PRICES VERSUS PREFERENCES: TASTE CHANGE AND TOBACCO CONSUMPTION

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- The relative efficacy of the different modes is important for designing health policies.
- Address a specific question: How much of the fall in tobacco consumption in the UK is due to a rise in the relative price of tobacco and how much can be attributed to taste changes?
- Aim to inform policy on the balance between information/health campaigns and tax reform.
- We also consider how tastes evolve across different education strata. Do tastes change differentially across education groups?

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- Implemented on household consumer expenditure survey data using RP inequality conditions on the quantile demand functions.
- Use conditional demands to allow for non-separability with alcohol consumption.

UK BUDGET SHARES FOR TOBACCO: QUANTILES



UK RELATIVE PRICE OF TOBACCO, 1980-2000



FIGURE: Relative price of tobacco (UK)

GALLUP POLL ON "DOES SMOKING CAUSE LUNG CANCER?"



FIGURE: Beliefs on tobacco harm

PRICES VERSUS PREFERENCES

WELCOME TO AFRIAT LAND

- To disentangle the effects of price and preference change, we use an Afriat (revealed preference) approach that explicitly allows for the fact that we only observe a finite set of data points.
- The usual features:
 - Nonparametric setting.
 - Reject/accept answers for rationalisation.
 - Tests for rationalisation involve algorithms that yield an answer in a finite number of steps.
 - ► If no rejection, set identification of objects of interest.
 - If no rejection, rationalisation is possible with smooth, monotone stable preferences.
- If rejection, derive a measure of the change in the distribution of tastes.

• Consumer *i*'s maximisation problem can be expressed as:

$$\max_{\mathbf{q}} u^{i}(\mathbf{q}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_{t}^{i}) \text{ subject to } \mathbf{p}'\mathbf{q} = x$$

where $\mathbf{q} \in \mathbb{R}_{+}^{K}$ denotes the demanded quantity bundle, $\mathbf{p} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{K}$ denotes the (exogenous) price vector faced by consumer *i* and *x* gives total expenditure.

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- We also allow for unobserved (taste) heterogeneity *across* consumers.

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- We also allow for unobserved (taste) heterogeneity *across* consumers.
- Using this framework we derive RP inequality conditions that incorporate minimal perturbations to preferences to account for taste change.

Imagine we observe the choice behaviour of individual *i* at *T* budget regimes: {**p**_t, **q**ⁱ_t}_{t=1,...,T} for *i* = 1, ..., *N*.

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- The RP conditions for consistency between the observed choice behaviour and this model that incorporates taste change are defined as follows:

Definition 1: Consumer *i*'s choice behaviour, $\{\mathbf{p}_t, \mathbf{q}_t^i\}_{t=1,...,T}$, can be "taste rationalised" by a utility function $u^i(\mathbf{q}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_t^i)$ and the temporal series of taste parameters $\{\boldsymbol{\alpha}_t^i\}_{t=1,...,T}$ if the following set of inequalities is satisfied:

 $u^i(\mathbf{q}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}^i_t) \leq u^i(\mathbf{q}^i_t, \boldsymbol{\alpha}^i_t)$

for all **q** such that $\mathbf{p}'_t \mathbf{q} \leq \mathbf{p}'_t \mathbf{q}'_t$.

In words, observed behaviour can be rationalised if an individual's choice at t yields weakly higher utility than all other feasible choices at t when evaluated with respect to their time t tastes.

MARGINAL UTILITY (MU) PERTURBATIONS

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- Characterising taste change in this way yields the temporal series of utility functions:

 $u^{i}(\mathbf{q}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_{t}^{i}) = v^{i}(\mathbf{q}) + \boldsymbol{\alpha}_{t}^{i\prime}\mathbf{q}$, where $\boldsymbol{\alpha}_{t}^{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{K}$.

- Under this specification, α^{i,k}_t can be interpreted as the taste shift in the marginal utility of good k at time t for individual i.
- The theorems below imply this specification is not at all restrictive.

TASTE CHANGES FOR ONE GOOD

 Begin with intertemporal separability (*no habits*), individual preferences in period *t* (individual subscript *i* is suppressed) are represented by:

 $u^{t}\left(q_{1},q_{2},...q_{K}\right)=v\left(q_{1},q_{2},...q_{K}\right)+\alpha_{t}q_{1}$

- The function v (q1, q2, ... qK) is a time invariant base utility function which is strictly increasing and concave in quantities.
- The term $\alpha_t q_1$ is a taste shifter for good 1 in period t.
- Normalisation: $\alpha_1 = 0$ so that the baseline preferences $v(\mathbf{q})$ are for period 1.
- Show these individual utility function satisfies single crossing in (q, α) space.

AFRIAT CONDITIONS

- For individual *i* we seek the Afriat inequalities that would allow us to rationalise observed prices {p¹,...p^T} and quantities {q¹,...q^T}.
- We can 'good 1 taste rationalise' the observed prices and quantities if there is a function v (q) and scalars {α₁, α₂, ...α_T} such that:

 $v\left(\mathbf{q}^{t}\right) + \alpha_{t}q_{1}^{t} \geq \psi\left(\mathbf{q}\right) + \alpha_{t}q_{1}$

for all **q** such that $\mathbf{p}^t \mathbf{q} \leq \mathbf{p}^t \mathbf{q}^t$.

AFRIAT CONDITIONS

Theorem 1: The following statements are equivalent:

1. Individual observed choice behaviour, $\{\mathbf{p}_t, \mathbf{q}_t\}_{t=1,...,T}$, can be good-1 rationalised by the set of taste shifters $\{\alpha_t\}_{t=1,...,T}$.

2. One can find sets $\{v_t\}_{t=1,...,T}$, $\{\alpha_t\}_{t=1,...,T}$ and $\{\lambda_t\}_{t=1,...,T}$ with $\lambda_t > 0$ for all t = 1, ..., T, such that there exists a non-empty solution set to the following inequalities:

$$(v (\mathbf{q}^{t}) - v (\mathbf{q}^{s})) + \alpha_{t} (q_{1}^{t} - q_{1}^{s}) \leq \lambda_{t} (\mathbf{p}^{t})' (\mathbf{q}^{t} - \mathbf{q}^{s}) \alpha_{t} \leq \lambda_{t} p_{t}$$

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- These inequalities are a simple extension of Afriat (1967).
- When they hold there exists a well-behaved base utility function and a series of taste shifters on good-1 that perfectly rationalise observed behaviour.

A SURPRISING RESULT

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Definition 2: There is 'perfect intertemporal variation' (PIV) in good 1 if $q_1^t \neq q_1^s$ for all $t \neq s = 1, ..., T$.

Theorem 2: Given observed choice behaviour, $\{\mathbf{p}^t, \mathbf{q}^t\}$ for t = 1, ... T where good-1 exhibits PIV, one can *always* find a set $\{v_t, \alpha_t, \lambda_t\}$ with $\lambda_t > 0$ for all t = 1, ..., T, that satisfy the Afriat inequalities.

• PIV is sufficient for rationalisation but not necessary.

TASTE CHANGES AS PRICE ADJUSTMENTS

- We can reinterpret the rationalisability question as a 'missing price problem'.
- We can find scalars {v₁, ...v_T}, positive scalars {λ₁, ...λ_T}, and a weakly positive taste-adjusted price vector, {p̃^t}_{t=1,...T}, such that

$$v\left(\mathbf{q}^{t}\right)-v\left(\mathbf{q}^{s}\right)\geq\lambda_{t}\left(\widetilde{\mathbf{p}}^{t}\right)'\left(\mathbf{q}^{t}-\mathbf{q}^{s}\right)$$

where

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{p}}^t = \left[p_1^t - \alpha_t / \lambda_t, \mathbf{p}_{\neg 1}^t \right].$$

- We refer to α_t / λ_t as the *taste wedge*.
- The change in demand due to a positive taste change for good 1 $(\alpha_t > 0)$ can be viewed as a price reduction in the price of good 1.
- This provides a link between two of the levers (*taxes and information*) available to governments.

Recovering taste change perturbations

- Given the no rejection result, we can always find a non-empty *set* of scalars that satisfy the Afriat conditions.
- Pick out values $\{v_t, \alpha_t, \lambda_t\}_{t=1,...T}$ that solve:

$$\min \sum_{t=2}^{T} \alpha_t^2 \text{ subject to the Afriat inequalities}$$

- This a quadratic-linear program.
- Minimizing the sum of squared α 's subject to the set of RP inequalities ensures that the recovered pattern of taste perturbations are sufficient to rationalise observed choice behaviour.
- With α₁ = 0, we interpret {α_t}_{t=2,...,T} as the minimal rationalising marginal utility perturbations to good-1 relative to preferences at t = 1.
- Can also impose more structure on the evolution of taste change over time. For example, monotonicity: α_{t+1} ≤ α_t.

- Our empirical analysis uses data drawn from the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey (FES) between 1980 and 2000.
- The FES records detailed expenditure and demographic information for 7,000 households each year.
- It is not panel data so we follow birth-cohorts of individuals stratified by education level.



Budget shares for Tobacco: Quantiles

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RES PHD MEETING, JAN 2015 18 / 43



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RES PHD MEETING, JAN 2015 19 / 43

THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEMANDS

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- That is preferences are assumed take the form:

$$U_{i}^{t}(q_{1}, q_{0}) = v(q_{1}, q_{0}) + w(q_{1}, \varepsilon) + \alpha_{t}q_{1}$$

= $v(q_{1}, x - p_{1}q_{1}) + \varepsilon_{i}q_{1} + \alpha_{it}q_{1}$

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with α_{it} representing the minimal shift in preference heterogeneity ε_i that will ensure rationality.

• Note that RP consistent responses to price and income changes will also be represented by a shift in the distribution of demands.

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PRICES VERSUS PREFERENC

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- This delivers a choice set that maximises the chance of detecting violations of a time invariant utility function in observational data.
- This SMP framework requires us to estimate the expansion paths (Engel curves) $\mathbf{q}^{E}(\mathbf{p}_{t}, \mathbf{x}_{t})$ for each education cohort E at each price regime \mathbf{p}_{t} .

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- We follow Blundell and Powell (2007) and Imbens and Newey (2009), using a quantile control function approach to correct for the endogeneity of total expenditure.
- We recover shifts in the distribution of demands and ask what are the minimal perturbations to tastes that maintain the RP inequalities at each particular quantile.

22 / 43

The Path of Quantile Demands - Low Ed



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RES PHD MEETING, JAN 2015 23 / 43

VIOLATION - LOW ED MODERATE SMOKER.



The Path of Quantile Demands - Hi Ed



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$$\widehat{\pi}_t^{E, au} = p_t^1 - rac{\widehat{lpha}_t^{E, au}}{\widehat{\lambda}_t^{E, au}}$$

The "taste wedge", $\hat{\alpha}_t^{E,\tau}/\hat{\lambda}_t^{E,\tau}$ represents the change in the marginal willingness to pay for tobacco relative to base tastes.

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- There are significant differences in the path of systematic taste change between education cohorts for light and moderate smokers.
- The taste change trajectories for light and moderate smokers in the high education cohort are similar.
- Education is irrelevant for explaining the evolution of virtual prices amongst heavy smokers.

TASTE WEDGES FOR LIGHT SMOKERS



TASTE WEDGES FOR MEDIUM SMOKERS



TASTE WEDGES FOR HEAVY SMOKERS



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- To relax this weak separability assumption we re-run our quadratic programming procedure on quantile demands that are estimated *conditional on alcohol consumption*.
- We partition the set of observations into "light" and "heavy" drinkers depending on whether an individual is below or above the median budget share for alcohol.
- The significant difference by education group in the evolution taste change for light and moderate smokers is robust to non-separability.
- 95% confidence intervals on virtual prices and the taste wedge are disjoint across education groups for all cohorts except for the "heavy smoking"-"heavy drinking" group. Effective tastes for this group evolved very little for both education groups.

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TASTE WEDGE RESULTS: CONDITIONAL QUANTILES (MODERATE SMOKER)



TASTE WEDGE RESULTS: CONDITIONAL QUANTILES (HEAVY SMOKER)



RES PHD MEETING, JAN 2015 32 / 43

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS I

- This paper has provided a theoretical and empirical framework for characterising taste change.
- We have uncovered a surprising non-identification result: observational data sets on a *K*-dimensional demand system can always be rationalised by taste change on a single good in a nonparametric setting.
- Our theoretical results were used to develop a quadratic programming procedure to recover the minimal intertemporal (and interpersonal) taste heterogeneity required to rationalise observed choices.
- A censored quantile approach was used to allow for unobserved heterogeneity and censoring of consumption.
- Non-separability between tobacco and alcohol consumption was incorporated using a conditional (quantile) demand analysis.
- Future work will use intertemporal RP conditions to recover the path of λ_t .

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS II

- *Systematic* taste change was required to rationalise the distribution of demands in our expenditure survey data.
- A series of strictly negative perturbations to the marginal utility of tobacco were found to be sufficient to rationalise the trends in tobacco consumption.
- Statistically significant educational differences in the marginal willingness to pay for tobacco were recovered; more highly educated cohorts experienced a greater shift in their effective tastes away from tobacco.
- We find virtual prices and the taste wedge are disjoint across education groups for all cohorts except for the "heavy smoking"-"heavy drinking" group.
- Education is irrelevant for explaining the evolution of virtual prices amongst heavy smokers.
- Line up taste change estimates with information/health campaigns/awareness.

TASTE CHANGES AND PRICES

US GALLUP POLL ON "DOES SMOKING CAUSE LUNG CANCER?"



FIGURE: Beliefs on tobacco harm (US)

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EXTRA SLIDES

BUDGET SHARE TOBACCO



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RESULTS Proportion Smoking



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RES PHD MEETING, JAN 2015

38 / 43



IN OTHER WORDS....

 Using the FOC for optimisation subject to the linear budget constraint yields:

$$\begin{pmatrix} v \left(\mathbf{q}^{t} \right) - v \left(\mathbf{q}^{s} \right) \end{pmatrix} + \alpha_{t} \left(q_{1}^{t} - q_{1}^{s} \right) & \geq \quad \lambda_{t} \left(\mathbf{p}^{t} \right)^{\prime} \left(\mathbf{q}^{t} - \mathbf{q}^{s} \right) \\ \alpha_{t} & \leq \quad \lambda_{t} \mathbf{p}_{1}^{t}$$

- *Afriat*: replace functions with *T* values of the function.
- Find scalars $\{v_1, ... v_T\}$, $\{\alpha_1, ... \alpha_T\}$ and positive scalars $\{\lambda_1, ... \lambda_T\}$ which satisfy these (linear) constraints.

THE SMP PATH

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- Specifically, we recover taste changes for cohort demands at the SMP expenditure levels {x
 t}{t=1,...τ}, which are determined as:

$$x_1^E = Q_x(0.5|E)$$
 (1)

and

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}_{t}^{E} = \mathbf{p}_{t}^{\prime} \mathbf{q}_{t-1}^{E}$$
(2)

for t = 2, ..., T and $E = \{L, H\}$, where $\mathbf{q}_t^E = \mathbf{q}^E(\mathbf{p}_t, \widetilde{x}_t)$.

• Note that we can abstract from the complicating issues caused by transitivity in the construction of the SMP path that are examined in Blundell *et al.* (AEJ: Micro 2014) because ours is a two-good demand system. Transitivity has no empirical content for a 2-good demand system.

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- To operationalise the SMP methodology, we require the sequence of quantities {q^E(p_t, x̃_t)}_{t=1,...,T}.

TASTE CHANGES AND PRICES

UK log demand, 1980-2000



ESTIMATION

 Use censored quantile regression for a triangular system of equations for the budget share of tobacco, wⁱ, at each price regime:

$$w^{i} = max(0, w^{i,\star})$$

$$w^{i\star} = Q_{w^{i,\star}}(\epsilon^{i}|x^{i}, \mathbf{z}^{i}, v^{i}, E^{i})$$

$$x^{i} = Q_{x^{i}}(v^{i}|z^{i}, m^{i}, E^{i})$$
(3)

where

$$\begin{array}{ll} \epsilon^{i} & \sim & U(0,1) | x^{i}, \mathbf{z}^{i}, \mathbf{v}^{i}, m^{i}, \mathbf{v}^{i}, E^{i} \\ v^{i} & \sim & U(0,1) | \mathbf{z}^{i}, m^{i}, E^{i} \end{array}$$

and x^i is total expenditure, z^i is a vector of household characteristics, v^i is an unobserved latent variable that is included to account for the possible endogeneity of x^i , and $E^i \in \{L, H\}$ denotes individual *i*'s education cohort membership. m^i , the log of disposable income, is our excluded instrument that allows us to recover v^i .

• For each education level and each year, we estimate 55*th*, 65*th* and 75*th* quantiles.