

THE MILL NEWS LETTER

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For our Milliana we are further indebted to Rea Wilmshurst, assistant extraordinary to the Mill edition, not the least of whose virtues is her extensive reading. In "The Toys of Peace," a short story by H.H. Munro ("Saki"), an uncle is persuaded by his sister and an article (an authentic one) in a London paper of March 1914 to cease giving his nephews war toys. (They, of course, want nothing but war toys.) When his gifts to them are opened, the first is a model of a municipal dust-bin (which they interpret as a well-designed fort); the second is "a little lead figure of a man in black clothes." He is identified by the uncle as "a distinguished civilian, John Stuart Mill . . . , an authority on political economy." "Why?" asks one of the boys. "Well, he wanted to be; he thought it was a useful thing to be." This reply brings forth from the boy "an expressive grunt, which conveyed his opinion that there was no accounting for tastes." The other toys are models of the Manchester branch of the Y.W.C.A., of Robert Raikes, the founder of Sunday Schools (whose statue, curiously enough, is close to Mill's on the Thames Embankment), of a municipal wash-house, and some loaves baked in a sanitary bakehouse, of a sanitary inspector, a district councillor, an official of the Local Government Board, of a ballot-box, various "tools of industry," of Mrs. Hemans, the poetess, Rowland Hill, father of the penny post, and Sir John Herschel, the "eminent astrologer" (*sic*). Left alone, the children quickly adapt the toys to their own ends, and when observed covertly by the uncle are found to have revised our "distinguished civilian" effectively: "John Stuart Mill had been dipped in red ink, and apparently stood for Marshal Saxe." (*The Short Stories of Saki* [New York: Random House Modern Library, 1930], 441-6.)

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This issue begins with an examination by John F. Laffey (History, Concordia) of Mill and Mannheim on the sociology of knowledge. A note

by John M. Robson on Mill's objection to the masculine gender (grammatical) is followed by notices of recent publications, forthcoming works, and an announcement; the number ends with reviews by L.W. Sumner (Philosophy, Toronto) and Allan D. Nelson (Political Science, Waterloo). As ever, we beg you to send us offprints and information about your Millian plans.

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FACES OF TRUTH AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE:
JOHN STUART MILL AND KARL MANNHEIM

John F. Laffey

Attempting to place John Stuart Mill within the context of "the development of sociological science," Lewis Feuer ranked him above Marx and Engels, Weber and Durkheim.¹ That startling claim rests upon a radical distinction between "ideology" and "the conscience of science" which, in Feuer's view, Mill so admirably embodied in that he "virtually alone . . . sought steadfastly to keep his sociology free from ideology."² Both the sharp dichotomy and the resultant panegyric stand open to question. But the problem posed by Feuer, that of locating Mill within the emergent sociological tradition, does call for scrutiny. Comparative analysis, moreover, has a contribution to make in arriving at a more modestly accurate and intellectually just appreciation of Mill's place within that tradition. It will be argued here that Mill (1806-73) produced much of the warp and woof which Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) scores of years later wove in the sociology of knowledge, a sub-discipline of sociology focused upon the relations between social and intellectual life. If the evaluation of Mill's insights which emerges from such a comparative exercise does not match Feuer's eulogy, it by no means redounds to Mill's discredit.

Differences in generation, as well as in national setting, might seem to preclude the possibility of comparison. Rough bench marks of separation in time and space are certainly apparent enough. The contrast between Mill's obsession with refuting determinism and Mannheim's frenzied efforts to escape complete relativism provides an almost too convenient measure of the distance between the concerns of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Figures central to Mannheim's intellectual life also furnish equally clear demarcations. Whatever Mill's occasional worries about the First International, he gave no sign of even knowing of the existence of his fellow Londoner, Karl Marx. Mannheim, on the contrary, wrestled throughout his life with the problems posed by Marx and his followers. And familiarity did not in itself guarantee agreement. If Mannheim became better acquainted with Mill's ideas after the triumph of the Nazis had forced him to take refuge in England, his reaction to those ideas remained ambivalent. Borrowing the notion of "*principia media*" from Mill, he remarked enigmatically that "to a certain point our use of the expression . . . and Mill's are alike; the differences arise where our general principles differ from his."³ Mannheim did not

bother to spell out such differences, but the contradictory evaluations of Hegel neatly telescope them: whereas Mill had maintained stoutly that "actual experience of Hegel . . . tends to deprave one's intellect," Mannheim acknowledged that Hegel's "general position is closest to our own."⁴ One might very well wonder about what the Victorian author of a once celebrated *Logic* (1843) had in common with a Hungarian Jew, steeped in post-Kantian German culture, who in his most famous work announced that "the aim of these studies is to investigate not how thinking appears in textbooks on logic, but how it really functions in public life and in politics as an instrument of collective action."⁵

Yet, if Mill's *Logic* was prescriptive in aim, his proffered remedies in this area, as in so many others, sprang from a deep concern with the conduct of public life. Conversely, even at their most analytical, Mannheim's endeavours remained much more prescriptive than his brief dismissal of the logicians implied. One can be more specific. Both Mill and Mannheim stood at different points in time within an evolving Liberal tradition, the contents of which they tried to change and the contours of which they sought to mould. Their efforts in this regard rested upon readings of their own times as ages of transition, an interpretation more novel in the 1830s than in the 1930s. Responsible intellectual and political life within such ages entailed for both a two-fold task: they attempted to relate ideas to specific socio-political milieus and at the same time to carry their own ideas, as well as the ideas of those prepared to follow them, beyond such given contexts. Mill never achieved Mannheim's degree of self-conscious consistency in the first area of endeavour, but, in his strivings to make theoretical and practical sense of his world, he supplied a crude map of central features of the latter's sociology of knowledge.

Differences in historical experience led inevitably to divergences in attitudes toward public life. Whereas Mannheim welcomed "the transition from *laissez-faire* to a planned society," Mill never abandoned his commitment to *laissez-faire* principles and, characteristically, linked them to the flourishing of political liberty.⁶ Whatever the degree of Mill's increasing allowance for governmental intervention in economic life, he continued to emphasize cooperation rather than the coordination which so fascinated Mannheim. Noting that "technique" had been used first in connection with "tangible objects like machines," Mannheim viewed it more broadly as "the application of technical conceptions to the forms of human co-operation. A human being, regarded as part of the social machine, is to a certain extent stabilized in his reactions by training and education, and all his newly acquired activities are co-ordinated to a definite principle of efficiency within an organized framework."⁷ Without ever having encountered that argument directly, but alerted by Carlyle and others to the dangers of machine imagery in human affairs, Mill already had a reply prepared: "Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his

own way."⁸ Taking their differences at the most extreme, an abyss separates the radical individualist who penned *On Liberty* (1859) from the author of the highly interventionist *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (1940).

Yet the matter is more complicated, for Mill and Mannheim agreed in regard to a number of important socio-political issues. Both were wary of political democracy. If Mill had espoused it early, practical considerations and the influence of Tocqueville led him to argue eventually that "one of the greatest dangers . . . of democracy, as of all other forms of government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power: it is the danger of class legislation; of government intended for (whether really effecting it or not) the immediate benefit of the dominant class, to the lasting detriment of the whole."⁹ He could be considerably blunter: "no lover of improvement can desire that the *predominant* power should be turned over to persons in the mental and moral condition of the English working classes."¹⁰ But even in that better world where the vote could be granted safely to all, "except . . . the recipients of parish relief," the opponent of the graduated income tax wanted a graduated suffrage which would award a "plurality of votes, in favour of those who could afford a reasonable presumption of superior knowledge and cultivation."¹¹

Democracy, a prospect for Mill, was a reality for Mannheim. He looked back with regret to the political world so familiar to Mill: whatever the manifold failures of economic liberalism, political liberalism possessed enormous merit in that "as long as democracy was only a pseudo-democracy in the sense that it granted political power to a small propertied and educated group and only gradually to the proletariat, it led to the growth of rationality."¹² But that world had vanished, and, borrowing Max Scheler's distinction between "democracy of Reason" (*Vernunftdemokratie*) and "democracy of impulse" (*Stimmungsdemokratie*), Mannheim now argued that "democracy . . . is not necessarily a vehicle of rationalizing tendencies in society--on the contrary, it may well act as an uninhibited expression of momentary emotional impulses."¹³ Indeed, the hasty introduction of "all classes" into the political process had produced Scheler's "democracy of the emotions."¹⁴ Echoing Tocqueville, Mannheim lamented the accelerating destruction of the "intermediate institutions" which had once stood "between the elites and the masses," a tendency which only strengthened "the significance of the completely fluid mass."¹⁵ But finding the masses at their most dangerous when they had no chance of achieving political responsibility, he argued, much like Mill, that the gradual acquisition of "some experience of politics" taught them "to act like responsible adults."¹⁶

Such considerations entered into both Mill's and Mannheim's treatments of the mechanics of government. Neither doubted the superiority of the parliamentary system. Believing that "the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government," Mill thought that existing parliamentary prerogatives provided "ample power, and security enough for the liberty of the nation."¹⁷ While no friend to "the obstructive spirit of trained mediocrity" which he found intrinsic to bureaucracy, Mill worried

more about the advent of democracy and, hence, devoted more attention to exalting representative principles to the detriment of notions of delegation.¹⁸ While vaunting the parliamentary system for favouring "the institutional separation of consensus from vacillating and selfish group interests and the sublimation of hostility into constructive criticism," all of which promoted "the growth of rational behavior in society," Mannheim still also saw control as the heart of the matter. The issue was all the more vital to him in that he recognized that "the problem of the democratic constitution of a planned society mainly consists in avoiding bureaucratic absolutism."¹⁹ Confronted with that menace, he found rather facile comfort in the notion that "the history of parliamentarianism is . . . the history of the control of control."²⁰

Both the agreements and the disagreements are instructive. If the differences in emphasis underline the divide between an older Political Liberalism and the newer Social Liberalism, the congruities of their more sweeping concerns highlight the extent to which both Mill and Mannheim adorned the larger Liberal tradition. That tradition and the sociological tradition have interpenetrated each other, on numerous occasions and in highly convoluted fashions, but they are by no means the same. Identifying Mill and Mannheim as adherents of the evolving Liberal tradition is but an important first step. Such identification does not in itself explain what drove them in the direction of the sociology of knowledge and, consequently, does nothing in itself to illuminate their relationship within the sociological tradition. Any attempt to confront those problems has to involve consideration of how Mill and Mannheim faced the crises of their own times and the less distinctly political solutions they offered for those crises. It might then be possible to close the circle, for the less explicitly political dimensions of their thought may very well be profoundly political.

Sociology is the offspring of a series of crises which began with the French and Industrial Revolutions.²¹ The currents unleashed by these upheavals still affected the world inhabited by Mannheim, the world of World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the emergence of National Socialism, the Depression, and then yet another World War. Having experienced directly Bela Kun's short-lived soviet regime in his native Hungary, Mannheim managed to find the degree of peace necessary for his most creative work during the years of the fragile Weimar Republic and in an England ravaged by economic decline. Along with the vicissitudes and honours accumulated during his wanderings, he carried with him a consistent hostility to Marxism. Never one for vulgar polemics, he waged his war against it in sophisticated terms. Freely acknowledging that "the sociology of knowledge actually emerged with Marx," he sought to integrate specific Marxist insights into the larger pattern of his sociology. Drawing in part upon the arguments of Max Weber, he then turned the Marxist notion of ideology against itself and charged Marxism with being simply another form of "false consciousness."²² Highly uncomfortable with the spectre of *homo economicus*, he pointed to divisions within the proletariat in support of his contention that not only did "interests . . . combat interests, but world postulates compete with world

postulates."²⁴ Eventually Mannheim concluded that, when measured against other tendencies toward change within society, "the struggle for power (especially the class war)" was but "purely secondary in its results."²⁵ That inference neatly complemented an expectation not unfamiliar to that sympathetic but critical friend of the Saint-Simonians, John Stuart Mill: the upper social strata would be willing to rally to a planning programme because the "transformation of the original form of capitalism does not consist in abolishing the claims of private property, but in withdrawing certain functions of the ownership of capital from the competence of the capitalists."²⁶

Caught in the whirl of cataclysmic occurrences, Mannheim revealed less consistency in his more specific reactions to these events. During the Weimar Republic he wondered, with an irresponsibility all too characteristic of many of its intellectuals, "whether the sublimation or substitution of discussion for the older weapons of conflict, the direct use of force and oppression, really constituted a fundamental improvement in human life. Physical repression is . . . harder to bear externally, but the will to psychic annihilation . . . is perhaps even more unbearable."²⁷ Still, fortified by confidence in what might be accomplished by the sociology of knowledge, as late as 1933 he exulted in at least one aspect of the current situation: "Whatever one may say against the modern cultural type, one cannot deny him one virtue, that of truthfulness."²⁸ By 1940, for quite understandable reasons, his vision had grown much more apocalyptic: "Civilization is collapsing before our eyes."²⁹ Mannheim now warned that "even if the flaws . . . in the working of liberal society are merely the effects of transition, that does not mean they cannot wreck civilization."³⁰

Not yet become the stuff of textbook cant, the notion of "transition" was of pivotal importance to Mill. Living through the period of the aftermath of the French Revolution, a period which also encompassed the awesome and often awful effects of the Industrial Revolution, Mill's sense of the transitory character of his age was, if anything, more acute than Mannheim's. If he had no more doubt than his Utilitarian predecessors that "the spirit of commerce and industry is one of the greatest instruments . . . of improvement and culture," he also bluntly observed that "hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions . . . have lightened the day's toil of any human being."³¹ Believing that the French Revolution had wrought "substantial good . . . of immense value, at the cost of immediate evil of the most tremendous kind," he came to view it as nothing more than "a mere incident in a great change in man himself--in his beliefs, in his principles of conduct, and therefore in the outward arrangements of society; a change that is so far from being completed, that it is not yet clear . . . to what ultimate goal it is tending."³² While the final result remained uncertain, Mill fully expected that "the nineteenth century will be known to posterity as the era of one of the greatest revolutions . . . in the human mind, and in the whole constitution of human society."³³ Already the tempo of change had been such that mankind had "lived centuries in fifty years," an experience he found reflected in "the spirit of the age," a phrase which he doubted could be found in any work older than half a century.

Plunged into such a period, Mill had not needed Hegel to teach him that one cannot jump over Rhodes: "whatever we may think or affect to think of the present age, we cannot get out of it; we must suffer with its sufferings, and enjoy with its enjoyments; we must share in its lot, and, to be either useful or at ease, we must even partake its character."³⁵ Fortunately, having defined the character of his age as one of transition, he could work for progressive change within it. He would eventually justify his *Autobiography* (1873) partially in light of that perspective and the intellectual labours which had grown from it: "in an age of transition in opinions, there may be somewhat both of interest and of benefit in noting the successive phases of any mind which was always pressing forward, equally ready to learn and unlearn either from its own thoughts or from those of others."³⁶ With all due allowance for the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle, he might also have claimed that saturation in German thought had not been necessary for him to become acquainted with the *Zeitgeist* and to acquire a primitive sense of dialectical development.

Although he construed it in a too narrowly Germanic fashion, Mannheim grasped the significance of Mill's period. He compared the intellectual challenges of his own day with those of the age of the French Revolution and its aftermath. Whereas the task of the earlier era had been "the development of a 'phenomenology of the spirit' and of a philosophy of history showing for the first time, the dynamics and morphology of mind and the role of the historical moment as a co-determinant of the content of intellectual products," he believed that it was up to his generation to formulate "an analysis based on the sociology of knowledge" which could serve as "a first step leading to direct discussion in an age which is aware of the heterogeneity of its interests and the disunity of its bases of thought and which seeks to attain . . . unity at a higher level."³⁷ His detailed analysis of the appearance and evolution of German conservatism in the first half of the nineteenth century aimed at showing, not only how it came to subsume ideas derived from a body of Liberal thought, which he described essentially in terms of its natural law dimension, but also how it spurred the development of a German intellectual tradition, drenched in one manner or another by historicism, which Mannheim sharply and proudly distinguished from the Western European sociological tradition with its positivist features.³⁸ He contended, more generally, that "first liberalism, then haltingly conservatism, and finally socialism made of its political aims a philosophical credo, a world view with well established methods of thought and prescribed conclusions."³⁹ Mannheim found little to dispirit him in such a process, for he detected in it, along with drives toward polarization, a tendency for the different systems to incorporate elements derived from each other in higher syntheses.

Such syntheses fell short of an Hegelian "absolute synthesis" and required varying degrees of socio-political anchoring. Mannheim's sociology of knowledge had as its key proposition an insistence "that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood so long as their social origins are obscured."⁴⁰ While he rejected the notion "that mental life as a whole is a purely political matter," he also maintained that "every historical, ideological, sociological

piece of knowledge . . . is clearly rooted in and carried on by the desire for power and recognition by a social group who want to make their interpretation of the world the universal one."⁴¹ Spurning the choice between "ideology" and "utopia" as unnecessary, he defined "progressive" thought and activity in terms of "*consciousness of the possible*" and a view of "the process of evolution from the angle of the *status nascendi*."⁴² That allowed him to present himself as a progressive who aimed at the creation of "a valid synthesis" which had to be "based on a political position that . . . will retain and utilize much of the accumulated cultural acquisitions of the previous epoch."⁴³

Mannheim knew very well that even intellectuals like himself no more circulated in a social vacuum than did their constructs. But he borrowed from Alfred Weber the phrase, "socially unattached intelligentsia," in order to emphasize their relative autonomy within society.⁴⁴ According to Mannheim, modern intellectuals could choose between two alternatives. They could offer their skills to "one or the other antagonistic classes."⁴⁵ He allowed that such a choice could lead in the direction of "dynamic synthesis" in that "it was usually the class in need of intellectual development which received their support," but with such development defined as the transformation of "the conflict of interests into conflicts of values."⁴⁶ However, in Mannheim's view, all too often such a decision simply revealed "the fanaticism of radicalized intellectuals" who found in it "a psychic compensation for the lack of a more fundamental integration into a class and the necessity of overcoming their own distrust as well as that of others."⁴⁷ The selection of the second option involved "scrutiny of their own social moorings and the quest for the fulfilment of their mission as the predestined advocate of the intellectual interest of the whole."⁴⁸ The intellectuals who made this choice might arrive at "the discovery of the position from which a total perspective would be possible" and, in the worst of circumstances, could still "play the part of watchmen in what otherwise would be a pitch-black night."⁴⁹ To be brief, those who pursued this course were on their way to becoming sociologists of knowledge. To put the matter more crudely, they had decided to follow the path already taken by Karl Mannheim. The heady prospect of "predestined" advocacy, however, needed to be balanced against the perils to be encountered on that path.

Mannheim dismissed the kind of determinism which so terrified Mill, the kind which asserted that "man and thought are nothing but the expression and reflex of various locations in the social fabric, and that there exist only quantifiable functional correlations and no potentiality of freedom grounded in mind," but he had more difficulty in dealing with charges of relativistic "nihilism."⁵⁰ While the development of the sociology of knowledge from "the self-relativization of thought and knowledge" might have been carried in a nihilist direction, relativism constituted the real problem for Mannheim. He readily acknowledged that "there are too many points of view of equal value and prestige, each showing the relativity of the others, to permit us to take one position and regard it as impregnable and absolute."⁵¹ While he urged that it was "imperative

in the present transitional period to make use of the intellectual twilight which dominates our epoch . . . in which all values and points of view appear in their genuine relativity," he denied that his own thinking could be described as relativist.⁵² Locating "the function of the finds of the sociology of knowledge . . . somewhere . . . between irrelevance to the establishment of truth . . . and entire adequacy for determining truth," he defined his own position as "relationist."⁵³ Mannheim contended that "relationism signifies merely that all the elements of a meaning in a given situation have reference to one another and derive their significance from this reciprocal interrelationship in a given frame of thought. Such a system of meanings is possible and valid only in a given type of historical existence, to which, for a time, it furnishes appropriate expression."⁵⁴

Here the German intellectual tradition, with all the historicist features so vaunted by Mannheim, repaid his fidelity in a fashion he sought desperately to avoid with the forced distinction between relativism and relationism. While wielding the weapon of the sociology of knowledge against the Marxists, he himself remained vulnerable to its cutting edge: "having familiarized ourselves with the conception that the ideologies of our opponents are, after all, just the function of their position in the world, we cannot refrain from concluding that our own ideas too, are functions of a social position."⁵⁵ The need to armour himself against an onslaught from that direction dictated that he never apply to his own ideas the insight that "a glance at the history of political thought shows that the exponents of synthesis have always represented definite social strata, mainly classes who felt threatened from above or below and who, out of social necessity, seek a middle way out."⁵⁶ Undoubtedly Mannheim conceived of the sociology of knowledge as a grander enterprise than mere political theory, but it is also an undertaking which threatens constantly to turn into a hall of reflecting, distorting, and blinding mirrors. In such circumstances self-protection required the invocations of relationism in efforts to banish relativism.

Situating himself in an "age of transition" in which "mankind have outgrown old institutions and old doctrines, and have not yet acquired new ones," Mill had none of Mannheim's difficulties with relativism.⁵⁷ The young Mill took in stride multiple "faces of the truth," and the mature Mill refused to recognize "absolute certainty."⁵⁸ Whereas the younger Mill argued that people "have in general an invincible propensity to split the truth, and take half, or less than half of it," the older Mill detected "a perpetual oscillation in spiritual truths, and in spiritual doctrines of any significance, even when not truths. Their meaning is almost always in a process either of being lost or of being recovered. Whoever has attended to the history of the more serious convictions of mankind--of the opinions by which the general conduct of their lives is, or as they conceive ought to be, more especially regulated--is aware that even when recognizing verbally the same doctrines, they attach to them at different periods a greater or a less quantity, and even a different kind, of meaning."⁵⁹ Although a firm believer in the need for and the possibility of intellectual

amelioration, Mill possessed a keener sense than Mannheim of what could be lost in its unfolding: "even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes, one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than that which it displaces."⁶⁰ Defining his own stage of civilization as one in which "certain kinds of improvement" took place, he pointed to "the diffusion of property and intelligence, and the power of co-operation" as its central features.⁶¹ But he debited to it, along with other costs, the consideration that "in an age of transition, the divisions among the instructed nullify their authority, and the uninstructed lose their faith in them."⁶² As for those divisions, though at that moment he did not think that such would always necessarily be the case in the future, Mill insisted that "in the present age of transition, everything must be subordinate to *freedom of inquiry*."⁶³

Such convictions rested upon historicist foundations.⁶⁴ Whatever the significance of the opposition between the Western European tradition of natural law and German historicism which Mannheim emphasized, Mill's Utilitarian upbringing had freed him from the weight of the former. While he initially expressed impatience with "politicians and philosophers" being "perpetually exhorted to judge of the present by the past," he came to castigate "the Cimmerian darkness still prevailing in England . . . concerning the very existence of the views of general history."⁶⁵ While German influences facilitated this shift in opinion, direct acquaintance with the views of French social theorists and historians, along with the magnitude of change in his own "age of transition," had more to do with bringing Mill to the perception that "to find fault with our ancestors for not having annual parliaments, universal suffrage, and vote by ballot, would be like quarrelling with the Greeks and Romans for not using steam navigation."⁶⁶ Such relativism allowed him to lay down a proposition which he believed held good not only for the past, but also for parts of the British empire and other portions of the globe of his own day: "despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end."⁶⁷ History showed, moreover, that "the human mind, in different generations, occupies itself with different things, and in one age is led by the circumstances which surround it to fix more of its attention upon one of the properties of a thing, in another another."⁶⁸ His reading of history allowed him to conclude that there were but "two elements of importance and influence among mankind: the one is, property; the other, powers and acquirements of mind."⁶⁹ If Mill never abandoned his concern with property, the second factor absorbed more of the attention of one who in portraying Jules Michelet might well have been describing himself: "a strenuous asserter of the power of mind over matter, of will over spontaneous propensities, culture over nature."⁷⁰ These propensities both helped and hindered Mill's gropings toward a sociology of knowledge.

Mill's drive towards the scientific understanding of society warred with his distinctive moralistic intellectualism. He had no doubt that "all privileged and powerful classes . . . have used their power in the interest of their own selfishness, and have indulged their self-importance in despising . . . those who were, in their estimation, degraded, by being under the necessity of working for their benefit" and could observe coldly that "the classes . . . which the system of society makes subordinate, have little reason to put faith in any of the maxims which the same system of society may have established as principles."⁷¹ Momentarily swept away by enthusiasm for the prospects for reform under the aegis of Lord Durham, he went so far as to explore the interests and attitudes of the more specific groups who made up the two larger aggregations of those "who feel secure [about] their interests . . . and still more . . . who feel secure that the interests of other people will be postponed to theirs" and "those who feel and think the reverse of all this."⁷² But whatever his continued championing of the concerns of the latter body, specific interests constituted Mill's great bugbear in politics and economics. Mill feared in government the role of "sinister interests (to employ the useful phrase introduced by Bentham), that is, interests conflicting more or less with the general good of the community."⁷³ And he proved as eager as Mannheim to exorcise the spectre of *homo economicus*: just as "no mathematician ever thought that his definition of a line corresponded to an actual line," just as little did the political economist "ever imagine that real men had no object of desire but wealth, or none which would not give way to the slightest motive of a pecuniary kind."⁷⁴ Consequently, Political Economy was but a branch of the larger subject of "social economy," or "somewhat less happily . . . *speculative politics*, or the science of politics . . . or the natural history of society," or, as he would learn to call it, "sociology."⁷⁵

The last, a "convenient barbarism," encompassed for Mill the study of "all the greater social facts or phenomena."⁷⁶ He listed these as "the degree of knowledge, and of intellectual and moral culture, existing in the community, and in every class of it; the state of industry, of wealth and its distribution; the habitual occupations of the community; their division into classes, and the relations of those classes to one another; the common beliefs which they entertain on all the subjects most important to mankind, and the degree of assurance with which those beliefs are held; their tastes, and the character and degree of their aesthetic development; their form of government, and the more important of their laws and customs."⁷⁷ A hierarchy in the relations among such factors still had to be established. Although he acknowledged that "it would be a great error . . . to assert that speculation, intellectual activity, the pursuit of truth, is among the more powerful propensities of human nature," Mill still selected as the most important element in society "the speculative faculties of mankind; including the nature of the beliefs which by any means they have arrived at, concerning themselves and the world by which they are surrounded."⁷⁸ He contended that "the state of the speculative faculties, the character of the propositions assented to by the intellect, essentially determines the moral and

political state of the community, as we have already seen that it determines the physical."⁷⁹ Here again Mill's own intellectual concerns, his own intellectual elitism, drove him towards and stopped him short of a sociology of knowledge.

Had he been able to develop his concept of "Ethology," Mill might have been able to surmount this problem. Arguing that "in human beings . . . differences in education and in outward circumstances are capable of affording an adequate explanation of by far the greatest portion of character," he pointed to the need for a new "Ethology, or the Science of Character."⁸⁰ In Mill's formulation, if "we employ the name Psychology for the science of the elementary laws of mind, Ethology will serve for the ulterior science which determines the kind of character produced in conformity to those general laws, by any set of circumstances, physical and moral."⁸¹ Although still embryonic, "Political Ethology, or the theory of the causes which determine the type of character belonging to a people or to an age," promised to become the most important branch of Sociology.⁸² Mill felt more comfortable with mankind, peoples and ages, than he did with classes, with all their self-centred interests, and never made clear whether he conceived of Ethology as a social psychology or a sociology of knowledge. But whatever the confusions, he recognized its political dimension. Aware of his difficulties in this area, he wrote to Auguste Comte shortly after the appearance of the *Logic*: "Je voudrais essayer de me rendre à faire quelque chose pour l'Ethologie, qui sera probablement . . . le sujet du premier livre que j'écrirai."⁸³ Sixteen years later he referred to Ethology as "a subject I have long wished to take up, at least in the form of Essays, but have never yet felt myself sufficiently prepared."⁸⁴ Mill's "Ethology," like Lord Acton's "History of Liberty," remained one of the great unwritten books of the nineteenth century.

The shadow of Comte, coiner of the "convenient barbarism," hovered over the *Logic*. While Mill's intellectual and personal relations with the imperious, impervious and impecunious Frenchman underwent fluctuating waves of appreciation and revulsion, it suffices to note here the harshness of his final judgment: "he has done nothing in Sociology which does not require to be done over again, and better."⁸⁵ Yet Mill exempted from the severity of his verdict Comte's "analysis of history, to which there is much to be added, but which we do not think likely to be ever, in its general features, superseded."⁸⁶ He accepted Comte's three stages of development, though he would have used other terms for them: "Instead of the Theological we should prefer to speak of the Personal, or Volitional explanation of facts; instead of Metaphysical, the Abstractional or Ontological; and the meaning of Positive would be less ambiguously expressed in the objective aspect by Phaenomenal, in the subjective by Experiential."⁸⁷ And while highly critical of Comte's contemptuous dismissal of psychology, Mill refused to accept Herbert Spencer's proposition that "the world is governed or overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides."⁸⁸ Here he closed the door firmly upon the type of approach which would lead eventually to Vilfredo Pareto's version of the sociology of knowledge. He agreed instead with Comte that "the main agent in the progress of mankind is their intellectual

development. . . . And hence the history of opinions, and of the speculative faculty, has always been the leading element in the history of mankind."⁸⁹ Whatever his distaste for key features of Comte's system, Mill chose to pursue a vision of Sociology which was from its inception a sociology of knowledge.

Mill still rejected Comte's over-arching synthesis just as firmly as Mannheim rejected Hegel's absolute synthesis. Mill remained, in general, far more chary than Mannheim in his use of "synthesis." But Mill's drive towards it cannot be doubted. In the heady days of the struggle for the Reform Bill he confessed that he would "not care though a revolution were to exterminate every person in Great Britain & Ireland who has £ 500 a year," but he then exempted "speculative Tories" like Wordsworth, Coleridge and Southey from his indictment and already looked forward to "a coalition prepared between the wisest radicals and the wisest anti-radicals."⁹⁰ Decades later he would still try to offer Liberal and Conservative "not a mere compromise, by splitting the difference between the two, but something wider than either, which, in virtue of its superior comprehensiveness, might be adopted by either . . . without renouncing anything which he really feels to be valuable in his own creed."⁹¹ Perceived in this light, Mill appears as a living exemplification of Mannheim's ideal intellectual's pursuit of limited but still valid syntheses. He was both an advocate and a watchman. But Mill was never a sociological mannikin. He pursued his own kinds of syntheses, at once intellectual and political, and, in so doing, opened paths over which Mannheim would later carry the burden of subsequent sociological theory.

What Mannheim endeavoured to accomplish in his historical study of German conservatism, Mill undertook to achieve in the essays devoted to Bentham and Coleridge. While Bentham's influence had been largely upon Progressives and that of Coleridge upon Conservatives, Mill deemed both "far too great men to be correctly designated by either appellation exclusively," and, in an image Mannheim could only have approved, he went on to claim that "the two systems of concentric circles . . . have only just begun to meet and intersect."⁹² Presumably Mannheim also would have appreciated Mill's later explanation of his favouring of Coleridge over Bentham: "I was writing for Radicals and Liberals, and it was my business to dwell most on that in writers of a different school, from the knowledge of which they might derive most improvement."⁹³ Yet Mill had hardly neglected appealing to the other side. Eschewing "the impracticable method of converting them from Conservatives into Liberals" in his discussion of matters like Coleridge's notion of "a trust inherent in landed property," he aimed instead at leading them "to adopt one liberal opinion after another, as a part of Conservatism itself."⁹⁴ A key element in Mannheim's prescriptive sociology of knowledge was already contained in Mill's determination that "the first step" in such a process should be "to inspire them with the desire to systematize and rationalize their own actual creed."⁹⁵ Mill believed he had shown, again in a fashion that Mannheim would have approved, that "a Tory philosopher cannot be wholly a Tory, but must often be a better Liberal than Liberals themselves."⁹⁶ The later sociologist of

knowledge, however, would have been justified in remarking that Mill's appreciation of Coleridge could also be interpreted as illustrating the reverse side of the last proposition.

Part of Coleridge's appeal rested upon the Conservative's projection of a "clerisy" which, as Mill saw the matter, should include "all who are capable of producing a beneficial effect on their age & country as teachers of the knowledge which fits people to perform their duties & exercise their rights."⁹⁷ That notion coincided with his early appreciation of the Saint-Simonian insistence upon "the necessity of a *Pouvoir Spirituel*."⁹⁸ But even at the height of his flirtation with the Saint-Simonians, Mill objected "altogether to the means which the St. Simonists propose for organizing the *pouvoir spirituel*. It appears to me that you cannot organise it at all. What is the *pouvoir spirituel* but the insensible influence of mind over mind?"⁹⁹ Mill was quite prepared to settle for such influence for himself and those like himself. With all his qualms about the present moral and mental condition of the proletariat and for all his expectation that "*the future well-being of the labouring classes is principally dependent on their own mental cultivation*," Mill did not find it contradictory that "they should feel respect for superiority of intellect and knowledge, and defer much to the opinions, on any subject . . . of those whom they think well acquainted with it."¹⁰⁰ Even when arguing for a plan of proportional representation which favoured the educated, he recognized that "a separate organization of the instructed classes, even if practicable, would be invidious, and could only escape from being offensive by being totally without influence."¹⁰¹ Such considerations underlay his excoriation of Comte, "the Grand Pontiff of Humanity," and the manipulative uses which he projected for the new Sociology.¹⁰²

Influence, for Mill, no more implied control than cooperation implied coordination. But as the "predestined" advocacy of the sociologists of knowledge yielded pride of place in Mannheim's thought to a concern with the implementation of policy by sociologically enlightened planners, distinctly Comtean notions of control and coordination made their appearance.¹⁰³ Much had changed in the structures of society and in the orientation of Liberalism during the decades which separated Mill and Mannheim. Yet they both stood within the Liberal tradition. They shared concerns common to Liberals in industrializing and industrialized capitalist societies struck by severe crises: most obviously, the need to fuse political and intellectual leadership; the need to provide political education for the populace, without allowing it direct and immediate access to the levers of political power; and the need to sublimate and/or obfuscate class interests in the service of a greater common good.

While the interests of both remained profoundly political, the challenges posed by the crises of their times impelled them to jettison narrow definitions of politics and to seek broader and more supple articulations of the nature of political life. Whatever the defects of the resultant solutions, the inclusion of social and cultural factors lent all the more strength to the Liberal vision of political dynamics. Their efforts to arrive at this more comprehensive perception inevitably involved some consideration of material

factors: Mill never gave up his concern with property, and Mannheim made his allowances for the insights of Marx and the impact of the Depression. But given their commitments to change within the confines of existing society, they subordinated such factors to the social interplay of ideas, the transmutation of struggles among interests into conflicts of values, and the forging of syntheses of ideas and values which, though often designed to benefit them, remained removed from the more immediate concerns of the threatening *demos*. If such efforts had become familiar enough by Mannheim's time, Mill was one of the first Liberals to take decisive steps in this direction.

Yet, for all his hankerings after a Coleridgean "clerisy," Mill lacked Mannheim's abiding concern with the group status of intellectuals. Those inclined to follow Mannheim into the sociology of knowledge's hall of mirrors might very well explain this shortcoming in light of Mill's--or, better, his father's--belonging to England's first generation of the "socially unattached intelligentsia." Leaving aside quarrels over the kinds and degrees of social mediation involved in such an "unattached" status, it can still be noted that "intelligentsia" did not enter into the English language until two score years after Mill's death. Similarly, for Mill, "ideology" had to do with a school of French thinkers whose ideas he dismissed as "the shallowest set of doctrines which perhaps were ever passed off upon a cultivated age as a complete psychological system."¹⁰⁴ Yet in Mill's own lifetime Marx gave "ideology" an entirely new meaning. According to Mannheim, in so doing, he laid the foundations for the sociology of knowledge, a kind of intellectual undertaking destined to overthrow Marxism's own claims to scientific status. Put most starkly, then, the greatest intellectual difference between Mill and Mannheim sprang from the former's being wholly pre-Marxist in orientation and the latter's living after Marx, as well as after giants like Weber who had sought to refute him.

Mill still knew enough about his own era to define it as an "age of transition." Unfortunately, the initial significance of that phrase has been lost as it has become all too familiar and nowhere more familiar than within the Liberalism of the twentieth century. Mill was hardly alone in this perception, for the reverberations of the French and Industrial Revolutions brought many of his generation, including Marx, to that consciousness of change which gave birth to a rich variety of different systems. But Mill steered clear of the formulation of a system. Indeed, he warned against the excesses of those systems, Hegelian, Comtean and Spencerian, which pointed toward the systemization of sociologies of knowledge. But borrowing from English romantics influenced by German metaphysicians, as well as from French historians and social theorists, Mill arrived at an historical relativism. Confronted with the sweeping nature of change in his lifetime, he managed to integrate that relativism into an English Liberal tradition which, in its Benthamite manifestation, had paid scant attention to history and which at best, as with Macaulay, had settled for a simplistic Whig reading of the past. Such relativism allowed Mill to entertain more or less simultaneously a variety of apparently contradictory ideas, to introduce some of the

views of his opponents into his own perspective, and to argue for freedom of inquiry. In undertaking all this, Mill reached towards and often enough realized the kinds of limited syntheses integral to Mannheim's prescriptive sociology of knowledge.

Yet Mill no more created or developed a coherent sociology of knowledge than he completed the Ethology which might have buttressed it. The Liberal theorist of the age of transition remained the captive of his era: his intellectual and moral concerns kept him partially within an older tradition, but at the same time the forms assumed by these concerns carried him toward a new form of inquiry. Lacking the kind of stimulus provided Mannheim by a socially and intellectually combative Marxism, Mill never arrived at a systematic perception of just what such inquiry involved and required. But to recognize Mill's limitations in this area is not to disparage him. He pursued his goals self-consciously and honestly and, in the course of so doing, arrived at positions later to be incorporated into Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. To confuse his self-consciousness and honesty with "the conscience of science" is not only to discount the ideological content of his labours, but also to do a subtle intellectual injustice to a man so aware of multiple and shifting "faces of truth." Flattering comparisons with Marx and Engels, Durkheim and Weber cannot repair the damage, for they but work to Mill's disadvantage. Seen in light of the sociological tradition, John Stuart Mill stands as a significant figure in the pre-history of the sociology of knowledge and, in important respects, emerges well from a comparison with its most influential proponent, Karl Mannheim.

NOTES

¹L.S. Feuer, "John Stuart Mill as a Sociologist: The Unwritten Ethology," in *James and John Stuart Mill: Papers of the Centenary Conference*, ed. John M. Robson and Michael Laine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 110.

²*Ibid.*

³Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Essays in Modern Social Structure* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1940), 360.

⁴To Alexander Bain, 4 Nov., 1867, *The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1849-1873 [LL]*, ed. Francis E. Mineka and Dwight N. Lindley, *Collected Works [CW]*, Vols. XIV-XVII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), XVI, 1324; "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge" (1925), in *From Karl Mannheim*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 100.

⁵Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (1929, in German; New York: Harcourt, Brace, n.d.), 1.

⁶John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, ed. John M. Robson, *CW*, Vols. II-III (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), III, 945; *A System of Logic*, ed. John M. Robson, *CW*, Vols. VII-VIII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), VIII, 869.

⁷Mannheim, *Man and Society*, 243-4.

⁸John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, in *Essays on Politics and Society*, ed. John M. Robson, CW, Vols. XVIII-XIX (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), XVIII, 262.

⁹John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, in *Essays on Politics and Society*, CW, XIX, 446.

¹⁰John Stuart Mill, "Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform (1859)," in *Essays on Politics and Society*, CW, XIX, 327. Throughout this article all emphases appear in the sources cited.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 324.

¹²Mannheim, *Man and Society*, 45.

¹³Karl Mannheim, "The Democratization of Culture" (1933), in *From Karl Mannheim*, 273.

¹⁴Mannheim, *Man and Society*, 45.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 96-7.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 344.

¹⁷Mill, *Representative Government*, 432.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 439.

¹⁹Mannheim, *Man and Society*, 343.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 380.

²¹John F. Laffey, "Auguste Comte: Prophet of Reconciliation and Reaction," *Science and Society*, 29, no. 1 (Winter 1965), 44-65.

²²Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 309; "Problems of Sociology in Germany" (1929), in *From Karl Mannheim*, 262.

²³Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 75; "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge," 88-9, n. 1.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 109-12.

²⁵Mannheim, *Man and Society*, 251.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 350.

²⁷Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 38.

²⁸Mannheim, "The Democratization of Culture," 345.

²⁹Mannheim, *Man and Society*, 15.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 107.

³¹John Stuart Mill, "De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [II]" (1840), in *Essays on Politics and Society*, CW, XVIII, 197; *Principles of Political Economy*, CW, III, 756.

³²John Stuart Mill, "A Few Observations on the French Revolution" (1833), in *Dissertations and Discussions [D&D]*, 2 vols. (London: Parker and Sons, 1859), I, 59, 57.

³³John Stuart Mill, "The Spirit of the Age, No. 1," *Examiner*, 9 Jan., 1831, 20.

³⁴John Stuart Mill, "De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [I]" (1835), in *Essays on Politics and Society*, CW, XVIII, 58; "The Spirit of the Age, No. 1," 20.

³⁵Mill, "The Spirit of the Age, No. 1," 20.

³⁶John Stuart Mill, *Autobiography*, in *Autobiography and Literary Essays*, ed. John M. Robson and Jack Stillinger, CW, I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 5.

³⁷Karl Mannheim, "Competition as a Cultural Phenomena" (1928), in *From Karl Mannheim*, 244; Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 285-6.

³⁸Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought" (1927), in *From Karl Mannheim*, 174-5; Mannheim, "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge," 82; Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations" (1927), in his *Essays in the*

- Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 281.
- ³⁹Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 36.
- ⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 2.
- ⁴¹Mannheim, "Competition," 244, 228-9.
- ⁴²Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," 161; "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge," 112.
- ⁴³Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 154.
- ⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 155.
- ⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 158.
- ⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 159.
- ⁴⁷*Ibid.*
- ⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 158.
- ⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 160-1.
- ⁵⁰Mannheim, "Competition," 260-1; "Problems of Sociology in Germany," 267.
- ⁵¹Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 84.
- ⁵²*Ibid.*, 85.
- ⁵³*Ibid.*, 285.
- ⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 86.
- ⁵⁵Mannheim, "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge," 70.
- ⁵⁶Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 153-4.
- ⁵⁷Mill, "The Spirit of the Age, No. 1," 20.
- ⁵⁸John Stuart Mill, "Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy" (1833), in *Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society*, ed. John M. Robson, *CW*, X (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 18; Mill, *On Liberty*, *CW*, XVIII, 229.
- ⁵⁹Mill, "The Spirit of the Age, No. 1," 21; Mill, *A System of Logic*, *CW*, VIII, 682.
- ⁶⁰Mill, *On Liberty*, *CW*, XVIII, 252-3.
- ⁶¹John Stuart Mill, "Civilisation" (1836), in *Essays on Politics and Society*, *CW*, XVIII, 119, 124.
- ⁶²John Stuart Mill, "The Spirit of the Age, No. 2," *Examiner*, 23 Jan., 1831, 50.
- ⁶³To John Sterling, 20-22 Oct., 1831, *The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812-1848 [EL]*, ed. Francis E. Mineka, *CW*, Vols. XII-XIII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), XII, 77.
- ⁶⁴One may disagree with Karl Popper's definition and evaluation of historicism, but to his credit he identified Mill as an historicist (Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, II: *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962], 87-8).
- ⁶⁵Mill, "The Spirit of the Age, No. 1," 20; "Coleridge" (1841), in *Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society*, *CW*, X, 140n.
- ⁶⁶John Stuart Mill, "The Spirit of the Age, No. 3," *Examiner*, 6 Feb., 1831, 83.
- ⁶⁷Mill, *On Liberty*, *CW*, XVIII, 224.
- ⁶⁸Mill, *Logic*, *CW*, VIII, 681.
- ⁶⁹Mill, "Civilisation," *CW*, XVIII, 121.
- ⁷⁰John Stuart Mill, "Michelet's History of France" (1844), *D&D*, II, 150.
- ⁷¹Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, *CW*, III, 760; "Chapters on Socialism" (1879), in *Essays on Economics and Society*, ed. John M.

Robson, *CW*, Vols. IV-V (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), V, 710.

⁷²John Stuart Mill, "Reorganization of the Reform Party" (1839), in *Essays on England, Ireland, and the Empire*, ed. John M. Robson, *CW*, VI (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 470. While Mill's call for reorganization led nowhere, it still remains revealing. Convinced that "no practical and judicious statesman could . . . take his stand anywhere but on the middle class," he insisted that to push for Universal Suffrage would be to make the mistake of the French Revolution in "attempting greater changes than the general state of opinion is prepared for." Having in effect equated such a state of opinion with that of the middle class, he still thought it possible for a statesman to "redress the practical grievances of the working classes." This meant, more specifically, that "the motto of a Radical politician should be, Government by means of the middle for the working classes." While providing admirable illustration of the workings of Mannheim's regretted "pseudo-democracy," such sentiments hardly added up to a formula for Radical success in the age of the Chartists (*ibid.*, 482-3).

⁷³Mill, *Representative Government*, *CW*, XIX, 441.

⁷⁴John Stuart Mill, "On the Definition of Political Economy" (1836), in *Essays on Economics and Society*, *CW*, IV, 327.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 320. The notion of Social Economy was destined for a longer life in France, and Professor Sanford Elwitt of the University of Rochester will have much to say about that in a forthcoming book.

⁷⁶Mill, *Logic*, *CW*, VIII, 895, 911.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 911-12.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 926.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 859, 869.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, 869.

⁸²*Ibid.*, 905.

⁸³To Auguste Comte, 8 Dec., 1843, *EL*, *CW*, XIII, 616.

⁸⁴To Alexander Bain, 14 No., 1859, *LL*, *CW*, XV, 645.

⁸⁵"Auguste Comte and Positivism" (1865), in *Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society*, *CW*, X, 327. Vol. XIII of *CW* is especially informative in regard to Mill's complicated relations with Comte.

⁸⁶"Auguste Comte," *CW*, X, 327.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 267-8.

⁸⁸Herbert Spencer, *On the Classification of the Sciences*, quoted in *ibid.*, 316. Mill assured Spencer shortly before the publication of his essay on Comte: "What I have now written, however, will give a very false impression of my feelings, if it raises any idea but that of minor differences of opinion between allies and fellow-combatants" (to Herbert Spencer, 11 Mar., 1865, *LL*, *CW*, XVI, 1011). Viewed in light of their contributions to the pre-history of the sociology of knowledge, the difference is not at all minor.

⁸⁹Mill, "Auguste Comte," *CW*, X, 315-16.

⁹⁰To John Sterling, 20-22 Oct., 1831, *EL*, *CW*, XII, 84, 78.

⁹¹Mill, *Representative Government*, *CW*, XIX, 273.

⁹²Mill, "Bentham," *CW*, X, 78.

⁹³Mill, *Autobiography*, *CW*, I, 227.

⁹⁴Mill, "Coleridge," *CW*, X, 163, 157, 163.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 163.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 162-3.

⁹⁷To John Sterling, 20-22 Oct., 1831, *EL*, *CW*, XII, 75-6.

⁹⁸To Gustave d'Eichthal, 7 Nov., 1829, *EL*, *CW*, XII, 40.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 40-1.

¹⁰⁰Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, *CW*, III, 763, 765.

¹⁰¹Mill, *Representative Government*, *CW*, XIX, 459.

¹⁰²Mill, "Auguste Comte," *CW*, X, 351.

¹⁰³As in the above discussion of Mill's treatment of Coleridge, it seems legitimate on occasion to indicate how Mannheim would very probably have reacted to Mill's endeavours. It is much more risky to read Mill's ideas forward into Mannheim's world. But if a brief speculative foray might be allowed, Mill's evaluation of Comte's ideas would seem to suggest that he would have had serious reservations about some of Mannheim's ideas, especially his later ideas. The logician who never abandoned his concern with the sinister role of special interests might have noted the dubious dexterity with which Mannheim transformed the vital question, "Who plans the planners?" into the query, "Which of the existing groups shall plan us?" before answering that it would "depend on which of these groups with their existing outlooks will produce the energy, the decisiveness, and the capacity to master the vast social machinery of modern life." Presumably the critic of Comte's priesthood of the Religion of Humanity, that is, the new sociologists, would not have shared Mannheim's enthusiasm for the "new forms of social services" which involved "an almost conscious manipulation of the emotional element in the relationship," or, more specifically, for "the social worker, who . . . gives not merely material help, but spiritual healing." While Mill might have accepted the proposition that "Sociology has already reached a stage in which it is possible to say which social forces and constellations have fostered individuality in history," it is unlikely he would have been willing to entrust its care to Mannheim, especially if he understood such a trust to involve the implementation of policy (Mannheim, *Man and Society*, 74-5, 323-4, 265).

¹⁰⁴Mill, "Coleridge," *CW*, X, 129.

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"WHY MEN?": MILL ON THE MASCULINE GENDER

John M. Robson

When in 1867 Mill proposed his well-known but unsuccessful amendment to the Second Reform Act, that "person" replace "man" in the clauses dealing with the franchise, he was attempting to bring into political effect a practice that he had adopted in his own writing--one, of course, that has become a public issue only in the past generation. Mill's most resolute effort is seen in the revisions of his major works, when he, in the early 1850s, substituted "people" or "mankind" (not "humankind") for "men," and "person" for "a man" or "he." In

commenting on these changes in this *News Letter* some years ago, I called attention to an interesting variant that appeared in the 3rd (1851) edition of the *Logic*. In one place where he retained "he" in the text, Mill appended this note to the word: "The pronoun *he* is the only one available to express all human beings; none having yet been invented to serve the purpose of designating them generally, without distinguishing them by a characteristic so little worthy of being made the main distinction as that of sex. This is more than a defect in language; tending greatly to prolong the almost universal habit, of thinking and speaking of one-half the human species as the whole."¹ This note, which first appeared in the year of Mill's marriage to Harriet Taylor, disappeared in the 5th edition (1862), the first after her death. No thoroughly convincing reason for the excision has been presented, for Mill's dedication to the cause was certainly not weakening; it may be simply that the note appeared out of place in the discussion of freedom and necessity. It may be, however, that he had abandoned the battle over the pronoun for the substantive struggle.

In preparing Mill's newspaper writings for the *Collected Works*,² I have found a previously unidentified article by him that contains a similar note, further confirming his statements in the *Autobiography* and *The Subjection of Women* that his dedication to sexual equality was early initiated and constantly affirmed.³ In the collection of Mill's books in the library of Somerville College, Oxford, there is a bound set of the *Examiner*, the weekly newspaper for which he wrote a great number of leaders and news reports (especially on French politics); the set includes all the issues from the latter part of 1830 through 1834, the period when most of Mill's articles appeared. Mill's writings are identified in the set by lists on the flyleaves, enclosing square brackets, and/or inked corrections.⁴ A few of the articles there identified are not included in Mill's own list of his writings,⁵ and one of these, signalled as his both by listing and a correction, is a review of his friend Sarah Austin's *Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia*, a translation from Victor Cousin with an extensive introduction.⁶

Included in one of Mill's extensive extracts from Austin's introduction is this sentence: "Leaving, however, the question, whether exemption from restraint is, of itself, the great desideratum for *men*, we may safely affirm, that for the class most deeply interested in the present inquiry, *children*, no such exemption is, or can be, contemplated or advised."⁷ To the word "*men*" Mill appended this note, which adumbrates that in the *Logic* nearly twenty years later in its tone and message, though not in its specific grammatical target: "Why *men*? The logical opposite of *children* is *grown persons*. From an imperfection in our language (not found in the French) there is often almost a necessity for using the masculine *pronoun* where both sexes are equally concerned, but seldom the masculine *substantive*. The effect upon the mind of this phraseology is bad; it encourages the habit of *passing by* one-half of the race as not concerned in its highest interests, and we should have been pleased if a woman had avoided sanctioning the practice by her example."

Mill must have known that Sarah Austin, already working very hard

to support her brilliant but unproductive husband, was not likely to worry about this matter; she never was an advocate of sexual equality. And Mill himself went on for many years using the "bad" phraseology, correcting and (for the most part) abandoning it only in the early 1850s. Nonetheless, in doing so then he predated the modern reform by more than a century. But even he [sic] could do little about the obnoxious, unFrench pronoun.

NOTES

¹*System of Logic, Collected Works*, Vols. VII-VIII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), VIII, 837n (Bk. VI, Chap. ii, Sect. 1), quoted in "'Joint Authorship' Again: The Evidence in the Third Edition of Mill's Logic," *Mill News Letter*, VI (Spring, 1971), 16.

²These will appear in 1986 as Vols. XXII and XXIII, edited by Ann P. Robson, with Francis E. Mineka.

³See *Autobiography, Collected Works*, I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 253n; and *The Subjection of Women, Collected Works*, XXI (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 261.

⁴See Ann P. and John M. Robson, "John Stuart Mill's Annotated Examiner Articles," *Victorian Periodicals Newsletter*, 7 (Dec. 1974), 3-6.

⁵Ney MacMinn, et al., eds., *Bibliography of the Published Writings of J. S. Mill* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1945).

⁶*Examiner*, 1 June, 1834, 341-2. Mill reviewed the work again and more extensively in July for the *Monthly Repository*, amplifying his praise and repeating only one brief quotation (see "Reform in Education," *Collected Works*, XXI, 61-74).

⁷P. 341; Austin's italics.

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Recent Publications

- Berger, F. R. *Happiness, Justice, and Freedom*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Blanshard, Brand. *Four Reasonable Men: Aurelius, Mill, Renan, Sidgwick*. Middleton, Ct.: Wesleyan University Press, 1984.
- Bloom, William T. *Force or Freedom: The Paradox in Modern Political Thought*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.
- Dinwiddie, J. R. "Early-Nineteenth-Century Reactions to Benthamism," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., 34 (1984), 47-69.
- Fleischman, Avrom. *Figures of Autobiography: The Language of Self-Writing in Victorian and Modern England*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
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- Greenleaf, W. H. *The Ideological Heritage. The British Political Tradition*, Vol. II. London: Methuen, 1983, 103-24.
- Grey, Thomas C. "Langdell's Orthodoxy," 45 *University of Pittsburgh Law Review* 1 (1983).

- Griffiths, A. Phillip, ed. *Of Liberty: Supplement to "Philosophy 1983."* Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, 15. Cambridge University Press, 1983. (Lectures on *On Liberty*, 1980-81.)
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- Hoag, Robert William. "John Stuart Mill on Happiness and Morality." Ph.D. thesis, Virginia, 1983. (DAI, 43, 449A)
- Hollander, Samuel. "The Wage Path in Classical Growth Models: Ricardo, Malthus and Mill," *Oxford Economic Papers*, n.s. 36 (June 1984), 200-12.
- Knight, Janice K. "With Liberty and Justice for Some," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 2 (Spring 1984), 85-90.
- Lind, K. W. "Microphenomenology and Numerical Relations," *Monist*, 67 (Jan. 1984), 29-45.
- Nuchelmans, Gabriel. *Judgment and Proposition: From Descartes to Kant.* Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1983. (Treats James Mill.)
- Rosen, Frederick. *Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy: A Study of the Constitutional Code.* Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1983.
- Sarvasy, Wendy. "J. S. Mill's Theory of Democracy for a Period of Transition between Capitalism and Socialism," *Polity*, 16 (Summer 1984), 567-87.
- Scarre, Geoffrey. "Proof and Implication in Mill's Philosophy of Logic," *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 5 (1984), 19-37.
- Smith, Lorne Albert. "The Logic of Concept Formation in Empiricist Philosophy and Chemistry, from Locke and Lavoisier to John Stuart Mill." Ph.D. thesis, Toronto, 1983. (DAI, 45, 547A)
- Welch, Kathleen Ethel. "A Mirror Both Scientific and Poetic: Rhetoric and History in English and American Autobiography." Ph.D. thesis, Iowa, 1982. (DAI, 43, 2686A)
- Wood, John Cunningham. *British Economists and the Empire.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

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Forthcoming Works

Samuel Hollander has finished his monumental study, *The Economics of J. S. Mill*, which we can look forward to seeing in print within a year.

G. L. Williams sends welcome news that Oxford University Press will be bringing out a volume, edited by him, entitled *John Stuart Mill's On Liberty*, consisting of published and unpublished materials by the late John Rees.

Eugene R. August reports that he will be supplying the entry on Mill for *Victorian Prose Writers* (expected in late 1985 or early 1986), a volume in the Dictionary of Literary Biography series published by Gale Research Co.

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Announcement

The International Hobbes Association has been formed, with a distinguished international board, to encourage research on Thomas Hobbes in a variety of disciplines, through conferences, and eventually by the founding of a journal. Initially the *Hobbes Newsletter*, edited by Tim Fuller and Martin A. Bertman, will serve as a clearing-house for Hobbesiana. Membership in the IHA, \$6. (U.S.) a year, includes subscription to the *Newsletter*; to join, write to Tim Fuller, Department of Political Science, Colorado College, Colorado Springs, CO 80903, U.S.A. Professor Fuller will also welcome items for inclusion in the *Newsletter*. Queries about organizing conferences, grants, and other matters relating to IHA should be sent to Professor Bertman, Department of Philosophy, SUNY, Potsdam, NY 13676, U.S.A.

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Book Reviews

Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. By Fred R. Berger. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Pp. x + 363.

A good treatment of Mill's moral and political theory would possess three distinct virtues. The first, and simplest, is coverage of all of the relevant primary and secondary literature. Clearly the central primary texts will be *Utilitarianism* and *On Liberty*. But commentators have all too often chosen to focus on just these two items (indeed sometimes on just a few selected passages from them) to the exclusion of the many other pertinent discussions scattered through Mill's writings. A truly comprehensive examination would collate all of these sources. It would also take note of the extensive secondary literature on Mill's moral and political theory, especially the important pieces which have resulted from the renewed philosophical interest in Mill of the past decade or so.

But the mere mechanical reproduction of these sources will not suffice. The second virtue of a good treatment is an interpretation of Mill's theory which will order and inform this mass of material. Such an interpretation must be constructed around some conception of the general themes that dominate Mill's various moral and political commitments. On the one hand this conception ought to show how these commitments are indeed parts of a single theory; it ought to explain the unity of Mill's moral and political thought. On the other hand it should also recognize that Mill was often careless and imprecise in the presentation and defence of his own theory. At some crucial junctures the texts may simply underdetermine any account of Mill's views. Worse, at other junctures different passages may each support different and incompatible accounts. A good treatment will refrain from manipulating the evidence of distorting the texts in order to conceal these gaps and incongruities. Instead, it will attempt to support its favoured interpretation while humbly conceding

that alternative readings cannot entirely be ruled out.

Finally, such a treatment will also provide a considered and judicious critique of Mill's theory, taking into account the more powerful lines of objection which have been directed against it. Here one's determination to display Mill's many strengths must be balanced by acknowledgement of his faults. A critique would be uninteresting if it failed to explain Mill's prominent position in the history of both utilitarianism and liberalism, but equally it would be mere slavish loyalty if it concealed the occasions on which he is unpersuasive or muddled or just downright mistaken. We want a critique to tell us which parts of Mill's moral and political theory must still be taken seriously a century after his death. To this end frank confession of Mill's fallibility is more constructive than stubborn defence of the indefensible.

No one has yet produced a treatment of Mill's moral and political theory which fully satisfies these three standards. Alan Ryan's *John Stuart Mill* attempted to display the unity of Mill's philosophical thought but in doing so allocated only a relatively brief space to his moral and political views. J. M. Robson's *The Improvement of Mankind* dealt exclusively with these views but in a manner more biographical than philosophical. More recently, John Gray's excellent *Mill on Liberty: A Defence* provided the first thorough exposition and defence of Mill's liberalism but did not attempt to deal in depth with the rest of his moral and political theory. There is therefore still room for a treatment of that theory which is textually complete, interpretatively illuminating, and critically acute.

In *Happiness, Justice, and Freedom* Fred Berger has set out to provide such a treatment. His principal thesis is that, contrary to some celebrated commentators, Mill's moral and political theory is a unified whole, the unifying themes being supplied by the three concepts in his title. It will surprise no one to be told that Mill's moral theory is concerned with the promotion of happiness nor that his political theory gives prominent place to freedom. But Mill, like most utilitarians, is not generally credited with having much to say about justice. Against this popular misconception Berger argues convincingly that justice is the link which connects Mill's morality and his politics, the last chapter of *Utilitarianism* serving in effect as the preamble to *On Liberty*.

Let us see, then, how well this book measures up against our three standards. Its coverage of the primary literature is exemplary. Although Berger allocates a considerable amount of space to analyzing the two central texts, he also systematically canvasses the evidence provided by Mill's other essays, as well as his letters and books. Had it no other merits whatever, this book would serve as a valuable compilation of the many farflung passages in which Mill constructs and refines the various components of his theory. Berger's handling of the secondary literature is just as impressive. He manages to devote some attention to virtually all of the important recent work on Mill's notion of happiness, his understanding of the nature of morality, his formulation and "proof" of the principle of utility, his account of the nature and function of moral rules, his analysis of duties, rights, and justice, his conceptions of autonomy and

individuality, his distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding activities, and his defence of liberty with regard to the former. If any significant interpretative option lies outside his range, it also lies outside mine.

The issue becomes more complicated when we turn to Berger's interpretation of Mill's theory. Since quite different views of the structure and content of that theory are in play, we should not expect any new contribution, however carefully considered, to put an end to the controversies. But here too the virtues of Berger's book are considerable. Its most important accomplishment by far is to make a convincing case in favour of the view that Mill's moral and political theory is a unified whole and against the view that Mill's liberalism is fundamentally at odds with his utilitarianism. Should the book have no other impact on Mill scholarship at all (which is highly unlikely), it would still do an enormous service if it contributed to the final and irreversible demise of the thesis of the "two Mills." Furthermore, Berger argues persuasively that the unifying elements of the theory are to be found in Mill's multiform conception of happiness, in the role played by autonomy both as a central ingredient of human happiness and as the value protected by principles of individual liberty. The story which Berger tells of the architectonic of Mill's theory is, I believe, correct in all of its essentials. Were a student to ask to be referred to a secondary source which provides a coherent and connected account of that theory I would have no hesitation in directing him or her to this book.

One service which Berger performs deserves special mention. He did not originate the idea that Mill's liberalism is one part of his substantive theory of justice, nor that the foundations of that theory are to be found in the final chapter of *Utilitarianism*. However, no one else who has seen this much has attempted to outline and integrate the other parts of Mill's substantive theory. Some of the most interesting and valuable passages of *Happiness, Justice, and Freedom* are those in which Berger summarizes Mill's views on such issues as punishment, equality, property, taxation, and political power, and attempts to connect these views back to their foundations. Most, perhaps all, of these topics have been dealt with piecemeal, but never before have they been systematically displayed as distinct but related elements in a utilitarian theory of justice.

A further merit of Berger's exposition is that he is forthcoming about those areas of the theory in which accusations of ambiguity or inconsistency are hardest to rebut. Where there is textual evidence that is embarrassing for his own interpretation he is not reticent about displaying it and not always confident that he can explain the seeming incongruity. Furthermore, there are areas of the theory--chiefly Mill's analysis of moral duties and his division of such duties into perfect and imperfect--where Berger quite sensibly doubts that the texts will ever support a unique authoritative interpretation. These occasions of modesty are particularly effective within an account that sets out, in the face of many previous commentators, to emphasize the cohesiveness of Mill's theory.

Lest I begin to sound sycophantic let me add that I find some of Berger's claims about the coherence and consistency of Mill's views

less persuasive than others. On the conceptual structure of Mill's moral theory and on the central role played in that structure by what Berger calls "the strategy conception of rules" I believe that Berger is correct on all the large issues, though not always on the smaller ones. But his thesis that there are no inconsistencies in Mill's various views about the nature of happiness is less convincing. Readers of *Utilitarianism* will recall that in the early going Mill seems to treat happiness as a single homogeneous state ("pleasure and the absence of pain") while when he later comes to the "proof" of utilitarianism he claims that it is a "concrete whole" whose parts are what we would ordinarily think of as sources of happiness (money, virtue, etc.). The simple view has produced Mill's reputation as a hedonist but it has never been easy to reconcile it with the puzzling things he goes on to say about the parts of happiness (readers will probably also recall the scorn which G. E. Moore, assuming Mill to be a hedonist, heaped upon these latter passages). Berger believes that Mill's conception of happiness is consistently complex. But this thesis is difficult to reconcile with the passages in which Mill seems to employ the simpler conception. The underlying problem is that Mill appears to need different conceptions of happiness for different purposes. The foundations of his moral theory are easiest to construct if happiness is interpreted as a determinate hedonic state capable of addition and therefore maximization. But the distinction between quality and quantity goes best if we switch from speaking of such a state to speaking of the various ingredients of happiness. The defence of liberty, despite the central role played by autonomy, will probably go through on either conception (here Berger would, I think, disagree). By contrast, the "proof" will probably go through on neither conception. If the claim that we only desire happiness for its own sake means that we always aim ultimately at some determinate hedonic state then (as Mill recognized) it is false. But if it means that we always aim ultimately at whatever we value or desire for its own sake then it is trivial. Mill's views about the nature and role of happiness appear to me to be one of those areas in which there is simply no way to fit all the pieces together. Berger's attempts to construct an overall pattern have not persuaded me that in this opinion I am being uncharitable to Mill.

Turning to Berger's critique of Mill, there is much less to say. When an interpretation is being presented by someone sympathetic to his subject there is no clean line of division between exposition and defence. Berger throughout the book attempts to assemble an account of Mill's theory that is at once faithful to what Mill actually said and defensible in its own right. Where he takes on the main objections of Mill's critics he is generally effective at showing either that they foist on Mill a position he did not defend or that, where their interpretation is sound, the position is anyway not implausible. However, Berger is not himself prepared to endorse Mill's theory in all of its aspects. His final chapter is given to an enumeration of what he regards as the main residual problems for the theory. Unsurprisingly, these concern the same central themes--happiness, justice, liberty, and the grounding of the theory. While

these discussions are not without merit, they seem rather pallid against the achievement of the rest of the book. Berger is at his argumentative best when he is fighting on Mill's behalf.

The substantial accomplishments of this book are, sadly, marred by some stylistic infelicities. Berger's style is generally transparent and undecorated. While this makes the book an easy read (at least for those familiar with the territory it traverses), it does leave the reader sometimes feeling patronized. This feeling is intensified by Berger's overindulgence in the use of literary signposts of the "in what follows I will first do this, then I will do that, and finally I will do the other" sort. But his most puzzling stylistic convention is his use throughout of "Millean" instead of "Millian." Does Berger know something I don't about the formation of attributive adjectives from proper names?

These are, however, minor blemishes in a book which deserves to become the standard treatment of Mill's moral and political theory. Doubtless a better can be conceived, but until it comes along this one will serve very nicely.

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Force or Freedom?: The Paradox in Modern Political Thought. By William T. Bluhm. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984.

Professor Bluhm has presented us with a very ambitious offering. He seeks to document and explain a highly complex and multifaceted problem, with both practical and philosophical dimensions--the "irreconcilability" of force and freedom in modern politics and in modern political philosophy--and also to offer at least the start of a solution to the problem. It appears that his primary concern is with the practical manifestations of the problem: our failure to achieve "freedom under law" and a "viable ideal of community" (ix). Consequently, individualism grows rampant in the U.S. (and elsewhere), the public interest is neglected and "the rational management of scarce energy resources, the conservation of a livable environment, security from violence at home or on the street, or respect abroad--shared values that can readily be described as aspects of meaningful freedom"--are not achieved. But he finds that the practical problem not only requires an incursion into philosophy for its solution; it also provides the opportunity for such a philosophical exercise: "The occasion for philosophizing . . . is the discovery that the world is collapsing" (275).

Our practical difficulties, he concludes, derive from the inadequacy of our modern "world view"; and that mechanistic view of the world is traced to the mind/body dualism of René Descartes, which continues to shape and delimit political thought (25). While Bluhm's analysis gives primary emphasis to the mind/body dichotomy, it appears to be more specifically Descartes' "mechanistic and necessitarian concept of law" that makes it "impossible to establish a workable relationship between force and freedom" (24). Nonetheless, Bluhm makes it appear that, if one proceeds from the mind/body

distinction, one is led, ultimately, either to an explanation in which everything is reduced to body subject to force and hence the denial of the possibility of freedom, or to one which reduces everything to mind (imagination and will) and hence the disappearance of body and an equally unsatisfactory ground for sorting out the proper boundary between freedom and force.

Bluhm traces the lingering effects of the Cartesian view through its subsequent historical variants in the major philosophies which have since dominated the Western intellectual landscape. In the course of this sojourn, he offers us some highly debatable interpretations of the philosophies discussed, too numerous and complex to detail here. However, a brief overview of his historical account, which occupies two-thirds of the book, is in order.

In Hobbes' philosophy Bluhm finds, not surprisingly, that "force emerges as superior to, and in tension with, individual freedom"; and he traces this result to Hobbes' reduction of everything to body (62). More questionably, he arrives at much the same conclusion in his interpretation of Locke, minimizing or explaining away Locke's efforts to eliminate arbitrary force and even to limit legitimate authority based upon the consent of the individual (78). His interpretation of Rousseau is similarly problematical. He concludes that "Rousseau could properly use the word *freedom* only for the life of the individual in a state of nature and that the artificial state of society is incompatible with any version of the concept of freedom. It is governed by force." (84.) Bluhm thus misses the import of Rousseau's ascription of man's rationality and morality to a later development within the state of society, and thereby his liberation from enslavement to the force of his bodily appetites in the state of nature.

In the cases of Kant, Hegel, Marx, and J. S. Mill, "freedom is a prophecy and an image of a historically evolved 'New Man.' It is a freedom that requires a special kind of moral regeneration--the creation by historical process of a noble free spirit to direct the harmonies of free body." (190.) But he concludes that all of these thinkers failed to achieve "the goal of moral freedom." In Kant and Mill "the ideal of freedom remains incoherent"; and in Hegel and Marx freedom is sacrificed to force. In his analysis of Mill, Bluhm expands upon Himmelfarb's thesis that there are two different and conflicting political theories to be found in Mill's various writings. But he goes her one better by alleging a multiplicity of Mills, and by extrapolating an improbable intent to restrict freedom of discussion from Mill's various remarks concerning the need for intellectual, moral, and political leadership for a progressive society. Bluhm is correct, I believe, in denying that Mill succeeded in resolving the philosophical issue of freedom versus necessity of the will. And he is no doubt correct in his surmise that this failure influences Mill's treatment of the relationship between political freedom and force; but that influence is more subtle and complex than Bluhm's simple projection.

Nietzsche, too, is found to promise freedom but to deliver force. Freedom is to be attained only by "his new philosopher, his free spirits of the future, his overman" (229); the many are to know only

"the yoke of limitless force" (220). And the freedom of the overman is merely "the freedom of animal spirit, the freedom of animal instinct" (229).

More recent efforts at "finding a new way" through "holistic approaches" are also briefly canvassed--existentialism, ordinary language philosophy, and phenomenology. But all are found to fail in their quest, because of their inability to escape from the Cartesian "frame of reference" (237). They, like their modern predecessors, have failed to come to grips with "the force-freedom problem." "Their efforts to place force, even in idea, at the service of human freedom," he tells us, "have failed."

While Bluhm also seeks to show the adverse *practical* political effects of all of these errant philosophies, by identifying current political behaviours deemed undesirable, the result falls far short of an ostensible showing that "The old way [of viewing the world, including all of the variant modern philosophies discussed] has not only been thought through but lived through and found wanting" (275). The demonstration is sketchy and fragmentary at best. Where are any of these theories being "lived" in a complete and undiluted way? I suspect that Professor Bluhm's argument in this regard will be found adequately persuasive only by those of us who were already convinced by prior evidence and reflection.

In order to find a solution to the problem of discovering the proper relationship between political freedom and force, the author proposes two working hypotheses which will allow us to escape from the Cartesian world view. The first entails the rejection of the belief "that the world and its history can be represented in terms of necessary laws and processes." And the second requires us to "suppose that body and mind are not useful starting points for theorizing" (277). We are then to seek the solution through a search for "a public mind, which is also an embodied mind--embodied in a human experience of which it is both cause and effect." "What," he asks, "could be more authoritative for defining and placing the ideal of freedom in a hierarchy of human values than what the human sense of the just and the prudent has in its long experience pronounced?" Such moral common denominators are taken to define "right as such," universal moral principles. He cites Aristotle in support of the contention that no philosophic defence or vindication of these norms is required. "Philosophical discussion is foreclosed by the 'names' of these things [i.e., "spite, shamelessness, adultery, theft, and murder"]. One philosophizes only about what is problematical or controversial." (282.) Bluhm fails to notice the indispensable support that Aristotle's natural teleology provides to the authoritativeness of these norms in the face of any philosophic scrutiny.

Thucydides, the Judaeo-Christian decalogue, and recent anthropological research are similarly invoked in support of these key norms. Bluhm proposes, then, to "begin to formulate a philosophy of freedom" around such "broadly shared" norms. "Freedoms congenial to them would be considered rightful; freedoms inimical to their maintenance or realization would be deemed harmful and subject to limitation" (286). He concedes that such agreed-upon norms might

provide too narrow a base for "an entire social policy of freedom," but he asks whether we might infer from them "the view or model of human nature that underlies them, the ideal of humanity, and the value system from which they are derived?" "Norms never hang in the air"; he explains, "they are always designed to realize some end or purpose" (287). He then rather surprisingly acknowledges the fairly obvious fact that "there is no such shared ideal but a great plurality of ideals."

Not to be defeated by this difficulty, he falls back to a weaker search for "common themes that link these ideals together, shared or cross-cutting concepts that evidence a certain continuity through the ages" (288). He then discovers one such theme: "a historical dialogue between hedonistic self-interest and inherent or absolute right as fundamental human motives" (288). A brief historical survey of the varieties of treatment of this theme in both the West and the East leads him to the conclusion that there is an extensive overlap between what people perceive to be required by moral right and what self-interest dictates. This overlap, he argues, is "the chief source from which we may legitimately draw a hierarchy of publicly . . . accepted values." It provides us with "a time-tested conception of human nature" from which further norms as policy directives can be deduced. But in the end he concedes that the norms he has uncovered merely "set parameters to the freedom of individuals largely in a negative way without filling in the positive content of moral action" (308). He stresses that we are *free* to create that more positive content and urges us bravely to do so.

How we are to avoid sheer arbitrariness in our free moral creativity is not disclosed. Nor does Bluhm attempt to provide reasoned answers to the various metaphysical and epistemological questions which led both the "modern" thinkers he has criticized, and their pre-"modern" predecessors as well, in the other directions which he rejects. Bluhm's analysis of the evolution of modernity is surely correct in suggesting that the broth which the moderns have been serving up has been getting progressively thinner and waterier because some of the original basic ingredients are rather insubstantial. But Bluhm's ostensible "solution" to the problem consists in little more than a condemnation of some of those original ingredients along with a little more water.

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COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL

Volume XX

Essays on French History and Historians

Edited by John M. Robson

Introduction by John C. Cairns

J.S. Mill's deep interest in French intellectual, political, and social affairs began in 1820 when, in his fourteenth year, he went to France to live for a year with the family of Sir Samuel Bentham. French became his second language, and France his second home, where he died and was buried in 1873. His interest in history began even earlier when, as a child of seven, he tried to imitate his father's labours on the History of British India; although he never wrote a history in his maturity, study of the past remained a passion, and helped shape the philosophy of history that informed his views of society and ethics.

This volume brings together for the first time the essays, running from 1826 to 1849, that meld these two abiding interests. They give as well insights into his personal aspirations, his developing view of comparative politics and sociology, his concern for freedom, and his feminism. Independently important, then, this volume also casts important light on Mill's practical and theoretical concerns during his formative years and maturity.

In the Introduction, John C. Cairns demonstrates how the essays reveal - through their reactions to the Revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848, and to French historiography, politics, and thought - the effect of France on Mill's thought, and also the way in which his other concerns influenced his reactions to France. The texts, with the variants and notes that are the hallmark of this edition, are described in John M. Robson's Textual Introduction, which explains the editorial principles and methods.

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