible. Then they eliminate strategies that are not as good as others given their beliefs about what strategies the other agents have kept. This elimination process is repeated until it converges to a set of preferred strategies for each agent. Joint ability holds if all combinations of preferred strategies succeed in achieving the goal.

In the next section, we describe a simple game setup that we use to generate example games, and test our account of joint ability. Then in Section 3, we present our formalization of the notion of joint ability in the situation calculus. In Section 4 and 5, we show some examples of the kind of ability results we can obtain in this logic and how they are proved. This includes examples where we prove that joint ability holds given weak assumptions about the agents. Then in Section 6, we discuss related work, and in Section 7, we summarize our contributions and discuss future work.
A simple game setup

To illustrate our formalization of joint ability, we will employ the following simple setup involving only two agents, $P$ and $Q$, one distinguished fluent $F$, and one distinguished action $A$. For simplicity, we assume that the agents act synchronously and in turn: $P$ acts first and then they alternate. We assume that there is at least one other action $A'$, and possibly more. All actions are public (observed by both agents) and can always be executed. We assume for the purpose of this paper that there are no preestablished conventions that would allow agents to rule out or prefer strategies to others or to use actions as signals for coordination (e.g., similar to those used in the game of bridge). The sorts of goals we will consider will only depend on whether or not the fluent $F$ held initially, whether or not $P$ did action $A$ first, and whether or not $Q$ then did action $A$. Since there are $2 \times 2 \times 2$ options, and since a goal can be satisfied by any subset of these options, there are $2^8 = 256$ possible goals to consider.

This does not mean, however, that there are only 256 possible games. We assume the agents can have beliefs about $F$ and about each other. Since they may have beliefs about the other’s beliefs about their beliefs and so on, there are, in fact, an infinite number of games. At one extreme, we may choose not to stipulate anything about the beliefs of the agents; at the other extreme, we may specify completely what each agent believes. In between, we may specify some beliefs or disbeliefs and leave the rest of their internal state open. For each specification, and for each of the 256 goals, we may ask if the agents are jointly able to achieve it.¹

Example 1: Suppose nothing is specified about the beliefs of $P$ and $Q$. Consider a goal that is satisfied by $P$ doing $A$ and $Q$ not doing $A$ regardless of $F$. In this case, $P$ and $Q$ can jointly achieve the goal, since they do not need to know anything about $F$ or each other to do so. Had we stipulated that $P$ believed that $F$ was true and $Q$ believed that $F$ was false, we would still say that they could achieve the goal despite the false belief that one of them has.

Example 2: Suppose we stipulate that $Q$ knows that $P$ knows whether or not $F$ holds. Consider a goal that is satisfied by $P$ doing $A$ and $Q$ not doing $A$ if $F$ is true and $P$ not doing $A$ and $Q$ doing $A$ if $F$ is false. In this case, the two agents can achieve the goal: $P$ will do the right thing since he knows whether $F$ is true; $Q$ will then do the opposite of $P$ since he knows that $P$ knows what to do. The action of $P$ in this case behaves like a signal to $Q$. Interestingly, if we merely require $Q$ to believe that $P$ knows whether or not $F$ holds, then even if this belief is true, it would not be sufficient to imply joint ability (specifically, in the case where it is true for the wrong reason; we will return to this).

Example 3: Suppose again we stipulate that $Q$ knows that $P$ knows whether or not $F$ holds. Consider a goal that is satisfied by $P$ doing anything and $Q$ not doing $A$ if $F$ is true and $P$ doing anything and $Q$ doing $A$ if $F$ is false. In a sense this is a goal that is easier to achieve than the one in Example 2, since it does not require any specific action from $P$. Yet, in this case, it would not follow that they can achieve the goal. Had we additionally stipulated that $Q$ did not know whether $F$ held, we could be more definite and say that they definitely cannot jointly achieve this goal as there is nothing $P$ can do to help $Q$ figure out what to do.

Example 4: Suppose again we stipulate that $Q$ knows that $P$ knows whether or not $F$ holds. Consider a goal that is like in Example 3 but easier, in that it also holds if both agents do not do $A$ when $F$ is false. In this case, they can achieve the goal. The reason, however, is quite subtle and depends on looking at the various cases according to what $P$ and $Q$ believe. Similar to Example 2, requiring $Q$ to have true belief about $F$ knowing whether $F$ holds is not sufficient.

To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing formal account where examples like these and their variants can be formulated. We will return to this in the discussion of related work. In the next section, we present a formalization based on entailment in the situation calculus.

The formal framework

The basis of our framework for joint ability is the situation calculus (McCarthy & Hayes 1969; Levesque, Pirri, & Reiter 1998). The situation calculus is a predicate calculus language for representing dynamically changing domains. A situation represents a possible state of the domain. There is a set of initial situations corresponding to the ways the domain might be initially. The actual initial state of the domain is represented by the distinguished initial situation constant, $S_0$. The term $do(a,s)$ denotes the unique situation that results from an agent doing action $a$ in situation $s$. Initial situations are defined as those that do not have a predecessor: $Init(s) = \neg \exists a \exists s'. s = do(a,s')$. In general, the situations can be structured into a set of trees, where the root of each tree is an initial situation and the arcs are actions. The formula $s \sqsubseteq s'$ is used to state that there is a path from situation $s$ to situation $s'$. Our account of joint ability will require some second-order features of the situation calculus, including quantifying over certain functions from situations to actions, that we call strategies.

Predicates and functions whose values may change from situation to situation (and whose last argument is a situation) are called fluents. The effects of actions on fluents are defined using successor state axioms (Reiter 2001), which provide a succinct representation for both effect axioms and frame axioms (McCarthy & Hayes 1969). To axiomatize a dynamic domain in the situation calculus, we use Reiter’s (Reiter 2001) action theory, which consists of (1) successor state axioms; (2) initial state axioms, which describe the initial states of the domain including the initial beliefs of the agents; (3) precondition axioms, which specify the conditions under which each action can be executed (we assume here that all actions are always possible); (4) unique names axioms for the actions, and (5) domain-independent foundational axioms (we adopt the ones given in (Levesque, Pirri, & Reiter 1998) which accommodate multiple initial situations, but we do not describe them further here).

For our examples, we only need three fluents: the fluent $F$ mentioned in the previous section in terms of which goals are formulated, a fluent turn which says whose turn it is to act, and a fluent $B$ to deal with the beliefs of the agents.

¹We may also ask whether the agents believe or mutually believe that they have joint ability, but we defer this to later.
Moore (Moore 1985) defined a possible-worlds semantics for a logic of knowledge in the situation calculus by treating situations as possible worlds. Scherl and Levesque (Scherl & Levesque 2003) adapted this to Reiter’s theory of action and gave a successor state axiom for B that states how actions, including sensing actions, affect knowledge. Shapiro et al. (Shapiro, Leperséance, & Levesque 1998) adapted this to handle the beliefs of multiple agents, and we adopt their account here. B(x, s’, s) will be used to denote that in situation s, agent x thinks that situation s’ might be the actual situation. Note that the order of the situation arguments is reversed from the convention in modal logic for accessibility relations. Belief is then defined as an abbreviation: \[ Bel(x, φ[now], s) \equiv ∀s'. B(x, s', s) ⊃ φ[s']. \]

We will also use \[ TBel(x, φ[now], s) \equiv Bel(x, φ[now], s) ∧ φ[s] \]

as an abbreviation for true belief (which we distinguish from knowledge formalized as a KT45 operator, for reasons alluded to above in Example 2).

Our examples use the following successor state axioms:

- \[ F(do(a, s)) \equiv F(s). \]
The fluent F is unaffected by any action.
- \[ turn(do(a, s)) = x \equiv x = P ∧ turn(s) = Q \lor x = Q ∧ turn(s) = P. \]
  Whose turn it is to act alternates between P and Q.
- \[ B(x, s', do(a, s)) \equiv ∃s''. B(x, s'', s) ∧ s' = do(a, s''). \]
  This is a simplified version of the successor state axiom proposed by Scherl and Levesque. It is appropriate when actions have no preconditions, when there are no sensing actions, and all actions are public to all agents.

The examples also include the following initial state axioms:

- \[ Init(s) ⊃ turn(s) = P. \]
  So, agent P gets to act first.
- \[ Init(s) ∧ B(x, s', s) ⊃ Init(s'). \]
  Each agent initially knows that it is in an initial situation.
- \[ Init(s) ⊃ ∃s' B(x, s', s). \]
  Each agent initially has consistent beliefs.
- \[ Init(s) ∧ B(x, s', s) ⊃ ∃s''. B(x, s'', s') ≡ B(x, s'', s). \]
  Each agent initially has introspection of her beliefs.

The last two properties of belief can be shown to hold for all situations using the successor state axiom for B so that belief satisfies the modal system KD45 (Chellas 1980). In addition, since the axioms above are universally quantified, they are known to all agents, and in fact are common knowledge.\(^3\) We will let \(Σ_e\) denote the action theory containing the successor and initial state axioms above. All the examples in Section 4 will use \(Σ_e\) with additional conditions.

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\(^2\)Free variables are assumed to be universally quantified from outside. If φ is a formula with a single free situation variable, φ[t] denotes φ with that variable replaced by situation term t. Instead of φ[now] we occasionally omit the situation argument completely.

\(^3\)Common knowledge is to knowledge what mutual belief is to belief.

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**Our definition of joint ability**

We assume there are N agents named 1 to N. We use the following abbreviations for representing strategy profiles:

- A vector of size N is used to denote a complete strategy profile, e.g. \(σ_1, σ_2, \ldots, σ_n\).
- \(σ_π\) represents an incomplete profile with strategies for every agent except player i, i.e. \(σ_1, \ldots, σ_{i-1}, σ_{i+1} \ldots, σ_N\).
- \(σ_i\) is used to insert a strategy for player i into an incomplete profile: \(σ_π ⊕ σ_i : σ_1, \ldots, σ_{i-1}, σ_i, σ_{i+1} \ldots, σ_N\).
- \(ι_i\) is used to substitute the ith player’s strategy in a complete profile: \(σ_π[ι_i : σ_i] : σ_1, \ldots, σ_{i-1}, σ_i, σ_{i+1} \ldots, σ_N\).

All of the definitions below are abbreviations for formulas in the language of the situation calculus presented above. The joint ability of N agents trying to achieve a common goal \(Goal\) is defined as follows: \(^5\)

\[ JCan(σ) \equiv \forall σ_i. [\bigwedge_{i=1}^N Pref(i, σ_i, s)] ⊃ Works(σ, s). \]

Agents 1 · · · N can jointly achieve the goal iff all combinations of their preferred strategies work together.

\[ Works(σ, s) \equiv ∃s′′, s ≺ s′′ ∧ Goal[s′′] ∧ ∀s′, s ≺ s′′ ⊃ \bigwedge_{i=1}^N (turn(s′) = i ⊃ do(σ_i(s′), s′) ⊆ s′′). \]

Strategy profile σ works if there is a future situation where Goal holds and the strategies prescribe the actions to get there according to whose turn it is.

\[ Pref(i, σ_i, s) \equiv ∀n. Keep(i, n, σ_i, s) \]

Agent i prefers strategy σ_i if it is kept for all levels n.\(^7\)

**Keep** is defined inductively: \(^8\)

- \(Keep(i, 0, σ_i, s) \equiv Strategy(i, σ_i). \)
  At level 0, all strategies are kept.
- \(Keep(i, n + 1, σ_i, s) \equiv Keep(i, n, σ_i, s) ∧ ¬∃σ_i', Keep(i, n, σ_i', s) ∧ GTE(i, n, σ_i', s, σ_i, s) \land ¬GTE(i, n, σ_i', s, σ_i, s). \)
  For each agent i, the strategies kept at level n + 1 are those kept at level n for which there is not a better one (σ_i’ is better than σ_i if it is as good as, i.e. greater than or equal to, σ_i while σ_i is not as good as it).

**Strategy** is defined over functions from situations to actions such that the required action is known to the agent whenever it is the agent’s turn to act.

\(^4\)Strictly speaking, the σ_i’s are second-order variables ranging over functions from situations to actions. We use Strategy(i, σ_i) to restrict them to valid strategies.

\(^5\)All definitions are w.r.t. to this goal. To avoid clutter, the Goal argument has been removed from all definitions.

\(^6\)Section 6 generalizes these definitions to the case where some of the agents are outside of the coalition.

\(^7\)The quantification is over the sort natural number.

\(^8\)Strictly speaking, the definition we propose here is ill-formed. We want to use it with the second argument universally quantified (as in Pref). Keep and GTE actually need to be defined using second-order logic, from which the definitions here emerge as consequences. We omit the details for space reasons.
As we mentioned, for each of the 256 possible goals we can use a second-order definition.

Strategy $\sigma_i$ is as good as (Greater Than or Equal to) $\sigma_i'$ for agent $i$ if $i$ believes that whenever $\sigma_i'$ works with strategies kept by the rest of the agents so does $\sigma_i$.

These formulas define joint ability in a way that resembles the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies of game theory (Osborne & Rubinstein 1999) (see Section 6). As we will see in the examples next, the mere existence of a working strategy profile is not enough; the definition requires coordination among the agents in that all preferred strategies must work together.

**Formalizing the examples**

As we mentioned, for each of the 256 possible goals we can consider various assumptions about agents’ beliefs. In this Section, we provide theorems for the goals of the four examples mentioned in Section 2. Due to lack of space we omit the proofs. Since there are only two agents, the previous definitions can be simplified. For better exposition, we use $g$ (possibly superscripted) to refer to strategies of agent 1 (hereafter called $P$) and $h$ for those of agent 2 (called $Q$).

**Example 1**

For this example, the goal is defined as follows:

\[ \text{Goal}(s) \equiv \exists s'. \text{Init}(s') \land \forall a. a \neq A \land s = \text{do}(a, \text{do}(A, s')) \]

Note that the goal in this example (and other examples) is satisfied only in situations resulting from doing a sequence of two actions starting from an initial situation. Therefore, using axioms of the situation calculus, we can prove that $\text{Works}(g, h, s)$ depends only on the first action prescribed by $g$ and the action prescribed by $h$ in response to that action:

Therefore, we have the following:

**Lemma 1** $\Sigma_e \models \text{Works}(g, h, s) \equiv \text{Init}(s) \land g(s) = A \land h(\text{do}(A, s)) \neq A$.

**Theorem 1** $\Sigma_e \models \text{Init}(s) \supset \text{JCan}(s)$

We can then easily show that the agents can achieve the goal despite having false beliefs about $F$ (see corollary 3):

**Corollary 1** $\Sigma_e \models [\text{Init}(s) \land \text{Bel}(F, \neg F, s) \land \text{Bel}(Q, F, s)] \supset \text{JCan}(s)$.

We can also trivially show that the agents have mutual belief that joint ability holds (again see corollary 3):

**Corollary 2** $\Sigma_e \models \text{Init}(s) \supset \text{MBel}(\text{JCan}(\text{now}), s)$.

**Example 2**

For this example, the goal is defined as follows:

\[ \text{Goal}(s) \equiv \exists s', a. \text{Init}(s') \land a \neq A \land [F(s') \land s = \text{do}(a, \text{do}(A, s')) \lor \neg F(s') \land s = \text{do}(A, \text{do}(a, s'))] \]

**Lemma 2** $\Sigma_e \models \text{Init}(s) \land [F(s) \land g(s) = A \land h(\text{do}(A, s)) \neq A \lor \neg F(s) \land g(s) \neq A \land h(\text{do}(g(s), s)) = A]$.\footnote{\text{MBel} is mutual belief among the agents and can be defined either as a fix-point or by introducing a new accessibility relation using a second-order definition.}

For the rest of the examples, the following definitions will be useful in presenting the proofs:

- $\text{BW}(x, \phi, s) \equiv \text{Bel}(x, \phi, s) \lor \text{Bel}(x, \neg \phi, s)$ the agent believes whether $\phi$ holds.
- $\text{TBW}(x, \phi, s) \equiv \text{TBel}(x, \phi, s) \lor \text{TBel}(x, \neg \phi, s)$.

As mentioned in Section 2, $Q$’s having true belief about $P$ truly believing whether $F$ is not sufficient for joint ability. This is because $\text{TBel}(Q, \text{TBW}(P, F, \text{now}), s)$ does not preclude $Q$ having a false belief about $P$, e.g. $F(s) \land \text{Bel}(P, F, s) \land \text{Bel}(Q, \text{Bel}(P, \neg F, \text{now}), s)$ being true.

**Theorem 2** $\Sigma_e \cup \{\text{TBel}(Q, \text{TBW}(P, F, \text{now}), S0)\} \not\models \text{JCan}(S0)$.

To ensure we are dealing with knowledge and not merely true belief, we can simply add the reflexivity axiom to the initial axioms (i.e. $\forall s. \text{Init}(s) \supset B(x, s)$) which results in a KT45 modal logic (Chellas 1980). Another approach is to remain in the KD45 logic but assert that $Q$’s belief about $P$’s belief of $F$ is correct:

\[ \text{BTB}(Q, P, F, s) \equiv \\
[\text{Bel}(Q, \text{TBW}(P, F, \text{now}), s) \land \text{TBel}(P, F, s)] \land \\
[\text{Bel}(Q, \text{TBW}(P, \neg F, \text{now}), s) \land \text{TBel}(P, \neg F, s)] \]

To keep our framework as general as possible, we take the second approach and add $\text{BTB}(Q, P, F, s)$ whenever needed. With this, we have the following theorem:

**Theorem 3** $\Sigma_e \models [\text{Init}(s) \land \text{BTB}(Q, P, F, s) \land \\
\text{TBel}(Q, \text{TBW}(F, \text{now}), s)] \supset \text{JCan}(s)$.

It follows from the theorem that if we include reflexivity axioms for the belief accessibility relations, $Q$’s knowing that $P$ knows whether $F$ holds is sufficient to get joint ability. More interestingly, it follows immediately that common knowledge of the fact that $P$ knows whether $F$ holds implies common knowledge of joint ability (using corollary 3).

**Example 3**

As mentioned earlier, the goal for this example is easier to satisfy than the one in Example 2:

\[ \text{Goal}(s) \equiv \exists s', a, b. \text{Init}(s') \land \\
[F(s') \land b \neq A \land s = \text{do}(b, \text{do}(a, s')) \lor \\
\neg F(s') \land b = A \land s = \text{do}(b, \text{do}(a, s'))] \]

**Lemma 3** $\Sigma_e \models \text{Works}(g, h, s) \equiv \text{Init}(s) \land [F(s) \land h(\text{do}(g(s), s)) = A \land h(\text{do}(g(s), s)) = A]$.

Nonetheless, we can prove that, unlike in Example 2, from $Q$ knowing that $P$ knows whether $F$ holds, it does not follow that the agents can achieve the goal.

**Theorem 4** $\Sigma_e \not\models [\text{Init}(s) \land \text{TBW}(Q, F, s) \land \\
\text{TBW}(Q, \text{TBW}(P, F, \text{now}), s)] \supset \text{JCan}(s)$.

Note the reason they cannot achieve the goal is not because no promising joint plan exists. Quite the opposite, it is the existence of at least two incompatible preferred joint plans that results in the lack of ability. We can prove that if $Q$ truly believes whether $F$ holds they can achieve the goal.

**Theorem 5** $\Sigma_e \models \text{Init}(s) \land \text{TBW}(Q, F, s) \supset \text{JCan}(s)$. 
Example 4
The goal here is easier than in Examples 2 and 3:
\[
\text{Goal}(s) = \exists a, b, \text{Init}(s') \land \{ F(s') \land (F(s) \land h(\text{do}(b, s')) \lor \neg F(s) \land [s = \text{do}(a, \text{do}(a, s')) \lor \neg A \land s = \text{do}(a, \text{do}(b, s'))] \}.
\]
This goal gives rise to the following lemma:

**Lemma 4** \( \Sigma_e \models \text{Works}(g, h, s) \equiv \text{Init}(s) \land (F(s) \land h(\text{do}(a(g), s)))\land \neg F(s) \land [g(s) \neq A \land h(\text{do}(g(s), s)) = A] \).

Similarly to Example 2, we show that if \( Q \) has true belief about \( P \) truly believing whether \( F \) holds, then assuming \( BTBel(Q, P, F, s) \), the agents can achieve the goal:

**Theorem 6** \( \Sigma_e \models \text{Init}(s) \land BTBel(Q, P, F, s) \land \text{JCan}(Q, \text{TBW}(P, F, now), s) \supset \text{JCan}(s) \).

It follows that \( Q \)'s knowing that \( P \) knows whether \( F \) holds is sufficient to joint ability. More interestingly, common knowledge of the fact that \( P \) knows whether \( F \) holds implies common knowledge of joint ability even though \( Q \) may still have incomplete or false belief about \( F \) (see corollary 3).

**Properties of the definition**
In this section, we present several properties of our proposed definition to show its plausibility. Let \( \Sigma \) be an arbitrary action theory describing a system with \( N \) agents with a \( K \)D45 logic of belief and a background goal \text{Goal}.

Our definition of ability is quite general and can be nested within beliefs. For example, we might consider cases where agents believe that joint ability holds while it is false in the real world. The following corollary can be used to prove various subjective properties about joint ability:

**Corollary 3** Let \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) be arbitrary formulas with free situation variable \( s \).

**Theorem 8** \( \exists \Sigma \) such that \( \Sigma \land \{ \exists i, \forall \sigma_i. \text{Works}(\sigma_i, \oplus_i, \sigma_i, S) \} \not\equiv \text{JCan}(S) \).

Another simple case where joint ability holds is when there exists a strategy profile that every agent truly believes works, and moreover everyone believes it is impossible to achieve the goal if someone deviates from this profile:

**Theorem 9** \( \exists \Sigma \) such that \( \exists \Sigma. \text{ETBel}(\text{Works}(\sigma, now), s) \land \forall \delta \neq \sigma. \text{EBel}(\neg \text{Works}(\delta, now), s) \supset \text{JCan}(s) \).

It turns out that joint ability can be proved from weaker conditions. In particular, instead of \( \text{ETBel}(\text{Works}(\sigma, now), s) \), it is sufficient to have both \( \text{Works}(\sigma, s) \) and \( \neg \text{Bel}(i, \neg \text{Works}(\sigma, now), s) \) for each agent \( i \), i.e. \( \text{Works}(\sigma) \) is consistent with every agent’s beliefs. Also, it is worth noting that even if there are several (incompatible) working profiles in the real world, the agents will prefer \( \sigma \) (due to their wrong beliefs) and achieve the goal.

We can generalize the result in theorem 9 if we assume there exists a strategy profile that is known by everyone to achieve the goal. Then, it is sufficient for every agent to know that there are the only profile in the real world at least as good as any other available strategy to them, for \( \text{JCan} \) to hold:

**Theorem 10** \( \Sigma \models \{ \forall s'. \text{Init}(s') \supset \bigwedge_{i=1}^N B(i, s', s') \land \exists \sigma. \text{EBel}(\text{Works}(\sigma, now), s) \land \forall \delta. \bigwedge_{i=1}^N \neg \text{Bel}(i, \text{Works}(\delta, now), s) \supset \text{JCan}(s) \).

Another important property of joint ability is that it is non-monotonic w.r.t. the goal. Unlike in the single agent case, it might be the case that a team is able to achieve a strong goal while it is unable to achieve a weaker one (The goals in examples 3 and 4 of Section 4 are an instance of this):

**Theorem 11** Let \( \text{JCan}_{c2}(s) \) be joint ability w.r.t. to background goal \( G \). Then there are theories \( \Sigma' \) such that \( \Sigma' \cup \{ \forall s. G_1(s) \supset G_2(s) \} \cup \{ \text{JCan}_{c1}(S) \} \not\equiv \text{JCan}_{c2}(S) \).

**Discussion and related work**

The definition of joint ability in Section 3.1 is w.r.t. \( N \) agents all trying to achieve a common goal. It can be straightforwardly generalized to allow some agents to be outside of the coalition. Let \( C \) be a coalition (i.e. a subset of agents \( \{1, \ldots, N\} \)). Since each agent \( j \notin C \) might conceivably choose any of her strategies, agents inside the coalition \( C \) must coordinate to make sure their choices achieve the goal regardless of the choices of agents outside \( C \). It turns out that a very slight modification to the definition of \text{Keep} is sufficient for this purpose. In particular, the definition of \text{Keep} for agents inside \( C \) remains unchanged while for every agent \( j \notin C \), we define \( \text{Keep}(j, n, \sigma_j, s) \equiv \text{Strategy}(j, \sigma_j) \).

Therefore, for every agent \( j \) outside the coalition we have \( \text{Pref}(j, \sigma_j, s) \equiv \text{Strategy}(j, \sigma_j) \).

As mentioned in Section 1, there has been much recent work on developing symbolic logics of cooperation. In (Wooldridge & Jennings 1999) the authors propose a model of cooperative problem solving and define joint ability by simply adapting the definition of single-agent ability,

\[ EBel(\phi, s) \triangleq \bigwedge_{i=1}^N \text{Bel}(i, \phi, s) \]
i.e. they take the existence of a joint plan that the agents mutually believe achieves the goal as sufficient for joint ability. They address coordination in the plan formation phase where agents negotiate to agree on a promising plan before starting to act. Coalition logic, introduced in (Pauly 2002), formalizes reasoning about the power of coalitions in strategic settings. It has modal operators corresponding to a coalition being able to enforce various outcomes. The framework is propositional and also ignores the issue of coordination inside the coalition. In a similar vein, van der Hoek and Wooldridge propose ATEL, a variant of alternating-time temporal logic enriched with epistemic relations in (van der Hoek & Wooldridge 2003). ATEL-based frameworks also ignore the issue of coordination inside a coalition. In (Jamroga & van der Hoek 2004), the authors acknowledge this shortcoming and address it by enriching the framework with extra cooperation operators. These operators nonetheless require either communication among coalition members, or a third-party choosing a plan for the coalition.

The issue of coordination using domination-based solution concepts has been thoroughly explored in game theory (Osborne & Rubinstein 1999). Our framework differs from these approaches, however, in a number of ways. Foremost, our framework not only handles incomplete information (Harsanyi 1967), but also it handles incomplete specifications where some aspects of the world or agents including belief/disbelief are left unspecified. Since our proofs are based on entailment, they remain valid should we add more detail to the theory. Second, rather than considering utility functions, our focus is on goal achievability for a team. Moreover, we consider strict uncertainty and assume no probabilistic information is available. Our framework supports a weaker form of belief (as in KD45 logic) and allows for false belief. Our definition of joint ability resembles the notion of admissibility and iterated weak dominance in game theory (Osborne & Rubinstein 1999; Brandenburger & Keisler 2001). Our work can be related to these by noting that every model of our theory with a KT45 logic of belief can be considered as a partial extensive form game with incomplete information represented by a set of infinite trees each of which is rooted at an initial situation. We can add Nature as a player who decides which tree will be chosen as the real world and is indifferent among all her choices. Also, for all agents (other than Nature) we assign utility 1 to any situation that has a situation in its past history where Goal is satisfied, and utility 0 to all other situations. However, since there is neither any terminal node nor any probabilistic information, the traditional definition of weak dominance cannot be used and an alternative approach for comparing strategies (as described in Section 3.1) is needed, one that is based on the private beliefs of each agent about the world and other agents and their beliefs.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, we proposed a first-order logic framework (with some higher-order features) for reasoning about the coordination of teams of agents based on the situation calculus. We developed a formalization of joint ability that supports reasoning on the basis of very incomplete specifications of the belief states of the team members, something that classical game theory does not allow. In contrast to other game logics such as (Pauly 2002; van der Hoek & Wooldridge 2003), our formalization ensures that team members are properly coordinated, i.e. do not have incompatible strategies. We showed how one can obtain proofs of joint ability and lack of joint ability for various examples involving incomplete specifications of agents’ beliefs. We also proved several intuitive properties about our definitions.

In future work, we will work to generalize the framework in various ways. Supporting sensing actions and simple communication actions should be straightforwardly handled by revising the successor state axiom for belief accessibility as in (Scherl & Levesque 2003; Shapiro, Lеспérance, & Levesque 1998). We will also examine how different ways of comparing strategies (the GTE order) lead to different notions of joint ability, and try to identify the best. We will also evaluate our framework on more complex game settings. Finally, we will look at how our framework could be used in automated verification and multiagent planning.

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**References**


